


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
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THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.

THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA:
ITS ORIGIN,
AND
AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF
LORD RAGLAN.

BY
ALEXANDER WILLIAM KINGLAKE.

VOLUME III.
BATTLE OF INKERMEN.

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SIS DISCLOSED IN THE APPENDIX, No. XVI.

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INKERMAN.

COMBAT OF THE LESSER INKERMAN.

26th October. Balacava still the object of the enemy's designs.

THOUGH Liprandi on the 25th of October had for the moment stopped short in his enterprise, he yet clung to the ground he had won; and on the morrow of the battle, the true seat of danger was still in front of Balacava.¹ There, accordingly, we shall soon find Lord Raglan determining how best he might baffle the 24,000 troops thus threatening his port of supply; but meanwhile, and to divert attention from Liprandi, the Russians directed an attack upon the north-eastern part of the Chersonese.

Effect of the Balacava battle upon the spirit of Liprandi's troops:

Owing to the signal and conspicuous defeats inflicted upon Liprandi's masses of cavalry by Scarlett's and Lord Cardigan's horsemen, the yesterday's battle upon the whole was calculated to humiliate his troops; and it is probable that their dispirited condition was the cause of his still prolonged hesitation in front of Balacava; but, on the other hand, the facts were such that—by means of a partial suppression, and a little of the usual embroidery—they could be narrated in a way highly gratifying to any of the Russians who were not themselves on the field; for Lord Cardigan's brigade had plainly purchased renown at the cost of huge, ruinous losses, and Liprandi, after all, was still in the unchallenged possession of the ground, the redoubts and the trophies he had wrenched from the grasp of the Turks. Thus, while such of the Russians as had taken part in the battle or witnessed its most famous incidents had good reason for being disheartened, those of their fellow-countrymen who had only heard of the conflict

Its effect upon the spirit of other Russian troops:

¹ This follows from what we now know—viz., that the movement against Evans was made to divert attention from Liprandi.—*Todleben*, p. 404.

through rumor and official reports might well be transported with joy.

To this last category the whole garrison of Sebastopol belonged; and on the morning of the 26th of October, their blood was so heated by a one-sided version of the yesterday's battle, by a public display of its trophies, and finally by an exulting 'Te Deum,' that they rose at last into the mood for warlike enterprise; and, as though to furnish an outlet for all this exuberant zeal, it was determined that, soon after divine service, a sortie should

be directed against our 2nd Division—the force which stood guard over the southern part of Mount Inkerman. Whilst in this way diverting attention from Liprandi, the enemy was not unwilling to feel his way upon ground which perhaps might become the arena of a not distant conflict, and apparently, he also cherished a hope that he might be able to fasten himself upon some part of the Inkerman heights, for his troops were to carry intrenching tools.

In the combat thus rapidly planned the Russians did not engage any formidable number of troops, but whilst fighting it on the predestined ground, they rehearsed, as it were, the attack which soon would be made in great earnest; and, on the other hand, their English opponent defended the heights on a plan which afforded a marked and interesting contrast to the one his successor adopted in the subsequent trial of strength. Thus a narrative of the earlier combat will help in more ways than one to illustrate the story of 'Inkerman.'

It was only in general by the presence of a Cossack vedette that the enemy displayed his real power on the northern part of Mount Inkerman; but he there nevertheless (with the aid of a few concealed riflemen) maintained an undisputed dominion; for the ground could be searched by his batteries in the Karabel Faubourg as well as by fire from his ships. So complete was his mastery that, when now he determined to issue in force from the Karabel Faubourg, to ascend Mount Inkerman, to traverse its northern part from west to east, and then—bringing round his left shoulder—to begin his advance toward Shell Hill, he rightly took it for granted that he might be able to do all this without being molested or even seen by the pickets of our 2nd Division. After moving thus far unopposed, he was to enter upon hostilities, to drive in our pickets, to establish himself

Its effect on the garrison of Sebastopol.

Object of the attack there planned.

Circumstances giving an interest to the 'Lesser Inkerman' combat.

The enemy's dominion over the northern part of Mount Inkerman:

His plan of attack.





on Shell Hill, and thence direct an attack against the main body of our 2nd Division, which lay camped behind its Home Ridge some three-fourths of a mile farther south. The assailing force was to be covered on its right by a separate body of troops moving up the Careenage Ravine.

The General to be assailed on Mount Inkerman was Sir De Lacy Evans, a veteran well skilled in that part of the war-craft which belongs to the hour of combat; and for the purpose of resistance to the feeble attack now attempted, he had, one may say, ample means; for, although he could bring into action no more than some 2600 infantry against a far greater force of assailants, his numerical inferiority was compensated by the strength of the ground, and besides, by his great ascendant in the artillery arm; but this was not all.¹ The Duke of Cambridge, after sending him an additional battery at the first sound of combat, came up on his right with the Guards; whilst Cathcart also and Bosquet moved troops toward the scene of the combat. Still, the only force destined this day to be actively engaged on Mount Inkerman was that of Evans's own division—the second—with its two field-batteries,² and the third battery (Wodehouse's) sent up, as we saw, in good time by the Duke of Cambridge.³

As regards the Careenage Ravine, the only troops there at first were a picket of the Light Division (which, however, was quickly drawn in) and 60 volunteers of the Guards commanded by Captain Goodlake;⁴ but these last were joined toward the close of the combat by some men of the Rifles under Captain Markham. On the left bank of the ravine there stood the right Lancaster battery, and there the main picket of the Light Division was stationed. The one gun then remaining in the battery was a 'Lancaster' manned by some seamen under Mr. Hewitt.

With forces which are stated to have comprised six battalions of infantry and four pieces of light artillery, Colonel Federoff moved out about mid-day from the Karabel Faubourg, crossed the Careenage Ravine by its viaduct, ascended along the sapper's road to the

¹ Evans had, it seems, on Mount Inkerman 2644 men. The rest of his strength was in the trenches.

² One under Captain Turner, the other under Captain Yates, and both commanded by Colonel Fitzmayer.

³ With this battery Colonel Dacres was present, as also was Captain Wodehouse (who commanded it), and Captain Hamley.

⁴ Respecting this force under Captain Goodlake, see note, *post*, pp. 30, 31.

brow of Mount Inkerman, and continued thence to march eastward across the front of our pickets until the head of his column had reached the Volovia gorge.¹ Then halting, and facing half about to its right, the column of march was converted all at once into an order of battle, the skirmishers swarming in front supported by company columns, and again by columns of attack. In this new order, the force began to advance against a picket of the 49th Regiment, which watched the ground from Shell Hill.

Even then, for some time, the picket remained undisturbed, its soldiery still lying down, their arms still piled, as was usual, the sentries in front still motionless; but presently two or three rifles, discharged by men in the brush-wood, began to raise an alert, and the picket, then moving at once into extended order, became engaged before long with the enemy's skirmishers.² Upon the right of this picket Colonel Federoff after a while began to press forward in strength; and, to avoid being cut off, the 49th men fell back by degrees—fighting hard nevertheless all the time—to one of the spurs in their rear. There, with the other companies afterward aiding them, they maintained a vehement combat—a combat which stopped the assailants in that western part of the field.

Upon learning that the picket of the 49th was engaged, Major Champion—the 'field-officer of the day' commanding the 1st Brigade pickets—sent forward three of his companies—each one of them about sixty strong—with orders to extend under the brow of Shell Hill, and there await the attack which was to be expected so soon as the picket of the 49th should be forced back. That event, as we saw, occurred after some lapse of time, and Champion's three companies being then face to face with the enemy engaged him in obstinate combat, whilst, moreover, some men under Sullivan—a valiant and trusty color-sergeant—proved able to harass the train of artillery ascending from behind Cossack Knoll.

This strenuous and protracted resistance secured time for

¹ The strength of the six battalions was apparently about 4300—4304 as I make it. Taking 700 as the strength of the column in the Careenage Ravine, the whole force of infantry would be about 5000.

² Although Colonel Federoff's advance could not for some time be seen by his opponents, it was plainly visible to our people on the Victoria Ridge, and I entirely owe my means of representing it to an admirable description furnished me by the kindness of Colonel Hibbert (late of the 7th Royal Fusiliers), who watched the movement with great care. The movement was reported to General Codrington and (through him, I believe) to Evans.

our artillerymen to plant their guns on Home Ridge; and no harm would have seemingly resulted, if the pickets thus achieving their task had now been at once driven in. But their obstinacy continued; and indeed the direct pressure put upon the front of Champion's extended line did not of itself suffice to make his men yield any ground. Colonel Federoff's movement, however, applied to the left of these troops that same irresistible leverage which had forced back the picket of the 49th by turning its right; and, General Evans not choosing to reinforce them, the enemy after a while made good his way on to the crest of Shell Hill, there establishing his guns in battery, and opened fire on Home Ridge.

His guns on
Shell Hill;
and engaged
by those of
Evans.

To these pieces of light artillery the 18 nine-pounders of Evans replied, as may well be supposed, with overpowering effect; but whilst keeping in hand three battalions, Colonel Federoff, with the rest of his foot, still continued to press back our pickets by the leverage of his turning movements; and the combatants—a dense cloud of Russians, with the English lightly flecking its edge—began to move down the hill-side. Evans could not at that time interpose with artillery fire, because the gray overcoat, worn alike by the Russians and the English, made it hard to distinguish between them.

Continued
pressure upon
our pickets.

Our people thus combating had a really unmeasured conception of the resistance that should be offered by a thin chain of pickets to an enemy advancing in strength. Still new in great measure to war, and ill-brooking that coercion by numbers which old campaigners accept, they, many of them, took offense, as it were, at the notion of being pressed back, grew savage against their assailants, and fought on with an obstinacy that could hardly have been exceeded if, instead of this outpost duty, they had had to defend to the last some only-remaining stronghold.¹ It was in this spirit, for instance, that Lieutenant Conolly fought, throwing off his gray coat—so that all might distinguish him from the enemy—and flinging himself into a clump of Russians, where he felled one man with his field-glass, whilst he cut down another with his sword. Far from seeking to moderate this zeal on the part of our pickets,

The spirit in
which they
fought.

¹ In the latter years of the Peninsular war, the French and the English, it is said, got to understand each other so well, that our people when advancing in strength could often drive in the French pickets without quarreling with them, by making recognized signs—signs which meant: 'You must be off; we are advancing in strength.'

Major Champion was himself in one of those warlike ecstasies which alternated with his pious emotions. 'Slate 'em, 'slate 'em, my boys!' was his exulting and often-repeated adjuration, as he moved in great bliss along their line. Even by some of the ablest staff-officers present with the combatants—as, for instance, by Colonel Percy Herbert and Captain Armstrong—it was apparently taken for granted that the ground in front of the position should not be thus yielded up; and they, both of them at different moments, petitioned their chief to give the pickets support.

Thus there showed itself now that same eager and general desire to maintain a fight 'out in the front' which was destined to exert a wild sway over the tenor of the subsequent battle; but on this 26th of October, General Evans, as we saw, still commanded the 2nd Division, and his conception of the way in which Mount Inkerman should be defended was the very opposite of the one formed by his successor on the later day. From the first, Evans made up his mind that, whenever attacked, he would draw full advantage from the natural strength of the ground; and this, as he judged, he might best do by declining to reinforce his pickets, by keeping his main strength collected on the Home Ridge, and there awaiting the time when he might deliver over the enemy's advancing battalions to the mercies of artillery-fire. At one point, it is true—on the left of the combating line—he suffered Captain Armstrong to strengthen the hard-pressed picket of the 49th by bringing it two companies in support; but this was all he conceded, and to Percy Herbert, who asked for a battalion, his answer was, 'Not a man!' With his eighteen field-pieces in battery on the Home Ridge, and the main body of his infantry there drawn up in line, he awaited unmoved the yet farther development of the attack.

The separate column meanwhile had been ascending the Carriage Ravine, and at first without being visible to its nearest adversaries; for though Goodlake's sixty men of the Guards stood posted across the ravine at a spot close below the caves, there was a bend in the course of the gorge which concealed the one force from the other.²

Advance of
the separate
column.

¹ Colonel Percy Herbert, I believe, did not fail to become a strong admirer of the determination which subjected him to this refusal.

² Respecting the origin and constitution of this singularly adventurous little body of volunteers under Goodlake of the Coldstream, see vol. iii. 'Invasion of the Crimea,' note, p. 354. There were two other officers who orig-

To assure himself against any ambush, Captain Goodlake (taking with him Sergeant Ashton) had gone up to examine the caves, leaving the rest of his sixty men halted across the bed of the chasm, and partly too on each bank. Whilst thus left for the moment without their commander, Goodlake's men were suddenly confronted by the sight of the Russian column thronging up round the corner below. The hostile force seemed like a mob, numbering about six or eight hundred men, and was pressing forward along the bed of the ravine, but also along each of its banks.¹ Goodlake's people retreated fring.

Goodlake himself, with Sergeant Ashton at his side, was still by the caves. Hemmed in by assailants, and debarred by the craggy and difficult ground from any possibility of effectual retreat, he thought that he and the sergeant must needs submit to be made prisoners. Sergeant Ashton, however, suggested that, if the captain and he were made prisoners, they would be assuredly put to death, in vengeance for one of their recent exploits;² and all notion of surrender being thereupon discarded, the alternative of course was resistance. The Russians, whilst closing in upon their two adversaries, fired at them numbers of shots, which all, however, proved harmless. On the other hand, Goodlake and the sergeant fired each of them once into the nearest clump of Russians, and then, with the butt-ends of their rifles, knocked away the foremost of their assailants, and ran down to the

inally acted with Goodlake in the formation and leadership of this body—namely, Cameron of the Grenadiers, and Baring of the Scots Fusileer Guards; but Cameron, in one of the expeditions, was wounded. Goodlake carried him out of the fight on his back; and Baring one day was so high-handed with a man of the Rifles whom he arrested in the act of retreating, that an inquiry on the subject was ordered; so that ultimately Goodlake was the only one of the three who remained free to act; and he commanded the force during a period of forty-two days, earning brilliantly his Victoria Cross. A narrative of the exploits of this force would make a volume of extraordinary interest; but I imagine there is no hope that any such will ever appear; for they who do these sort of things are apt to be men of few words. No doubt, Goodlake, Cameron, and Baring, and the men acting under them, knew well that by constantly hanging close upon the enemy they gained opportunities of doing really good services; but they would hardly deny, I believe, that one motive at least, if not the main one, for engaging in these enterprises, was love of adventure and sport.

¹ The Russian military authorities ignore this column, and my impression is that it was a battalion of marines, or of seamen. They wore dark-gray coats, with black belts and caps (rather like those of our Greenwich pensioners), with red bands round them, and leather peaks.

² What the sergeant said was: 'They would kill us over that picket job.' He alluded to the fact that this little force under Goodlake had lately attacked a Russian picket, taking an officer and some of the men prisoners.

foot of the bank. There, however, they were in the midst of a mob of Russians advancing up the ravine. To their great surprise, no one seized them; and it was evident that, owing to the gray cloaks and plain caps they both wore, the enemy was mistaking them for his own fellow-countrymen. Shielded by this illusion, and favored, too, by the ruggedness of the ground, and obstructive thickets of brush-wood, which enabled them to be constantly changing their neighbors without exciting attention, they moved on unmolested in the midst of their foes; and, though strange, it is not the less true, that this singular march was continued along a distance of more than half a mile.

At length, with its two interlopers, the Russian throng came to a halt, and not without a reason, for it was confronted by Goodlake's sixty men of the Guards, who, after their lengthened retreat, were making a stand, and had posted themselves some thirty yards off, behind a little trench, which there seamed the bed of the gorge. Goodlake, with his trusty sergeant, soon crossed the intervening space which divided the Russians from the English, and found himself once more amongst his own people.

When halted in front of Goodlake's men, the separate column was not far from being abreast of Feder-
Progress of the
combat in the
Careenage
Ravine. off's foremost combatants on Mount Inkerman, and may therefore be said to have accomplished successfully the early part of its task; but the leader, as may well be imagined, now sought to do more, and for his next step, to overthrow the sixty men of the Guards confronting him from behind their trench. He exerted himself with a valor and energy much admired by our people, making vehement and repeated efforts to draw forward his men; but he every time failed to get a following, for Goodlake's men, with their venturesome chief now restored to them, showed no signs of yielding; and for some time the antagonist forces—the throng of Russians on one side, and the sixty men of the Guards on the other—remained thus standing at bay. Desisting after a lengthened combat from their endeavors to dislodge Goodlake's men, the Russians submitted to stand debarred from any farther advance; but they clung to the part of the ravine they had been able to reach, some entering the magazine grotto, where they found abundance of food, others planting themselves in the brush-wood, and behind jutting pieces of rock.¹

¹ The magazine grotto was a cavern in which the powder for the Lancaster battery had been stored, but it was also used by the men of the neighboring picket as a place for cooking and eating.

Continuation
of the enemy's
efforts on
Mount Inker-
man.

We left Evans suffering his pickets to be slowly pressed back; and Champion was already under the coercion of a fresh turning movement directed against his left when he received a message announcing that a mass of Russians might be expected to come marching up by the Quarry Ravine, thus threatening him on the opposite flank. The announced danger, if existing at all, was not, it would seem, close at hand; but Champion could not know this, and he instantly ordered his people to fall back to the main picket wall. In order to attain their goal before the announced mass should reach it, they executed this retrograde movement in all haste, and in truth one may say by a rush.¹ Those of Champion's men who had been hitherto combating on his left flank, drew in rapidly toward the same spot; and his 4th company (which had been on his right) now also acceding to him, he had a strength of nearly 240 men with which to oppose the strong body of Russians still descending the side of Shell Hill, and approaching the main picket wall.² Against this light obstacle—people afterward called it 'the barrier'—a valiant young ensign, Koudriazeff, led forward some men of the Bourtisk regiment. He fell slain, and his attack was repulsed. Champion even made efforts to bring his men into the mood for a charge, standing up all the time whilst he urged them, on the top of the main picket wall; and although not responding to his almost Quixotic appeal, they some of them advanced a little way and fired a few shots, thus causing the foremost of the Russians to fall back upon their main body. The huge body of Russians on the one side and the small band of two hundred and forty English on the other, stood confronting one another for some length of time, but combating only with fire-arms. The enemy ceased to gain ground.³

It was evident that if the Russian commander would cling to the enterprise, he now must support his first line; and the merit of the plan which Evans had been following might be presently put to the proof. From the crest of Shell Hill a column began to descend; and at first with impunity, for our gunners were only

Defeat of his
columns advancing
in support.

¹ This was evidently the circumstance which led General de Todleben to state that our pickets fell back precipitately.

² Champion estimated this Russian mass at certainly a very high number. He says: 'I suppose our picket at the barrier must have stood the attack of 2000.'—*Letter*, 28th October, 1854.

³ Champion's dispatch to General Pennefather, 27th October, 1854.

getting its range. Then round-shot tore in through its ranks; and the column breaking at once abruptly turned flankwise for shelter, dropping down into the Quarry Ravine; but even there it continued to suffer, for our skirmishers gained the edge of the bank, and fired down upon the fugitive crowd. Another strong column began to descend the hill-side, but upon encountering the fire of our batteries it broke, and retired the way it came.¹ A third column showed itself, and met the same fate.² Presently the men of the first column, after having descended a little way down the ravine, began to climb up its left bank in order to make good their retreat by thus bending off to the west; but upon their attaining the high ground, they came under the eyes of our gunners for the second time, were overtaken by round-shot and shell, and pursued, too, by obstinate skirmishers still pressing them in flank and rear.³ The Russians still engaged with our pickets could now be distinguished from their adversaries;⁴ and being accordingly visited by artillery as well as by infantry fire, they began to fall back. They took care to avoid undue haste, and to turn round and fire as they went;⁵ but the men of the pickets sprang forward in pursuit. Already the enemy's guns had limbered up and retreated. Colonel Federoff, the commander of the Russian force, was struck down, grievously wounded, and—occurring almost simultaneously with a cluster of other misfortunes—this incident, as may well be imagined, increased the consternation they caused; but it is plain that the ruin of the three columns stricken by artillery was itself, without more, the ruin of the whole enterprise. The whole of the enemy's forces on Mount Inkerman were in retreat. On the right Evans suffered Percy Herbert to advance with four companies of the 41st; and as a support to the men of the pickets now eagerly engaged in pursuit, he threw forward his 30th and 95th regiments, but—still wary—he halted them before they had passed over Shell Hill, and even indeed upon ground within seven hundred yards of its summit.

His entire defeat on Mount Inkerman.

The retreat and pursuit.

¹ Colonel Hamley, an eye-witness, p. 83.

² Narrative by an eye-witness, Mr. Cavendish Taylor, late of the 95th Regiment, vol. i. p. 47. This careful observer specially testifies that the three columns broke *before* they retired. He writes: 'They lost their formation—the columns broke before they retired. I saw them.'

³ Hamley, p. 83.

⁴ There was by this time a visible admixture of redcoats, caused mainly, I suppose, by the accession of the two reinforcing companies.

⁵ Colonel Hamley, p. 83.

When at last he had fled clear of his pursuers, the enemy again incurred fire; for Mr. Hewitt (the naval officer then acting in the Lancaster battery), threw down the part of the parapet which intercepted the fire he had planned, slewed round his Lancaster gun, and was presently hurling its missiles into the midst of the retreating force.

In the Careenage Ravine, the enemy's discomfiture was completed by Captain Markham with some men of the 2nd Rifle battalion; but the Russians, before they succumbed, sustained a sharp combat against him in front of the magazine grotto, and seven of their number were killed, the Rifles having five men wounded. Captain Markham and Captain Goodlake between them took an officer and several men prisoners.

In this combat, the interval between the first and the last exchange of shots—both occurred in the Careenage Ravine—was one of perhaps some three hours; but the period during which Evans and Federoff stood really trying conclusions lay all within a few minutes. The losses acknowledged by the Russians were 270 either killed or wounded;¹ and Evans's people alone took more than eighty prisoners, including two officers. Of the English, twelve were killed and seventy-seven wounded. They did not lose any prisoners.

Told briefly, the combat was this: an advance of some five thousand Russian infantry encountered for a while by a chain of slowly receding pickets, and then crushed all at once by artillery.

From the moment when the enemy had completed his preliminary operations by establishing himself on Shell Hill, half an hour at the most proved enough to determine the result of his effort; and indeed the attack was so weak that it scarce gave our people fair warrant for indulging the language of triumph. Still, in Evans's way of repulsing his assailants, there was an easy and masterful grace which could not but give confidence to his troops, and the more so perhaps since the combat for once resembled a field-day at home. The General's plan of suffering the combat to approach his own chosen ground, and then ending it at once with artillery, proved apt for the occasion in hand; but the immediate success of his tactics was not their only result. By refusing to engage

¹ Todleben, p. 406.

out on front more than three or four hundred of his infantry, he gave to this small portion of his division—and through them to the rest of it—an hour of the most wholesome training that any good troops could well have. The few left to strive with the many discovered, and discovered with glee, that against extravagant odds they could stand combating Russian infantry for an indefinite time, losing ground indeed, little by little, when coerced by turning movements, but suffering no ruinous carnage, and not having one man taken prisoner. From the success of such an experiment, even if it had been carried no farther, they could hardly have failed to acquire a strong sense of their relative power; but this lesson of course impressed them more forcibly still when they saw that their interesting and even amusing strife against numbers was crowned all at once with a victory. In reality, as we know, Evans so drew advantage from the valor of the pickets, and the sure quality of all his infantry, that he soon became the master of the combat, and determined its issue at exactly the time he judged best by his use of the artillery arm; but this was a truth hardly evident to the English foot-soldier engaged out in front with the enemy. He of course heard the roar of the cannon, and with more or less certainty knew that flights of round-shot and shell were passing over his head, but still he looked chiefly, as was natural, to his own particular antagonists; and when, after a lengthened struggle, maintained at huge odds, he found the hostile crowd at length receding before him, and began to advance in pursuit, he imagined that the result must be owing entirely to the inferior quality of the Russian troops. He accordingly came back from the chase with a feeling of contempt for his adversaries which, however unjust, became rooted nevertheless in his mind; and the day was at hand, when to the soldiers of our 2nd Division, with howling throngs of Russians before them, this consciousness of a decisive ascendant might be as the faith that lifts mountains.

At night, and long after this combat, the Allied troops were roused from their slumbers by a singular cause of alarm, for all at once there was heard what sounded as though there must be a squadron of madmen delivering in the midst of the darkness a headlong cavalry charge. A number of Liprandi's cavalry horses, without any bits to their bridles, but otherwise completely caparisoned, had broken loose from their pickets, galloped up by the Woronzoff road, rushed through the French

Incursion of
Russian cav-
alry horses.

line of outposts, and torn their way into the camp. About a hundred of them were taken, and some portion of our shattered cavalry obtained a welcome re-mount.

SIR GEORGE CATHCART AND THE DORMANT COMMISSION.

ON this same 26th of October, Lord Raglan received a communication from the Home Government which gave him unspeakable pleasure; and the subject, in one point of view, is germane to the battle of Inkerman. We shall come to a moment when the prospects of the battle were—at least for a while—overcast by an ill-omened act of waywardness on the part of Sir George Cathcart; and it would seem that the origin or the growth of the feeling which rendered the outbreak possible may be traced by the clue I am giving.

To meet the contingency of Lord Raglan's being killed or becoming disabled, the Home Government had secretly provided that in such case the command of the army should devolve upon Sir George Cathcart, and Sir George was intrusted accordingly with what is called a 'Dormant Commission.' It was known that the arrangement, if divulged, would not only be mortifying in the extreme to Sir George Brown, but might prove in other ways mischievous;¹ and no one in the Crimea was to be intrusted with the secret except Lord Raglan, H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge, and Sir George Cathcart himself. For Lord Raglan, who lived in close relations with Brown, it was distressing to have to witness his friend's touching ignorance of the measure which, if so one may speak, had been secretly taken against him, and he forced to avoid every word, every look, which might tend to dispel the illusion. As regards Cathcart, the baneful effect of the Dormant Commission upon his mind is best shown by

¹ In reality, Sir John Burgoyne (a General of Engineers) was the officer next in seniority to Lord Raglan; but the Home Government imagined that the notion of his taking the command of the army would be regarded by all (including Sir John himself) as entirely out of the question, and it seems that Brown shared this impression. It was, however, quite erroneous; and Lord Raglan, after the withdrawal of the Commission, undeceived the Government upon this point, assuring them that, in the event of the vacancy occurring, Burgoyne both could and would take the command.

a paper in his own handwriting, which he left one day at Head-quarters. It runs thus:

'CAMP ABOVE SEBASTOPOL, 4th October, 1854.

'MY DEAR LORD RAGLAN,—Finding that I am not admitted to your confidence, and that Sir George Brown and M. G. Airey appear even to act in your name, without your knowledge, in the conduct and management of military details at this most serious crisis of the campaign in the Crimea; also that I have scarcely had an opportunity, except at Varna, on my landing, of an interview on business, or received a single communication, verbally or otherwise, on the subject of the state of affairs from you; considering also that the circumstances of my present position, known only to yourself, the Duke of Cambridge, and myself in this country, and to H. M.'s Govt. at home, my duty to my sovereign demands that I should request an interview at the time most convenient to you, without delay, at your Head-quarters.—Your most sincere and devoted friend,

(Signed)

'GEO. CATHCART.'

Whatever may have been the value of any counsels which Sir George Cathcart was willing to proffer, it is plain that he must have grievously weakened any power of persuasion he had by this display of his feelings; and the note, I think, shows how perniciously the secret of the Dormant Commission had fermented, as it were, in his mind.

Now, however, the Commission was to be withdrawn.

Withdrawal of the Dormant Commission. The Government, I believe, had no reason for becoming dissatisfied with Sir George Cathcart, but they felt that the step they had taken in secret was one which, if known, would have been cruelly mortifying to Sir George Brown; and, when they came to hear of the great zeal with which Brown had toiled in preparing for the expedition, and the gallant part he took in the battle of the Alma, they determined to undo their act.¹ The Duke of Newcastle accordingly requested that Sir George Cathcart would give up the Dormant Commission to Lord Raglan in order that it might be canceled.² This Sir George

The high tone with which Cathcart met the announcement. Cathcart at once did, and nothing could be better than the tone and temper of his letter. 'My dear Lord Raglan,' he writes, 'you have known me long enough, and I hope well enough, to believe me when I say that your communication this moment received is the most gratifying to myself that I could possibly receive, and that the Duke of Newcastle does me no more than justice in saying that he well recollects the ob-

¹ The Duke of Newcastle assigns those two reasons for the change.—*Private letter to Lord Raglan*, 13th October, 1854, received the evening of the 26th.

² *Ibid.*

'vious reluctance with which I accepted the Dormant Commission. The fact is, I considered it a command, and though I did not fail to express my adverse opinion, I felt bound to submit to H. M. commands and obey them, be they what they may. I only now delay placing the Commission in your hands for this night because I will not trust it to an orderly, but I will be the bearer of it myself, to-morrow morning, please God, and in the mean time will not write farther on the subject."

Addressing the Duke of Newcastle on this subject, Lord Raglan's gratification at the change. Raglan says: 'I am sure you will agree with me that Cathcart's conduct throughout this matter has been exactly what might be expected from a man of his high feeling. Your decision to annul the Commission is an immense relief to me. In my usual intimate relations with Brown, I have felt ever since I knew what you had determined a great deal less comfortable than before, and that I was in possession of a secret that would come like a thunder-bolt upon him if any thing should happen to me. Now all is right, and I need no longer say to myself, "False face must hide what the false heart doth know."'"

If it be true, as I have inferred, that the grant of the secret Commission to Cathcart had an ill effect upon his temper and feelings, there would plainly be error in imagining that the withdrawal of it was calculated to restore his equanimity. His letter shows, it is true, that he fervently welcomed the change; but there remained the fact that the Queen's Government had at one time singled him out as the officer best fitted to succeed Lord Raglan in the command of our army; and it was natural, perhaps, that the recollection of this circumstance should tend to lessen his deference for others—including even Lord Raglan—and to give him what proved to be an undue confidence in his own judgment. To account for his conduct on the day of Balaclava, and for what by-and-by we shall see him doing at Inkerman, there will be need of all the light that can fairly be shed on his motives.

¹ Dated, Camp above Sebastopol, 26th October, 1854, 8 P.M.

² Private letter, Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, October 27, 1854.

THE RETENTION OF BALACLAVA.

At the time of the combat on Mount Inkerman, Balaclava, as we saw, lay in danger; for Liprandi, though cowed by the results of the yesterday's cavalry fight, remained holding as yet to his purpose, and was not only still close impending with some 24,000 men and 78 guns, but established on the rib of high ground which supports the Woronzoff road, and thence looking straight down the smooth gorge which enters the place from the north. To avert, if he could, the disaster of having Balaclava forcibly wrested from his hold, Lord Raglan had ridden down from Head-quarters, and was met in front of the place by Sir Colin Campbell, its able commander.

Lord Raglan could choose, as he thought, between two courses of action. One of these was to endeavor to provide for the defense of Balaclava by the painful and dangerous expedient of withdrawing troops from the Chersonese. The other plan, on the contrary, seemed to offer important advantages, for, if able to adopt it, Lord Raglan might at once effect a wholesome concentration of his scanty forces, and increase by no less than one-fourth the strength of the English infantry disposable for the next day of battle.

As a measure of prudence, which need not of necessity await his final decision, he requested Captain Tatham (the able naval officer then commanding in the port of Balaclava) to embark at once any of the landed ship's guns or stores which were not then in use, to remove from the harbor all the vessels that could well be dispensed with, and to bring down the rest to a lower part of the bay. This step taken, he addressed himself to the question awaiting his judgment.

It was evident that, with Liprandi close by, at the head of some 24,000 men, the continued occupation of Balaclava would necessitate a formidable deduction from the strength of the Allied forces disposed in front of Sebastopol; and no soldier who had glanced at a map could well fail to see that, if the English, as well as the French, could draw all the supplies they required through the bays of Kamiesch or Kazatch, they might add

26th October.
Lord Raglan
providing
against the
occurrence of
a disaster at
Balaclava.

The two plans
which seemed
open to him.

His directions
to Captain
Tatham, R. N.

The advan-
tages of aban-
doning Bala-
clava.

largely to their military power by abandoning a town and port which lay altogether detached from the main position, and concentrating the whole of their strength on the ridges of the Chersonese upland. Upon the question of abandoning

Lord Raglan's
inchoate re-
solve.

his accustomed port of supply, Lord Raglan indeed determined to have the opinion of his Commissary-General; but with that reservation he seems to have adopted the measure, and Captain Heath (then in port with the *Niger*) received instructions accordingly. These, however, at night were reversed. Sir Edmund Lyons opposed to the plan an impassioned resistance, which Lord Raglan, however reluctantly, was prepared, I believe, to withstand; but there is a carnal Providence which commands the commanders of armies, and he who finally determined the question was the Commissary-General.

Conclusive ob-
jection to the
plan inter-
posed by the
Commissary-
General.

Mr. Filder declared that, without the port of Balaclava, he could not undertake to supply the army. This objection proved conclusive; and our people with their little army, comprising but 16,000 bayonets, continued to go on laboring with their three heavy tasks—that is, with the siege, with the defense of the Chersonese at its most endangered part, and finally with the defense of Balaclava—an undertaking now raised into one of some magnitude by the close presence of Liprandi's forces.

Lord Raglan, thus baffled, confronted the peril as best he could, and strained his scanty resources to meet the requirements he had wisely desired to evade. The navy, as ever, was prompt to bring aid.

Upon the suggestion of Tatham, a screw line-of-battle ship—the '*Sanspareil*,' under Dacres—was sent into the harbor, and in addition to the force of marines already defending the ground, large numbers of seamen were landed.

Sacrifices ne-
cessitated by
the retention of
the place.

Vinoy, with his whole brigade, was already on the ground, and Sir Colin Campbell had placed at his disposal uncounted battalions of Turks; but these forces, after all, represented but a part of the sacrifices which the retention of Balaclava involved; for out of his own little army—we have seen how huge were its tasks and how scanty its numbers—Lord Raglan devoted to this object more than 2000 men, including a portion of his most superb troops.¹

¹ 2158—viz., the Highland Brigade 1543, the provincial battalion 615. Until the evening of the 25th the 93rd was the only part of the Highland Brigade which Balaclava absorbed.

Whatever was the force of those reasons which induced Admiral Lyons to deprecate the abandonment of Balaclava, the greatness of the sacrifice that his policy involved should at least be understood. By-and-by, when we feel the hard strain that was put upon our scanty forces by the exigencies of 'Inkerman,' it will be well to remember that in that hour of trial the defense of Balaclava was absorbing not only a splendid force of marines and seamen, but a fifth of Bosquet's corps and the whole of our Highland Brigade.

In the course of the week which succeeded to the 26th of October, the enemy's forces in the valley of the Tchernaya were largely increased; and on the 2nd of November, after first extending his left, he effected a menacing demonstration against the eastern defenses of Balaclava, by throwing forward his pickets in that part of the field, and supporting them too with artillery. It was thought that he might be meditating an attempt to get round into the place by the sea; but he did not at the moment do more than try the range of his guns. Considering the enemy's actual strength in the valley, and his evident means of augmenting it, Lord Raglan could not help apprehending that Balaclava might be powerfully attacked; and, down to the 3rd of November, he was going on with his exertions to provide for the defense of the place, without even at the last feeling confident that his object had been wholly secured.¹

The movement of the 2nd of November was, however, a feint intended to divert attention from counsels fast ripening into action. Whether menacing Balaclava, or gathering on the Old City Heights, or still marching up day by day with more and more troops from the north, all the enemy's movements now were conducing to one design.

¹ 'I will not conceal from your Grace that I should be more satisfied if I could have occupied the position in considerably greater strength.'—*Dispatch to the Secretary of War, 3rd November, 1854.* Lord Raglan's determination to make this communication official (instead of putting the words into a private letter) was, I think, significant.

26th October to 2nd November. Continuation of the enemy's apparent designs against Balaclava:

Lord Raglan's continued exertions for its defense.

The enemy's now settled purpose.

BATTLE OF INKERMAN.

CHAPTER I.

STATE OF THE SEBASTOPOL CAMPAIGN IN THE BEGINNING OF
NOVEMBER, 1854.

I.

IF the forces which made good their descent on the Crimea had only at first to encounter the governor of an outlying province, they were still, after all, the invaders of a mighty empire, well able, after a while, to bring a great army against them; and when they accepted the counsels which made their adventure drag on into a lengthened campaign, they prepared for themselves a day of conflict with the gathered strength of the Czar.

That day was now close at hand. Released by the diplomatic errors of the Allies, and by the consequent determination of Austria, from all warlike tasks in the country of the Danube, the enemy's 4th Corps had long been moving round from the neighborhood of Odessa to reinforce Prince Menschikoff in the Crimea. By that circuitous land route which the Russians had been driven to use since they lost the command of the Euxine, the distance to be compassed was great; but the marches of the troops had been pressed forward with extraordinary vigor, and their progress, it seems, was much quickened by causing numbers of men to be carried in the light carts of the country. From the early days of October, battalions after battalions had been reaching the neighborhood of Sebastopol. On

Reinforce-
ments dis-
patched to
Mentschikoff.

the evening of the 2nd of November, and in the course of the next morning, the 10th and the 11th Divisions successively appeared in the neighborhood of Sebastopol; and by Saturday the 4th of November the reinforcements thus hur-

Strength of the
Russians on the
eve of Inkerman.

ried to the scene of the conflict had amounted to so large a number that the effective strength of the troops then gathered under Prince Menschikoff

koff, and acting as land forces on the Sebastopol theatre of war, must be computed at not less than 120,000.¹

II.

In the armies of the French and the English, as augmented by the number of sailors and marines withdrawn from their fleets for land service, there was an effective strength of about 65,000 combatants.² Of foot soldiery included in this number, the French counted 31,000,³ whilst the effective rank and file of the English infantry was almost exactly 16,000.⁴ General Canrobert and Lord Raglan had also under their orders, the one, a body of near 5000,⁵ and the other a body of near 6000⁶ Ottoman soldiery. These brave men, under the leadership of a few gifted Indian officers, might have proved themselves excellent troops; but from a want of the requisite knowledge both at the French and the English Head-quarters, the resource had been neglected, and, notwithstanding their warlike capacity, it would be illusory to reckon the Turks, in unqualified words, as

¹ General de Todleben states that at this time 'the effective strength of the 'Crimean army united under the orders of Prince Mentschikoff in Sebastopol and its immediate neighborhood, *sans compter les équipages de la flotte*, 'reached a strength of 100,000 men.'—'*Défense de Sebastopol*,' p. 437. The seamen thus left to be added to the 100,000 men of the land service had been regularly drilled and organized, forming battalions of infantry with a strength (at the opening of the siege) of 18,501; the marines also at that time having a strength of 2666, and the 'local companies' a strength of 1950. There were, moreover, 5000 dock-yard laborers amenable to military discipline, accustomed to work under fire, and conducting, of course, most effectively to the defense of Sebastopol. The seamen, it is true, sustained serious losses between the opening of the siege and the 5th of November; but, considering that I adopt General de Todleben's reckoning of the land forces without dispute, that I do not reckon in any of the 5000 dock-yard laborers, and, finally, that I leave a margin of no less than 3117, the Russians, I trust, will consider that the above number of 120,000 is stated with fairness and moderation. Some of the seamen were, no doubt, on board ships, but then those ships were engaged, so to speak, in land service, and that of the most effective kind. I do not count at all the 2708 artillerymen who manned the coast batteries, because they were strictly confined to that duty (see 'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. iii.), and may be considered as neutralized by the Allied fleets against which they guarded the place.

² Effective combatants of French army, including their landed seamen (Official State in 'Atlas de la Guerre')	40,100
English army ('Morning State' of 3rd November, 1854).....	22,343
English seamen and marines (about).....	2,500
	<hr/> 64,943

³ 31,453.

⁴ Viz., 15,992; 'Morning State' of 4th November, 1854.

⁵ 4907.—*Atlas Guerre d'Orient*.

⁶ Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, 28th October, 1854.

components of the 'effective' strength now possessed by the Allies. For the moment they were almost as useless to Canrobert and Lord Raglan as a diamond is to a man who mistakes it for a worthless pebble.¹

But whether reckoning or excluding those Turkish contingents, the Allies were numerically inferior to their adversaries by several tens of thousands. So, the world, with its mighty experience, having always held it most certain that the strength of those who beleaguer a fortress should exceed by large proportions the strength of those who defend it, there was now an almost monstrous inversion of what ancient maxims had taught. The few were besieging the many.

III.

If only from the fact that the Russians now had this great ascendant in numbers, it was to be inferred that before long they would put forth their strength; but, moreover, the state of the siege operations had at length become such as to impel the enemy to the same conclusion, and even to quicken his resolve; for when Colonel de Todleben saw that the French were operating against the Flagstaff Bastion by regular approaches, with an apparent intention to force at that point the Russian line of defense, he judged that they had entered at length upon a right path of action, and that they must surely break into the work unless their final attack could be averted by an effort of the relieving army. The progress of that and the other siege-works had been such that the time for an assault on Sebastopol now appeared to be ripe; and it was with the prospect of finally arranging their plan of attack before another day should pass by, that General Canrobert and Lord Raglan, when parting from one another on Saturday, the 4th of November, agreed to meet on the morrow.² That same morrow, however, was destined to be seized by

¹ The Turkish troops at this time were so seriously believed to be valueless that Lord Raglan refused to receive more of them. After mentioning in his private letter of 28th October, 1854, to the Duke of Newcastle that Omar Pasha had offered him the garrison of Varna as well as some other troops from Shumla, he adds: '*I declined them* before I received your letter.' This ill opinion of their quality resulted in great measure from their loss of the redoubts intrusted to them on the 25th of October; but with respect to that, see 'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. iv.

² Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, private letter, 8th November, 1854.—At the meeting, Canrobert was to bring Bisot, Forey, and Bosquet, whilst Lord Raglan was to have with him Burgoyne, England, and Cathcart.

an adversary who well understood that, to intercept the attack by a battle, he needs must be prompt.¹

IV.

With the exception of the troops which guarded the Head-
Position of the Allied armies. quarter camps and the two French ports of supply, the infantry forces of the Allies were extended in a much-bending line which rested on the sea near Strelenska Bay, ran parallel with the bend of the Sebastopol defenses till it reached the Careenage Ravine, then—carried all at once toward the north—was made to enfold half Mount Inkerman within its net-work of pickets, then turned back again southward along the crest of the Sapounè Ridge, held on along the edge of the topland in the trace of the re-entering angle which marks the pass by the Col, then descended abruptly from the Chersonese, stretched eastward in front of Kadiköi, and ended with the defenses of Balaclava.

The left of this extended line was formed by the three divisions of the French siege-corps, under General Forey. Of those three powerful bodies, the one
Their left. lying most to the eastward was the division of Prince Napoleon, and accordingly that was a force which might be called upon for service in the open field if, in aid of the English when attacked by great numbers at their extreme right, General Canrobert should consent to withdraw troops from his siege-corps. By the route it would have to take, Prince Napoleon's Division lay at a distance of about six miles from the 'Isthmus' leading to Inkerman.

Next toward the right, but on the other or eastern side of the man-of-war harbor ravine, and distributed across three successive ridges, there lay those portions of the English army—namely, Sir Richard England's Division, Sir George Cathcart's Division, and General Buller's brigade—which had in their front the two systems of siege-works called Chapman's and Gordon's Attacks.

The daily task of the troops in the several camps of General Forey, Sir Richard England, Sir George Cathcart, and General Buller, was to help in the siege
The primary task of these troops. operations and maintain the defense of the trenches. If Lord Raglan, when assailed by great numbers, should be forced to call up his siege-troops to aid the defense of Mount Inkerman, the distances that must be traversed in order to reach the scene of the conflict would be these: by

¹ 'Les forces de la défense au 4ème bastion [*i. e.*, the Flagstaff Bastion] 'touchaient à leur agonie.'—*Todleben*, p. 435.

Their distances
from Mount In-
kerman.
 Buller's troops, about a mile and a half; by Cath-
cart's, about two miles and a half; by Sir Richard
England's, about three miles.

Codrington's
brigade. Its
position and
duties.
 On ground to the right of Buller's camp, or, in other
words, on the Victoria Ridge, General Codrington
with his single brigade had a double task as-
signed to him; for whilst furnishing a quota of
men for Gordon's 'Attack,' he was not divided from the ene-
my by any continuous line of siege-works, and accordingly
stood charged with the outpost and other duties that are in-
cident to war in the Open.¹ He had to defend his part of the
ground against any attempted invasion, and we shall hear
of a Russian dispatch which, if duly obeyed, would bring
upon his 1200 men an attack by full 20,000;² but in the
event of an enterprise being directed against Mount Inker-
man, General Codrington's duty was simply to hold fast his
own ridge without attempting to cast himself into the thick
of the fight by crossing to the eastern side of the ravine.³

The Naval Brigade under Captain Lushington was en-
gaged in the siege-batteries, but the reserve of the force
was stationed near the head of this Victoria Ridge, and its
camp-guard had been lately supplied with 300 rifles.

All the divisions and brigades hitherto spoken of contrib-
uted to carry on, in the trenches, the attack against the lines
of Sebastopol; whilst the primary task of the troops whose
positions must now be shown was to defend the ground oc-
cupied by the Allies, or in other words, to cover the siege.

V.

Disposition of
the troops
which covered
the siege.
 It was on Mount Inkerman that attack was to be most
surely expected; and the force so posted as to
be having, from its position, the more immediate
charge of the ground, was the 2nd English Di-
vision. This division (commanded on the day of battle by
General Pennefather)⁴ lay camped near the 'Isth-
mus' which joins Mount Inkerman to the main of

¹ The right Lancaster battery was, no doubt, in Codrington's front, but it had been nearly dismantled, having now only one gun left in it, and being at this time far in rear of Gordon's and Chapman's foremost trenches, it could hardly be considered as a part of the 'siege-works.'

² For General Codrington's strength, see Appendix, No. I.

³ The two brigades commanded respectively by Codrington and Buller constituted the Light Division, of which Sir George Brown was the Chief.

⁴ In the absence of Sir De Lacy Evans, who was on board ship suffering from illness. Sir De Lacy found strength to ride up and be present in the field of battle, but without resuming the command.

the Chersonese upland, but was charged with the defense of all that half of Mount Inkerman which extended to the then recognized border of the enemy's dominion, and accordingly threw out its pickets to ground which was nearly a mile in advance of its foremost tents. It had a strength of nearly 3000.¹

The outpost duty had been so arranged that from the extreme right of Codrington's outlying watch in the Careenage Ravine, the chain was continued by troops of the 2nd Division, and by them carried eastward till it met the re-entering line of pickets which, extending from north to south, watched toward the valley of the Tchernaya. On the south of the Isthmus that re-entering line was prolonged by the pickets of the Guards.

The Brigade of Guards lay camped at a distance of about three quarters of a mile in rear of the 2nd Division, and was under the immediate command of Major-General Henry Bentinck; but H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge was present in person with this portion of his division. The Guards performed a twofold duty; for being near the crests of the Sapounè Ridge they watched the approaches of the Chersonese from the east, and were also charged with the more momentous task of supporting the 2nd Division in its resistance to attacks from the north.

Posted thus to defend the Chersonese at its most assailable part, the 2nd Division and the Guards had to furnish and maintain on the watch night and day as many as fourteen pickets, each consisting of an entire company, and on account of the stress put upon them by this heavy amount of outpost duty, had been lately dispensed from the additional task of supplying working parties and guards for the trenches.²

¹ 2956, all told. See Appendix, No. II.

² Before this change, the double exigencies of outpost duty and duty in the trenches had absorbed so large a proportion of the troops that there were times in the day when the number of men left in camp was most perilously small. Sir De Lacy Evans, writing, I suppose, at one of those hours when the working parties, and both the reliefs and the old pickets, were absent on duty, said: 'I have but 600 men on this front position. The troops are completely worn out with fatigue. This is most serious.' And so early as the 25th of October Sir George Brown had even reported 'that at daylight, instead of having any one in camp for the defense of the position, we (the Light Division) shall be short of troops to relieve pickets.' These letters are quoted in the 'Journal of the Royal Engineers,' and at a page immediately preceding its mention of the battle of Inkerman, p. 47; but as respects the Guards and the 2nd Division, the double stress did not really continue to so late a period as might be thence inferred. I must own that the information before me does not enable me to see how the reduction of the strength left in camp could have ever reached the extreme points stated by Evans and Brown; but I suppose they could have explained their meaning.

Having its extreme left at a distance of about a mile and a quarter from the Guards, with the steeps of the Sapounè Ridge and the lines of circumvallation on its immediate front, and extended over a space of about two miles and a half along the edge of the Chersonese from the Woronzoff road to the Col, there lay the main part of the French 'Army of Observation,' commanded by General Bosquet. The troops thus camped comprised the brigades of General Espinasse, General d'Autemarre, and General Bourbaki. Bosquet, present in person with this part of his Corps d'Army, was charged primarily with the task of there defending the Chersonese against attacks from the east; and accordingly, when put upon the alert, he used to draw up his troops in a line of columns extending along the crest with their front to the plain of Balaclava.

His extreme left, however, was scarce more than two miles from the camp of our 2nd Division; and therefore, if he should be freed from all care for the safety of the ground in his front, he might soon bring to succor the English a battalion or two to begin with, and go on by degrees reinforcing them until he should have fetched his last man from ground nearly five miles distant.

Next to Bosquet, but on the southern side of the Col, there was the intrenched camp of Canrobert's Turkish auxiliaries. Turkish auxiliaries, who, posted on high commanding ground overlooking the road, contributed to the defense of the Pass.¹

The troops hitherto spoken of lay all on the toplands of the Chersonese; but, as we saw, it had been judged necessary to retain Balaclava; and accordingly, after passing the heights occupied by the Turkish auxiliaries, the line which would trace the direction of the whole encampment must descend all at once in an easterly direction to lower ground near Kadiköi. There, close overlooking the road by the Col, and fronting straight across it, lay the brigade of General Vinoy.² Lastly, and on the extreme right rear of the whole encampment, there were the lines of Balaclava defended by Sir Colin Campbell with his

¹ His brigade (the 2nd brigade of the 1st or Bouat's Division) was a part of the force constituting Bosquet's Corps d'Armée.

² The Turkish auxiliaries placed at Lord Raglan's disposition were not suffered to take part as combatants, but some of these brave men were employed in a service not less perilous--namely, that of bringing up ammunition to our people fighting in front, and they devoted themselves to this task with unsparing valor.

Highland Brigade, with a part of the 2nd Rifle battalion, with a body of Royal Marines, with a number of sailors, and besides, some convalescents and others detached from various regiments.

Both General Vinoy's brigade and Sir Colin Campbell's Highlanders fulfilled a double purpose; for they not only covered Balaclava, but were so placed that they would be ready to fall upon the flank of any Russian force attempting to gain the Chersonese by forcing the Pass at the Col. These, however, were all the services that could be rendered to the common cause by Vinoy and Campbell. They could not abandon the defense of Balaclava and the approaches of the Col to aid their comrades on the north-east of the Chersonese.

The main part of the Allied cavalry lay camped near the English Head-quarters, but the remains of Lord Cardigan's brigade were on the Sapounè Ridge, and not far from the windmill which used to stand in those days a little to the south of Mount Inkerman. Both the French and the English Head-quarters remained where they first were established.

Thus the troops lay drawn out in a chain which, with all its manifold bends, was not far from 20 miles long; and it can hardly be said with accuracy that the Allies defending the Chersonese had any reserves of infantry; for their battalions all ranged out in front along the circumference of the occupied ground, and it was only by stripping some part of their line that they could reinforce any other part. They were all, so to speak, at the outposts.

Troops thus planted may be detained for hours together in a wrong part of the battle-field by an enemy who chooses to threaten them; and at last, when they see through his feints, it is only by lateral movements (which may be lengthy and even precarious) that they can hope to transfer themselves to the real seat of danger. It is evident that a reinforcing power which has to be exerted under such conditions must always differ widely from that which belongs to a well-placed reserve.

Against all attacks on the Chersonese from the plain of Balaclava, the ground, very strong by nature, had been made altogether secure by sufficient works of defense and the presence of superabundant forces.¹ Elsewhere, the positions of

¹ Both Sir John Burgoyne and General de Todleben considered the position impregnable on that side.

the Allies had weak points, and especially it was possible that a formidable attack might be ventured upon the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese. There, indeed, the danger was great.

From Lord Raglan's exceeding eagerness to press the siege with the very utmost of his means, and from the opinion which led General Canrobert to accumulate troops along the eastern crests, it resulted that there was a cruel impoverishment of the resources with which the English were left to defend Mount Inkerman. Canrobert evidently placed an extraordinary reliance upon the English troops, and especially, it is believed, upon the 'bonnets de poil'—for so, and in tones of an almost affectionate enthusiasm, he used to call the Guards; but, supposing that he knew the scant numbers of Pennefather and the Duke of Cambridge and of the English reinforcements that could be spared from other quarters, it must be owned that he carried this trustfulness to an almost extravagant length.¹

Circumstances under which the defense of Mount Inkerman was left in the first instance to a small body of men.

VI.

For some time the French and the English commanders had been receiving continuous though imperfect intelligence of the reinforcements poured into the Crimea; and so early as two days before the battle, Lord Raglan apparently believed that the positions of the Allies were in peril. As we saw, after the action of the 25th of October he had reluctantly weakened his too scanty resources on the Chersonese, for the purpose of reinforcing the troops which guarded his port of supply; and the still retained strength of the Russians in the neighborhood of Tchorgoun had ever since forced him to continue this dangerous severance without making him sure after all that Balaclava might not be the subject of a formidable attack, but also, as he well understood, the blow might perhaps be delivered upon the Inkerman ridge, and in that case would fall, to begin with, upon the few weak battalions of his 2nd Division. Yet, despite the extreme insufficiency of the force with which he was defending the Chersonese at its accessible part, he could obtain no fresh aid from the French. His troops, he wrote, were well posted, but then there were 'not enough of them,' and 'General Canrobert,'

Lord Raglan's perception of the conditions of things on the 3rd of November.

¹ That in spite of Lord Raglan's instances Canrobert had hitherto withheld all aid from the endangered position of the English, see Lord Raglan's letter of the 3rd November, quoted above, and on following page.

he continued, 'assures me that he can not give me any farther assistance until the French troops arrive from Greece. 'When that will be I don't know.'¹ He, however, spoke buoyantly of the task before him; for after showing the nature and the variety of the perils which threatened his scanty forces, he added one of those sentences which—more by their cheerful and firm-hearted tone than by any actual statement of fact—tended strongly, when coming from him, to allay the cares of a Minister: 'Thus we have plenty to think of'—it is so he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle—'and all I can say is, we will do our best.'²

VII.

But although General Canrobert and Lord Raglan had learned a part of the truth, the full extent of the great reinforcements obtained by Prince Menschikoff remained still unknown in the Allied armies, and it was not so much on their camps but rather upon their distant homes, where every mail from the Levant was awaited with longing and dread, that the coming attack threw its shadow. Designs contrived for the purpose of overwhelming the invaders had been weighed, at the least, if not dictated in the Russian capital under the personal directions or approval of the Czar, and it was, therefore, no wonder that intelligence of the meditated blow should filter through central Europe (where the Powers were all of them neutral) and penetrate into England and France. In some instances, the relatives of officers serving in the Crimea were forewarned, by dear Russian friends whom even the war had not alienated, of an impending attack which was to be delivered, they said, with such overpowering numbers as to insure the destruction or capture of the whole Allied army; and the dread of having to hear that some great disaster had come was increased by a piece of information—then painfully interesting—which Diplomacy had found means to acquire. A paper purporting to be the copy of a letter addressed by Prince Menschikoff in cipher to the Governor of Warsaw, for transmission by him to the Czar, was placed in the hands of one of our ambassadors. It ran thus:

'Chancery of Warsaw. Report addressed by Prince Menschikoff to Prince Paskiewicz. Dispatch deciphered 19/31 Oct., in the evening.

'The enemy no longer dares to stir out of his lines. We never cease to harass him and kill some of his men. Our squadrons make frequent bat-

¹ Private letter to Duke of Newcastle, 3rd November, 1854.

² Letter of 3rd November, 1854.




Sketch Map illustrative of the general action, showing the positions of the allies before they were put on the alert, & indicating the attacks about to be delivered.



The activities on the eastern side of the (Chersonese) were called by the Russians the Saporine or Breather Heights

The Church indicated near Quarantine Bay is that of St. Vladimir referred to in page 462.

Scale of Miles.



'tues and attacks. The enemy throws some shells at them, but his cavalry dares not risk itself beyond the range of the batteries. The army is filled with enthusiasm. General Liprandi, whose coolness and resolution I can not sufficiently praise, has caused to be thrown up some armed works (strong redoubts) on the right flank of the enemy, and he threatens the enemy in rear. The enemy can not effect his retreat without exposing himself to immense losses. If the weather should favor us, nothing can save him from a complete disaster. Future times, I am confident, will preserve the remembrance of the exemplary chastisement inflicted upon the presumption of the Allies. When our beloved Grand-Dukes shall be here, I shall be able to give up to them intact the precious deposit which the confidence of the Emperor has placed in my hands. Sebastopol remains ours.

'Heaven visibly protects Holy Russia.

'Have the kindness, Prince, to bring this to the knowledge of our august Sovereign for the great satisfaction of his magnanimous heart.'¹

CHAPTER II.

DISPOSITIONS FOR A GENERAL ENGAGEMENT.

I.

THE Inkerman Sunday perhaps may be said to owe all its renown to the fight which raged many hours on one chosen corner of ground; but the enemy's front of battle, that day, was several miles greater than any that Mount Inkerman alone could afford him, and his measures along the whole line were so well knit together by a single, all-governing purpose, that the aggregate of the strife they provoked acquired distinct unity, and constituted a general action. To all the other operations of the day the fight on Mount Inkerman bore indeed huge proportions, but still, after all, though immensely predominating, it was only a part of the battle.

On the eve of the action, the seamen and the land forces under General Möller formed still, as before, the established garrison of Sebastopol, but General Soimonoff with the whole of his column lay also, that night, within the lines of the fortress. The column of General Pauloff was beyond the Tchernaya, encamped on the Old City Heights; and there too, though not yet commanding, General Dannenberg was present in per-

The conflict of the 5th November regarded as a general action.

Disposition of the Russian forces on the eve of the battle.

¹ The authenticity of this paper was not, I think, much doubted by those to whom it became known. Upon seeing it the French Emperor ordered the immediate preparation of 20,000 troops more; but by that time—though France and England did not quite know of it—the great battle had been fought.

Prince Mentschikoff's entire line of battle did not end at that point near the faubourg to which we have hitherto traced it; for his powerful force still collected within the lines of Sebastopol would not only touch by its left the right rear of Dannenberg's troops, but also act under orders which assigned it for the day distinctly aggressive tasks instead of mere garrison duties, and linked it to the army outside by the bond of a common purpose. So regarded, General Möller (who commanded in the place) would be adding to the 62,000 men under Gortchakoff and Dannenberg the whole power of the garrison, thus bringing the united array to a strength of full 100,000, and extending the front of battle to a length of about twelve miles.¹

If at first it seem strange that the garrison of a beleaguered fortress should be made to form part of a line of battle and have to combat accordingly alongside of the relieving army, it will be remembered in the next moment that the Allies were the original innovators, and that by undertaking to besiege Sebastopol without having means to invest it they made the anomaly possible.

With a view to the approaching engagement, Prince Mentschikoff's Head-quarters were established near the ruins of Inkerman.

II.

The Russians took the precaution of leaving between three and four thousand men to watch the road from Baktchi Seräi,² and they kept a small force on the Severnaya or North Side; whilst the Allies, on the other hand, employed a number of troops in guarding their ports of supply; but these detached bodies, whether Russian, or English, or French, were not so sundered from the main armies by either distance or purpose that they might not by possibility take part in the day's strife; and speaking broadly, it may be said that on the appointed day the two hosts would be confronting one another with

The numerical strength of the contending armies.

¹ In putting the above force at 'full 100,000' I believe that I have kept a good way within bounds; for, there being only a small number of men on the north side, and only 3862 on the Baktchi Seräi road, it is difficult to see how any deduction much exceeding 10,000 could fairly be made from the 120,000: and under that aspect the Russian force arrayed for the general engagement would be 110,000—i. e., 10,000 more than I have stated it. Even the excepted forces were, in a sense, taking part; and considering how easily and rapidly the enemy moved troops across the roadstead, I should hardly have erred if I had reckoned in as reserves all the troops on the north side.

² 3862 of infantry, with 36 guns.—*Totleben*, p. 450.

the whole effective strength of the forces then engaged in land service upon the Sebastopol theatre of war. The Anglo-French army of 65,000 men with 11,000 Turkish auxiliaries was to encounter an enemy whose forces numbered 120,000.¹

But a comparison of the numbers that could be brought to bear actively upon the issue of the approaching conflict brings to light a yet greater disparity. The opposing armies were both of them hampered with duties which confined a great part of their respective forces to particular tracts of ground; for the Russians were obliged to keep manned the whole southern front of their fortress, and the Allies, on the other hand, were under the necessity of not only guarding their trenches and their ports of supply, but also—and in pure self-defense—the whole of that Chersonese topland, on which their main strength lay encamped. The Sebastopol lines of defense had a front of nearly four miles; but the belt of ground along which the Allies were compelled to stand tethered had a very much greater extent. There indeed was no part of their line—a line nearly twenty miles long—which they could well leave unguarded; and accordingly the chain thus distended was of very necessity weak, but especially so at one place, for the infantry defending Mount Inkerman—and this was ground vitally precious—had a strength of only 3000.²

From this state of things it results that the aptest computation of numbers would be one that can answer two questions: 1st, ‘With how many men could the Russians afford to make their attacks?’ 2nd, ‘What amount of reinforcing power could the Allies exert to support a threatened part of their line?’

To the first question a perfectly complete answer would be hardly possible, but this at least can be said: The numbers the enemy could spare for aggressive purposes. The enemy proved that he could bring forward to fight aggressively in the Open forces numbering altogether 68,000 men, with 235 guns.³

¹ As shown *ante*, p. 44.

² The strength of the 2nd Division was 2956; and the presence of 30 men of the Guards, under Captain Goodlake, raised the force on Mount Inkerman to 2986.

	Men.	Guns.
³ Soimonoff and Pauloff.....	40,210	135
Gortchakoff (see note, <i>ante</i> , p. 54).....	22,444	88
	<u>62,654</u>	<u>223</u>
Timovieff, first and last.....	5,325	12
	<u>67,979</u>	<u>235</u>

In addition to all these, there was the above-mentioned force (see note, *ante*,

As regards the second question, we shall see the Allies placed in straits which oblige them to put forth to the utmost their reinforcing power, and at the same time so favored by the enemy's mismanagement that, with hardly any hindrance from him, they remain free to march as they choose along the main part of their line; yet withal, it will appear that, when the 3000 men guarding their weak point are beset by 40,000 assailants, the fresh troops they bring up by degrees and in the course of five hours number only 14,200, with 50 guns;¹ and—because of the losses too surely sustained in the interval—we may have to see them fighting for their very existence with infantry forces increasing from only 3000 at first to less than 13,000 at the last.²

p. 53) of 3862 men, with 36 guns, which, though not charged with aggressive duties, was operating in the Open; so that out of the whole 120,000 men it was not found necessary to detain for defensive purposes, within or about Sebastopol, any more, at the very most, than 48,159.

¹ Under the greatest stress short of defeat that could well be put upon them we shall find the English able to move to the aid of the 2nd Division the following infantry and cavalry:

The Guards.....	1,331
Light Division, troops moved to Mount Inkerman.....	649
3rd Division, " ".....	281
Do., " Victoria Ridge.....	619
4th Division, " Mount Inkerman.....	2,217
Cavalry, under Lord George Paget.....	200
Total English reinforcements horse and foot, with besides 26 guns.....	5,297
French infantry brought up and engaged on Mount Inkerman.....	3,575
Cavalry brought up, and engaged on Mount Inkerman.....	700
French infantry brought up later, and not actively engaged.....	4,644
Total French reinforcements of horse and foot, besides 24 guns.....	8,919
Total English and French reinforcements of horse and foot, with besides 50 guns.....	14,216

² See in Appendix the components of the French and English forces present on Mount Inkerman, from which it results that the English had there first and last 7464 infantry, and the French 8219, of whom 3575 were actively engaged. A letter now open before me, when compared with the above number of 7464, gives an interesting proof of Lord Raglan's mastery in questions of what may be called military business. Writing nearly a fortnight before the battle, he was able to give the Home Government an admirably close estimate of the numbers with which he could fight such a battle as the battle of Inkerman. 'When these [the infantry effectives] have furnished the guards and working parties for the trenches, there remain in camp available for the support of those in advance in case of a sortie, and for the maintenance of our position, *which is assailable on our extreme right and right rear,*

Of course, the alarming predicament in which the Allies had thus placed themselves was one which mainly resulted from the disproportion long existing, and now immensely increased, between their huge task and their numbers; but in part it was owing to a faulty disposition of their troops. By causing an undue determination of strength toward the circumference of the position General Canrobert exposed both the French and the English forces to the contingency of being thus heavily overmatched in numbers, and of being overmatched, not merely for a brief period, but during a long succession of hours, which might include the crisis of a battle, and the fate of the invaders. Enamored of the commanding position afforded by the Sapounè Heights, he seemed to forget that the stronger the ground the less was there need for loading it with troops; and instead of merely watching and guarding this part of his extended border-land by the ordinary means, he strove to hold it fast by the bodily presence of so many thousands of men as to leave himself without any reserve of infantry with which to act from a centre.

III.

In order to make a full use of the tempting occasion thus offered him, the enemy constructed a plan which, in one at least of its contrivances, disclosed the skill of the framer.

He convinced himself that no project for forcing the steep slopes of the Chersonese from the east could present a fair chance of success, and, again, that an attack upon the Sebastopol front of the Allies would be probably baffled by their trenches and the power of their heavy siege-guns. What remained was either to assail the French at their extreme left near Streleska Bay, or else make an assault on our people at the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese; and (by reason of the exceeding scantiness of the English force defending that last part of the ground) it was determined that the blow should there fall.¹

The first and most weighty attack on this part of the Chersonese was to be by its northern approaches; and, as ultimately ordained—whether with or without due author-

¹ 'something under 8000 men.'—*Private letter of Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, October 23, 1854.*

¹ Todleben: 'Although the nature of the ground rendered this position a strong one in itself, it was to be considered that the number of English troops which occupied it was very weak.'—P. 443.

ity—the blow was to be leveled at Mount Inkerman only with a weight of 40,000 men.

But along his whole front of twelve miles the enemy's forces were ordered to take their share in the action. Thus from the westernmost angle of Sebastopol a part of the garrison was to make a powerful sortie against the French left with the hope of preventing Canrobert from drawing his strength toward the seat of the real attack. The rest of the garrison was enjoined to devote itself to the objects of the battle as distinguished from all other tasks. Its troops were to disregard the fire of the siege-guns, to exert their artillery powers against any columns of infantry which might come within range, and finally, if confusion should be observed in the French or the English batteries, to move out in force, and seize them.¹ Next, still following the enemy's line of battle from west to east, we come to the part of the plan which provided for an attack on Mount Inkerman. Soimonoff, issuing from the Karabel Faubourg, and Pauloff coming up from the bridge at the mouth of the Tchernaya, were to ascend the northern steeps of Mount Inkerman; and Dannenberg, then taking command of the 40,000 men thus assembled from the east and the west, was to carry all before him in that part of the Chersonese, overwhelming at once the 3000 men under Pennefather, but pushing his ascendant yet farther in a southerly direction by rolling up the line of any force bestowed along the Windmill Heights which might still be attempting to guard them against an attack from the east.

Thus far, all was to be achieved by sheer strength of numbers, but the ingenious part of the plan will be learned by observing the task allotted to Prince Gortchakoff, whose forces prolonged the enemy's line of battle in an altered direction, by carrying it on southward through the plain to ground not far distant from Balaclava. From the opening of the battle until the cardinal moment which will be presently indicated, Prince Gortchakoff was to menace General Bosquet by feints, and thus strive to prevent him from bringing succor to Pennefather. But so soon as the victorious Dannenberg should have not only driven the English from Mount Inkerman, but rolled up their line farther south, Prince Gortchakoff was to ascend unopposed by the approaches thus happily opened for him, and bring his 22,000 men to receive a glad welcome on the heights from Dannen-

¹ The earlier clauses of this instruction are given in General Möller's order. The last one in Prince Mentschikoff's general order of the 4th November.

berg's conquering host. That done, the enemy would be on the Chersonese with an army—even after some losses—of about 60,000 men, including a great body of cavalry. He trusted that before the sunset of the appointed day he would be already intrenching his victorious troops upon the conquered ground, and was not indeed without hope that by that time he might find himself master over all the eastern part of the Chersonese.¹ He judged, and judged soundly enough, that his field-army thus firmly established on the toplands and having its right in close contact with the army of Sebastopol, would not merely forbid the intended assault of the Flagstaff Bastion, but perhaps at once force the Allies to abandon the siege; and the stress of such fortune, he knew, might well make it hard for the French and the English commanders to avert an overwhelming disaster.²

The immediate object of the battle contemplated by the enemy.

Ultior prospect resulting from the anticipated success of the attack.

IV.

Having gained the ascendant in numbers, and fashioned her plan of attack, Russia now also sought to evoke that more subtle element of power which derives from the souls of men. So large a body of people, children all of one monarch, one nation, one faith, had been gathered together in arms for a mighty effort within a narrow compass of ground, that feelings of a sort hardly known perhaps to isolated or scattered men, could be generated and raised to fierce heat by the fermenting of the compacted numbers; and simultaneously with the coming of the thousands long followed by thousands which acceded to Prince Mentschikoff's army in the early days of November, the dutiful Muscovite soldier was enraptured with the tidings that two of the Imperial Princes had re-

Measures tending to inflame the zeal of the Russian soldiery.

¹ Todleben, p. 443.

² The plan as I state it is the one which—whether with or without due authority—was actually followed. It was sketched—though in somewhat vague terms—by Prince Mentschikoff's general order on the 4th of November. The Prince left the details to be filled in by Möller, Soimonoff, Pauloff, Dannenberg, and Gortchakoff, and all these gave instructions or recommendations in writing. These will be found in the Appendix, No. VI. Dannenberg's recommendations do not enter into my statement of the plan as above given, because they were not acted upon, but an account of his endeavor to alter the arrangements will be found in subsequent pages. With respect to Gortchakoff's instructions, the general order was worded as though it meant to direct against Bosquet's position an actual, unfeigned attack; but on authority which I regard as indisputable, I have satisfied myself that the orders really given to Gortchakoff were of the kind stated in the text.

solved to come and share with him in the peril and the glory of the approaching fight. On the eve of the appointed Sunday, the Grand-Duke Michael and the Grand-Duke Nicholas were already in camp, and their presence raised an outburst of that significant kind of loyalty which promises a warlike devotion—devotion to be tried on the morrow.

But Religion too called men to battle. The vast empire of the Czar, as we have before seen, was so circumstanced in regard to creed, that commensurate with its sense of being a nation was its sense of being also a Church; and sacred, most sacred was the task which, on this chosen Sunday, the Czar would be intrusting to his soldiery; for he had launched them in a war to the knife against the invaders of his empire, the enemies of the Orthodox Faith, the despoilers of churches, the disciples, the abettors of Islam, and therefore (in the apprehension of simple men) the open foes of the Cross. Now at last—O holy Saint Vladimir!—that appalling sacrilege which horror-struck men on the ramparts had seen with their own eyes would be surely avenged.¹ So great was the value attached by men in authority to the force of a religious incentive, that, even at the risk of putting their adversaries on the alert, they, so early as four in the morning, called people to mass and to battle by the clangor of the bells in their churches; and it was with a soldiery consecrated for battle that Soimonoff before break of day would march out from the Karabel Faubourg. Pauloff's troops, as we know, lay on heights beyond the Tchernaya, but their spiritual guides were in camp, and with power scarce lessened by the want of any sacred appliances; for customarily, even in cities, the utterances of the Eastern Church are delivered in the roar of strong priests without aid from the wailing of organs. When men heard the Sebastopol bells, the head of this column of Pauloff's was already some way on its march.

¹ Near Quarantine Bay there stood an ancient and much venerated church dedicated to St. Vladimir, which some French soldiers pillaged in the early days of the siege, and they were seen carrying off their spoil by Russians posted at their bastions.

CHAPTER III.

EVE AND EARLY MORNING OF THE 5TH OF NOVEMBER IN
THE ALLIED CAMP.

I.

FROM about 10 o'clock on the morning of the 4th of November, rain more or less heavy was almost constantly falling; but the atmosphere did not prove so obscure as to hinder men's eyes from detecting a certain air of busy movement on the part of troops gathered above the Inkerman ruins; and, since this indication agreed with the last reports brought into camp, many people at length became sure that the enemy, after having been frequently and largely reinforced in the course of the six preceding weeks, had within the last day or two received yet farther accessions, and was now in great strength.

The English camp on the eve of the 5th of November. Commanding (in the absence of Evans¹) our 2nd Division, General Pennefather was the officer primarily in charge of Mount Inkerman, and every afternoon, at this period, he used to ride to the front, because he liked to employ the last hour of daylight in straining after all such knowledge of the enemy's plans as might be attained by the eye and the field-glass. Pursuing his daily custom on the afternoon of the 4th of November, he rode to the crest of Shell Hill; and thence not only saw still continuing on the Old City Heights those signs of activity and swollen numbers which before had been marked, but also descried there a small, yellow object. What he saw was indeed nothing more than a simple *calèche*; but, although without means of knowing that this was the carriage which had brought two sons of the Czar to take part in great things on the morrow, he yet imagined that the arrival of a traveler at such a time might have military significance; and becoming more than commonly anxious to probe the enemy's designs, he dispatched Captain Carmichael, a highly skilled officer, who well knew the ground, to the extreme point of the Inkerman Spur, with instructions to be there half an hour before dark and report in person to

¹ Sir De Lacy Evans lay invalided on board ship.

the General any appearance of movement or alteration of position on the part of the enemy. Carmichael obeyed; but after completing a labored survey (which the Russians, though usually jealous, did not care, at this time, to disturb), neither he nor Major Grant, who was with him, could detect any military change, except the establishment of a fresh body of cavalry on the right bank of the river between the Tractir and the Inkerman bridges. Captain Carmichael observed, it is true, and duly reported to Pennefather, that large flocks of sheep had been newly driven into the pastures near the Inkerman ruins; but this, at the time, was a circumstance which men knew not how to interpret.¹

II.

Although Prince Mentschikoff's general directions for the morrow had been issued so early as 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the Saturday, no spy nor deserter found means to steal into camp with the news of the intended attack; and the night passed away without any report from the outposts which awakened attention in camp.²

In the English service, an officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department was accustomed to visit the camps of the several divisions every morning before break of day, in order to be able to apprise Head-quarters of any observed change in the attitude or apparent purposes of the enemy. Captain Ewart, the able officer charged with this task on the morning of the 5th of November, was in his saddle soon after 4 o'clock. After visiting successively the lines of the 3rd, 4th, 1st, and Light Divisions, and learning in each that all was quiet, he at length reached Pennefather's camp. There, some time before, the troops of the 2nd Division not serving on outpost duty had stood to their arms as usual at the appointed hour of the early morning; and already, in the absence of any known cause of alarm, had been dismissed to their accustomed occupations. The wood and the water parties had gone off to their work; and all was tranquil. Captain Ewart learned that from this camp there was noth-

¹ Our present knowledge of the enemy's plans may warrant a surmise that the flocks were driven into their new pastures with a view to the supply of the field-army when established and intrenched (as Prince Mentschikoff hoped it would be) on the downs of the Chersonese.

² We shall hear, *post*, p. 97, of the 'rumbling' heard at the outposts and duly reported by Captain Sargent of the 95th, and by Morgan of the same regiment; but the tidings did not 'awaken attention in camp.'

ing to report, except indeed that the night had been more than usually quiet.

Three or four minutes still had to pass before all this repose would be broken.

III.

General Codrington, whose brigade, as we saw, was camp-
 ed on the south-western side of the Careenage
 The first intel-
 ligence of the
 attack. Ravine, had formed for himself the good habit of
 riding to the front every day about an hour be-
 fore sunrise; and on the morning of the 5th of November
 he was faithful to his custom, bringing with him Mackenzie,
 his able brigade-major. Having reached the right Lancaster
 battery, he found that the relieved pickets had just come
 in; and, there being at that time no apparent cause of alarm,
 they were ordered to march into camp. After waiting, how-
 ever, some time, General Codrington heard the firing of mus-
 ketry on his right front. The firing—very slight at first—
 increased so rapidly and became so well sustained that its im-
 port was presently clear; and Codrington, judging it cer-
 tain that an attack had begun, arrested the homeward march
 of the relieved pickets, sent one of the companies to reinforce
 the Lancaster battery, disposed the other three companies
 on the eastern slopes of the ridge, with their front toward
 Mount Inkerman, and then galloping back into camp, put all
 his troops there under arms. Sir George Brown—a most
 industrious officer and almost distressingly vigilant—was
 wrought for a moment to anger at the sight of an ‘alert’ in
 his camp without having first learned its cause; but he soon
 apprehended the truth, and indeed became willing to im-
 part it on his own authority to Head-quarters. He saw and
 stopped a staff-officer galloping toward the camp of the
 2nd Division. This staff-officer proved to be Captain Ew-
 art, the officer whom we saw going round, and receiving
 at every camp a report of the enemy’s quietness. After
 quitting the then tranquil camp of the 2nd Division, he had
 ridden some way along the crest of the Sapounè Ridge, try-
 ing hard, though in vain, through the mist to observe Prince
 Gortchakoff’s forces; and having then all at once heard
 the firing in the direction of Mount Inkerman, he was now
 hastening back to Pennefather’s lines in order to learn its im-
 port.

Sir George directed the captain to ride immediately to
 Lord Raglan in the saddle. Lord Raglan, and say that the English were at-
 tacked. Ewart obeying carried the intelligence

straight to Head-quarters, and before many minutes had passed Lord Raglan was in his saddle.

By this time, firing was to be heard more or less from almost every part of that extended front of battle which the Russians, as we saw, were to be presenting at an early hour along a curved line of twelve miles; and the now fast awakening thunder of French artillery on the Sapounè Ridge might well be assigned as a proof that Bosquet must think himself challenged.

But although these encompassing sounds as of battle reached Lord Raglan at once from many a quarter, they did not distract him. Balaclava, indeed, for aught he knew, might be the object of attack; but he trusted that Colin Campbell and Vinoy would find means to defend the place, and that even if—belying his hope—their forces should prove too scanty for the task assigned them, he had it not now in his power to ward off the disaster by sending down troops to their aid. He therefore at once gave his undivided mind to the hypothesis of an attack on the Chersonese; and, supposing it taken for granted that this was to be the real object, he did not, it seems, doubt a moment that the blow would fall on Mount Inkerman. Thither, therefore, he rode, and thither also, after rapidly providing that the ground in front of the English left and centre should be watched by Sir Richard England, he ordered reinforcements to march.

IV.

Confronting thus on Mount Inkerman the enemy's principal onslaught, Lord Raglan also had on his right and right rear the extended array of Prince Gortchakoff; whilst again on his left, under Möller, there stood the whole mass of the Sebastopol forces, already obeying the orders which assigned them their part in the action. These forces, under Gortchakoff and Möller, were together so great in numbers, and constituted so large a proportion of the enemy's whole line of battle, that, without learning first what they did, one might fail to apprehend the true scope of the general engagement as distinguished from that famous part of it which raged upon one narrow hill. And the same sweeping glance which shall scan these auxiliary operations will pointedly help to elucidate the course of the fight on Mount Inkerman; for, since neither the French

Firing heard in many directions.

Lord Raglan's conclusion.

His measures, and immediate departure for Mount Inkerman.

Great proportion of the forces under Gortchakoff and Möller.

The bearing of their efforts upon the fight on Mount Inkerman.

nor the English had any force held in reserve, they could only bring succors to the endangered ground by fetching them from other parts of their line of battle, where the state of the action might be such as to warrant the withdrawal of troops; and it was to deter them from resorting to that directly needful expedient that both Gortchakoff and Möller had already come into action. Each of those two commanders, we know, had been charged to detain the Allied troops before him by simulated or actual aggressions, thus doing his best to prevent them from moving to the real seat of danger; and accordingly, if we witness their efforts, we shall see under what conditions the Allies could bring up reinforcements to the scene of the real attack.

CHAPTER IV.

OPERATIONS ON GORTCHAKOFF'S FRONT.

I.

IN preparing to operate from that part of the front of battle already indicated which lay across the plain of Balaclava, Prince Gortchakoff at first had for guidance the paper of instructions which was issued to the Generals at about 5 o'clock in the evening of the 4th of November. It directed him 'to support the general attack, to distract the enemy's forces by drawing them upon himself, and to endeavor to seize one of the routes leading up the Sapounè Heights. His cavalry was to be held in readiness to effect the ascent the moment it should be possible.' These written instructions, however, were explained down by oral communications; and, as Prince Gortchakoff understood, it was his duty, not necessarily to execute any actual and determined attack, but to amuse and detain the Allies by threatening them from the east. Yet the steeps he confronted were lofty as well as abrupt, and it was scarce feasible for him to simulate an attack upon heights so commanding without making heavier sacrifices than are commonly thought to be warranted for the purpose of any mere feint.

II.

Issuing from Tchorgoun in the early morning of the 5th of November, Prince Gortchakoff formed his line of battle with its left in advance of Kamara, ex-

His operations,

tended it in a north-easterly direction across the Fedioukine Hills, and yet farther prolonged his array to a reach of nearly five miles, by showing a strong mass of cavalry on the lower Tchernaya, and planting-skirmishers on its banks, who could easily communicate with Prince Mentschikoff's appointed Head-quarters on ground near the Inkerman ruins. From this line of battle he opened a vain cannonade at long range, and moved some battalions part way toward the frowning Sapounè Heights, trying thus to make it appear that he was going to attack them in earnest. His right wing confronted our Guards, his centre and main strength faced Bosquet, and his left was so placed that by a mere change of front it might be made to threaten Balaclava.

The ground watched by our Guards was the northern part of those heights which Prince Gortchakoff seemed to be threatening; but H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge, there commanding in person, was not long diverted from the scene of the real attack by any of the false demonstrations going on in the valley beneath. He at first, indeed, moved two battalions to the crest of the heights which he specially had in his charge, but the roar of the fight on Mount Inkerman had an earnestness which he soon understood. Leaving only the Coldstream—and that for no great length of time—to act in support to his pickets, he led his two other battalions—the Grenadiers and the Scots Fusileers—in a northerly direction toward ground on the right flank of Pennefather.¹

Against the French troops farther south, Prince Gortchakoff's feint was more pointed, and not at first wholly vain; but the firing had scarce lasted an hour when Bosquet, divining by that time that the real attack was on Mount Inkerman, ordered two battalions and a half and two troops of horse-artillery to march toward the Windmill, and at once hastened thither in person.

Near the Windmill, however, an unfortunate rencontre took place. Bosquet there met Sir George Brown and Sir George Cathcart, and hastened to proffer his aid, informing the two Generals that he was already followed by some infantry and artillery; and that if the operation then commenced on Mount Inkerman should prove to be the real at-

¹ The Coldstream soon followed, as did also, somewhat later, two of the relieved pickets; and (including Prince Edward's picket at Quarter-guard Point) the whole number of the Guards which sooner or later reached the Inkerman battle-field was 1331.

tack, he could withdraw other troops from the positions they then occupied.¹ Sir George Brown and Sir George Cathcart took upon themselves to decline the offer. They said, it appears, that the English had sufficient reserves at hand; and added a request that, instead of advancing to the scene of the conflict, Bosquet would be pleased to watch the ground in rear of Canrobert's redoubt.² Brown and Cathcart, it would seem, must have spoken under the impulse of a feeling of pride, which, however perturbing to the judgment, must still in a way be admired, because it is a main ingredient in that wonderful assemblage of qualities which makes the British soldier what he is; and indeed this answer to Bosquet was not unlike such as might have come from two superb sergeants or privates who had found themselves asked to acknowledge that the English wanted help from a Frenchman.

Certainly Brown and Cathcart, being unacquainted with the enemy's design for overwhelming Pennefather with 40,000 men, had not even the rudiments of that knowledge which alone could have warranted an English officer in disclaiming all need of French support on Mount Inkerman, and directing General Bosquet's resources into another part of the field. Bosquet, however, attached importance to their words, and, finding his offer rejected, he not only stopped the march of his battalions toward the scene of the real attack, but was even induced to send off some troops toward the Canrobert redoubt, as the two English Generals had requested. So, although the Russians themselves had but little success in that important part of their plan which was to be executed by threatening the Sapounè Heights, a few words heedlessly spoken brought about that very result—I mean the continued detention of Bosquet—which the enemy was vainly laboring to prepare by the efforts of 22,000 men. Lord Raglan, indeed, after-

And afterward
by the mistaken
assurances
of Brown and
Cathcart.

¹ Bosquet's report, 7th November, 1854.

² *Ibid.* Sir George Brown was so eager and industrious in the use of the pen, that his non-contradiction of this published report of Bosquet's goes far to establish the accuracy of the French General. Sir George also left uncontradicted the statement of the great French official work, the 'Atlas de la Guerre d'Orient,' which was published many years before his death. The 'Atlas' says: 'Les Généraux Sir G. Brown et Sir G. Cathcart ont remercié le Général Bosquet de l'offre de son concours; seulement ils l'ont prié de 'renforcer les troupes vers la redoute Canrobert,' etc. Fay (Bosquet's aide-camp) reports the answer of Brown and Cathcart thus: 'Nos réserves sont suffisantes pour parer aux eventualités; veuillez seulement couvrir notre droite en arrière du retranchement anglais.'—P. 125.

ward reversed the intimation conveyed by his two divisional Generals, and requested, as did also Pennefather, and the Duke of Cambridge too (through Colonel Brownrigg), that Bosquet would come to support our people at Inkerman; but meanwhile time had been lapsing; and we shall have to see the English engaged during a period of between two and three hours without yet receiving aid from the French.

After the rejection of the offer just made by him at the Windmill, Bosquet rode back once more to the Telegraph, but the emptiness of the menaces going on in the plain beneath him was by that time so clear that he cast off all remnant of doubt, and bent his whole thought to Mount Inkerman. He accordingly judged that, notwithstanding the refusal he had met with from Brown and Cathcart, his aid at the true seat of danger would be sooner or later invoked; and he was still at the Telegraph expecting every moment a summons, when Colonel Steel, and also, it seems, some other English officers, came bringing him the assurance that the attack on Mount Inkerman had become serious, and intimating that his support was there needed.

Bosquet thereupon ordered Bourbaki to proceed to Mount Inkerman with the same troops which once already before had been sent toward the Windmill.¹ At the same time he ordered that Bourbaki's troops should be followed by a battalion of the 3rd Zouaves, as well as by a battalion of Algerines;² and, a little later, he directed that General d'Aute-marre should also bring forward toward the scene of conflict the other battalion of the 3rd Zouaves, with both the battalions of the 50th Regiment.³ More than half⁴ of these 6000 troops⁵ were not only destined to be in time for the fight, but to have an important and brilliant share in its struggles; and the remainder of them, though never thrown forward to take part as active combatants, were nevertheless on Mount Inkerman some two hours before the close of the battle.

Colin Campbell and Vinoy were neither called upon to resist any actual attack on Balaclava, nor to strike at the flank of any assailant undertaking to force the Col; but with Gortchakoff's force in the plain,

Bosquet's clear perception of the enemy's real purpose.

The reinforcements which Bosquet at intervals was able to bring to the field of Inkerman.

The power of Colin Campbell and Vinoy neutralized.

¹ One battalion of the 7th Léger, one of the 6th of the line, 4 companies of the Foot Chasseurs, together 2115, and 2 troops of horse-artillery.

² 757 and 703, together 1460, and 2 batteries.

³ 703 and 1601, together 2304. ⁴ 3575 infantry and 24 guns. ⁵ 6263.

they could not of course be withdrawn from the ground they stood charged to defend, and accordingly for Inkerman purposes their power on this day was neutralized.

III.

On the whole, we must see that Prince Gortchakoff's operations were producing very little effect; but the actual truth is that his orders condemned him to a state of expectancy, and made his duty depend upon the uncertain fortune of others. The designer of the enemy's plan had assumed that by the 40,000 men advancing against Pennefather, the scant numbers of the English attempting to hold Mount Inkerman would, as a matter of course, be quickly thrust back to the ground near the Windmill, and that the crests along that part of the Chersonese would at once be swept clear of their defenders. For that event Gortchakoff was to watch; and the moment it should take place he was to move up rapidly with horse, foot, and artillery to the ground he would find laid open for him by Dannenberg, thus bringing the numbers of Russian troops assembled together on the Chersonese to a strength of about 60,000. So the foreordained condition of things was such that, if the English, though pressed by mighty numbers, should still for a while hold their ground, they would be not only fending off the heavy multitude of their immediate assailants, but also arresting the action of some 22,000 additional troops. And that is exactly what happened. No blame ought to fall on Prince Gortchakoff. His advance had been left to depend upon a contingency which failed to occur, and it was by the unforeseen tenacity of the small force encountered by other commanders that his power was kept in abeyance.

CHAPTER V.

OPERATIONS ON THE SEBASTOPOL FRONT.

I.

Except by the powerful sortie under Timovieff which will be presently narrated, the garrison forces did little to detain the Allied troops before them; and if now we pass over from our right to Forey's siege-corps on our left, we shall find nothing of moment there

The garrison
forces before
9.30 A.M.

happening, until Prince Napoleon, in obedience to an order from General Canrobert, sent three of his battalions, under General Monet, toward the scene of the conflict on Mount Inkerman. General Canrobert, it seems, had not been slow to assure himself that Mount Inkerman was to be the scene of the real attack, and had dispatched the orders so early as eight o'clock in the morning; but some unexplained delays took place, and at half-past nine o'clock General Monet, with his three battalions, had traversed only a small proportion of the six miles which divided him from the main fight. Prince Napoleon himself was in camp, but had been ordered to hold himself in readiness to move at a moment's notice with the two battalions, which there remained to him, and follow the march of his other troops toward Inkerman. So at the time of the sortie, now about to be spoken of, Forey had with him the whole of his siege-corps except the three battalions under Monet, then marching in the direction of Inkerman.

Canrobert's endeavor to draw reinforcements for Inkerman from his siege-corps.

Troops remaining with Forey at 9.30 A.M.

II.

At half-past nine o'clock, General Timovieff, with some 3000 foot¹ and four guns, issued from the lines of Sebastopol at a point near the Quarantine Bastion, passed between the bay and the cemetery, advanced upon the flank of the siege-works on Mount Rodolph, drove before him the outposts of the French, broke into their batteries, overthrew the guards of their trenches, and spiked a number of their siege-guns.² By this rapid attack Timovieff drew upon himself the whole of the troops remaining under Forey; for De Lourmel's brigade advanced against the front of the assailants, and D'Aurelle's brigade against their right flank, whilst Levailant's division moved forward in support, and the exigency was even judged so grave as to warrant a departure from General Canrobert's orders; for instead of continuing to hold himself in readiness for the march toward Mount Inkerman, Prince Napoleon, with the two battalions remaining under his personal orders, made a movement in the opposite direction to aid the repulse of the sortie.

Seeing the strength of the forces converging upon him, and fearing for the safety of his communication with Sebastopol, Timovieff, when closely pressed, began to withdraw, and found himself supported in the operation of effecting his

¹ The four 'Minsk' battalions, with a strength of 3075.—*Todleben*, p. 483.

² Eight guns, according to the French; according to the Russians, fifteen.

retreat by fresh troops sent out from Sebastopol. He was followed by the French, and in the ardor of pursuit De Lourmel's brigade penetrated into the nook which divides the lines of Sebastopol from the Quarantine Sea-fort. There the French troops underwent a murderous fire, and De Lourmel himself was mortally wounded. His brigade sustained heavy losses, and fell somewhat into confusion, but was extricated after a while by the troops of D'Aurelle's brigade and Levailant's division, which were manœuvred for the purpose under the personal directions of Forey. At half-past eleven, the French as well as the Russians had completed their withdrawal; and Prince Napoleon, with the two battalions then remaining at his side, began to march toward Mount Inkerman, but too late to take part in the fight.

This sortie of Timovieff's was an enterprise executed with much spirit, but not so appointed in regard of time or place as to have the effect of swaying events by forbidding the march of opportune reinforcements to the endangered ground.

III.

From the Karabel Faubourg the Russians maintained a strong fire against the English siege-works, but attempted no sortie with the object of detaining the reinforcements in march for Mount Inkerman. It would seem that the powerful garrison of Sebastopol may have been paralyzed by the hampering words of the general orders, which, being conceived in a too rigid spirit, undertook to assign beforehand the exact contingency in which an attack was to be attempted. The garrison troops had been ordered to move out and seize the batteries of the Allies if confusion should be there setting in;¹ and that contingency not occurring, it happily resulted that the tens of thousands of men who were so placed as to be able to make sorties which might grievously detain the English reinforcements, were suffered to remain standing idle.

Thus the Generals in rear of our trenches were left so unchecked by demonstrations in their front, that they could move freely toward Inkerman with some portions at least of their forces.² Sir Richard England, who commanded the 3rd Division, had at his disposal for field operations a body of about 1400 men. With these (after leaving General Eyre in command

The part taken
by the garrison
in the Karabel
Faubourg.

English rein-
forcements
marched to-
ward Mount
Inkerman.

¹ Défense de Sebastopol, p. 448.

² The rest being for the most part on duty in the trenches.

of the trenches) he began to march toward the scene of the conflict, but when he gained the next ridge and found it vacated by the departure for Inkerman of the troops under Cathcart, he prudently replaced it by a portion of his own force. With the remainder, consisting of two battalions under Sir John Campbell, who commanded the brigade,¹ Sir Richard England continued his march toward the east. He rightly conceived it his duty to watch the two miles of ground which lay between the front of his camp and that of the Light Division; but whilst remembering that part of his task he so placed the main part of his two battalions near the head of the Dock-yard Ravine that, if needed, they might be able to support General Codrington in the defense of his position. Sir George Cathcart commanded the 4th Division. He himself, no less than his people, had long sorely chafed at the destiny which assigned him on the day of the Alma a less stirring task than he liked, and now it was with undisguised joy that he welcomed the first sound of battle alighting upon the ear of the camp, and put his troops there under arms. He directed that the newly-relieved troops just come or coming up from the trenches, should remain in camp; but, as regards that part of his order, he was quietly disobeyed by the greater part of the troops to which it applied; and when he rode off to the Windmill, he was speedily followed by nearly 1700 men, as well as by Townsend's battery.² When afterward, by a message sent back from Mount Inkerman, he revoked the detaining order, he drew to himself some 500 men more, and brought up the number of the reinforcements he furnished to 2200.³

General Buller, who commanded the 2nd brigade of the Light Division, had but few men in camp, because nearly the

¹ The 1st Royals and the 50th.

² These 1700 men marched in six separate bodies (4 battalions and 2 wings), but at very short intervals, and without regard to the question whether they belonged to this or that brigade. Windham thought otherwise, but was mistaken. The 63rd, for instance, marched off in company with the 21st.

³ 2217, viz. :

General Goldie's brigade.	{ 57th Regiment, under Captain Ed. Stanley, 196,	
	(later) 151.....	347
	{ 20th Regiment, under Colonel Horn	340
General Torrens's brigade.	{ 21st Fusileers, under Colonel Ainslie.....	402
	{ 1st Rifle battalion, under Colonel Horsford.....	278
	{ 4 companies of 68th Regiment, under Colonel Hen- ry Smyth.....	384
	{ 2 companies of 46th, under Captain Dallas.....	
	{ 63rd Regiment, under Colonel Swyne.....	466

whole of his 19th Regiment, and large portions also of the 77th and 88th, were either in the trenches or out on picket;¹ but with excellent dispatch he brought 650 men to Mount Inkerman, and was quickly in the thick of the fight.²

IV.

Coming now to the Victoria Ridge, we are still on the Sebastopol front, but at its eastern extremity, and on ground where General Codrington (with the 1st brigade of the Light Division) was not only confronted by the Malakoff tower and works, but also exposed on his flank to the enterprises of the enemy's field army. There was nothing between him and Mount Inkerman except the Careenage Ravine, and already one of his pickets disposed some way down in its bed had been so effectually surprised and turned by the Catherineberg riflemen that the officer commanding it was taken prisoner with no less than twelve of his men.³

How General Codrington discovered the coming attack, and put his troops in camp under arms, we have already seen, but the ulterior measures he took still have to be shown. He was ably assisted not only by Mackenzie, his brigade-major, and his aid-de-camp Campbell, but also by Major Bunbury of the 23rd, who on hearing the outbreak of the battle had come up to offer his services.

At first there were only a few companies that could be brought together, but when most of the relieved pickets and the relieved men from the trenches had come in, Codrington assembled altogether about 1100 men disposable for service in the field, and with these prepared to defend his side of the Careenage Ravine.⁴ He had no field-artillery; and the con-

¹ At first there was only one company of the 19th in camp—viz., the No. 6 company, commanded by Lieutenant Lidwill; but somewhat later Captain Ker's company came in, and a third one being afterward formed under Captain Bright, Major M'Gee assumed the command of all three.

² 649—viz., 4 companies of the 77th, under Colonel Egerton, 259; 5 companies of the 88th, under Colonel Jeffries, 390.

³ The picket, I believe, had been placed with great care under the personal direction of Sir George Brown, but he apparently failed to *link* it effectually with Pennefather's line of pickets on Mount Inkerman.

⁴ 'The whole amounting to about 1100.'—*General Codrington's Report* the day after the battle. When the pickets had all come in, his assembled strength on the ridge was 1219. This force included the 1100, besides portions of the Rifles, and of the 7th, 23rd, and 33rd, a small body of marines, commanded, I believe, by Captain Hopkins, sent up from Balaklava in exchange for an equal number of the Rifle Brigade. It was at the instance of Lyons, who wished to give the marines an enlarged experience, that this exchange took place.

ditions, this day, were not such that the one gun still left in the Lancaster battery could be brought to bear eastward by recurring to the expedient adopted on the 26th of October.¹

If Dannenberg's wish had been followed, the 1100 men brought together by Codrington would have had upon them the whole weight of Soimonoff's 20,000 infantry and 38 guns. As it was, no massive and predetermined attack took effect against the Victoria Ridge, but our Lancaster battery was subjected to a severe enfilading fire.² From this Codrington labored to shield it by maintaining a careful infantry-fire across the Careenage Ravine; and his men did not fail to make targets of any Russian battalions which inclined so far west on Mount Inkerman as to come within the power of their rifles.

There were some of the enemy's troops in the bed of the Careenage Ravine, which—acting perhaps from mistake or under some fortuitous impulse—made bold to ascend the western acclivities of the gorge, and advance toward the Lancaster battery; but Captain Elrington with a portion of his company of the Rifles drove them down at the point of the bayonet. They retreated along the bottom of the ravine, and did not return into the fight.

Disposing the main part of his force in a line which fronted across the ravine, General Codrington maintained his position all day on the Victoria Ridge,³ and at first without other aid; but he was supported after a time by some companies of the 19th Regiment, and likewise, as we already know, by the main part of the two battalions belonging to the 3rd Division which Sir Richard England had moved toward the east.⁴ At a later hour there reached him some pieces of field-artillery, which could not, however, be used

¹ See *ante*, p. 35. Some of the enemy's guns were, this time, so placed that Mr. Hewitt could not throw down the parapet on the right flank of the work without laying it open to artillery-fire.

² Sir Thomas Troubridge, an excellent officer of the 7th Fusileers, was in the battery when he received the cruel blow from a round-shot which all but crushed both his feet. He was the field-officer of the day, and when struck was succeeded by Major Bunbury.

³ The line tracing it from right to left was formed by some companies of the Rifles under Colonel Lawrence, of the 7th under Yea, of the 33rd under Mundy, of the 23rd under Bell, I believe, and of the marines under Captain Hopkins.

⁴ Sir R. England's troops thus acting were so well placed, it appears, as to be almost, if not entirely, sheltered from the fire. There was one casualty in the 1st Royals, but whether it occurred on this ridge, I know not. In the companies of the 19th, whilst advancing, there occurred five casualties. Captain Ker was mortally wounded.

with any advantageous result.¹ Two or three of them were brought into action, but overpowered by the enemy's fire, and very soon after withdrawn.

Codrington lost in killed and wounded some 180 men.²

Though dissevered from Mount Inkerman by the Careenage Ravine, our troops on its bank under Codrington were still very near, as the crow flies, to that master-part of the battle which raged on the other hill-side; and from this close proximity it resulted that the General's firm hold on a vitally needed position was a wholesome sign of ascendancy reacting on the principal fight. The Victoria Ridge at its peak was a height which showed from afar; and although a dense mist had enshrouded Mount Inkerman, this closely neighboring hill remained in great measure unclouded. When people—French, English, or Russian—were able to observe its eastern front, they always saw our troops there established with an air of steadfast dominion, and the advantage resulting from this apparent indication of power was enhanced by the spirit in which General Codrington acted. Whilst discharging to the utmost his own special task, he preserved a due sense of its proportion to the rest of the conflict, and never forgot that the all-paramount fight was the one he saw writhing in mist on the opposite bank of the ravine. His vigilance did not derive from any perturbing anxiety. Far from seeking unduly to strengthen the ground in his charge, he voluntarily dispensed with the presence of troops brought up to support him, and sent them off to Mount Inkerman.³ Calm, trustful, assuring, every message that came from him tended to avert or allay all alarm for the safety of the Vic-

¹ Viz., two guns from Wodehouse's battery, followed afterward by a third, and subsequently by two guns of Swinton's battery attached to the 3rd Division. The ground was so unfavorable, and the enemy's guns so much more powerful, that no artillery conflict could be hopefully maintained by the portions of batteries thus brought up, and the attempt, though made, was soon abandoned.

² Amongst these were Lieutenant Thorold of the 33rd Regiment, and Lieutenant Malcolm of the Rifles, both killed; and the list of wounded included besides Troubridge, Captain Shipley, Captain Rose, Lieutenant Vane, Lieutenant Corbett, Lieutenant Butler, Ensign Jones, and Ensign Owens.

³ It was he who sent thither (with his trusty Mackenzie to guide it) a wing of the 50th Regiment; and he also, I believe, pressed, though in vain (through Mackenzie), that the three companies of the 19th, which had been brought to his ridge, should go off to Mount Inkerman. Ker, Lidwill, and Bright, and the officers and men of the three companies, were eager to do so; but the Major resolved to place them, as before shown, on the west side of the Victoria Ridge.

toria Ridge; and Lord Raglan, never finding it necessary to be there present in person, was able to remain undistracted at the seat of the real attack.

V.

We have now passed from west to east through all that part of the battle which extended along the Sebastopol front to ground on the verge of Mount Inkerman, and are left after all to conclude that if Prince Gortchakoff's measures on the opposite flank did but little to arrest the march of French and English reinforcements, General Möller with far greater numbers effected still less. It was not to Timovieff's vigorous sortie that the paucity or the tardiness of the succors obtained from Forey's siege-corps could rightly be traced; and, so far as concerns English troops dispatched from their lines before Sebastopol to encounter General Dannenberg's masses, the garrison did not even endeavor to forbid this transfer of strength by feigning an attack on our trenches. It is true that in proportion to their huge task, the English reinforcements were after all very scant, but that was a circumstance owing to Lord Raglan's sheer want of numbers, and not in any degree to efforts made by the enemy.

It was well for England and France that the military authority exercised within the lines of Sebastopol had by this time returned to its normal state, and superseded that brilliant dictatorship which began the defense of the fortress; for if Colonel de Todleben had still been there in full power, he would hardly have stood acquiescent by the ramparts of the Karabel Faubourg whilst our siege-troops were leaving their camps, and marching across his front to succor their comrades at Inkerman.

VI.

Upon the whole, it results that the enemy obtained no substantially fruitful services from that vast number of troops to which his auxiliary measures were intrusted; for, although the Allies stood extended before him upon a front of some 20 miles without having any reserves that could be marched from a centre, he failed to make them expiate their fault, and suffered them to reinforce their endangered post by moving troops with great freedom along the circumference of their position.

Result of the efforts made by the garrison.

General failure of the enemy's auxiliary operations.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FIGHT ON MOUNT INKERMAN.

DESCRIPTION OF MOUNT INKERMAN.—ITS DEFENSES.—STRENGTH OF PENNEFATHER.—ARRANGEMENT OF THE PICKET SYSTEM.—THE ENEMY'S CONFUSED AND CLASHING COUNSELS.—HIS FINAL DETERMINATION.

I.

HAVING now learned the state of the battle in every other part of the field, we at length reach the scene of the enemy's main attack.


Except at the narrow, isthmus-like ridge connecting it with the downs farther south, the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese stands sundered from all other heights by, on one side, the marshes of the lower Tchernaya; on another, the Sebastopol roadstead; on a third, the Careenage Ravine; and the part of the uplands thus almost cloven off from the rest is that 'Mount' or pile of hills which, in spite of all Russian geography, has gathered, where English is spoken, the steadfast name of Inkerman.¹

In shape, this Mount Inkerman is like the stock of a gun;² and, having the butt-end turned northward, it there shows a breadth of about two miles and a quarter; but in trending toward its southern extremity the ground so narrows away

¹ What the *Russians* call the 'Inkerman Heights' are those overlooking the ruins from the opposite or northern side of the river, and called, *ante*, p. 42, the 'Old City Heights.' In *their* nomenclature, our 'Mount Inkerman' is merely a part of the 'Sapounè Heights.'

² See this diagram:

Cape Tröitsky.



that, even with the abutting steeps on either side, the isthmus—if so one may call it—has a diameter of only about six furlongs, and the upwold, or high level part of the neck, is scarce 400 yards across. Measured from Cape Tröitsky to the head of the Well-way—the more easterly of the two highest dells which feed the Careenage Ravine—the length of Mount Inkerman falls little short of three miles.

Though in most places steep, the sides of the mount have been riven by numbers of breaks, which more or less ease the ascent; and, indeed, so large a proportion of the whole ground is thus taken up by deep hollows, that the downs at its top have but a moderate extent, forming only, as it were, the skeleton of what the mount would be if not cleft by ravines.¹ The spine of the rock thus left standing up over the valleys begins at the Tröitsky Peak, and, stretching thence away to the isthmus in an arched line, subtended by the Careenage Ravine, throws out at right angles to itself several ribs of high ground. From Tröitsky Peak² onward along the course of the arc, the wold mounts up by gently ascending steps—St. George's Brow,³ Cossack Rise,⁴ Cossack Knoll,⁵ Shell Hill⁶—till it reaches the centre of the English Heights,⁷ and thence slopes down to the isthmus.

In the centre of Mount Inkerman, Shell Hill lifts its peak to a height of nearly 600 feet above the sea-level; and, taken along with the rib shooting out on each side, it offers a spacious and commanding site for the establishment of field-batteries; but also the conformation of the

¹ The whole area of what a strategist includes under the name of the Inkerman 'plateau' may be subjected, it seems, to a method of reckoning which allows it, at the broadest part, a measure of less than half a mile, and at the narrowest only 140 yards.—*Todleben*, 'Défense de Sebastopol,' vol. i.

² 314 feet above the sea-level.

³ 368 feet.

⁴ 370 feet.

⁵ 505 feet.

⁶ 583 feet. Amongst the officers and men of the 2nd Division there was a difference of habit in regard to nomenclature, for some called Shell Hill 'Cossack' Hill; but the ground which rightly took a name from the Cossack vedette lay farther toward the west. 'Shell Hill' was so called on account of the missiles which used to come lighting upon it whenever the enemy saw there a group of English officers, or even a single horseman. Of that fire no man, it is believed, drew so much as the indefatigable Percy Herbert; and if it follows that from that circumstance he earned a right to christen the ground, there can be no doubt that 'Shell Hill' is the right name. He has always so called it. It was he who 'explained away' the shells, making out that they were less dangerous than they seemed because they must have been thrown by gunners who were guided only by telegraphed signals, and could not see the objects they fired at.

⁷ 614 feet at the centre. At the northernmost extremity—i. e., at 'Mount Head'—636 feet.

ground is such that if the disposers of ordnance brought up from the north should desire, when in action, to refuse their right, they might bend off that part of their artillery line along the crest of West Jut—a less advanced rib of high ground—and in that case they would have for their guns a front of no less than a mile. This Shell Hill, with its juts, east and west, was the range of heights destined to be seized by the Russians at the very outset of the fight, and to give them the means of at once opening a destructive fire from batteries well covered toward each flank by ravines. As a first stepping-stone to victory, Shell Hill was of infinite worth; but the very excellence of the position was what, in diabolology, has often been called a ‘snare,’ for it tended to affect the disposers of the Russian artillery with a dangerous contentment, ill befitting the design of the enterprise.¹

From the summit of Shell Hill to the centre of the English Home Ridge, a distance of about 1300 yards, the spine of the upwold still maintaining a high elevation bridges over the interval by an easy bend, such as that along the back of a horse, from the withers-point to the croup; but, as the means of approach for an army engaged in attack, this Saddle-top Reach is wanting in breadth; for, whilst suffering deep encroachment on the east from the channel of the Quarry Ravine, it is straitened too on the west by the intrusion of the Mikriakoff Glen, and numberless dells or gullies.

But the formation of the ground is such that the occupation of Shell Hill in strength must needs carry with it the control of the Quarry Ravine, including that upper part of it, seven hundred yards in length, which runs parallel with the Saddle-top Reach, and in this sheltered hollow an assailant determining to force his way southward over the hillock in front of the Isthmus would find a lair of great value from which to make his spring at a distance of only six hundred paces from the coveted goal.

South-east of Shell Hill, and overlooking the approach by the Saddle-top Reach, there stand the English Heights. These bend so abruptly at their centre that, though forming throughout an entire and single mass of high ground, they still present two distinct ridges at right angles to each other, one ridge with a front toward the north, the other with a front toward the west.

¹ Général de Todleben’s opinion is that the Russian artillery gravely injured the prospects of the enterprise by remaining stationary on Shell Hill instead of pushing on to more advanced positions, and thus bearing forward the weight of battle.

The part of the hill facing northward reaches all along the front of the ground where our 2nd Division lay camped on the morning of the battle, and is called the Home Ridge. Having its westernmost slope at a distance of about 300 yards from the steeps of the Careenage Ravine, this ridge passes thence to the eastward, and culminates at the bend of the hill. With the bend counted in as a part of it, the crest of this Home Ridge has a front of about 650 yards, which looks down obliquely along the Saddle-top Reach; and its reverse slopes descending upon what was the camping-ground of our 2nd Division, face back in a southerly direction toward the entrance of the Isthmus.

The other part of the hill is called the Fore Ridge. Fronting as it does toward the west, this Fore Ridge looks down slantwise across the Saddle-top Reach; and its reverse slopes descending eastward, bend down to the brow of the steeps overhanging the Inkerman marsh. At its northern extremity, the Fore Ridge is called the Mount Head;¹ and it there stands so forward as to be closely overlooking the entrance of the Quarry Ravine.

Such ridges as these, it is plain, could not but be a great source of defensive strength to the General who might be able to arm and to man them; for everywhere their sides have a strong incline, and they not only offer commanding positions for the artillery which might be made to cross its fires on the approaches, but can also by means of their reverse slopes afford good shelter to troops.

To the few in their strife with the many, a field of battle which afforded a spacious front for the outposts, yet tapered away at last into a small compact stronghold, plainly offered immense advantages; but we shall find that General Pennefather—for reasons which were not without force—abstained from adapting his defense to this peculiar configuration of the ground.

There was a part of the Inkerman field which, if not of such value in battle as to warrant a determined attack, or invite to a bloody defense, still chanced to become the scene of much valiant and obstinate, though, in one sense, irrelevant fighting. From the north-eastern slopes of Mount Head there shoot out two spurs of unequal length. The one on the right—the Kitspur—is the lesser of the two. It

¹ Its height above the sea-level is 636 feet. This was in later days the site of the strong redoubt thrown up by the French.

stands buttressed by steeps which, however rude and difficult, can still be climbed without peril by people going on foot. It was there that there stood on the day of the battle the parapet of a dismantled work which was destined to become famous in history. The other outshoot of ground—the The Inkerman Tusk. Inkerman Tusk, or Spur—stretches far in a northeasterly direction between naked crags, on either side; and, though smooth, or gently sloping home down to the brink of the precipice, it there ends at last with absolute suddenness in a sheer wall of vertical rock.¹ The cleft which divides the Kitspur from the Inkerman Tusk is St. Clement's Gorge.

The English never treated Mount Inkerman as a defensive The brush-wood clothing Mount Inkerman. position which (in order to leave its assailants exposed to view and to fire) should be cleared of obstructions; and (except upon spots near the camp, which had been stripped by men toiling after fuel)² the ground at the time of the fight was in most places clad with a stunted oak brush-wood. This grew very scant on the toplands, but abundant on most of the steepes. In some places it reached a man's knees, in others his waist or his shoulders, and in others again surrounded him with boughs 9 or 10 feet high.

The high rock-built topland or spine of Mount Inkerman The roads. was so free from difficult steepes, so thinly coated with soil, and so sparsely interrupted by the there puny stems of the under-wood, that guns once brought up to the brow could be easily moved on along the downs; but Nature had placed graver hindrance in the way of ascent, and it was only upon roads made by man that great trains of artillery could well be dragged up the ravines.

After, years before, bringing an aqueduct along the northern skirts of Mount Inkerman, and across the Careenage Ravine, Science did not then press on its conquest of natural obstacles by carrying a roadway in the same direction; and even down to the outbreak of the war, it was only by fetching an extravagant circuit along the Post-road, and traveling all round the ravine, that a man could pass with a carriage from Inkerman Bridge to Sebastopol.

This still unaltered Post-road, after crossing Inkerman

¹ No maps or plans can adequately express the characteristics of this spur, and it was only on seeing it in 1869 from the valley of the Tchernaya that I apprehended its singular form.

² The parts of the bushes taken for fuel were the roots. These our soldiers used to call 'clumps.'

The Post-road. Bridge, begins the ascent of the Mount by entering the Volovia Gorge, but presently bends round into the jaws of a long, craggy, winding defile called the Quarry Ravine, and climbs up along its left bank, keeping always on ground much higher than the bed of the water-course. After coming up clear of the ravine to the open downs at its head, the line of way stretches southward under the front of the Fore Ridge, crosses over the Home Ridge, runs straight through the centre of what was Pennefather's camping-ground, goes on by the Isthmus to ground near the Windmill, and—being then at last clear of the Careenage Ravine—turns off into the Woronzoff road.

In old times, before skilled engineers had traced the line of the Post-road, people threaded their way through the Quarry Ravine by following the course of its bed, and the road then in use still existed at the time of the battle. There were thus two parallel roads running each very near to the other by which an assailant might move up his columns through the Quarry Ravine to the open topland above.¹

But on the outbreak of the war, Prince Mentschikoff made haste to connect the Karabel Faubourg with Inkerman Bridge by a work called the 'Sapper's Road;' and—as though he had caught a dim foresight of what afterward proved to be needed for the enterprise of the 5th of November—he so shaped his new line of route as to make it—not merely a link between the east and the west, but—also a means of affording two metaled ways of ascent home up to the spine of Mount Inkerman. So if, meaning to use the new work for that last purpose, a general would regard it as comprising two roads, which having come, one from the faubourg and the other from Inkerman Bridge, meet each other on the crest of the Mount. One moiety of the new highway, that is, the West Sapper's Road, after leaving the faubourg, and crossing—by a viaduct—the great Careenage Ravine, winds on into a gorge, and climbs up betwixt its banks to the height called St. George's Brow. There it is met at an angle by the other half of Prince Mentschikoff's work, that is, by the East Sapper's Road, which, after having parted from the Post-road near Inkerman Bridge, and made its way westward for more than a mile almost

¹ Measured *horizontally*, the average distance between the two roads must be little more than about 150 yards, but in their *altitude* the difference is great.

close alongside of the aqueduct, has all at once turned toward the south, and climbed up St. George's Ravine.

Thus, apart from its obvious uses as a way of lateral communication between the army of Sebastopol and the army beyond the Tchernaya, this Sapper's Road opened to both the means of invading Mount Inkerman; for if one of the armies should march out from the faubourg, it could ascend with its train of artillery by the West Sapper's Road, whilst the other having come from the north across Inkerman Bridge could move up by St. George's Ravine; and the two heads of columns at last might be then side by side on the Brow, where the ground was open enough for the orderly junction of converging forces. Once on St. George's Brow, the united forces would have downlands before them very little obstructed by brush-wood, and might freely move on to Shell Hill.

Upon this Sapper's Road the whole problem of the Russian attack on Mount Inkerman may be said to have rested; for excepting the Post-road (which climbed up along the perilous defile of the Quarry Ravine, under the eyes of the English sentries), Prince Mentschikoff's new work afforded the only two metaled ways lying under his own control by which guns could be brought up the Mount. As it was, the Russian commander, by using the two metaled ways of ascent comprised in his Sapper's Road, could not only bring up his forces from the east as well as the west, and unite them with their trains of artillery on the height called St. George's Brow, but might do this in peace without trespassing, as it were, out of his own ground, without having to drive in one picket—nay even, if Fortune should smile, without being observed by our outposts.

The Careenage Ravine, though forbiddingly hard to cross, could with much more ease be ascended; and there was a cart-road which went up along its bed, past the Mikriakoff Farm, to the junction of the two gully channels which meet under Quarter-guard Point. There, the road turning off from the Well-way (which leads straight up to the Isthmus) bent away into the other or more westerly channel, and thence gained the Victoria Ridge at a spot not far distant from General Codrington's tents. The Russians, however, were scarce under temptation to adventure their artillery in the depths of this Careenage Ravine, and no infantry which might attempt to ascend it could advance upon an extended front.

Road along
the channel of
the Careenage
Ravine.

II.

Irrespectively of the troops with which the enemy proposed to march upon Mount Inkerman, he had some resources prepared beforehand, which could not but strengthen the ground for him on the day of his enterprise. His guns near the Light-house might prove indeed, it is true, to be rather molesting than formidable; and the Malakoff, with all its armament, might help him only a little by taking a blind part in the fight; but the more northerly batteries of the Karabel Faubourg, and the Vladimir and the Chersonese steamships lying moored on the east of the roadstead, made him sure of his dominion on the Sapper's Road, and could cover the advance and retreat of either those troops which were to operate from Sebastopol or those brought from Inkerman Bridge. Moreover, the starboard batteries of the two ships, whilst held ready to sweep with their fire the nearest hill-sides of the Mount, could also search the ravines; and, in the event of the fight being rolled toward the north, might interpose with great power.

If occupied in its entirety by even a moderate force well secured against the peril of having its communications cut off, Mount Inkerman might have been guarded with comparative ease;¹ but an undisputed dominion over the northern half of the Mount had been deliberately left to Prince Mentschikoff;² and thus it might happen that at the very outset of the battle General Pennefather would be encountering an army already sharing the heights with him.

There were many who saw that the charge and the peril of defending the southern half of Mount Inkerman might be incalculably lightened by throwing up works of defense; but—intent on Sebastopol, and overladen with their double burden of siege-work as well as field duties—the English were altogether unable to command the hands needed for strongly intrenching the ground, and no such undertaking was executed or even begun by their corps of engineers.

It happened, however, that in conformity with the known

¹ By pushing forward strong outposts to occupy the spurs toward the north.
—See 'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. iii., p. 290.

² See *ibid.*, vol. iii., pp. 290, 291, for the reasons which prevented the occupation of the ground. As showing the completeness of the enemy's empire over the northern part of Mount Inkerman, see the narrative, *ante*, p. 26.

The crest-work.

wish of Sir De Lacy Evans, and under the impulsion given by the energies of Colonel Percy Herbert,¹ the artillerymen of the 2nd Division, with what help they could get from their infantry comrades, had thrown up a work on Hill Bend, and carried it—although not continuously—some way along the crest of Home Ridge. What the artillerymen desired was that, in the event of their field-guns being brought into action on Home Ridge, they should be provided with some cover, however slight. To this end our people formed an embankment by heaping together loose stones, and adding besides so much earth as might guard against the mischief of splinters; but the rock of this crest being scantily coated over with soil, they had to fetch the needed material from lower ground; and did not prove able to make alongside the embankment any lengthened excavation that could well be called a ditch or a trench. On Hill Bend, the designer had seized the advantage offered by the form of the ground, and the work at this spot, whilst having (as elsewhere) a face toward the north, had also a face—with room for three guns—looking toward the north-west, in other words, looking straight along the Saddle-top Reach, and directly fronting Shell Hill. At that north-west face, and there only, the embankment had a thickness of several feet;² but height was wanting, for it seems that the work at this part rose little more than two feet above the ground.³ Elsewhere, the embankment was far more slender, but also, at some places, higher.

Toward the left, this crest-work was a construction so slight, and so rude, that by many whose tents stood close under, it was never so much as observed; but on the right of the road, the growth of the humble rampart was more often remarked, and men called it the Folly of this man, or the Folly of that one, uniting it with the name of any officer to whom, for the moment, camp satire might chance to impute the design.

Yet, despised as it had been, and slight as it really was, the work proved to be of great service in the battle; for it not only fulfilled its main purpose by giving at least some

¹ The Assistant Quartermaster-General attached to the 2nd Division.

² The merit of giving solidity to this part of the work—it proved to be of great advantage in the battle—belonged to Captain Gubbins.

³ Indeed it is the impression of General Collingwood Dickson (who brought his two 18-pounders into battery at this part of the work) that the height was much less than that above stated; but he nevertheless bears witness that the number of missiles stopped by this dwarf bank was very great.

cover to the artillery, but also afforded shelter to men lying down behind it; and besides, it marked out the front of a good rallying-ground for disordered troops.

Where the ground began to descend into the Quarry Ravine, there stood, crossing and blocking the Post-road, one of those low picket-walls or lengthened heaps of loose stones by which our men serving on outpost duty used to make for themselves a scant shelter. Having a height of about three and a half or four feet, and extending some way into the brush-wood on either side of the road, this small fence marked and sheltered the 'Grand-guard' of the inlying picket there posted, and was called at first by our people the 'Main Picket Barrier,' but afterward simply 'the Barrier.' It was destined to be an object of moment in the fight, not alone for the sake of the cover which so slight a pile could afford, nor even on account of any special worth attaching to its position, but because it served as a landmark defining a part of the ground on which resolute men, if so minded, might determine to make a stand. Lower down the Quarry Ravine, our people had obstructed the Post-road by making a cut across it.

These slight works were all that had been done to strengthen the ground against invaders; but the parapet of a dismantled earth-work, thrown up weeks before for another purpose, was still to be seen upstanding on one of the slopes of the Kitspur.¹ When in use, the work had been armed with a couple of 18-pounders, soon afterward withdrawn, and men called it the 'Two-gun,' or more often the 'Sand-bag' Battery. It often gave pleasant shelter to men out on picket against easterly winds; but the notion of ever using the parapet in an infantry fight had been so entirely absent from the mind of the constructor that it was not even furnished with a banquette. Though having no genuine worth as a lodgment to be used in attack, or as an obstacle good for defense, this dismantled parapet, rising up on a conspicuous crest to a height of eight or ten feet, was still so enticing an object that in the turmoil of battle (where men often strive after false prizes) it might become the stake for which numbers would die, and receive, some day, from French soldiery, a dismal name telling of slaughter.

¹ The 'other purpose' above referred to was that of silencing a Russian gun placed in battery near the Inkerman ruins, which had attempted to molest our people. The Russian gun was quickly silenced; and, the object having been attained, our two 18-pounders had been withdrawn some days before the day of the battle.

ter.¹ Far from giving an advantage to the Allies, this ill-omened pile was destined to bring them into grave peril, first by causing an all but ruinous severance of the small English force, and next by drawing the French into a wrong field of action.

Such, then, was that southern half of Mount Inkerman which had to be attacked and defended; and there is warrant, perhaps, for saying that a skilled commander who could arm the whole range of the English Heights with powerful batteries supported by a proportionate force of good infantry might be trusted to keep his hold against assailants double in number. But it was no such smooth problem as this that offered itself for solution on the morning of the 5th of November. Far indeed from having the 60 guns and the 20,000 troops which would elicit the military value of the English Heights, General Pennefather had only in the early morning 12 pieces of field-artillery and something less than 3000 foot, with a right to expect reinforcements of uncertain amount as well as at uncertain intervals, from time to time coming up; and it did not, of course, follow that heights, excellent as a standing-ground for a whole army-corps, must be a proportionately good stronghold, or even any stronghold at all for a general thus weak in numbers. So, whatever General Pennefather may be presently shown to have achieved by dint of sheer fighting in many parts of the field, we shall scarce see him forming or wielding that particular engine of defensive war which soldiers call a force 'in position.'

III.

The upwold in the immediate rear of Mount Inkerman afforded no second standing-ground, either natural or artificial, to troops which by stress of battle might be driven back through the Isthmus from the position of the English Heights; for the Canrobert Redoubt was a work which had no other purpose or use than that of strengthening our defenses against what were never attempted, that is, attacks from the east. This part of the Chersonese could be distinguished from afar by the trunk of a dismantled windmill, long familiar to the eyes of our people;² and it constituted the only approach to Mount

¹ The 'abattoir.' When I visited the ground in 1869, the parapet was yet standing.

² In the autumn of 1869, I found the massive trunk of this windmill still marking the ground as in the time of the war.

Inkerman from ground lying south of the Isthmus. When coming to take part in the fight, reinforcements, whether English or French, were all of them destined to pass by way of this Windmill Ridge; and here, too, or on ground very near, when the moment should seem to be ripe, Prince Gortchakoff was to crown the heights with more than 20,000 fresh troops.

IV.

Lying camped at the Isthmus, and having altogether a strength of a little less than 3000 foot,¹ with twelve guns under Colonel Fitzmayer, the 2nd Division —a hard-worked, but zealous and ever warlike force—kept watch on Mount Inkerman, by maintaining an extensive system of outposts.²

Strength of the force under Pennefather in charge of Mount Inkerman.

On the right rear of the camp the chain furnished by this division linked itself to the extremity of the line of pickets there maintained by the Guards, stretched thence northward to the flank of the Kitspur, passed looping across the head of the Inkerman Tusk, and thence turned back to the Barrier or Main Picket Wall, the station occupied by the 'field-officer of the day.' Re-appearing (after a break) near the head of East Jut, the line passed in a south-westerly direction across the folds of Shell Hill, went on to the edge of the upwold, and thence following the steep part way down sought to link itself with that chain of the Light Division pickets which began near Mikriakoff Farm in the bed of the Careenage Ravine, and ascended to the right Lancaster battery on the slopes of the Victoria Ridge. Of course, the scope of the ground thus watched could be varied from time to time as circumstances might command; and at night in particular, as is usual, the men who had watched during daylight from the brows of the hills, were commonly drawn back so far as to avoid being seen on the sky-line; but even, irrespectively of that precaution, the chain in some places at dusk was often a good deal retracted.

The chain of outposts there maintained.

The Russian vedette, always rooted to one spot of ground, was near, very near to our sentries; but in general remained hidden from them by the bend of the hill, and it was not the habit of our riflemen to go beyond bounds in order to disturb the lone horseman. People gazing from the west

¹ 2956—see table in Appendix.

² See note in Appendix, showing how the pickets were furnished on the eve and morning of Inkerman.

used to wonder how Russia and England in the persons of their outermost sentries could be always so near and so peaceful.

At the end of their twenty-four hours of outpost duty, and always before break of day, the pickets used to be relieved, and there was, therefore, a lengthened time every morning when, the old and the new pickets being all of them on outpost duty, a very large proportion of the division was absent from camp.

A system of pickets thus crossing the centre of Mount Inkerman, instead of skirting its front, did not purport, of course, to be one which could so overlook the approaches as to insure early knowledge of any approaching attack; but, although Colonel Percy Herbert, the Assistant Quartermaster-General, used to pray that the chain should be looped forward in such manner as to secure the maintenance of an effective watch on the northern and north-western Spurs, he had always been answered that this was not to be done without either employing more forces than could well be spared for the purpose, or else incurring the risk of having men surrounded and taken. The intermediate plan of keeping the pickets as before during the main part of the day and night, but causing them to patrol toward the front in the early morning, was an expedient of later days.

As a part of the precautionary system of the 2nd Division, two guns used to be kept, at this time, on what was called 'picket' duty—that is, they were placed on the Post-road, close in rear of the infantry tents, with their horses already 'hooked in.'

In advance of the 2nd Division pickets, and on ground not far distant from St. George's Brow, the venturesome Goodlake was present on the morning of the action with 30 men of the Guards.¹

Not as part of the general or army system of pickets, but rather as a means of securing his camp from surprise, H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge was accustomed to maintain a watch at Quarter-guard Point; and we shall see that the company of the Grenadier Guards there posted under H. S. H. Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar was at one moment reached by the swelling flood-tide of battle.

V.

Prince Mentschikoff's written orders were delivered at five in the afternoon on the 4th of November, and, so far as

¹ With respect to the nature and exploits of this roving band under Goodlake, see note, *ante*, pp. 30, 31.

Prince Ment-
schikoff's
written orders
for the attack
on Mount In-
kerman.

concerned the attack by Soimonoff and Pauloff with their 40,000 men, his words ran as follows :

'It is decided that to-morrow, the 5th of November, the English shall be attacked in their position, in order that we may seize and occupy the heights on which they are established.

'1. The field army-corps at Sebastopol,¹ . . . under the command of Lt.-General Soimonoff, after having previously moved out from the line of fortifications, will march, starting from the Careenage Ravine, at six o'clock in the morning.²

'2. The detachment camped on the Old City Heights,³ . . . under Lt.-General Pauloff, will, at six o'clock in the morning, restore Inkerman Bridge, and push on vigorously to meet and join the corps of Lt.-General Soimonoff. With this detachment will be General de Dannenberg, commander of the 4th Infantry Corps, who is to take the paramount command of the two corps as soon as they shall have effected their junction.⁴

'5. All particular measures concerning the execution of the orders given remain under the responsibility of the commanders of the corps of troops above mentioned, who in the night between the 4th and the 5th of November will acquaint me with their dispositions.

'6. At the commencement of the action the Commander-in-Chief will be near Inkerman Bridge.'

Both Soimonoff and Pauloff rightly understood that the Prince by these words meant to order a conjoint attack of their two army-corps on Mount Inkerman;⁵ and the written directions to their troops, which they accordingly framed, were accepted without disapproval by the Commander-in-Chief.⁶

Although Dannenberg's appointment in strictness would take no effect till the morrow, it yet gave him of course from the first a certain inchoate power, and he himself plainly judged that he was al-

¹ Here follows a detailed description of the force.

² The hour was afterward altered to 5 A.M.

³ The Heights in the original, and by the Russians generally, as we have before seen, were called 'les hauteurs d'Inkerman.'

⁴ Clauses 3 and 4 are the instructions addressed to General Gortchakoff, commanding the troops which would operate in the valley of Balaclava, and General Möller, commanding the garrison, and will be found *ante*, at pp. 59, 66, and 75.

⁵ This is shown by their two papers of subsidiary directions (which see in the Appendix, No. VI., under the heads of 'First' and 'Second Papers'), and by Prince Mentschikoff's tacit approval of those arrangements.

⁶ 'First' and 'Second Papers' *ubi ante*.

ready entitled to command the two lieutenant-generals.¹
 His first set of instructions. For their guidance, accordingly, he drew up a set of directions, which, if ill conceived and inapt, and therefore embarrassing, still did not apparently seek to extend the field of the enterprise.²

But later in the evening, Dannenberg conceived the idea of insisting that Soimonoff should deliver his attack on the Victoria Ridge instead of Mount Inkerman, and he went on to press his new plan by the use of peculiar language, which, although indirect and unfit, and at first sight confounding, still had clearness enough, when studied, to show what his meaning must be. Besides making a second alteration in Pauloff's arrangements,³ he dispatched a paper to Soimonoff, in which, without openly saying that he had resolved to supersede the hitherto accepted plan, he professed to take it for granted that Soimonoff—in forgetfulness of all past decisions—would be making his attack on the west of the Carcenage Ravine, and gave him accordingly three subsidiary directions, all plainly based on the assumption that the Victoria Ridge, and not Mount Inkerman, was to be Soimonoff's theatre of action.⁴ Indeed his aide-camp says that he parted at night from Soimonoff's people with an 'au revoir' for the morrow on the crown of the Victoria Ridge.

With the same object, and still using the same indirectness of language, Dannenberg sent a report to Head-quarters which, however obliquely expressed, still said quite enough, it would seem, to arouse almost any commander, and force him at once to arbitrate;⁵ but Prince Mentschikoff, as though seized by that torpor which oftentimes palsies a man who has long been preparing great issues, did not so interpose his authority as to take care that Dannenberg should be either overruled or obeyed; and, the expedient of personal interviews or of farther communications by the pen not being adopted, Soimonoff was left in his dilemma. He had either to accept the strangely indirect language of one not yet in strictness his chief as a sufficing warrant for the abandonment of a plan adopted and still tacitly sanctioned by Prince

Prince Mentschikoff's non-interference.

Soimonoff's final determination.

¹ 'I made the following disposition.'—*Dannenberg's Dispatch*, 8th November, 1854.

² See this Paper in the Appendix, No. VI.

³ This alteration is fully recited in the 'Third Paper' *ubi ante*.

⁴ See his 'Second Paper' in the Appendix, No. VI.

⁵ See this, the 'Third Paper' in the Appendix, No. VI.

Mentschikoff, or else venture to resist the directions of a general who on the morrow (if both should live till the junction) would be his commanding officer. He chose the last

alternative.¹ Rejecting both the sets of instructions addressed to him by Dannenberg, he not

only resolved to follow the old design, but to follow it in his own way; and since Pauloff's arrangements, however severely dislocated by the interference of Dannenberg, were not after all inconsistent with Soimonoff's purpose, there re-emerged in the end, out of all this confusion, the originally accepted plan of throwing upon Mount Inkerman alone the whole might of the two army-corps.

Accordingly Soimonoff, leading the whole of his own forces over the viaduct, and following the west part of the Sapper's Road up to the top of St. George's Brow, would thence march straight on to Shell Hill; and Popoff, with his seamen undertaking to restore the Inkerman Bridge some time before break of day, General Pauloff, after sending 6000 of his light infantry to ascend the Mount at its north-eastern angle, would follow the eastern part of the Sapper's Road with all his remaining battalions and the whole of his artillery. Passing thus along the shore of the roadstead, he would thence bend up to the ground of junction on St. George's Brow, where (being a good deal later than the forces brought up from Sebastopol) he would find himself close in rear of Soimonoff's reserves. These movements accomplished, the task of placing some 40,000 men and 135 guns on Mount Inkerman would at length be fulfilled. A body of sappers marching with Soimonoff's forces was to intrench the ground which should be wrested from the English, and the direction of the work was intrusted to Colonel de Todleben.

¹ Dannenberg assuming that, before the junction, he had a right to command Soimonoff, stated in his dispatch that he had ordered him to attack with his left on the left or western bank of the Careenage Ravine, but that, instead of doing so, Soimonoff's force had advanced on the right or eastern side of the ravine; and this statement naturally generated the idea that Soimonoff had made a mistake, the truth being, however, as stated in the text.

. *FIRST PERIOD.*

FROM 5.45 A.M. TO 7.30 A.M.

I.

With his 19,000 infantry and 38 guns, General Soimonoff, in darkness and mist, had marched out from the Karabel Faubourg at five o'clock in the morning, and it may be said that about three-quarters of an hour later he was already beginning the battle. In conformity with the orders issued beforehand, a great quietness was maintained. The road—the West Sapper's Road—had been broken by floods; but, under the hands of engineers sent forward in advance of the troops, it was, minute by minute, restored to such a condition that, without being gravely delayed, the whole body of troops, with its 29 battalions and all its cannon and tumbrils, could move down to the viaduct, cross over to the opposite steep of the Careenage Ravine, and—still following the West Sapper's Road—make good its ascent of Mount Inkerman. The head of the column, accordingly, after crossing the viaduct, moved silently up the acclivities on the Inkerman side of the ravine, and with this part of his force General Soimonoff was present in person. He did not himself know the ground, and was led by a guide. When the Kolivansk battalions had gained St. George's Brow, Soimonoff ordered that they should be allowed a halt of ten minutes, and addressed to them some words of encouragement and guidance, telling the men that they would fight under the eyes of the two young grand-dukes, and directing that the march, when resumed, should still be conducted in silence.

St. George's Brow was the ground where the two army-corps, if accurately timed in their movements, would effect their junction; but Soimonoff's people as yet could hear no tramp of battalions, no rumbling of artillery-wheels in the direction of St. George's Ravine or along the shore of the roadstead; and in truth, at this time, all the forces of Pauloff—for Dannenberg's confusing orders had been clogging their movements—were still on the other side of the Tchernaya. Yet without for that reason delaying his march, General Soimonoff after a while began to move on toward Shell Hill; and, the ground now admitting it, he soon extended his front.

The companies of the 6th Rifles and the eight light-infantry battalions of the Tomsk and Kolivansk regiments,

His advance
in order of
battle.

supported by the four Catherinburg battalions, and having with them 22 heavy 12-pounder guns, constituted the more advanced portion of Soimonoff's force; and at six o'clock these foremost troops, having a front which stretched freely across the toplands from north-east to south-west, were silently advancing along the spine of Mount Inkerman in their favorite order of battle. First marched the Rifles in extended order, then on the right two battalions of the Tomsk, and on the left, in the same alignment, two battalions of the Kolivansk regiments; but each of these four battalions had been broken up into four 'company columns,' three marching in front upon the same alignment, with intervals between them, and the fourth coming on in support. So that which followed next to the Rifles was a line of small columns twelve in number, with four other like columns in their immediate rear.¹ In support to all these troops the four Catherinburg battalions marched together in close battalion columns. The 22 guns, covered by the infantry, moved in double column of route; but when brought into battery, were to take the centre of the line of battle.

The rest of Soimonoff's forces were meanwhile ascending Mount Inkerman, but not with that absolute freedom from hostile interruption which had been enjoyed by the head of the column. A part of his infantry was ascending by the West Sapper's Road, and still a mile distant from the foremost sentries thrown out by our established chain of pickets, when the march of the silent battalions was discovered by Captain Goodlake, then posted where we observed him with his 30 men of the Guards.

Though seeing was difficult, and no decisive noises were audible, he became, as he expressed it, 'aware' that columns of infantry were ascending the steep slopes of the hill. Thereupon he at once dispatched one of his soldiers with orders to go up along the bed of the Careenage Ravine, and give our people due warning of the approaching attack; but the man for some reason ascended by the bank on his left to the top of Mount Inkerman, and was there taken prisoner by the advancing masses. Goodlake plied the discovered columns with fire, and the combat he provoked cost him a loss of six or seven men, but in one way proved advantageous; for this, it seems, was the firing which led General Codrington to infer that an attack was beginning, and to put his troops in camp under arms.

¹ As regards the actual state of the battalions thus broken up into 'company columns,' see *post*, p. 108.

The enemy's reserves when brought up were so placed in the rear and right rear of the assailing forces that they could quickly begin, when needed, to take their part in the fight.

Whilst ascending Mount Inkerman, and advancing along its high ground, General Soimonoff was covered on his right flank by a separate body of troops called the Under-road Column, which moved up along the bed of the Careenage Ravine.¹ When once on the heights, he was so rudely divided from the bed of the ravine by intervening steeps, that during the main portion of his march he could not well maintain lateral communications with the force thus covering his right; but the two lines of advance were converging, and, if all should go well with his enterprise, he might greet his Under-road Column in the very camp of our 2nd Division.

So quiet from the first had been Soimonoff's march, so obscure to the eye were his troops in their sombre capotes, and so well had his enterprise been favored by the remaining shades of night, and an atmosphere dim with mist or drizzling rain, that even when daylight was breaking, his silent, gray line of battle still glided on for a while unseen and unheard by the English. Yet he now had come within hail of that ledge in advance of Shell Hill, where a chain of our sentries stood posted.

II.

After seeing that a Russian general could thus quietly lay his unresisted hand upon nearly one-half of Mount Inkerman, it becomes time to learn how our outposts were all this while keeping their watch.

¹ The only troops I am able to specify as comprised in this Under-road Column are the hundred or so of riflemen belonging to the Catherinburg regiment; but the testimony of our people goes along with the antecedent probability of the case in showing that the column altogether had considerable numerical strength; and one may conjecture—this is only conjecture—that besides the Catherinburg riflemen it included one or two battalions—perhaps of sailors or marines—belonging to the garrison forces. I may here, however, say once for all, that (except as regards the Catherinburg riflemen, who count in as part of the regiment) any strength which the Under-road Column may have had was *over and above* all these numbers which I ascribe to the Russians. I have now additional reasons for believing that the force, as on the 26th of October, consisted of sailors or marines. The truth is that the Russian military authorities got the control of the official reports, and were not at all prone—nay, perhaps did not judge it their duty—to report the services of the naval men.

During part of the night between the 4th and the 5th of November, thick mist and drizzling rain so obscured the air as to embarrass the intercommunication of sentries, and from this cause it happened that the chain of our outposts about Shell Hill was drawn in more closely than usual; but it can scarce be surmised that the old pickets, if strictly kept out at their appointed posts, would have perceived any signs of the coming attack.¹

The English pickets at night.

Many able officers—as, for example, Major Thornton Grant, the ‘field-officer’ in command, Captain Sargent, Bellairs, Carmichael, Morgan (of the 95th)—were with the pickets that night; and the thickness of the atmosphere was regarded as furnishing reason for increased care. Indeed, Captain Sargent of the 95th thought the night so good a one for an attempted surprise by the enemy, and besides was so strongly impressed by that rumbling sound of wheels which will be presently mentioned, that he not only caused his men to reload their wetted rifles, but saw to the doing of this with his own eyes—nay, aided it with his own hands; and the tension caused by his vigilance became so great, that the accidental discharge of a rifle by a bungling soldier of the 95th Regiment created an unusual stir, and sharpened yet farther the sensitive watchfulness of the picket. Still, the keenest observer, that night, could see nothing worth mark through a curtain of mist or drizzling rain. There, however, were sounds of which we now know the meaning. Bellairs, it seems, only recognized the striking of the gongs on board ships of war; but at 4 o’clock in the morning many—even amongst those in camp—heard peals ringing out from the churches. None judged that the Sunday bells had any warlike significance; but whilst listening some hours after midnight, several officers and men, and in particular Captain Sargent, were able to hear a low, continuous sound, which imported the movement of wheeled carriages in the direction of the Old City Heights. By most men the distant rumbling of wheels was not thought to be a sound of much import; but Captain Sargent, judging otherwise, reported the incident promptly to the field-officer on duty, and although he concurred with Major Grant in ascribing the sound to long trains of *arabas*, he still, as we have seen, took

¹ This conclusion seems warranted by the fact—see *post*, p. 98—that even at a later time, and when Soimonoff’s forces were much nearer to their goal, the new pickets, though posted out in their right places, were still there for some time without being able to detect any signs of the coming attack.

care to accept the warning.¹ In another part of the field, Morgan of the 95th heard the same rumbling noise, and sent in a non-commissioned officer with orders to convey the intelligence; but the distant journeying of the enemy's artillery or wagon-trains at night had been heard so often before, that these tidings when brought into camp found seemingly little attention, and at all events raised no alarm.²

In the hour before sunrise, as was their daily custom, the troops in the camp of the 2nd Division turned out and stood to their arms; but, there being then no signs of a coming attack, were soon after dismissed. The wood and the water fetchers went out to their tasks as usual, and the reliefs of the outposts furnished by the division took place at the appointed hour. Before day-break, the old pickets, excepting two of them, were all home in camp, and the new pickets all at their posts.

The 2nd Division called to arms as usual before sunrise.

The relief of their pickets.

III.

The new pickets did not remain on the line which had been occupied by their comrades at night, but at once pushed forward to their appointed posts on ground more advanced. After this, for a while, all still remained quiet and blank. But presently, when day was beginning to break, a sentry in advance on Shell Hill discerned through the mist what he judged to be a Russian column approaching, and reported this to Captain Rowlands of the 41st, the officer in command of the picket. Rowlands instantly ran up to the brow; and, the atmosphere then clearing a little, he was able to detect the approach of two Russian battalions, each seemingly gathered in column. Upon these he soon caused the men of his picket to deliver their fire; and

The new pickets.

The enemy at length discerned and checked by Rowlands's picket.

¹ The sound, as we now know, was occasioned by the march of Pauloff's artillery, which began at 2 A.M. I have no reason for supposing that Major—now General—Thornton Grant (who was a particularly vigilant and careful officer) omitted to send in an account of the sound reported to him by Sargent, and also heard by himself, but I do not remember his mentioning the fact to me. The General is now commanding a division in India.

² This is proved by the report—'unusually quiet'—(see *ante*, p. 63) which was given as the answer to Captain Ewart's official inquiry from Headquarters.

It was stated that a soldier had come to Major Bunbury, of the 23rd, and told him that he had heard the rumbling, and that Major Bunbury did not report the fact. This statement is an example of the deception that may lurk in an imperfect truth. The man did report the circumstance to Bunbury, but not till *the day after the battle*.

the two battalions, thus suddenly greeted, were taken, it would seem, by surprise, for they turned and fell back.

Of course the gathered thousands soon re-asserted their power; but the picket was obstinate, and maintained a fretting combat. At the end of about half an hour, the Russians were able to put twenty-two heavy guns in battery on the crest of Shell Hill; but even after this had been done, they still found themselves galled by a clinging, persistent fire.

IV.

The sound of the combat, thus begun at the outposts, came from ground where continuous firing must of necessity be significant, and it quickly raised an alert. For the second time that morning, the troops in the camp of the 2nd Division were called to arms, and in a few minutes they formed upon Home Ridge—the ground where they used to parade. The men who had gone out on wood and water parties came running in to arms. The two guns kept ready on ‘picket,’ followed soon by Fitzmayer’s ten remaining pieces, were brought up and put in battery on the crest of Home Ridge;¹ and, however little havoc at first might be wrought by their missiles sent blindly into the mist, Colonel Herbert pressed eagerly that they should open at the instant, for he divined that a ready fire from Home Ridge would tend to check the enemy, and prevent him from at once moving forward in strength to push home the advantage he had gained. The fire opened accordingly, and was destined, as we shall see, to work good effect by deflecting the Russian attack.

The main weight of the cannonade from Shell Hill was made to swoop past over the heads of our troops on Home Ridge;² the aim, it seems, being to send destruction amongst those English reserves which the enemy thought must be gathered about the camp of the 2nd Division and along the ground in its rear. Round-shot tearing their way through the lines, and shells bursting in the midst of them, soon turned the camp into a scene of hav-

¹ Captain Pennecuk’s battery on the right of the Post-road, and Captain John Turner’s on its left. At a later time, Fitzmayer for some reason moved three of Turner’s six guns still more to the left, placing them on the west slope of the Home Ridge.

² It is true that Lieutenant Arthur Armstrong (a young officer of great promise) was killed at this time with his regiment; but, then, being the adjutant, and therefore on horseback, he was exposed to a fire which spared men on foot.

Havoc in the camp of the 2nd Division. oc; for tents were thrown, or upwhirled as though by a hurricane, and draught-horses that had been picketed in rows were turned into slaughter-heaps, or cut loose and sent wandering piteously with mangled limbs. But the plan of destroying, by this persistent fire, a great portion of Pennefather's reserves, was baffled by the circumstance of his having no reserves to destroy. Except sentries pacing the lines and men busied in striking the tents, hardly any one had been left in camp.¹

Thus far, then, the enterprise of the Russians had singularly prospered, for at no greater cost than that of being galled by a picket, they had been able to make themselves masters on fully three-fourths of Mount Inkerman, and to establish their guns on a crest whence they swept the approaches of Pennefather's position, and searched his very camp with their fire.

V.

Respecting the way in which the 2nd Division could best meet an attack such as that now begun, two almost opposite ideas had successively reigned in their camp. Sir De Lacy Evans would have concentrated his scant force of 3000 men on the English Heights. Ranging his twelve guns on the crest of Home Ridge, and posting his battalions on its reverse slopes, he would have asked that a like disposition of artillery and infantry might be made on the Fore Ridge also, so soon as reinforcements competent to the task should come up. Far from supporting his pickets with fresh troops, he would have been willing to see them driven in after a moderately lengthened resistance; but, the front being then left clear, he would have provided that the enemy's approaching columns should be torn by his artillery-fire, and that their shattered remnants, if still coming on, should be met on the crest of the English Heights by well-ordered battalions of infantry, springing up at his word of command from their place on the reverse slopes.

General Pennefather, however, in the absence of his inviolated chief, was now commanding the 2nd Division, and the defense of Mount Inkerman was a problem which he regarded from his own point of view. Without at all underrating the strength of the English Heights, he still found himself always remembering that there lay no ground in their rear

¹ Captain Allix, a valued officer and an aid-de-camp of Evans's, chanced, it seems, to be passing through the camp at this time and was killed.

upon which the English, if thence forced back, could well make a second stand; and he was unwilling that the fate of the Allies on the Chersonese—nay, even in all the Crimea—should be staked, as it were, once for all upon this single rib of ground. Governed much by that aspect of the question, and being of such temperament as to become quickly heated in battle by his inborn passion for fighting, he inclined to dispute with the enemy for every step of ground,

The one
adopted by
Pennefather.

and so to keep the strife raging, however unequally, on ground more or less in advance of his own heights. Instead of drawing in all his strength for a decisive conflict on the Home Ridge, he would reinforce his combating pickets by pushing forward little bodies of troops, some two or three hundred strong, and thus generate in front of his position that kind of conflict that can be waged for a time in brush-wood, by a few men opposing great numbers. Plainly, to adopt this course of action, and to carry it to the extent of leaving no sufficient troops in reserve for the defense of the heights, would be to intrust great issues to the free-will and personal prowess of small groups or knots of men, instead of to coherent battalions. And in weighing the value of the plan it was to be remembered that, although the protracted resistance of skirmishers to formed and powerful masses would of necessity involve a rapid expenditure of ammunition, there were no means by which the needed supplies of cartridges could be quickly pushed forward to the extreme front, and dealt out to numbers of men, whilst scattered and fighting in cover.

Still, Pennefather, as we have seen, could give a reason for his choice of tactics, and one that was not without force.

VI.

Pennefather's instinctive desire to follow this last plan of action was quickened from moment to moment by the evident life and stir of the fights which his obstinate pickets stood waging on the slopes of Shell Hill; for the mist or incumbent cloud which obscured all else did not shut out from view the flashes of the musketry, and by these the whole tenor of the strife carried on by the unseen combatants was plainly disclosed.

Fired by the sight, and enchanted with the evident tenacity of the resistance, Pennefather began to push forward little bodies of troops in order—for so he expressed it—in order 'to feed the pickets.' On this errand he sent the 30th Regiment, divided into two wings. He pushed forward the 41st

Regiment under General Adams toward his right front. In the same direction, but with orders to halt and take post on the right of the Home Ridge, Colonel Percy Herbert moved up one wing of the 49th under Bellairs; whilst on the opposite or left side of the field the other wing under Dalton, together with a wing of the 47th, under Major Fordyce, was pushed forward to the head of the Mikriakoff Glen. For a while, the 95th remained posted on the reverse slopes of Home Ridge; but before long its scanty strength was divided into wings, of which one under Champion advanced toward the Sand-bag Battery, whilst the other under Hume pushed forward in the centre of the field. As to the 55th, it had furnished that day a large proportion of the 2nd Division pickets, and the companies so employed were already out fighting at the extreme front. Thus, then, with the exception of some companies of the 47th and the remnant of the 55th, not already engaged at the outposts, the whole of the 2nd Division was sooner or later taken off from the heights which constituted the natural stronghold of the Inkerman position, and for the most part pushed forward in numerous small bodies under separated leaders, who, whilst working in mist and through brush-wood, were not to be easily reached by any command from Head-quarters.

From the time when this diffusion of troops toward the front had fully taken effect, the whole number of English infantry then left to defend the Home Ridge, or, in other words, to guard the first and last stronghold of the Inkerman position, against the army brought up to attack it, became reduced to only a few hundred.¹ When once carried into effect, this plan of splitting the regiments and pushing them on in fragments to the front under mist and through brush-wood, could not well be revoked, nor even much altered; and indeed the character of the tactics adopted at the outset so governed the subsequent tenor of the defense that when reinforcements approached, they were for the most part drawn forward piecemeal, and absorbed, as it were, into the fight. One after another the small bodies of men from time to time coming up were laid hold of for some special com-

Scantiness of the force left to defend the heights.

These dispositions practically irrevocable.

¹ In the judgment of Sir Percy Herbert—and no living man can know more of ‘Inkerman’ from actual personal observation—the number was always *less than five hundred*. His computation, I believe, would not be found to hold good quite continuously (I am thinking of the right wing of the 21st and the 63rd Regiment); but, except as regards a limited period of time, he is no doubt substantially right.

bat; and this in no instance was done by the order of Lord Raglan, but always to meet the need for 'a hundred or 'two' of fresh troops, which was judged to be pressing for the moment at some particular spot. As though it had been understood from the first that the coming strife in the brush-wood was not to be that of formed battalions, the colors of most of the 2nd Division regiments were betimes sent back to the Windmill.¹

The attack on Mount Inkerman was not at the first regarded as being what men call a 'battle,' nor indeed did it seem for a while that the combat going on would prove to be one vitally momentous. Although Lord Raglan had come very early, and although he remained on the ground, it did not result that General Pennefather's control of the defense was forthwith superseded by the arrival of his chief. The General, temporarily commanding the Division, and cheerily conducting the fight, was, as it were, on his own ground; whilst, on the other hand, the mist lay so thick that a newly arriving chief, who in such conditions had hastened to assume the immediate governance, would have been perplexing his subordinate by a blind, random exercise of authority. Far from so interposing, Lord Raglan, whilst proferring all the aid that Pennefather could ask, still left him to pursue his own plans without being disturbed by orders. When General Canrobert came up, he even appeared to go farther in the same direction, for he courteously offered to place his forces at Pennefather's disposal.

Pennefather's control not superseded by Lord Raglan's presence on the field.

VII.

But consistently with the determination to leave an undisturbed power for the moment in the hands of Pennefather, Lord Raglan was able to discover and apply a resource by which the Russian artillery, now overweighting our field-pieces, might itself in turn be outmatched. He ordered that two of the 18-pounders belonging to the siege-train should at once be brought up; and ultimately, though not without first having had to express his dislike to the word 'Impossible' (which was the answer brought back to his first message), he succeeded in achieving his purpose.² The accession of

Lord Raglan's order to bring up guns from the siege-train park.

¹ General Pennefather did not give this order, and he has assured me that he never could learn whence it came. The 95th did not send back its colors.

² Respecting the circumstances under which the word 'Impossible' was used, see the foot-note, *post*, 4th Period.

heavy artillery power thus provided by the quick, happy thought of Lord Raglan, was destined to exercise a surprisingly powerful effect upon the issue of the conflict.

VIII.

With batteries now planted on the crest of Shell Hill, and great masses of infantry drawn up in support, General Soimonoff had intended to delay his farther attack until the time when Pauloff's troops coming up by the East Sapper's Road should appear in strength on the toplands; but an incident occurred which might easily fret a man's temper, and perhaps make him change his resolve.

Soimonoff's intention at this time.

The occurrence which changed his resolve.

A column sent out on reconnaissance from Soimonoff's right pushed on so far toward the south that at length it came near to that spot by the Mikriakoff Glen, where Dalton's wing of the 49th, now commanded by Grant, had been posted.¹ With this little force Grant was sitting at ease in his saddle, and suffering his wiseacre pony to browse on the Inkerman oak-leaves, when the Russian column approaching first darkened the mist, and then all at once seemed to break through it. Grant, speaking brief to his people, said, 'Give them a volley and charge!' He was obeyed. His men delivered their fire, and then cheering, with their bayonets down at the charge drove straight at the opposing mass, broke fiercely into its ranks, and not only trod down all resistance, but even made bold to take prisoners. Then Grant pressed on in pursuit to the foot of Shell Hill, and even there did not stop, but persisted in his chase of the column till he drove it at length fairly in through the line of the enemy's guns.

This blow, it would seem, was the one which provoked the impending attack a little before its due time; for Soimonoff, losing his patience, resolved to move forward at once without any longer awaiting the accession of Pauloff's forces.

Acceleration of the impending onset.

IX.

From the ground where Grant's people halted when staying at last their pursuit, they could hear breaking out on the reverse slope of the crest an undefined multitudinous stirring as of a host, followed close by the myriad hurrahs

¹ Major Dalton, already mortally wounded, had been succeeded in command of the wing by Major Thornton Grant. The wing came into action with a strength of 245 men.

which gave voice to the rage of a close-gathered soldiery, and portended a general onset. Soon the mist toward Shell Hill became charged with the slow-creeping darkness of numbers upon numbers in movement; and presently, it was plain, the gray masses covered ground far and wide, though no eye reached the bounds of their strength.

We now know what forces there were. Besides some companies of the 6th Rifles advancing in front as skirmishers, they comprised the twelve battalions of the Tomsk, the Kolivansk, and the Catherinburg regiments, numbering altogether more than 9000 men.¹ Only the battalions of Tomsk and Kolivansk were to be in first line; but, whether acting from zeal, or mistake, or from whatever other cause, the four Catherinburg battalions, which had orders to follow in support, were induced to take other courses, and three of them moved forward from their assigned places in the rear, till they aligned with the troops in front, whilst the fourth one strayed off toward the east.

Except that one stray battalion, all the troops engaged in the movement soon began to incline to their right. Shunning the line of artillery-fire which, in spite of the mist, was seen blazing out from Home Ridge, they avoided the up-wold of the Saddle-top Reach, and found means to skirt it by choosing their path lower down along the bank of the Mikriakoff Glen; but in marching they became deeply echeloned, the columns on their right pressing far in advance, whilst those on their left were held back. General Soimonoff was present in person with the 9000 men thus thrown forward, and he gradually made good his advance, pushing always before him, as he marched, those four companies of men under Grant whose hardihood had brought down the attack. Grant's people yielded ground slowly, always covering their retreat by an obstinate fire; and it is remembered that one of them—Mackie—with true Scotch tenacity, never flagging for an instant under the pressure of the advancing thousands, watched as carefully as any grim constable in the old town of Edinburgh, over the little knot of prisoners he was taking off under his charge.

The Under-road Column meanwhile had been ascending with such good dispatch along the bed of the Careenage Ravine, as to be now even more in advance than the troops on the high ground above;

Progress of
the Under-
road Column.

¹ 9586.

Soimonoff's and, if Soimonoff's design were inferable from the positions attained by his forces, it would follow that he was minded to overwhelm the English by not only striking, but also turning their left.

X.

Whilst Soimonoff's troops on the heights and the Under-road Column beneath thus concurrently advanced, they were not the only assailants whom Pennefather had to encounter; for, although the main body of Pauloff's corps—having orders to march round by the East Sapper's Road, and up the St. George's Ravine—had not yet ascended Mount Inkerman, there were two of his light-infantry regiments—the regiments of Taroutine and Borodino—which came up by the more direct path of the Volovia Ravine, and they both gained the heights in such time as to be able to take part in the enterprise with an additional force of nearly 6000 men.¹ These might strike at both the right and the centre of the English whilst Soimonoff was attacking their left.

After crossing the Inkerman Bridge in dead silence, the Taroutine battalions ascended the Volovia Ravine, and having at length crowned the heights, they at first understood that they were to remain halted on the East Jut and await further orders; but it presently happened that they deserted the stray Catherinburg battalion making haste toward the east, and took that direction of march as a clue for their own guidance. Descending accordingly from the high ground, they crossed the Quarry Ravine, and were still moving toward the south-east, when some of them found their gaze drawn to the parapet of a dismantled battery standing out with conspicuous abruptness on the edge of a not distant crest;² and, in the absence of orders, they made this object their goal. Before long, the two foremost battalions had crossed St. Clement's Gorge, had ascended the steep of the Kitspur, and were gathered before the silent parapet—it was the parapet of the now famous Sand-bag Battery—and there for some time the soldiers stood shouting, with their caps in the air, as though urging the two battalions behind them to come up and take part in the attack. In all four of the battalions, meanwhile, the bugles were sounding;

¹ 5844.

² The atmosphere, so clouded by mist in other parts of the field, was here in such a state as to allow a comparatively distant view.

but—dreading perhaps some ambush—the troops remained for a time in a state of tumultuous hesitation. Captain Chodasievitch, who stood some way down in rear of the shouting troops, had hitherto labored to keep his company steady and well collected, but he now laid a spark to the zeal of his people, made them fancy they could see the Grand-Dukes, cried out at last, ‘Forward with the bayonet!’ and when answered by his men with a cheer, he not only led them compactly through the rest of the disordered soldiery and on to the base of the parapet, but himself clambered up to its summit; and, his example being followed, a multitude of the Taroutine troops flooded over and into the work, driving out, as they entered, the six men under a sergeant who since the relief of the pickets had been the only force kept at this post.¹ Though for some time thronged in confusion, and galled by the fire of Captain Barnston’s picket, which stood posted higher up on the Kitspur, the whole of these Taroutine troops—with, besides, that stray Catherinburg battalion which had wandered into their company—established themselves on the ground they had won with their front toward the south. More-over, the four Borodino battalions having completed their ascent, and continued to push on their advance, now prolonged in a westward direction the array of the Taroutine regiment, and extended across the Quarry Ravine at its uppermost part, with their right drawn up on the Post-road.

Their seizure of the work.

Junction of the Borodino with the Taroutine battalions. Their array.

XI.

The 6000 men² thus united, with their right on the Post-road, were divided from the forces advancing under Soimonoff by the breadth of the Saddle-top Reach, but so linked to them, nevertheless, by the interposed batteries of Shell Hill, that the whole formed, to-

The enemy’s entire front of battle at this time;

¹ Chodasievitch, 188 *et seq.* It was by the express order of Colonel Carpenter (the officer in command of the pickets) that Captain Barnston was placed with the main body of his company on the upper part of the Kitspur, and directed to post only six men under a sergeant in the Sand-bag Battery. The Colonel’s orders tend to show that he understood the ground, and that if his valuable life had been spared a few hours longer, he might have averted the error of which we shall afterward hear. His perspicuity seems the more remarkable if one happens to remember that during the preceding night the relieved picket—a picket of the 95th—had maintained a much more considerable number of men in the work.

² The 5844 being swelled to 6668 by the accession of the ‘stray Catherinburg battalion.’

gether, a single array which extended in a loop from the Ca-reenage Ravine on the west to the edge of Mount Inkerman on the east; and it is right to observe the formation in which

Formations
adopted by
his assailing
forces.

the 15,000 infantry undertaking this attack presented their front to the English. Besides the Catherinburg battalions which had strayed from their appointed course, the assailing troops, as we have seen, were those of the Tomsk, the Kolivansk, the Borodino, and the Taroutine regiments; and since each of these regiments, whilst keeping back two battalions to act in support, pushed forward its two other battalions to lead the advance, there was formed from this source a van of eight battalions moving on next after the skirmishers. Every one of these eight battalions was in 'company columns,' and therefore broken up into four distinct masses, each consisting of a single company.² The three foremost of those lesser columns marched all in the same alignment, and the fourth one in rear of their centre. So, except on Soimonoff's right (where three of the Catherinburg battalions had thrust themselves on by mistake, and were operating in battalion columns), the forces moving next in the wake of the skirmishers were twenty-four company columns, with eight more of them coming on in support.

But the actual state of the thirty-two subdivided masses thus thrown forward bore scarce any outward resemblance to that disposition in columns which the theory of the method enjoined. The ranks were so broken whilst making their way through the brush-wood that a battalion split up into four was far from disclosing to English observers the law of its intended formation, and seemed to be either one mass undivided, though loosened in structure, or else a huge number of skirmishers unaccountably thronging together. Substantially, such a battalion was a dense swarm of soldiery unmarshaled, but still coherent; and, since the positions of men under such conditions could be swayed more or less by their personal inclinations, it resulted that the natural gregariousness of the Muscovite race tended always to contract these assemblages, thus causing them in general to occupy a good deal less ground than if they had been formed in the barrack-yard.

¹ Not to be confounded with what we call 'column of companies.' Since the great war of 1870-71 a new interest attaches to the formation which breaks up a battalion into four columns, because it is understood that this method (with the variation of throwing out one of the four companies as skirmishers) was the one adopted by the Prussians.

² The Russian battalion was divided into only four companies.

Russian Battalions.

On smooth ground.


*Russian Battalion
in close column.*



*The same when
disposed in
Company Columns.*



In thick brush-wood.



In immediate support to the eleven battalions thus constituting the front of the attacking force, the nine remaining battalions advanced in a line of columns.

But whilst the enemy with these twenty battalions advanced from both the right and the left, he persistently held back his centre. There, his front of artillery, with some 10,000 men behind it in immediate support or reserve, formed the head and the trunk of an army which, although thrusting forward abundance of infantry like a claw from each flank, still did not itself come bodily down to advance along the Saddle-top Reach. This peculiar disposition of force was not one prepared by design. It resulted, apparently, from the impelling presence of General Soimonoff on the enemy's right, from the want of any like-minded Russian commander in other parts of the field, and from an evil temptation to tarry on the strong vantage-ground of Shell Hill, but, above all, from the jets of artillery-fire plainly seen through the mist on Home Ridge, which, by warning all comers against the perils of the Saddle-top Reach, set them hankering after flank movements.

As supports and reserves to the batteries and the 15,000 infantry thus actively delivering the attack, the enemy had on the toplands, and indeed close at hand, more than sixteen additional battalions;¹ and, altogether, the force with which he confronted Pennefather at this hour comprised about 25,000 infantry,² with 38 guns.

XII.

The only succors destined to reach Pennefather in time for this early fight were the 6 guns of Townsend's battery, and 649 men of the Light Division, making up altogether, along with his own troops, a force of 3600³ infantry and 18 guns.

The first of the English reinforcements—namely, five companies of the Connaught Rangers, with a strength of 390 men, and the 6 guns of Townsend's battery, now hastily came into action on the left of Home Ridge; but at the very outset they met with discomfiture. The Connaught Rangers wandered on a long way through dense mist, till at last, whilst struggling in broken and rocky

¹ The sixteen battalions of Vladimir, Sousdal, Ouglitch, and Boutirsk, with, besides, the half-battalion of sappers.

² 24,643.

³ 3605, besides Goodlake's 30 men of the Guards.

ground near the head of the Mikriakoff Glen, they all at once found themselves met by heavy masses of Russian infantry fast closing upon them; and not being, it seems, at the moment in a state for effective combat, they fell back, with the purpose of re-forming their ranks, but still for the time in disorder. Toward the same part of the field Townsend's battery advanced in column of route, under the vehement personal impulsion of Colonel David

Advance of
Townsend's
battery.

Wood, whose ardor was not to be cooled by the mere want of infantry supports. Whilst groping, as it were, through mist, the battery had already become involved in thick brushwood, when Lieutenant Miller (the officer in command of the two foremost guns), who had ridden forward some paces to reconnoitre the ground, was met by Grant's people retreating.

Miller desired that the handful of infantry thus falling back should form up in rear of his guns—three of which by this time were unlimbered—and believed that with this support he might be able to open upon the enemy with artillery-fire; but Grant, as we know, had come from the front with no small means of knowing that the enemy was overwhelmingly strong in this part of the field; and when he found that

Three of his
guns left ex-
posed to the
power of the
Russian col-
umns.

there were no limbers or teams at hand with which to effect the withdrawal of the guns, he judged that any effort to save them by making a stand must of necessity prove vain. His men, accordingly, continuing their retreat, passed on to the rear of Townsend's three foremost guns, which were thus left exposed to the immediate attack of two columns advancing upon them. These, it seems, were the 2nd and 3rd Catherinburg battalions.

Colonel Wood being asked for orders in this emergency, answered tersely, 'Fire case!' but the enemy's masses—which before, though unseen, had been close—now broke out at once into sight through the curtain of mist, and were presently within ten yards of the half-battery. They came on, approaching it from the direction of our right front, and were uttering strange, joyous cries. Without limbers or teams (which already were a long way in rear), no attempt to withdraw the guns could be made; and our artillery-men, retarded somewhat by their very eagerness, had delivered but one hasty shot when already the enemy was closing upon

Singular con-
flict undertak-
en by Lt. Mil-
ler and his ar-
tillery-men.

them. Left without any kind of support, Miller in last resort bade his gunners draw swords and charge, and he himself under a shower of bullets rode straight at the nearest of the advancing Rus-

THE FIGHT ON MOUNT INKERMANN

First Period.

The Enemy engaging closely along his whole front.

EXPLANATIONS.

A Russian battalion in close column thus

" " broken up into companies & columns thus

Pickets thus

Skirmishers and broken troops thus


B. The Barrier or Main Picket Wall. Manoeuvred there with 200 men of the 30th.

A. The three English Guns in the hands of the Enemy.

G. The point reached by Goodlake in the early morning when he first descried the Enemy.

Scale.





sians.¹ As though bewildered by the novelty of the challenge and the sudden necessity of having to encounter a horseman, these men for a moment stopped short in their onset; and then there followed a conflict of a singular kind between, on the one hand, a great weight of advancing infantry, and, on the other, a few score of artillery-men, finding vent for some part of their rage in curses and shouts of defiance, but wildly striving besides to beat back the throng from their beloved guns with swords, with rammers, with sponge-staves, nay even, one may say, with clenched fists—for the story of the mighty Clitheroe bruiser felling man after man with his blows, and then standing a while unmolested and seemingly admired by the enemy, is not altogether a fable.

Of course a struggle like this was rather a fray than a combat; and the columns at last, rolling on with irresistible weight, the enemy—at least for the time—was left in possession of Townsend's three foremost guns.²

On our extreme left the swirl of the war-tide had run up yet farther and higher; for—surprising, as we saw, the picket of the Light Division, and without encountering any farther obstacle—the Under-road Column had ascended along the bed of the Careenage Ravine, and its soldiery, almost at their goal, were now swarming up by the Well-way to within a few paces of Pennefather's tents, thus striking into the flank and rear of the English position.

So, upon the whole, it resulted at this time that whilst the Russians were content toward the east with a less determined advance, and inclined to hold back toward their centre in avoidance of the Saddle-top Reach, they had so used their strength on the west of Mount Inkerman, that the left of Pennefather's position was both overborne in front and turned in flank; the achievement of the enemy being made, besides, the more signal by his capture of three English guns.

¹ In recognition of his service on this occasion, Colonel Miller holds the Victoria Cross.

² These evidently were the guns which the Russians (confused by the mist, and mistaking the Mikriakoff Glen for the Careenage Ravine) supposed they had taken from Codrington.—See *Totleben*, p. 460. General Codrington never for a moment lost any guns, and, indeed, at this time he had no guns to lose.

XIII.

This was the state of the fight when General Buller in person (who had marched from his camp rather later than the five companies of the Connaught Rangers) came up opportunely in the left rear of Pennefather's camp. It is true, he brought with him only four companies (comprising just 259 men) of the 77th Regiment, under Colonel Egerton; but this force, small as it seems, was destined to exert a strong sway over the course of the battle.

With their right toward the shoulder of the Home Ridge and their left closely skirting the Well-way, the companies of the 77th, having already wheeled into line, were diving into the mist and the smoke, guided rather by the sounding tumult of battle than by any thing that had yet been descried, when, from the shot whistling past, from the piercing flashes of the musketry, but at last, from the gray shapes of men dimly seen, and a gathering darkness importing dense numbers behind them, Buller's aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Hugh Clifford, became sure that what immediately confronted him was a number of Russian infantry disposed in no order themselves, but followed by compacted masses, and already within a few paces. Clifford imparted this conviction to his chief; and if Buller, who was near-sighted, remained for a moment incredulous, he quickly accepted the truth, and determined that the men were at once to fix bayonets, but continue their forward movement.

Clifford, intrusted with the order, rode off, and carried it down the line; but upon reaching the extreme left he saw that the 77th men were there overlapped by forces of the enemy, not seen, nor heard of before, which were filing up by the Well-way into the left rear of Egerton's people. This newly seen force was the Under-road Column which had long been ascending Mount Inkerman by the closely constricted bed of the Careenage Ravine, and moving of necessity upon a very narrow front. The head of the column had already climbed up past the spot which Clifford had reached, and the nearest part of the long, trailing, snake-like body thus defiling before him was its neck. Clifford seized the moment. Calling out to the men who formed the extreme left of the 77th line, he asked them in simple, nay, almost boyish language, 'to come and charge with him.' Then, galloping forward him-

Arrival of General Buller with some men of the 77th, under Egerton.

His advance against the enemy's approaching masses.

Lt. Hugh Clifford's exploit against the Under-road Column.

self, he rode straight at the nearest of the enemy's troops, struck into the throat of the column, and was followed so loyally by the score or two of the 77th men who had heard his sudden appeal, that they too, no less than their youthful leader, broke through the opposing files, and were received into the midst of the hostile soldiery.¹

Amongst the surmises which aimed at an explanation of the result, one was that from the apparition of a single horseman coming suddenly out from behind the mist, and galloping into their ranks, the Russians inferred a great charge of cavalry delivered against their unprepared flank; but, whatever might be the particular form of their dominant apprehension, they plainly were taken by surprise. Some indeed, it is true, held firm for a while, defending themselves with the bayonet as well as with fire, but the great bulk of them stood and looked helpless, with the air of brave soldiers bewildered, and seeking in vain for guidance.

Thus—though only at one confined spot between its head and its trunk—the integrity of the column was disturbed by a melley of intermingled combatants; and, Clifford's handful of men having soon obtained an ascendant, the Russians who had struggled against him disengaged themselves now from the strife, and before many moments the soldiery advancing still from below were met and borne down by a descending torrent of fugitives. Those men forming the head of the column who had all but reached Pennefather's camp before the moment of Clifford's attack, now judged, it would seem, that they were hopelessly cut off, for they laid down their arms, and gave themselves up as prisoners. And the trunk of the column thus pierced and beheaded by Clifford's assault on its left was now also under a fire delivered against its opposite flank.

Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, who was on picket duty with his company of the Grenadier Guards at Quarter-guard Point, could scarcely have hoped that his watch (which was in the nature of a 'quarter-guard' thrown out from Bentinck's camp, and quite unconnected with the general system of the English outposts) would all at once prove to be in the front of battle; but when he saw that the Russians in the bed of the Careenage Ravine and on its right bank were driving in the pickets, and turning the flank of the 2nd Division, he understood that an opportunity had come to

Prince Edward's successful attack from the other side of the Well-way.

¹ For this exploit Clifford received the Victoria Cross.

him. After first drawing back the men to ground which seemed apt for his design, he caused them there to lie down in skirmishing order, and open fire upon the trunk of the Under-road Column—the force which we saw giving way at its higher extremity under the sudden assault of Hugh Clifford. The fire thus delivered from an opposite flank did not fail to confirm the overthrow of a column already discomfited in front. The smitten troops made haste to fall back. Prince Edward pressed their retreat, took from them some prisoners, moved down after them to the verge of the crag which was the extreme limit of his watch, and thence pursued them with fire.

Thus, by the happy effort of a youthful Lieutenant on one side of the Well-way and of a Captain of Guards on the other—the one with a following of perhaps some twenty men, the other with a company about eighty or ninety strong—the enemy's turning movement was altogether defeated, and that too at a moment when he seemed to be on the verge of a signal achievement. The defeat of the Under-road Column proved final, and no second enterprise was attempted in this part of the field.

Final discom-
figure of the
enemy's turn-
ing move-
ment.

XIV.

The series of fights now beginning on Pennefather's extreme left traveled thence by degrees along the whole line to his right, and any account of its progress which would follow the order of time must therefore of necessity pass from the west to the east of the field.

The combat first in this order was not an affair of close fighting (like most of the Inkerman struggles), but a sample of the strife between column and line when engaged at a distance of some eighty or a hundred yards. After having thrust itself into the front of General Soimonoff's right wing, his 1st Catherinburg battalion, with a strength of 800 men,¹ came on, skirting the up-wold of the Saddle-top Reach by moving across the alternate ridges and hollows which bound it toward the south-west. Keeping up a brisk, harmless fire which sent

Fordyce en-
gaged against
the 1st Cather-
inburg battal-
ion.

¹ About 824; the strength of the four battalions which composed the regiment being 3298. In speaking of the battalions of any Russian regiment as the '1st,' '2nd,' '3rd,' or '4th,' I designate them according to their respective order in the battle, going from the proper right to the proper left, and do not thereby mean to indicate their actual army-list titles.

flights of balls far and high through the foliage of the stunted oaks, this battalion, though not yet in sight, still plainly disclosed its approach; and Major Fordyce of the 47th (the officer who had been posted with some 300 men of his regiment¹ near the head of the Mikriakoff Glen), deployed his small force into line, pressed forward in the direction of the fire, and at length, when about eighty yards off—for the mist at this spot was not dense enough to prevent him—could see the head of the column descending from the opposite ridge.

Though already drawn out into line, the troops under Fordyce had become yet farther extended whilst making their way through tall brush-wood; and, notwithstanding the smallness of their comparative numbers, they now showed a much broader front than the body advancing against them in column at quarter distance.

The foremost of the Russians made haste to be plying their muskets, but they did our people no harm, for the force being gathered in column, and firing with an inferior weapon at a range of eighty yards, and from a narrow front, stood under conditions which made its energy vain. On the other hand, Fordyce's men, whilst remaining unstricken themselves, were all of them carefully file-firing from a widely extended front; and, since each of them, with a good rifle in his hands, and with ample space round him, could shoot at his ease, they soon began to work havoc in the mass which served for their target. After enduring a few rounds the

Defeat of the
1st Catherin-
burg battal-
ion.

column broke in confusion, and began to fall back with all the speed that the heaviness of its formation and the nature of the ground would allow.

Fordyce, moving on after it at a distance of about a hundred yards, did not either cease firing or stay his pursuit till he had driven the mass before him across the opposite rib. Then, being far in advance and unsupported, and having all but expended his ammunition, he came at last to a halt, and caused his men to lie down close under the crest they had gained. There he kept fast his hold till other troops came to relieve him.

XV.

It may be that the fate of the 1st Catherinburg battalion thus vanquished by Fordyce was visible, or in some way made known to those 2nd and 3rd battalions of the same

¹ More accurately 285, for he had with him only one wing of the regiment, and the strength of that was 570.


regiment which captured Townsend's half-battery, and had hitherto pressed Grant's retreat; for, although not attacked, they all at once came to a halt, and desisted from farther pursuit. Grant, thereupon staying his retreat, and fronting once more to the enemy, the two hugely unequal forces stood planted face to face, and so for a while they remained.

XVI.

Whilst Grant stood at bay, the wing of the 77th moved past him on his right.¹ In thus pressing forward, Colonel Egerton—however unknowingly—was opposing his 259 men to the right wing of a body scarce less than 8000 strong, then led on by Soimonoff in person to attack the English position;² whilst, to aid his small force in encountering these masses, there was nothing he could anywhere see except the handful of men, under Grant, which he was leaving behind him on his left rear.³

It may well be supposed that if Egerton had known the strength of the opposing forces, he would not have persisted in his advance without support; but one of the effects of the dimness on this Inkerman morning was to abate the respect due to numbers by keeping them out of sight at a distance, and Soimonoff attacking in echelon with the left of his forces refused, made no more than one-fifth of them visible to their English assailants. When Egerton made up his mind to engage the

¹ Grant himself—now General Grant—bears witness to this. This diagram will help to explain how it happened that Egerton, who at the time of Clifford's exploit appeared to be on our extreme left, was soon afterward on the right of Grant and Fordyce.



² 7938—i. e., Soimonoff's attacking force of 9586, less the strengths of the 1st Catherinburg battalion defeated by Fordyce, and of the 4th Catherinburg battalion, which had strayed off to the east.

³ Even that force—though he 'could' have descried it by riding to the extreme left of his line—he did not in fact see.

troops straight before him, he was blind to those Catherinburg battalions which we last saw confronted by Grant, and had had no glimpse of the thousands then advancing on his right front.

But the force directly opposing him disclosed itself gradually to the sight. First, after the line of the Russian skirmishers, and indeed partly mingled amongst them, there came shapeless clumps of the gray-coated soldiery, disposed in what seemed to be a crowd somewhat loosened, but all as with one intent keenly forcing their way through the brush-wood; and in close support to these there marched a dense column so formed that, whilst plainly ample in depth, it still showed as broad a front as Egerton's slender line.

The Russian troops thus advancing were two battalions of the Tomsk regiment, with a strength of about 1500,¹ and this force, as we know, Colonel Egerton was undertaking to meet with his 259 men; but the troops he commanded, if small in numbers, were of a splendid quality, well officered, highly disciplined, and full of trust in their leaders, in themselves, in their regiment.

And, along with the small English force, there was one very simple, nay, primitive spring of action which the enemy for some reason had thought fit to discard. Amongst the whole fifteen hundred Russians confronted by Egerton, our people from first to last could see but one horseman, whilst the English with their modest strength, scarce reaching 260, had with them a number of officers, who, remaining throughout on their chargers, could see and be seen by the men. Besides General Buller himself, and his aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Hugh Clifford, Colonel Egerton, commanding the regiment, and Straton and Dixon, field-officers, and Morgan the adjutant, were all in their saddles; and in spite of the mist, there was never perhaps a moment throughout the whole fight when a man of the 77th could look abroad in his doubt or bewilderment, without seeing above him, though dimly, the form of a mounted officer in whom he knew he could trust.

It has been surmised that the foremost of the Russians, unacquainted with the English custom of fighting in line, and inferring that the mist which disclosed to view one or two ranks must conceal the

¹ More accurately, 1562. From preceding explanations (see *ante*, pp. 95 and 109), it will be gathered that the foremost of the two battalions aimed at being in 'company columns,' and the supporting battalion in close column.

depths of a column, may have fancied they were met by such numbers as would be implied in their own service by a front like the one they now saw. At all events, when they descried the English force marching against them, they faltered and stopped, not as though they inclined to flight, but rather like soldiery coming suddenly upon a new phase of battle, and looking about for guidance. Meantime they opened a fire which was not without effect; and although the apparition of Egerton's line had stopped their advance, the great column behind them refused to share their hesitation, and continued to heave its way forward.

Colonel Egerton, seeing thus much, judged that now the moment was ripe; therefore turning to General Buller, by whose side he rode, he said to him, 'There are the Russians, General, what shall we do?' Buller's answer was short. He only said, 'Charge them!' Egerton at once gave the word to 'Halt, then fire a volley, and charge.'

The foremost of the Russians had not long stopped their advance, when across the dim, narrow space, now dividing them from Egerton's force, they heard English words of command. They saw their foe come to a halt. They saw his long hedgerow of firelocks, now ingrafted with bayonets, bend down, come level, then blaze, and in the instant a pitiless volley tore through their loose masses in front, and swept down like a blast on the face of the column behind them. Then, from under the new ridge of smoke which Egerton's troops by this fire had piled up along their whole line, there rose the 'Hurra!' of the English, as though in some outburst of joy. Whilst the Russians yet listened to the roar of their enemy's welcome, all before them lay still wrapped in cloud; but presently, those who stood calm, and could look in the eye of the storm, saw here and there, moving in dimness, the shadowy form of a rider, the naked gleam of a sword, then the wing of the 77th, along its whole front, bursting out once more into sight through the bank of the smoke, and tearing straight down at a run, with bayonets brought low to the 'charge.'

Though the Russians first exposed to the charge had sought, as we know, to maintain that formation of 'company columns,' which grew afterward famous in Europe, the thickness of the brush-wood or some other cause had prevented them from giving fair trial to the lessons of their German advisers, and they hung together in knots, or grosser aggregates, neither

General Buller's terse order.

The word given by Egerton.

The volley of the 77th.

Their charge.

Overthrow of the loose masses forming the Russian front.

having the formidable massiveness of a close battalion column, nor the agile, sagacious vivacity which belongs to smaller units of strength. They did not stand. They broke away as they could, or threw themselves down in the thicket; affecting to be slain, and their overthrow was but a beginning of evil, for the solid column behind them, being now all at once laid bare to the onslaught descending against it, began to waver, and stopped. Then it heaved, then broke, and before the swift-coming line had yet touched it with steel, was turning as though for flight.

There followed a long, raging turmoil, for the men of the 77th breaking loose in pursuit, still drove forward singly or in knots, and tore their way into the throng, some bayoneting the encumbered, long-skirted Russians, some felling them with the stocks of their rifles, but others using their firelocks because the thickness of the brush-wood was so great in several places as to keep the assailants and the assailed some distance asunder. The officers acting with this wing of the 77th had sprung to the front at the moment of commencing the charge, and each of them now in the melley became the leader of some group which instinctively followed his guidance; but also there was many a cluster of men toiling hotly in the wake of a sergeant, a corporal, or some trusted comrade, and upon the whole the force proved itself apt in combining individual energy with as much of combined action as the conditions of the tumult would allow. Toward this end the mounted officers brought powerful aid, because, overlooking the melley from the vantage-height of their saddles, they could see at what points it might be at the moment most useful to press the pursuit, and it was owing in great measure to this guidance that the victors were able to cling so fast to their prey. On the other hand, the overthrown column, which only a little before had been an aggregate unit obedient to the word of command, was now a variously-willed multitude; for numbers of them were prone in retreat, whilst many, like their comrades before them in the company columns, dropped down in the brush-wood and feigned to be dead; but others again gathering together into groups, or even small masses, and perceiving, perhaps, with a natural indignation that after all they were many, although hunted down by a few, turned savagely on their pursuers, and engaged them—sometimes with advantage—in obstinate hand-to-hand fights. On its flanks more especially, as may well be supposed, the men of the 77th felt the stress of the hostile numbers in which

Overthrow of
the close col-
umn in their
rear.

Melley of in-
termingled
combatants.

they had buried their slender, broken line; and Captain Willis on the right, who had led his grenadier company in their charge, springing foremost into the melley, became so encompassed by numbers of obstinate Russians that he was only saved in the end by dint of hard personal fighting, and the loyal rush of some men who flew in apt time to the rescue. The company acting on the opposite or left flank was engulfed at one time in the multitude on all sides crowding around it, and suffered heavy losses. Captain Nicholson—an officer of great stature and strength—who had led its attack, fell slain at an early moment.

The tumult was lasting, but never stationary, and always, though slowly, it moved from the south to the north. Down the last of the slopes descending from the English Heights, and along the south-western skirts of the Saddle-top Reach, and thence on to where the ground rose toward the line of Russian batteries, the broken column retreated, and retreated always in torment, for the pursuers hung fastened on their prey, and were tearing still at its life.

The Russians, who had thrown themselves down that they might seem like the dead, were careful of course to lie still whilst the English ran past them, but they afterward jumped up unhurt, and increasing by degrees to a number much greater than that of the whole force against them, these ‘resurrection boys’—for so in their mirth our soldiery called them—became a somewhat grave danger in Egerton’s rear, for it seemed at one moment that his scanty force might be heaved forward by the sheer weight of the crowd pressing on from behind, and so carried bodily forward between two reuniting throngs of Russians into the midst of the enemy’s lines. The numbers of Russians in Egerton’s rear were too formidable to allow of their being made prisoners; and our people indeed so desired to be rid of foes swarming behind them that there resulted in the midst of the strife a kind of tacit accord. The resurgents on their part, whilst sheering off by the flanks, took care to give no offense; and the English soldier, contented, allowed them to make their way past without either shooting them down, or trying to intercept their retreat.

At length, on the slope of Shell Hill, Colonel Egerton came to a halt. He re-formed the scant, straggling line which had swept thus victoriously from the very camp of the English to the edge of the Russian position; and, artillery-fire from the heights hav-

Egerton’s unrelenting pursuit.

The 77th at length halted in an advanced position.

ing opened by this time against him, he caused his men to lie down. The column still retreating before its now recumbent foes, and still pursued by their fire, was half-way up the hill-side, when the sole mounted officer—he rode a dark-colored charger—whom the English could see with the Russians, was observed all at once to come down from his saddle—either falling or dismounting abruptly; and it has been surmised that this horseman was no other than General Soimonoff, then struck by the shot which caused his death. What we know with certainty is, that at a time not less early, and in a part of the field not far distant from the one thus assigned, the brave and resolute commander, who had been the soul of the enterprise, received his mortal wound.

Until a later part of the morning, when an order withdrew him to another part of the field, Colonel Egerton held fast to the ground he had won. His men lying down in the brush-wood were in great measure sheltered from fire; but it was otherwise, of course, with the mounted officers who kept their saddles. General Buller at this time had two horses killed under him, and was himself disabled by the round-shot which destroyed his second charger.

Colonel Egerton's victory carried with it much more than the final defeat of the force directly opposed to him. Those who governed the action of the two Catherinburg battalions standing halted in front of Grant might not have been unduly troubled if learning that the body of 1500 Tomsk troops on their left had simply undergone a defeat; but when they saw it pursued, when they saw it persistently stricken, and hunted from south to north over no small part of the field, and this, too, by an enemy whose real strength, on account of the mist, could be only inferred from results, they apparently judged that they must conform to the yielding movement, and draw off without waiting to be attacked. At all events, they fell back.

Those two Catherinburg battalions, as we saw long ago, had overflowed the ground where three of Townsend's guns stood; but having captured neither limbers nor teams, they did not now, when retreating, find means to take off their prize, and accordingly the ebb of the receding soldiery left the cannon—all three of them—standing on the site of the fray with our gunners.

Upon the retreat of the columns before him, Grant once

General Soimonoff mortally wounded.

Egerton's retention of the ground he had won.

Effect of Egerton's victory upon the 3rd and 4th Catherinburg battalions.

Their retreat, leaving behind them the three English guns.

Renewed advance of Grant and Jeffreys. Recovery of the lost English guns. more became the pursuer; and not far off, Colonel Jeffreys (whose five companies of the Connaught Rangers were now again in good order) made haste to resume his advance. When our troops, after thus moving forward, began to pass over the ground just abandoned by the masses in their front, they saw standing before them, deserted, the three lost pieces of cannon. The discovery, even to them, was an interesting and grateful surprise; but immense, a little while later, was the joy of many a gunner belonging to Townsend's battery, when he clasped his nine-pounder once more, and found, as he presently did, that the endeavor to spike 'her' had failed.¹

Grant and Jeffreys so pushed their advance as to be, when they halted, within canister range of the enemy's guns on West Jut; and they held the ground they then took until ordered to establish their forces in another part of the field.

Thus the collateral results of the fight maintained by the wing of the 77th were of hardly less value than those directly obtained. Other tasks, on that Inkerman day, yet awaited Egerton's force; but this perhaps is the place where the names of the officers engaged can best be recorded. Besides General Buller, commanding the brigade, and Lieutenant the Hon. Hugh Clifford; his aid-de-camp, both present in person, the officers who took part in the charge executed by the wing of the 77th were—Colonel Egerton, commanding the regiment, Major Straton, Major Dixon, Captain Willis, Captain Nicholson, Lieutenant Lemprière, Lieutenant Acton, Adjutant Morgan, and Assistant-Surgeon Humphrey.

XVII.

Resolute advance farther east of six Russian battalions. A little way farther east, the enemy still continued to advance with six battalions of infantry; and it would seem that these troops were screened by the mist from any depressing knowledge of what had been going on near them; because, far from conforming, as other troops had done, to the movements of retreat on their right, they came on with a greater decisiveness than their countrymen had hitherto displayed, the truth being, that our pickets, after long and obstinate resistance, had by this time, in great measure, expended their cartridges, and could be driven in with comparative ease.

¹ In the language of gunners a piece of field-artillery is endearingly treated as feminine.

For some time the six battalions—two of the Tomsk and four of the Kolivansk regiment—found means, as other columns had done before, to avoid the open topland, and make good their way on hanging ground along the north bank of the Mikriakoff Glen; but afterward, bending to their left, they made bold to trespass at last upon the hitherto avoided domain of the Saddle-top Reach; and—for the moment—they transgressed with impunity, because the men of our pickets, now driven before them in numbers, were masking the fire from Home Ridge.

One of the Kolivansk battalions, separating itself from the others, inclined away toward Hill Bend in a direction which was almost due east; but the rest of the force, deeply echeloned, advanced on that part of Home Ridge which was the nearest to the Post-road on its western side, and confronted the right half of the battery commanded by Captain John Turner, who was present in person with this part of his force.¹

The columns still advancing, the foremost of them was at length within case-shot distance of the three guns, but shielded from their fire by the interposed soldiery of our retreating pickets, who, having come in from an extended front to a narrow space, were here thickly gathered. A non-commissioned officer of artillery, named Conway, moved forward from Captain Turner's side, and cried out to the infantry, in a voice of thunder, 'Lie down, men! lie down!' Many heard and obeyed, and very many, although not themselves hearing either this or other like warnings, could still see and follow the example of those who did; and the result was, that in a strangely short space of time the interposed infantry-men were all lying flat and effaced. Then Turner, firing safe over them, sent two rounds of case-shot into the advancing masses, which carried slaughter amongst them, and not only drove back at once the column marching in front, but also (as will be inferred from the sequel) so shook the four other battalions as to dispose them toward flight.

The men of the pickets, springing to their feet and cheering, pursued the column in its retreat down the side of the ridge, and, encountering no resistance from the rest of the five battalions, drove back the whole force before them home on to the base of Shell Hill.

¹ The separation of Turner's left half-battery had taken place some time before. See note, *ante*, p. 99.

The columns thus falling back passed dimly in sight of the 77th, whilst halted and lying down on the ground it had won; but Egerton's people, in the mist, mistook them for English advancing, and did not molest their retreat.

XVIII.

The mist was so isolating, that it strangely intercepted the spread of victory; and, although at but a small distance from the scene of the overthrow which Turner had just now achieved, the top of Hill Bend was a point from which, at this time, an Englishman could see nothing hopeful. There, as we know, Colonel Percy Herbert had posted three companies of the 49th under Capain Bellairs, and the 183 men composing this force were drawn up behind the low crestwork. On their left were Pennecuik's guns, but the battery had been suffering from the heavier metal on Shell Hill, had lost many horses, and from one cause or other had been for some time silent. Toward the front, as far as the eye could reach in the mist, the ground was peopled with English soldiery in no state of formation, and not only retreating without ceremony, but even retreating in haste. Indeed, some were running. These troops belonged to different regiments, and were plainly for the most part the remains of the pickets and of the troops sent out to support them, who, after long and tough fighting, were now suffering themselves to be driven in quickly because they had exhausted their cartridges; but the number of the fugitives visible within a small space was so great that an observer might easily fail to recognize them as men coming in from the outposts unless he understood how the progress of the enemy's attack upon a triangular wedge of ground like Mount Inkerman was compressing what had been a widely extended chain of pickets into a narrow space. The men, when questioned, said, growling, that they had used up all their cartridges, showed no disposition to make a stand, and hastened off to the rear. The column more immediately pressing upon the fugitives was that Kolivansk battalion which had diverged, as we know, from the main body of the regiment. It was seen working up through the brush-wood.

Bellairs not only thought that the mere sight of the strong eddy thus setting in from the front might of itself work mischief, but saw, too, that the advance of the column was placing the guns on his left in no little danger, and already, it seems, he was forming his re-

The state of
the fight as
seen at Hill
Bend.

Bellairs. His
perception of
the emergen-
cy.

solve when Captain Adams (the aid-de-camp of his father, General Adams, then commanding the brigade) rode up, and said, 'I think you had better advance, Bellairs.' The heads and shoulders of the advancing Russians now seen above the brush-wood showed that the column was within about eighty yards. Bellairs gave the order to 'fix bayonets'—for this had not yet been done—'to fix bayonets and advance.' Without firing a shot his men cleared the low parapet, drove forward under a hail of musketry till within forty yards of their enemy, and then with a loud hurra, and breaking into a run, went straight at the head of the column. The column turned and fled, pursued by the fire of their assailants, but gaining a good deal of shelter from the thickness and the height of the brush-wood which grew in that part of the field.

Charge executed by Bellairs with his 183 men of the 49th.

Overthrow and retreat of the Kolivansk column.

XIX.

Farther east, but upon an alignment less advanced than the scenes of the preceding encounters, the Borodino and the Taroutine regiments, with, besides, that stray Catherinburg battalion which had joined their advance, were still in order of battle upon a front which extended from the Post-road by the head of the Quarry Ravine to the crest beyond the Sand-bag Battery; and, the mist here not being so dense as to forbid combined movements, the 6600 infantry¹ thus gathered might have been wielded as a single force by any one entitled to command them. It seems, however, that no general officer was present, and the only order hitherto given to these Borodino and Taroutine battalions was not one of such kind as to engage them in any bold enterprise.

Array of 5600 Russians between the head of the Quarry Ravine and the Sand-bag Battery.

The four battalions of the Taroutine, and the one of the Catherinburg regiment, were about to be attacked by a corps 500 strong, under General Adams in person, and on the opposite flank the right of the Borodino regiment was confronted, at some distance, by a little band of 200 men under Colonel Mauleverer;² but, except those two bodies of English, and a few of the outpost men still hovering near, the 6600 Russians had no hostile troops before them. The Taroutine battalions remained halted, but the two Borodino battalions, which were on and near the Post-road, began to move forward.

The sole English forces opposing it.

Advance of two Borodino battalions.

¹ 6668. ² The left wing of the 30th Regiment, with a strength of 202 men.

The 200 men under Colonel Mauleverer were a wing of the 30th Regiment. This small force already in line attempted to deliver its fire upon the advancing masses of the Borodino regiment, but from the practice of piling arms in all weathers without closing the muzzles, it resulted that but few of the pieces would receive fire, and for a moment the men, baffled by this sudden failure of their rifles in the close presence of the enemy, began, as it seemed, to waver; but Colonel Mauleverer, a cool, skillful, and resolute officer, who commanded the regiment, and was present on foot with this wing, proved equal to the emergency. If no spark could be wrung from the firelock, he knew there was still the bayonet. He caused his men to advance to the 'Barrier,' or main picket wall, and there for the moment lie down behind it. The enemy's masses approached, and the head of his foremost column was already within a few yards, when Colonel Mauleverer himself and Major Walker, and indeed, as it seems, all the officers who were acting with this wing of the 30th, rose and mounted to the top of the wall. Yet there they stood hardly a moment. With scarce a glance back to their people, they frankly leaped down to the enemy's side of the Barrier. In an instant the men were up, and following over the wall. Without farther recourse to their wetted firelocks, but welcoming with a joyful hurra the sudden time for the bayonet, they sprang at the nearest battalion whilst still in its company columns, and were presently tearing their way through the loose, shapeless swarm. Mauleverer himself was gravely wounded, and numbers of his officers and men fell killed or disabled;¹ but the encounter, if bloody, was short. The shreds of the enemy's company columns, thrown back in a heap of confusion upon the solid mass coming up in support, seemed to bring it to instant ruin, for that last body also, though it scarce could have felt English steel, began to fall back in disorder; and within a brief interval from the moment when Mauleverer and the rest of the officers sprang up to the top of the wall, the slender line of the 30th, with a remaining strength of per-

Mauleverer's counter advance with a wing of the 30th Regiment:

His charge.

Overthrow of the two Borodino battalions immediately confronting him.

¹ The losses of the whole regiment (which had a strength of 404) were in killed and wounded 127, including Captain Conolly and Lieutenant Gibson killed, and Colonel Mauleverer, Captain Rose, Captain Dickson, Captain Bayley, and Lieutenant Lewin wounded (the last of them mortally); and it is believed that the particular encounter sustained, as above described, by only a wing of the regiment, is the one in which Conolly, Gibson, and Lewin were mortally, and Bayley severely wounded.

haps some seven or eight score soldiers, was driving a broken throng from the head of the Quarry Ravine and up the slopes of Shell Hill.¹

The immediate consequence of this exploit was not its only result; for the two unstricken battalions of the Borodino regiment accepted the defeat of their comrades as a blow which must rule their own fate. They turned, and began to descend along the channel of the Quarry Ravine. Thus all four of the Borodino battalions were now in retreat.

XX.

In obedience to the instruction he had received, General Adams led the 41st Regiment toward the Sand-bag Battery, and the almost entire battalion thus acting under his immediate orders had a strength of more than 500 men.² With this force extended in line, he advanced along the Fore Ridge to Mount Head, descended thence to the Kitspur, and (after first meeting the soldiery of our pickets there driven in from the front) was at last face to face with the Taroutine regiment, and the stray Catherinburg battalion, troops numbering altogether 4000 men.³ For the first time on that day the Russians were met by a whole English battalion, or one at least nearly complete; and it seems that at the very sight of this force approaching, the buglers of the Taroutine regiment began to sound 'Left about!'⁴ But, whether obeying their bugles, or yielding rather under the fire which presently crashed through their ranks from the extended front of the 41st, the loosened company columns of the Taroutine regiment made haste to turn; and, Adams pressing on his advance, it not only resulted that those subdivided masses fell back in confusion, and abandoned the site of the Sand-bag Battery, but that the three solid columns which had stood in support were carried away with the rest

¹ The defeated battalions apparently fled toward the hill-top, in the hope of soon finding themselves covered by the fire of the Russian artillery; but they afterward turned, and ultimately retreated from Mount Inkerman by descending the Quarry Ravine. The Borodino regiment, of which the two defeated battalions formed half, had a strength of 2509. Major Walker was brilliantly prominent in the charge, and upon the recommendation of Colonel Mauleverer (who modestly ignored his own part in the encounter) he received the Victoria Cross.

² 525. The strength of the entire regiment all told was 599, but one company was out on picket in another part of the field.

³ 4159.

⁴ Chodasievitch, p. 198.

down the sides of the nearest declivities. Adams warily marking the density of the copsewood, and the steepness of the descent by which the throng flooded down, would not suffer his men to pursue except with their fire, and the enemy, finding cover from the rifle-balls of our people in the fall of the ground, dropped quickly out of their reach; but panic then took up the chase and made the retreat a sheer flight. Thus the whole of the force which (including the Borodino corps before overthrown) had been 6600 strong, was now passing away discomfited from the field of strife. By what farther wanderings the stray Catherinburg body made good its way back to Sebastopol, no record before me has told; but the eight battalions of the Borodino and the Taroutine regiments descended to the foot of Mount Inkerman, drew off along the bank of the river, and were not again brought into action.

If here once again the thousands gave way to the hundreds, it must be remembered in excuse for these Taroutine and Borodino regiments that they were troops somewhat shaken in confidence by their experience of defeat on the Alma; that now on the Inkerman day they had ventured almost at random across the ravines and the ridges, having no artillery with them; that they had been left to guess at their duty without the guidance of any general officer; that from the first they had had, as it were, the sensation of being astray, and that plainly in the hour of trial there was no fit commander to wield them.

The defeated body of 6600 finally removed from the field of battle.

Circumstances under which the Taroutine and the Borodino regiments fought.

XXI.

So, in that course of decisive fighting which began on Pennefather's left, and was thence carried eastward along our whole front, the twenty Russian battalions which had undertaken the actual attack¹ were themselves assailed and defeated, nay, brought to sheer ruin, by a few small and separated bodies of English combatants;² whilst the enemy's sixteen battalions, drawn up in support or reserve,³ made no effort to avert or retrieve the overthrow thus inflicted upon their comrades. Those sixteen battalions, it is true, remained un-

Result of the first or early morning's fight ending at 7.30.

¹ With a strength, at the outset, of 15,420.

² Besides the artillery-men serving Turner's three guns, the whole numbers of English who took part as *active* combatants in the above course of fighting was, as I make it, 1539.

³ With a strength of 9223.




THE FIGHT ON MOUNT INKERMANN


EXPLANATIONS.

First Period.

*Final overthrow of the Enemy's first twenty
battalions and recapture of Ironsends three guns
The Enemy's fresh troops of the 11th Division coming
into action.*

Scale.







shaken, and had hardly, indeed, been subjected to any special strain on their courage, for, besides being kept out of fire, they all of them occupied heights from which they could see little or nothing of their fugitive brethren now draining off through the ravines. But the loss of General Soimonoff—the soul of the enterprise—and of General Villehois, and an appalling number of other officers—many high in command—was of itself almost fatal to any hope of obtaining fresh service from the remnants of the defeated columns; and, upon the whole, it resulted that this discomfiture of the twenty battalions who actively engaged in the attack was not a mere repulse, but, so far as concerned those troops, an absolute and final defeat, which removed them from the field of battle, and ended their part in the day's fighting.¹

Nor can this strange result be ascribed to any want of due perseverance on the part of the Russians. The disasters to which the enemy exposed his dense, crowded masses might be soberly called 'overwhelming,' and in some of his hapless columns the havoc, it seems, was sheer ruin. The Catharinburg regiment suffered not only a terrible slaughter of its rank and file, but lost all its battalion commanders, besides two-thirds of its other officers; and two of the Kolvansk battalions, which had gone into action with a strength of more than fourteen hundred men, came out, after less than an hour, in charge of a captain, with only, as he has reported, some ten score of men between them.² All this carnage had been incurred by attempting to overwhelm a few steady, resolute soldiery with the weight of gross columns; but the combatants stood shrouded in mist, and it seems that the great bulk of the Russian officers never knew the conditions under which they fought. They imagined that their forces had been sacrificed for want of sufficient numbers.³

It was now about half-past seven o'clock.

¹ 'De tous les bataillons qui devoient attaquer la position des Anglais, vingt avaient déjà quitté le champ de bataille'—*Todleben*, p. 465; and the assertion is confirmed by the elaborate plans accompanying the General's work, which are careful to represent that after their early morning's fight all the twenty battalions were finally withdrawn from the conflict.

² Kronsikoff's statement, Czarevitch's Collection. The writer was a captain in the 1st Kolivansk battalion.

³ 'In spite of the accumulated forces of the enemy, our columns succeeded in occupying his batteries and fortifications, and maintained themselves in that position hoping to get new supports; but except the three regiments of our division [those three regiments alone had come into action with a strength of 9297] no others appeared. That bewildered us to the last degree. Having no possibility of maintaining our position any longer, we retreated.'—*Ibid.* The recent date of the statement and of its publication

XXII.

The battalions which executed this early morning attack had a strength of 15,000,¹ with present supports and reserves bringing up their number of infantry to nearly 25,000;² and 38 pieces of cannon. To encounter the forces thus brought to assail them on Mount Inkerman our people proved able to gather 3700³ foot with—at first 12 and afterward—18 guns. It may be said that the Duke of Cambridge and Sir George Cathcart were advancing to the support of Pennefather with reinforcements which would sooner or later comprise nearly 3500 additional infantry,⁴ that the batteries on Home Ridge would ere long be receiving an accession of 18 field-pieces, followed soon by two heavier guns, and that the forces thus preparing to act, though not yet on the scene of the actual fight, should be counted as supports and reserves already lending their weight to the defense of Mount Inkerman; but if forces which were only approaching are treated as part of the strength, they must be counted, of course, on each side, and under that mode of reckoning the disparity of the compared numbers will still appear great; for then, with a present and an approaching strength, comprising altogether only 7000 infantry⁵ and less than 40 pieces of cannon, the English must be found to have stood confronted by a body of 35,000 foot,⁶ and 135 guns, of which 54 were 12-pounders.

And it can scarcely be said that in this early part of the fight the English foot-soldiery made up for scant numbers by using their advantage of ground; for those of their infantry who engaged the enemy's columns did not even in any one instance stand still to await the attack behind their sheltering heights, but always, on the contrary, pushed forward, and chose the scene of each combat by simply striking at the enemy wherever they chanced to find him.

The mist was a circumstance which at first gave advantage to General Soimonoff; but it afterward proved a graver embarrassment to the

tends to prove that the false impression of the writer must have been one generally entertained in the Russian army, for otherwise, apparently after so many years, it could hardly have remained uncorrected.

¹ 15,420.

² 24,643.

³ 3692—*i. e.*, 2nd Division, with Buller's force, Prince Edward's company of the Grenadiers.

⁴ 3461—*i. e.*, the Guards, less Prince Edward's company (already counted), and the 4th Division.

⁵ 7155.

⁶ 35,385.

Comparison
of the num-
bers engaged
in this early
fight.

The strength
of the ground
not taken ad-
vantage of by
the English
infantry.

Effect of
the mist on
the respect-
ive forces.

Russians—engaged as they were on strange ground—than to the troops of our 2nd Division, long camped on Mount Inkerman, and defending, as it were, their own copse. The Russians, it is true, had masses so great and so dense in proportion to the ground they assailed, that, despite the dimness of the atmosphere, their columns—too huge to be lost—could in general be reached by orders dispatched from elsewhere, and the whole of them might therefore, if steady, maintain that clear singleness of action and purpose which makes the strength of an army; whilst the English force, on the contrary, was broken up into detachments so small and so far apart that the mist which lay heavy between them made their severance from each other complete; and at many a spot, as we have seen, a young officer with a very scant following of soldiery and strong bodies of Russians before him, became, as it were, the supreme commander in a narrow field of action beyond the reach of control, and also cut off from all help. But this kind of isolation proved not altogether uncongenial to the peculiar people who are said to have been always warlike without having patience to be ‘military;’ and for once, notwithstanding old maxims, the slender and separate stems proved stronger than the closely bound fagot. A force which had greatness and unity gave way to a number of spontaneous efforts by segregated handfuls of men.

Quality of the English officer when isolated with only a small body of men.

The result was, of course, in a great measure owing to the high quality of the officers who thus found themselves invested with power, and yet, speaking generally, they were not selected men. Thornton Grant, Hugh Clifford, Prince Edward, Fordyce, Buller (with Egerton under him), John Turner, Bellairs, Mauleverer, Adams—all these, one after another, conducted separate fights, but excepting Buller and Adams (both Brigadier-Generals) they none of them came into action with a prospect of independent command, such as that which circumstance gave them. It seems hardly unsafe to conjecture that a number of leaders thus raised up into sudden power by the chances of battle, yet proving, every one of them, equal to the varying and successive occasions, were, after all, only fair samples of the body from which they came, and that, as regards both its officers and the soldiery under them, our army at Inkerman was rich in men able to cope with that kind of emergency which can best be met by sheer fighting.

The English came into action without having broken their

The English
troops fast-
ing.

main need

Want of am-
munition.

fast; and before the close of the battle there must have been many whose bodily strength was a little impaired by want of food and drink; but the kind. The centrifugal force exerted by Pennefather's peculiar tactics carried with it of necessity a rapid expenditure of cartridges, and this, too, by troops so far in advance, so dispersed in the copsewood, and, besides, so shrouded in mist, that, as long as they remained fighting thus in the extreme front, they were necessarily beyond the reach of all measures for enabling them to replenish their pouches. Already, as we have seen, numbers of the pickets and their immediate auxiliaries had from this cause become almost powerless; and we shall find that, in spite of the valiant devotion that was manifested by Turkish and English drivers who pushed forward with reserve ammunition, the evil was one which for some hours continued to increase.

Results proved that Percy Herbert had received a happy inspiration when he divined that the mere sight of a quickly opened fire from Fitzmayer's guns would tend to weaken the early morning's attack; for the enemy, thus led to believe that our people stood ready to meet him, became, it would seem, overcau-

Effect of the
early fire from
Home Ridge.

The failure of
numerical
strength in
each separate
encounter.

tious. Under the scaring effect of the artillery-flashes, which blazed through the mist from Home Ridge, the twenty assailing battalions were made to bend aside right and left from the open Saddle-top Reach, and it is plain that the expedient which thus caused them to swerve helped greatly to mar their attack.

From the moment when—Clifford beginning—our people became the assailants, the Russians failed to draw any even temporary advantage from weight of numbers, and indeed had to expiate their gross method of fighting by the endurance of frightful losses. The ascendant of the few over the many was for the time so decisive that it scarce appeared to leave room for the common element of chance. Every time it attacked, and after strife always short, the scant slender line had mastery over the column.

Under an almost unique concurrence of circumstances, it so happened that this overthrow of the twenty battalions, however complete, still failed to exert that wide power over the minds and hearts of men which commonly attends upon victory; for the Russians, when driven back, flooded down for the most part by the Mikriakoff Glen and the Careen-

Circumstances which
marked the
defeat of the
twenty battal-
ions and im-
paired its
moral effect.

age Ravine, or else by the defile of the Quarry, and dropped away from the Mount under cover of the brush-wood and the mist without being seen by their fellow-countrymen of the 11th Division then advancing in support along the high ground to take their places in front; whilst the English, on the other hand, losing sight of their adversaries for a moment in the dimness of the air and the smoke, and then quickly again finding themselves confronted by similar masses, did not even, it seems, imagine that they had finally driven off from the field several thousands of the enemy's infantry; and, though facing anew big, gray columns, which were really fresh troops, supposed themselves still contending against the obstinacy of their earliest foes. In short, this first hour's achievement, though extirpating from the battle-field, as the Russians declare, more than 15,000 of their infantry forces, was nevertheless an event so little known at the time by any other than the fugitives themselves, that to the remainder of the assailing army it brought no discouragement; to the English, no new sense of power, and—except toward the left of the defended ground—no rest, no break, no change.

SECOND PERIOD.

7.30 A.M. TO 8.30 A.M.

I.

If 15,000¹ of the enemy's defeated forces were now altogether abandoning the Inkerman battle-field, and guns brought up by the enemy. 10,000² fresh infantry, followed close by no less than 97 additional guns, had made their way round under Pauloff along the East Sapper's Road, and up St. George's Ravine to the higher slopes of Shell Hill. General Dannenberg, on gaining the heights, took command of not only the force which marched under Pauloff, but also of the other army-corps which Soimonoff had led out from Sebastopol.³ It was evidently understood that for all the purposes of the fight on Mount Inkerman, General Dannenberg had an independent authority which Prince Mentschikoff would not supersede. When the Prince had come up, he placed himself on St. George's Brow, and there kept the Grand-Dukes at his side.

By means of the fresh artillery brought up under Pauloff,

¹ 15,430.

² Computing the Sapper battalion at 750, 10,712.

³ So prearranged, see *ante*, p. 59.

the enemy's array of batteries was strengthened, but also prolonged, from Shell Hill to the end of East Jut;¹ and General Dannenberg's dispositions. General Dannenberg could now move his battalions under the cover of nearly ninety guns already in action,² well planted on commanding heights, and extended along a whole mile of front.³

General Dannenberg, for some reason, determined that, notwithstanding the long, toilsome march which they had even then hardly completed, the troops of the 11th Division just brought up by Pauloff should exclusively constitute his attacking force, and that the sixteen battalions, which had been hitherto employed as inactive supports and reserves, should still remain charged with like functions in the approaching fight; but the disposition of those last troops was now so far altered as to make them extend their protection to the batteries newly placed on East Jut.

Though drawn up, from the first, on high ground, and not, for the most part, at any great distances in rear of Soimonoff's guns, the 9000⁴ men composing those supports and reserves had been as free from the strain of actual fighting as the battalions newly brought up; and, upon the whole, it may be said that (except the troops assailed in their march by Goodlake's thirty men) no portion of the 19,000 infantry⁵ now about to be wielded by Dannenberg had hitherto fired a shot.

With the 10,000 fresh troops of Pauloff's army-corps General Dannenberg undertook to engage the centre of the English, but also to attack them at the same time with great vigor on their right, and to begin by driving in the little body of soldiery still posted by the Sand-bag Battery.⁶ So, after gaining Shell Hill, the Okhotsk regiment and the Sapper battalion crossed the Quarry Ravine and the Inkerman Tusk, descended into St. Clement's Gorge, and thence (by help of the Sappers, who cut through the dense and tall brush-wood) made their dif-

Advance of
his 10,000
fresh troops.

¹ At first twenty-four, and afterward, it seems, thirty-two guns were established on East Jut alone.

² At this moment, or very soon afterward, there were eighty-six guns in battery.

³ Of the enemy's 135 pieces, no less than fifty-four were of the great calibre belonging to what the Russians called 'batteries of position,' the guns being 12-pounders, with 32-pounder howitzers.

⁴ 9036, without counting the 207 Sappers who, however, were also on the ground.

⁵ Taking the battalion of Sappers at 750, 19,748.

⁶ The attack on our right was, at this time, the primary object. — *Todleben*, p. 468.

ficult way up the Kitspur at a point near its northern extremity. In this diagonal line of march they were followed some way by the Iäkoutsik and the Selenghinsk battalions; but the Iäkoutsik troops so shaped their course that they would ultimately come to the front in or near the Quarry Ravine and on the right of the Okhotsk regiment; whilst, on the other hand, the four Selenghinsk battalions prepared to form the left wing of the assailing forces. Before coming under fire, the troops were already in that order of attack which had been adopted by the Tomsk and three other regiments in the preceding fight.¹

During the latter part of their progress these fresh troops were not in reality separated from the fugitives of the Taroutine and Borodino regiments by any great interval of either space or time; but the formation of the ground was such that the routed troops, as we saw, could pour off by ways of their own without either obstructing or discouraging the forces newly brought up; and indeed it is believed that the advancing battalions had the singular advantage of not even seeing the discomfited soldiery who only a few minutes before had been crowded over the same ground.

II.

What force could the English oppose to the 19,000 infantry, supported by nearly ninety guns already in battery, which Dannenberg was now wielding against them, and how, in particular, would they meet the attack of the 10,000 fresh troops thus advancing upon their centre and their right front?

Before coming to the English numbers, it must be observed that Dannenberg was confining his onsets to a chosen part of the field, that down to the end of the battle he continued to avoid any second attack in the direction of Soimonoff's enterprise, and that by this exercise of his prerogative as the attacking commander, he neutralized any bodies of men which our people might keep for defense on ground no longer assailed. It was on Pennefather's left rear and left front that the maintenance of this safeguard was judged to be needful.

Prince Edward, as before, with his picket at Quarter-guard Point, and Fordyce, having Grant's force conjoined, but withdrawn to the head of the Well-way—these stood in charge to repress all newly

¹ *I. e.*, skirmishers first, then two lines of company columns, then one line of battalion columns.—See *ante*, p. 103.

attempted flank movements from the bed of the Careenage Ravine; whilst Egerton and Jeffreys on Pennefather's left front watched against any second attack by either the Mikriakoff Glen or the west of the Saddle-top Reach. Afterward, Egerton with his victorious little force was brought back to aid the defense of the Home Ridge at a critical moment; but on the other hand, when reinforcements from the 4th Division were approaching from the direction of the Windmill, a wing of the 21st Fusileers, 200 strong, under Lord West, was pushed forward to a spot near the one which Egerton vacated; and upon the whole it may be understood that the troops thus kept watching the English left rear and left front were now fully a thousand strong. They were troops which had come with a strength of more than 1200, and constituted one-third part of the 3600 infantry which our people had brought into action.¹

A Russian column at one time appeared moving up from the Mikriakoff Glen, but Lord West with ease drove it down; and it may be almost unreservedly said that from the close of the first great fight until the end of the battle, the troops thus disposed on Pennefather's left front and left rear remained unmolested by infantry. If still under artillery-fire, they had earned the reward of hard toil, and there were soldiery near the head of the Well-way whose rest could not always be broken by the occasional hum of a round-shot, or the roar of the neighboring fight. Many lay wrapped in sleep.

The two other third parts of the English infantry had suffered in the course of the fighting a material diminution of their power. General Pennefather, it is true, had not yet sustained crushing losses in killed and wounded; but several hundreds of his picket-men and picket-supports, after long and obstinate skirmishing in copsewood overlain with thick mist, had become disengaged more or less from the guidance of their chiefs, and were merely now so many units without any aggregate strength.² Many, it is believed, including a large proportion of officers, long remained in advanced positions; whilst again, as we saw, there were numbers of the

The two other
third parts of
the English
infantry.

The 'spent
'forces.'

¹ Prince Edward, Fordyce, Grant, Egerton, and Jeffreys came into action with a strength of altogether 1266; and the English infantry, including Goodlake's 30 men and all the reinforcements which came up in time for the first fight, numbered, as we have seen, 3635.

² See in Appendix, No. VII., a computation showing the number of the pickets and their skirmishing supports.

men with dumb rifles who had come back loosed from command, and savage for want of cartridges; but, although the formation of the ground made it certain that the soldiery thus driven in must draw closer and closer together when approaching the Isthmus, they were a medley from various regiments, neither linked by a common authority, nor working any longer as skirmishers. Percy Herbert strove hard to give them coherence, for he judged that the moment might be near when every bayonet would be wanted for the defense of Home Ridge, and the reserve ammunition, it seems, was brought up in good time; but still this 'spent force' of combatants (which gathered for the most part between Pennefather's camp and Home Ridge) was not in such state as to be able to take its share of the fights now impending.

There remained, however, to General Pennefather for defense against the coming attacks several organized bodies of infantry, which numbered altogether about 1400 men.¹ It may be said that about one-half of these held advanced positions; for, near the scene of their victory in front of the Barrier, there stood what remained of the wing of the 30th, which fought under Colonel Mauleverer; and General Adams, with the 41st Regiment (which was joined before long by Bellairs with his three companies of the 49th), still remained by the Sand-bag Battery.

On Home Ridge, Townsend's six field-pieces, now adding their strength to that of Fitzmayer's twelve guns, brought the whole number up to eighteen; and the reverse slope was occupied by the remaining moiety of Pennefather's disposable infantry—that is, by the 95th Regiment, by a remnant of the 55th, and three companies of the 47th—troops which came into action with a strength of rather more than 700, but about to be reduced to some 300 by the approaching removal of the 95th Regiment.²

The reinforcements destined to reach Pennefather in time to share, sooner or later, in the now impending fights of this Second Period were: Two field-batteries dispatched from the First, and one from the Light Division,³ some 1200 of the Guards,⁴ and 2000 men

The approaching reinforcements.

¹ See Appendix, No. VII.

² See Appendix, No. VII.

³ The artillery furnished by the 1st Division was commanded by Colonel Dacres, Captains Paynter and Woodhouse commanding each a battery. The battery furnished by the Light Division was commanded by Captain Morris, but the captain's chief was Colonel Lake. The troop of horse-artillery attached to the Light Division was at Balaclava.

⁴ 1244, making with the picket already there 1331.

brought up by Cathcart from the 4th Division,¹ so that ultimately the 1400 English infantry, before standing ready to meet the next coming attacks, would be increased to about 4700; and two battalions of French infantry, with a strength of altogether 1600, were also approaching.² Of these succors, these three English field-batteries, and more than 700 of the Guards,³ with the Duke of Cambridge present in person, were already so close that, for the purpose of any fight on Home Ridge, they might be almost regarded as present.

Coming after a victory which had expunged from Mount Inkerman more than twenty Russian battalions, these reinforcements, though small, might still have sufficed, it would seem, to make good the defense of a position in which nature had built up a stronghold for a few thousand steadfast infantry, with thirty or forty guns; but our people, under the guidance of Pennefather, did not even for a moment fall back upon the modest task of merely guarding their heights. Again, as before, pushing forward into advanced positions, they accepted the strife wherever it offered, and we shall see them allowing their strength to be drawn all away and consumed by the allurements of a fight on wrong ground, where the very success of a combat might jeopardize the fate of the battle.

Continued impression of the English as to the dimensions of the conflict.

The English remained unacquainted with the aggregate of the facts which constituted their morning's victory, and did not yet know or imagine the dimensions of the fight in which they were engaged. They understood well enough that Pennefather's struggle for the defense of his copse was one that must be firmly maintained, and that, to that end, he ought to receive all the succor he might need; but not having yet come to suspect that a whole Russian army, numbered by several tens of thousands, had really undertaken to mass itself upon the Inkerman corner of ground, they still thought of the trouble the Russians were giving as something far short of 'a battle;' and Lord Raglan and Canrobert having both of them intimated to Pennefather from the first that they came to offer him succors, but not to supersede him in the management of his fight, the condition of things thus established was still kept in force. Even under clear daylight, it would have been seemingly rash to overrule or disturb so valiant

¹ Altogether 2217 were contributed by the 4th Division, of whom 2066 (being all of them except 151) were in time for the second fight.

² 1665—viz., 6th of the line, 757, and 7th Léger, 908.

³ 757.

Conduct of the fight still left to Pennefather.

a soldier as Pennefather, whilst defending the familiar copse-wood upon which he had long been camped; and the density of the mist still made it impossible for any other commander to obtain such a glance of the battle-field as could warrant the interposition of his overruling authority.

But whilst he generously abstained from every word which might disturb Pennefather's arrangements, Lord Raglan and his Staff. Raglan, as may well be supposed, was yearning after that knowledge of the state of the field which the mist had hitherto denied him; and, his prime task of ordering up reinforcements having been performed long ago, he was not recalled from the front by any work of duty elsewhere. So he yielded to his natural inclination, and was always at this period on the English Heights, or between them and the Sandbag Battery.

It was for this ceaseless exposure of his life that he afterward found himself affectionately chided by the Secretary of State,¹ and compelled to excuse himself by saying that to keep clear of round-shot and shell would have been to avoid the battle. Lord Raglan's happy calm in action was a quality which imparted itself to others. If a spy sent forward by Dannenberg had, by some clever artifice, penetrated to the part of Home Ridge where Lord Raglan sat in his saddle, he might have observed the English Commander conversing with Airey or Strangways; but, if speaking the truth, he must have reported that—in spite of an unforeseen onslaught which had burst, as it were, on Mount Inkerman with the might of 40,000 men—he had failed to detect in the Head-quarter Staff any sign of discomposure, and perhaps might have had to confess that he had both gazed and listened for minutes and minutes together without, after all, learning any thing, except, perhaps, some such fact as that the English mail had come in, and that the chief's right-hand man could find time to be delivering to this friend or that a welcome letter from home.² Under conditions like those of

¹ Duke of Newcastle, 27th November. Lord Raglan, in his answer, 18th December, 1854, after acknowledging the kind feeling which dictated the Duke's letter, says: 'I can assure you, however, that I am not at all aware of having exposed myself either rashly or unnecessarily either at Alma or at Inkerman. The enemy's artillery is so numerous and powerful that it is almost impossible to keep clear of the line of it unless I should determine to remain out of action altogether; and I can with truth say that the impossibility of well observing the enemy was felt by me as a great misfortune, I mean at Inkerman.'

² To Colonel Dickson, for instance, and at a critical period of the battle, an officer of the Staff delivered a letter from England.

Inkerman it would be hard to overrate the advantage derived from the visible presence of a chief unaffectedly calm, and this quiet air of routine in all the people about him.

The period of the first morning fight was divided from that of the next one by a deep mark of severance, which is perceived, of course, at the instant by those who have learned that the twenty Russian battalions engaged in the earlier onslaughts were altogether withdrawn from the field, and that Dannenberg chose only fresh troops for the succeeding attacks; but it must not be supposed that the English could detect such a change at the time. The increasing roar of a heavily strengthened artillery intercepted or weakened attention to the lull in the musketry-fire; and the defeated soldiery, when they vanished—dropping down out of sight by the steeps—were so promptly replaced by fresh troops, that our people marked no distinct break in the tenor of the fight, except such as might naturally occur between the repulse and the renewal of any infantry attack. They indeed saw columns upon columns brought up, as it seemed, in support, but did not either know or imagine that the enemy, when he once more confronted them, had changed all his fighting battalions.

III.

Imagining, probably (as almost all the infantry-men did), that the parapet of the Sand-bag Battery marked a part of the Inkerman defenses, General Adams prepared to resist the attack now directed against it; and from this time, accordingly, the error which ascribed a great value to the position of the Kit-spur began to work mischief. We shall have to see our people entangling themselves more and more heavily in obstinate, bloody fights, for a worthless spur of ground seven hundred yards distant from their Home Ridge, and thus not only wasting a huge proportion of their scanty strength, but suffering their front of battle to become distorted and forked, nay, broken, one may say, into two.

Adams, still near the Sand-bag Battery, was joined, before long, by Bellairs with his three companies of the 49th, and had thus altogether a force of 700 men;¹ but perceiving that the numbers against him were huge as compared with his own, he ordered his Brigade-Major—Captain, now Gen-

The error which began to entangle our troops on wrong ground.

The force near the Sand-bag Battery. Armstrong's communication with the Duke of Cambridge.

¹ The strength with which the nine companies of the 41st and the three companies of the 49th had come into action was 710.

eral Armstrong—to ride back and learn whether any supports were at hand. Armstrong found the Duke of Cambridge with two battalions of the Guards already drawn up in line on the right of Hill Bend, and was at once assured by His Royal Highness that he would advance in support.

General Adams meantime held his ground, and soon became engaged with the masses approaching his position. He did not, it is believed, at the moment apprehend the whole truth; but, as we now know, he was opposing 700 men in an outlying position to an enemy advancing against the English centre and right with more than 10,000 fresh troops, and this at a time when there were no forces present on either his right or his left which could undertake to secure him from the peril of becoming enfolded—enfolded by masses which of necessity would largely outflank him so soon as they should come up abreast of the five foremost battalions. English troops, indeed, were still holding the Barrier; but between their right and the left of Adams there lay that unoccupied space which Pennefather a little later began to call the Gap. For the moment, it is true, the five nearest battalions, with their strength of little more than 4000 men,¹ were the only part of the approaching force which had come within fighting distance; but a present numerical superiority of five to one, with the prospect of quickly doubling the odds, was enough to warrant flank movements against Adams, as well as attacks on his front; and if any one ask why our people allowed a small body of soldiery to linger on such a spot and there stand at bay under conditions thus glaringly adverse, it must be answered that their determination resulted from the mistake of imagining the Sand-bag Battery to be a link in the existing system of the Inkerman defenses, and one which they thought marked the value of the ground on which Science had placed it. From that cause, as well as from the natural inclination of our people to remain fastened upon an object for which they had once contended, the dismantled parapet continued to exercise a ceaseless fascination—not indeed lastingly upon the very same troops—for any soldiery which had once entered the Sand-bag Battery soon learned to understand its worthlessness—but upon successive bodies of men.

When at length the 4000 drew close, and began their attack, Adams drove in their skirmishers, overthrew the com-

¹ Taking the Sappers at 750, and including the 360 Riflemen, 4292.

The fight maintained by Adams toward his front.

pany columns of the Okhotsk regiment, and worsted, or at all events checked, its two supporting battalions; but the Sapper battalion coming up to the rescue with great determination, the English were in their turn pressed back a little, and thenceforth for a while the fight heavily swayed to and fro. The Okhotsk and the Sapper battalions were perhaps of harder material than their comrades of the 10th and 17th Divisions; or it may be they fought more tenaciously because the now clearer state of the atmosphere allowed them to obtain and enjoy a full consciousness of their great ascendant in numbers. At all events, the discomfiture of the troops constituting their front was not followed, as had happened in the earlier morning, by a disruption of the columns charged to act in support. Numbers fell under the coolly delivered fire of the English line; but this time the disabled or discomfited soldiery in front were continually replaced by men thrown forward from the masses behind.

The flank attacks:

sands, but they soon felt the stress of that lev-
 erage which the enemy could apply by getting
 round their flanks. Whether the Iakouts and the Seling-
 linsk battalions had yet so closely approached as to be able
 to take part in these flank attacks, or whether—as indeed
 was easy enough—the five foremost battalions spared some
 of their troops for the purpose, I can not undertake to say;
 but our people from an early moment had been threatened
 by troops curling round their right flank, and now Russian
 skirmishers, strongly supported, began to come up, moving
 eastward from St. Clement's Gorge, if not indeed also from
 the Quarry Ravine. In other words, the 700 English, whilst
 they strove against the masses straight before them, and
 warded off the forces on their right front, were now also
 challenged on their left flank, and even toward their left
 rear. Under these conditions the engagement by degrees
 resolved itself into a number of separate struggles. No
 sooner had one Russian column been driven back than a
 fresh one appeared approaching a flank, and now it would
 seem, but certainly for the first time that day, the idea of
 the 'company column,' which Russia had learned from the
 Germans, proved more or less apt for its purpose by acting
 as a powerful unit with the animation derived from a sepa-
 rate though not discordant volition. At each extremity of
 their line the endeavors of our soldiery to repulse flank at-
 tacks were made of necessity by changes of front, and of

course when it happened that a column was already on either the right rear or the left rear of our people, the only way to attack it, or prevent it from cutting off the force, was by a more or less retrograde movement. Accordingly, these combats on the right and on the left created at each flank a side eddy which could not but tend to draw back by degrees that part of the force which was engaged with the enemy in its front, and the English, though still fighting obstinately, and inflicting, it is supposed, heavy losses upon the enemy, began to lose ground. General Adams, however, it would seem, had not recognized yet the full stress of the operations undertaken against his flanks, and still looked upon victory over the actual combatants in his front as the object that had to be sought; for he was observed at this time neither turning to parry the attacks on his right or his left, nor trying to draw the troops off, but, on the contrary, encouraging them to hold their ground.

In the 41st and 49th Regiments there were many who long remembered with affectionate tenacity those latter moments of their dear chief's presence amongst them. Of noble presence, great in stature, and seated upon a big English horse, he towered above the people around him, strangely proof, as it seemed for a while, no less against the common storm of the musketry-fire than the willful flight of the balls which came seeking the tall rider's life; and his form, half disclosed through the smoke, had, men say, at the time a dim grandeur, which dwells perhaps thus in their minds because it was the form of one doomed. But his hour, if nigh, was not yet. Armstrong, sent, as we know, to learn whether succors were at hand, had come galloping back to his chief with the intimation he had just received from the Duke of Cambridge; and Adams, lifting his hat whilst he cheered on the men of the 41st, now told them that the Guards were coming up in support.

The fighting at this time grew closer, and here and there it was hand to hand. In some instances our people grew furious against the weight of numbers which was beginning to heave them back. Four young officers of the 41st—Captain Richards, Lieutenant Swabey (already wounded, but refusing to quit the fight), Lieutenant Taylor, and Lieutenant Stirling), all these sprang forward, encouraging their men, and then, calling, they say, upon one another, rushed into the enemy's ranks, and, not being followed by their men, were slain. Colonel Carpenter, the commander of the same regiment, being struck down

Continuance
of the fight-
ing.

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at a moment when our people were losing ground, remained during some cruel instants in the enemy's hands; and, though presently rescued by the valor of a private soldier named Thomas Beach, he afterward died from his wounds. Amongst those who fell on the side of the Russians was Colonel Bibikoff, an officer of, it seems, high distinction, commanding the four Okhotsk battalions.

Even in an earlier stage of this conflict the ranks of our soldiery had become much opened out, for the gaps which losses occasioned could not well be made good on such ground by ordering the men to close up; and from that cause in part, but much more from the eagerness of the combatants, from the thickness of the brush-wood, and the dislocating effect of the efforts to resist flank attacks, the English line, before long, ceased to show any trace of formation. The interior of the Sand-bag Battery having before it a parapet ten feet high without any banquette, kept the bulk of any soldiery placed there in a state of impotence, and was really of less worth to infantry than any other strip of land on the crest. Its fate was not governed, this time, by any specific struggle for the possession of the work itself, but rather by the general result of the combat which Adams maintained on the Kitspur; and when our people, overborne by weight of numbers in front, and attacked at the same time in flank, began at last to yield ground, the Battery, as a necessary consequence, passed again into the enemy's hands.

The loosened knots and groups now constituting the remains of the 700 men under Adams still contested the ground foot by foot with the advancing thousands, and thus caused them at last to desist from pressing their ascendant; but our people, when disengaged from their combat with infantry, came under artillery-fire. Carrying with them their wounded, they fell back to the side of Mount Head.

The commander we saw in his saddle overtopping the eddies of the fight, had hitherto seemed to ride proof against all the missiles of war; but during the lull which now followed, General Adams received a shot in his ankle, and the wound proved mortal.¹ He was a man much honored and loved by the troops which formed his brigade.²

¹ It was not till after the arrival of Hamley (with whom, indeed, he communicated) that Adams was disabled.

² The brigade called in camp the 'Forties,' comprising the 41st, 47th, and 49th Regiments.

IV.

Captain Hamley had come up with three guns,¹ and he now so placed them in battery on the eastern slope of Mount Head, that whilst commanding a great sweep toward the front, their left was well covered from the fire of the enemy's artillery by the crown of the hill. When our soldiery had so far drawn off as to leave a clear front for the gunners, it appeared that the troops which had fought against Adams were more or less hanging back, for none, or scarce any of them, as yet could be seen moving up toward Mount Head. Therefore, bending his mind for the time to a column 600 yards off on the farther side of the Quarry, Captain Hamley plied it with round-shot, and presently saw the force break, then turn to its left, and drop hurriedly down into the shelter of the Ravine; but after a while, troops supposed to be part of the same force came climbing up on the right bank of the Ravine, and at length also some of the men who had combated Adams began to appear on the slopes. They moved cautiously, and hung in the brush-wood, undertaking to skirmish a little, but attempting no decisive advance. Upon such of the enemy's people as were near enough to be worthy of fire Hamley opened with 'case,' and they were quickly repressed.

Preceded, as it was, by the withdrawal of our troops from the Kitspur, this happy use of three guns placed the contest for a moment on exactly that kind of footing which was desired by men basing their tactics on the strength of the Inkerman ground.

With the means of extending their batteries to the Fore Ridge after the manner just shown them by Hamley, and some 4000 infantry² either guarding already, or else close approaching their heights, our people had resources enough for the defense of their natural stronghold in front of the Isthmus; and, if only they had resisted the lure of the Sandbag Battery—now loved more than ever, because in the

¹ Captain (now Colonel) Hamley was adjutant to Colonel Dacres, commanding the two batteries attached to the 1st Division, and it was with three guns, forming the half of Paynter's battery, that he thus opportunely appeared.

² Present, at Home Ridge, troops of 2nd Division, about..... 700

“ at Hill Bend, two battalions of Guards..... 757

Approaching, part of the Coldstream and of the 4th Division, together about..... 2500

enemy's hands—they must have been thenceforth secure—not, of course, against the chances of war, but against the necessity of having to fight under desperate conditions.

Except as regards the brief and successful operation thus conducted with three pieces of cannon by Captain Hamley, the commanders of all the three batteries which had been newly brought up found berths for their guns on Home Ridge, and there kept them in action alongside of the other artillery.¹


V.


The two battalions of the Guards which Armstrong had found at Hill Bend were the Grenadiers, commanded by Colonel Reynardson, and the Scots Fusileers, under Colonel—now General—Walker. Together, they had there a strength of more than 700 men.² The Divisional General—H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge—and General Bentinck, who commanded the brigade, were both of them present with this part of the force. The Grenadiers stood in front, supported, at some little distance, by the Scots Fusileers, and both regiments were already in line.

To these high-mettled soldiery the message delivered by Armstrong, amidst the sounding tumult of battle, had given a kind of impulsion which could not be all at once deadened by the ceasing of the particular combat for which aid was asked, nor even by Hamley's repression of the troops moving up from the Kitspur; and men seemingly took it for granted that there was still some emergency which required the Guards to engage without Lord Raglan's authority. The Duke of Cambridge was not a man so constituted as to be proof against the contagion of surrounding opinion; but at least, before moving forward, he took some wise precautions. He sent Colonel Brownrigg to Bosquet with orders to let the French general know that the attack was serious and request prompt support; and desiring also to learn something of the fight in which he was going to mingle, His Royal Highness dispatched Sir Charles Russell of the Grenadiers with orders to go to the front and see which way the enemy was ad-

¹ General de Todleben, vol. i., p. 474, attaches great importance to the vigor and boldness with which, he says, English guns were thrown forward; and unless he mistook French for English guns, it would seem that his impression must have been caused by witnessing this operation of Hamley's.

² 757.





vancing.¹ Sir Charles ran up to a part of the crest where Captain Paynter was trying to bring some of his guns into play. When asked where the enemy were, Paynter answered, 'They are all round us, but thickest there;' and so speaking, he pointed to the right front of the English position.

Advance of the two battalions of Guards. The Duke, hearing this from Sir Charles's report, moved his two battalions of Guards along the eastern slopes of Fore Ridge in the direction of the Sand-bag Battery.

Array of the forces opposed to them. The forces more especially designated by Paynter's terse speech were the same we saw moving, with a strength of more than thirteen battalions, from the enemy's right hand to his left; but the Iäkoutsks and the Selinghinsk battalions had by this time dropped into their places on either flank of the troops which came to close quarters with Adams; and when their march was complete, the whole body of the thirteen battalions stood ranged on a front which, though broken by a somewhat wide interval where crossing the Inkerman Tusk, may still be said to have formed an almost continuous arc—an arc carried back from its extreme right at the head of the Quarry Ravine across St. Clement's Gorge, but thence again bending forward along the interior of the Sand-bag Battery to ground even yet farther south.²

That lair in the Quarry Ravine where the Iäkoutsks battalions for the most part stood posted was a fastness under the guns of Shell Hill and East Jut, of infinite worth to the enemy. Thence his troops could emerge at their pleasure, either moving directly against the 'Barrier' and the centre of Pennefather's position, or bending aside to their left and cutting off any English who might adventure too far on the Kitspur without securing their flank. The first of these two courses of action was the one for the moment engaging the attention of the Iäkoutsks battalions, which accordingly busied themselves, as we shall by-and-by see, against the few score men of the 30th, then confronting them near the Barrier; and the advance of the Guards was thus left unmolested by any force showing itself on their left flank. Deceived, as was natural, by this immunity, the Duke of Cambridge seems to

The Duke being left unmolested on his left, continues his advance.

¹ He also dispatched Colonel F. Hamilton on a similar mission, but the Colonel's horse was shot under him.

² The two Iäkoutsks battalions on the right; the four Selinghinsk battalions on the left; in the centre, the force which most directly combated Adams—viz., the four Okhotsk, the one Sappers battalion, and the companies of Rifles.

have understood that the ground between the Barrier and the head of St. Clement's Gorge was held by Pennefather's troops.¹ At all events, he continued his march against the Sand-bag Battery, and thus entered the concave of the arc which Dannenberg had spread out before him.

The Guards moved under a fire of artillery from the first, and of musketry afterward. Whilst they marched, they saw nothing of the columns in the Quarry Ravine, nor of those in St. Clement's Gorge; but they soon beheld, straight before them, the Sand-bag Battery and the forces gathered about it, some covering the approach to its gorge, some ranged at its flanks. A few of the soldiery were standing on the top of the parapet.

The Duke of Cambridge was, in one sense, opposing his Strength of the forces directly opposing the Duke's 700 men. 700 men to the whole of the thirteen battalions directed against the English position;² but the troops he more immediately challenged were the nine battalions of the Sappers, the Okhotsk and the Selinghinsk regiments—troops brought into action with a strength of some 7000 men.³

Upon coming more near, the Grenadiers tried to open fire, Charge of the Grenadiers. but the wetted chambers of their rifles were proof against the spark from the cap; and during some moments, whilst snapping and snapping in vain, the men growled out loud murmurs of rage, but in another instant they had found their solace. Whether spontaneously or whether by Colonel Reynardson's orders, they brought down their dumb firelocks to the charge, and delivered their attack with the bayonet. The enemy, not awaiting their assault, was swept out of the battery, swept away from the ground at its flanks, and driven back over the ledge in front of the dismantled parapet, to the steeps lower down. There the fall of the ground withdrew him from the sight of the English, who all remained on the crest. To have pursued the fugitives down the steeps and into the jungle beneath would have been to commit an act of self-dissolution; and our officers, using great exertions to restrain their men, were able to keep them back on the high ground. Of course such restraint was most wise, nay, vitally essen-

¹ This I think is to be inferred from an expression contained in H. R. H.'s letter to Lord Raglan of the 20th December, 1854.

² When we show the part taken against the Guards by one of the Iâkoutsk battalions, the accuracy of the above statement will be apparent.

³ With the Sappers, estimated at 750, 7129.

tial; but still, with the greater good thus insured, there were some disadvantages; for the defeated masses, not being pursued, could quickly stay their retreat, could rally and re-form upon sheltered ground, and prepare to renew their attack.

The Grenadiers, fronting now to the eastward, with their right a little thrown back, prepared to hold what they had won; and they busied themselves in the task of drying their rifles with the fire of numberless caps: but the men in that part of the battalion which lined the Sand-bag Battery were chafing already at a discovery which before had tormented the soldiery of the 41st Regiment, and was afterward destined to trouble successive bodies of men.

The parapet of the Sand-bag Battery—is a monument of heroic devotion and soldierly prowess, yet showing, as preachers might say, the vanity of human desires.¹ Supposed, although wrongly, to be a part of the English defenses, and fought for, accordingly, with infinite passion and at a great cost of life, by numbers and numbers of valiant infantry, the work was no sooner taken than its worthlessness became evident, not, indeed, to the bulk of the soldiery, but to those particular troops which chanced to be posted within it. The new-comers quickly learned that by the height of a parapet rising nine or ten feet from the ground, and the absence of any banquette, they were hindered from delivering fire except through the two embrasures or from the shoulders of the work, and that, therefore, whilst remaining within it, they would be in a state of comparative impotence, hardly tolerable to warlike men.

When the discomfited Russians had re-formed under cover of the acclivities, they again moved forward to attack the Grenadiers, and again were driven down below the ledge in front of the battery; but there, once more under shelter, and not pursued, they were able to rally. These attacks were from time to time repeated, and always, it may be said, with the same result; for the enemy was in every instance forced back from the brow, but never pursued so far down as to be prevented from reconstructing his force upon ground close under the ledge.

Combats sustained by the Grenadiers.

¹ When I visited the field in 1869, the parapet was still a conspicuous object.

VI.

Meanwhile, but at some distance in rear of the Grenadiers, the Scots Fusileer Guards had been advancing in line under a good deal of fire, and already suffering losses; but the battalion at length was halted, and the men, after having closed in, were made to lie down. When the Grenadiers (as before narrated) had faced round to the east, they no longer covered the front of the Scots Fusileers; and Colonel Walker galloped forward to reconnoitre the now unguarded ground which lay straight before him. On his right, whilst he rode, the Grenadiers were successfully fending back their assailants from the eastern steep of the Kitspur; but presently when at the crest, and looking down thence in the direction of his own front, he saw two of the enemy's columns coming up unopposed from St. Clement's Gorge. His orders had been to form on the left of the Grenadiers, but the emergency emboldened him for once to use his own judgment. He led his battalion straight forward, and having soon come within range of the columns, was going to open fire, when violent words assailed him.

‘Where the devil are you going to, sir? Form on the left of the Grenadiers!’ This peremptory recall to strict obedience was from the Duke of Cambridge; and it seems that the vehemence of His Royal Highness intercepted explanation, for Colonel Walker instantly faced his battalion to the right, and marched in the direction required for forming on the left of the Grenadiers. He did what little he could to check the enemy from whom he was thus drawn away, but the movements required by a strict obedience to the Duke's order were continued for about five minutes. At the end of that time, General Bentinck, commanding the brigade, rode up much excited and ordered the colonel to move his battalion to the spot from which the Duke just before had withdrawn him. The roar of the fight made it hard to gain the ear of the troops, and their colonel's voice, weakened by a recent illness, gave way under the effort; but happily General Bentinck (who exerted great energy) found means to make himself heard, and the Fusileers were at length countermarched to the ground from which the Duke had withdrawn them.

The Russians meanwhile had pushed on their advance, and the two solid columns apparently became more or less inter-

Advance of
the Scots Fu-
sileers against
two columns
on the north
front.

Interposition
of the Duke
of Cambridge,
and change of
direction.

Interposition
of Bentinck,
and counter-
march of the
battalion.

fused ; for what now met the eyes of the Scots Fusileers, and at a distance of only about 50 yards from the brow, was a single though far-spreading mass of the gray-coated soldiery—a mass loosened out from the effect of its march through dense brush-wood, but still plainly held together as an organized body.

The mass
opposed to
them.

When he judged that the moment was ripe, Colonel Walker caused his Scots Fusileers to deliver a volley and charge. The Russian throng, stricken by fire, and not awaiting the bayonet, rolled back in some haste down the steeps, and the colonel was leading forward his men to press its retreat when an aid-de-camp reached him with orders to stay the pursuit.

First charge
of the Scots
Fusileers.

VII.

The Duke of Cambridge had learned by this time that he must fight with a front to the north as well as with one to the east ; and he strove hard in person to effect the requisite change in the line of the Grenadiers ; but the battalion at the moment was eagerly engaged, and the din, the roar, the tumult, intercepted words of command. His Royal Highness, intent on his task, persistently rode with his aid-de-camp, Major James Macdonald, along the front of the battalion, exposed to the fire of his own people scarce less than to that of the enemy ; and, his visible presence and gestures much aiding the efforts of voice, he succeeded in effecting the change ; so that when the Scots Fusileers, after having been recalled from their pursuit, were at length drawn up in their place on the left of the Grenadiers, the two battalions together formed a line strongly bent near the centre, with a front spread out toward the north as well as a front toward the east.

Change of
front effected
by the Gren-
adiers.

Position of
the two bat-
talions of the
Guards now
formed up to-
gether.

Against both fronts the enemy's masses were still in a condition to advance ; for after their previous discomfiture they had not been pursued, and such of them as were operating from the east stood dispensed from the need of any lengthened retreat, because the abrupt fall of the ground at a distance of only a hundred yards from the face of the Battery enabled them, without going far, to drop down upon sheltered ledges from which, after forming anew, they could easily repeat their attacks. Troops able in this way to rally in safety after every defeat, and conscious of their great ascendant in numbers, did not fail to be making their onsets again and again ;

The enemy's
means of re-
peating his
attacks.

whilst, on the other hand, the two battalions of the Guards, though inflicting upon the enemy a far greater destruction than they themselves underwent, were all this time suffering losses under the enemy's fire which, by reason of their scanty numbers, they could ill afford. And, since men of the Guards—not having been prohibited from doing so by orders given beforehand—were constantly busying themselves by twos and threes in carrying off wounded men, there resulted from this cause alone a large and increasing deduction from strength, with besides all the mischief and confusion occasioned by work of such kind going on in rear of the combatants. Moreover, it was inevitable that troops thus ceaselessly fighting, and always in the very front, should soon come to the end of their cartridges.

A column of Russian infantry was advancing upon the Sand-bag Battery, when the few score of Grenadier Guards then posted within it grew all at once so impatient of the state of impuissance to which they had found themselves reduced by the want of a banquette, that they would no longer accept the paralyzing shelter of the work, and they came out, leaving it empty, not apparently with a mind to retreat, but to look for a better fighting ground. Colonel Walker, however, seeing this abandonment of the Battery without knowing the cause, was bitterly pained, and his grief turned to rage when he saw troops detached from the enemy's advancing column rush exultingly into the work with triumphant hurrahs. At this moment his horse was shot under him; but quickly regaining his feet, he sent some of his Scots Fusiliers under Dawson Damer with orders to turn the Russians out of the Battery. Damer, instantly attacking, swept the enemy out of the work; and during nearly the same moments Colonel Walker, with the rest of his battalion, fired a volley into the bulk of the column, and, charging immediately afterward, drove it down the hill-side, the enemy, this time, retreating in disorder as well as in haste. Walker following and pursuing with fire increased the confusion; but again, as before, he was overtaken by an aid-de-camp with orders to stay his advance. The order which checked him was one rightly conceived, but he chafed at the wholesome restraint when he saw the beaten column enjoy its immunity, and re-form at the bottom of the hill.

The column when restored to order advanced once more up

Third charge
of the same
force.

o the crest, and again, as before, Colonel Walker undertook to meet it with the remains of his Scots Fusileers. The Fusileers delivered their fire, but the Russians, though scathed, did not turn. Walker ordered his battalion to charge. Colonel Blair, riding onward before the line—that horse of his, for its singular beauty, is still curiously remembered—was struck down mortally wounded, and Drummond, the adjutant (dismounted), who also had come to the front, received a shot through the body; but already the Scots Fusileers had sprung forward with their bayonets down ‘at the charge,’ and the enemy, shunning their steel, was driven pell-mell down the hill. Walker, this time, was suffered to continue the pursuit as far as his own judgment warranted, and he afterward brought back his battalion to the left of the Sand-bag Battery.

The Duke of
Cambridge’s
expedition in
search of re-
inforcements.

His successive defeats did not end the enemy’s trust in great numbers, nor hinder him from renewing his efforts; but the Duke of Cambridge at this time rode back toward Home Ridge in quest of reinforcements; and, before going on with the story of all these fights on the Kitspur, we must see how his efforts resulted.

VIII.

The Gap.

Imprudence
of reinforcing
the Guards
without also
securing the
Gap.

Between the right o our troops engaged near the Barrier, and the left of the Scots Fusileers who stood fighting on the brow of the Kitspur, there was still that unpeopled slope which went by the name of the Gap. Unless troops could be found to man that hill-side, there would always be imminent danger of a turning movement against the left rear of the Guards;¹ and indeed, if the Gap were not closed,

¹ This diagram will perhaps help to show what was meant by ‘the Gap.’



the fight sustained on the Kitspur must continue to be one of a vain and isolated kind, in which it could hardly be right to entangle any more troops.

Few, however, at this time had freed themselves from the mistake of imagining that the dismantled Sandbag Battery, and the ground where it stood, formed a part of the English position; and besides, as was natural, the Duke of Cambridge could ill bear that a combat long and valiantly maintained by the Guards should end, after all, in discomfiture for want of a little support.

To get this support for his troops, he pressed hard on the slender resources which our people retained at the Isthmus, and even, indeed, drew some men from that unwearied 2nd Division which (with only such help as we saw) had not only fought and won the great fight of the earlier morning, but was now, in scant numbers, defending the very core of the English position.

Pennefather, as we saw, had been retaining no more than a few hundred of his organized infantry on that vital ground—the Home Ridge—which constituted the last bulwark of the English on Mount Inkerman—nay even, as he himself thought, their last bulwark in all the Crimea; but the man was so fearless, so free from all lurking desire to keep the troops to himself, and still so enamored of the idea which impelled him to seek combats in front instead of awaiting them upon the strong ground behind, that, weak as he was in numbers, he now parted with the half of his substance. He suffered one wing of the Rifle battalion which Cathcart had placed at his disposal, and also one wing of the 95th, to be laid hold of for the purposes of the fight on the Kitspur; and when, also (as we shall afterward see), he had dispatched to the Barrier the other wing of the Rifle battalion, and the other wing of the 95th, the force of organized infantry which then remained with him on the English Heights comprised less than 400 men.¹

From those troops of the 4th Division which already had reached Mount Inkerman, there was drawn for the fight on the Kitspur one wing of the 1st Rifle battalion under Colonel Horsford, followed soon by one wing of the 20th Regiment under Colonel Crofton. So, altogether, three wings were severed from three weak battalions to

¹ See Appendix, No. VII. It was not till a later moment that the right wing of the 21st and the 63rd Regiments took post on this ground, and that the four companies of the 7th were brought from the left to strengthen the defense of the Home Ridge.

The waste of power caused by drawing these succors to the Kitspur.

sustain the fight on the Kitspur. No help that such succors might bring to that outlying part of the field could at all countervail the harm done by thus maiming three organized bodies, and drawing away half of each from what was the true field of action. The 95th was a regiment of such mettle as to be in its entirety a force of great worth, though numbering scarce more than 400;¹ the Rifles, counting only 270, were still a famous battalion, and one on which Cathcart relied with an almost enthusiastic trustfulness;² the 20th Regiment, with its strength of only 340, and armed with the smooth-bore musket, was yet of so high a quality that it had justly been looked to as a force which might govern the crisis in any fight undertaken for the defense of the English position;³ but to cut all these bodies into halves, and engage the six fractions in separate tasks, was to waste more or less by dispersion the power of three prime battalions.

On a part of the crest facing eastward, the Duke of Cambridge had an interview with Sir George Cathcart, of which, by-and-by, we shall have to say more; but, for the present, it must suffice to know that the Duke vainly urged Sir George to advance by his left in support to the Guards on the Kitspur with a body of nearly four hundred men which he then had in hand, and was met by a steadfast refusal.

Cathcart thus withholding his aid, by what other means could the perilous gap be closed? Two battalions of Bourbaki's brigade had by this time come up; and whilst one of them—the 6th of line—stood posted in rear of Hill Bend, the other—the 7th Léger—was also on the reverse slope of the ridge, but on a part farther west, and, indeed, almost close to the Post-road. This 7th Léger was 900 strong,⁴ and consequently much greater in numbers than any body of men which the English had hitherto brought into action at the same time and place. To the surprise of our people—for there was no question of cavalry charges—the battalion was in hollow square, a forma-

Arrival of two French battalions.

¹ 443.

² He presented the battalion to Pennefather as one which could 'do any thing.'

³ I find Sir George Brown, for instance, disclosing this reliance on the 20th when he first became aware that the attack was serious. The Duke of Wellington once publicly called the 20th the most distinguished regiment in the service, and proceeded to justify praise which, at first, of course, seemed inviolable, by saying that it had won all its great store of fame *with one battalion*. It now has two.

⁴ 908.

tion understood to be chosen for the purpose of maintaining coherence and preventing clandestine evasions. General Bosquet, in person, had not yet come up, and the brigadier, though conspicuous in the field at a later time, was not at these moments present with either his '6th of the line,' or his 7th *Léger*.

Those English spread about on the Isthmus whom I called the 'spent forces,' had not yet been brought back to so strait-laced a state as to be altogether free from the boisterous attributes of a populace, and when the two French battalions came marching up gayly to the sound of their drums and their clarions, they were welcomed into the fight by vehement cheers; but almost immediately afterward their popularity fell; and soon our people were treating them with almost savage disfavor. All this rage was for no better reason than that the two French battalion commanders, without sanction from higher authority, could not take on themselves to advance. Both the Duke of Cambridge and Pennefather besought the commander of the '7th *Léger*' to move forward, but they besought him in vain; and if the pressure applied by our people to the colonel of the '6th' was even more hard, it still proved equally fruitless. The features of an officer tormented by all this urgency might reflect his distress of mind, and from that cause present the appearance which our people observed; but soldiers often harbor the fancy that impending fate casts its shadow on the countenance of a man who is doomed, and General Pennefather, in the midst of his wrath with Colonel de Camas, was softened a little by seeing—for so he imagined he did, and that, too, with absolute certainty—that the Frenchman 'had death on his face.' The battalion under this treatment exerted a hard self-restraint, but still through its ranks there traveled a murmur of acrid rage.

The rudeness, nay almost the violence, with which some of our people permitted themselves to treat these two French battalions may be more or less palliated by alleging the excitement of the fight and the stress of crying emergencies, but still was very obviously wrong, and even, moreover, unjust. Our own reinforcements, it is true, upon reaching the field, had suffered themselves to be drawn into any part of the fight where they

¹ A prophecy or rather 'prognosis' of this kind is not often mentioned unless it has been fulfilled. For the mournful fulfillment in this instance, see *post*, p. 249.

heard they were specially needed, and this they had done without waiting for the sanction of rightful authority; but, however brilliant the feats which had hitherto resulted from this impetuous course of action, it was one of a dangerous kind, and very much less appropriate now than in the earliest hour of the battle. The two fresh battalions had come up at a season which was ripe for well-planned operations under the orders of a commander-in-chief; and if any one erred at this time in not moving forward French troops to share the fight with our people, it was to General Canrobert, and not to regimental officers, that the blame would justly attach. At this the Second Period of the action, our people had no right to expect that the commander of a French battalion, without the sanction of his brigadier, or any higher authority, would follow the example of the English reinforcements by suffering himself to be hurried forward at once on the plea of emergency, and become thus absorbed into the fight.

But, however unwarrantable the impatient discourtesy of our people, it still remained true that no portion of the 1600¹ French troops which had now reached Mount Inkerman could yet be induced to advance.

After the failure of his last entreaty, the Duke of Cambridge said he must return to the front; and—
The Duke's return to the Kitspur. whether in anger, or whether in mere haste to shorten his road—he asked the commander of the '7th Léger' to let the troops make way for him. The officers, with ready and high-bred courtesy, made haste to open the ranks, and His Royal Highness, riding through the battalion, moved forward once more to join his men on the Kitspur.

It resulted from the Duke's expedition that, irrespectively
The results of his expedition in search of reinforcements. of his own Coldstream, already moving forward to join its brigade with a strength of 300,² he had succeeded in obtaining reinforcements for his people to the extent of 500.³

IX.

All this while the fight at the Sand-bag Battery had continued to rage; and, indeed, after the failure of his last at-

¹ 1665.² 314.³ 521—viz.:

Wing of 95th.....	222
Wing of 20th.....	160
Wing of Rifles.....	139
	<hr/> 521

Dannenberg's preparations for his next attack. tack on the work, General Dannenberg seems to have determined that his next one should be more resolute, more weighty, and better combined. The path of the assailing infantry was to be, this time, made smooth before them by an unsparing fire of artillery; the Okhotsk corps, aided by the Sappers battalion, would attack from the north, the Selinghinsk troops from the east, and at intervals when they could be spared from their conflicts with Pennefather's centre, the Iäkoutsk battalions emerging from the head of the Quarry Ravine were destined to apply a new leverage by turning the left of the Guards.

So now from Shell Hill and East Jut artillery-fire swept slantwise across the higher slopes of the Kitspur, both raking the position of the Guards and plowing the unpeopled ground in its rear as though to warn back any succors approaching to the aid of our troops. Then once more the advance of the enemy's infantry began. The nine battalions which were now to concentrate their power by attacking the Sand-bag Battery from both the north and the east, had a strength of 6000;¹ whilst their adversaries were the now thinned remains of those Grenadier and Scots Fusileer battalions which, even before all their losses, had numbered less than 800;² and, though also there were intermixed with these Guardsmen or otherwise taking part near them, many yet unwearied survivors of the body which had fought under Adams, the conflict, we may say, was still one where the hundreds were engaged against the thousands.

The air by this time had so cleared that the ascending throng of the Okhotsk and Sappers battalions could be seen from the first by our troops, and the foremost of the assailants, when near, could be plainly discerned; but even then the murky gray overcoats, and the numberless, numberless circles of the 'muffin-caps' (as our people expressively called them) had hardly a more uniform sameness than the round bullet-heads, closely cropped, and the broad, high-boned faces, all young, but of a dismal, white hue, and disclosing that blank, dazed look which our people had observed long before in the soldiery of other Russian battalions.

¹ Giving the Sappers battalion its estimated strength of 750, these troops had come into action with a strength of 7129, and their losses had certainly not reduced them to 6000. This computation does not include the four Iäkoutsk battalions, which, however, as will be seen, were ultimately destined to contribute toward the numbers acting against our Guards. ² 757.

Into the thick of the mass thus advancing the Fusileers strove to pour a fire which should be ceaseless and rapid, yet sure. No longer new to battle, they at this time toiled less like hot combatants than careful, intelligent workmen. When a soldier, displaced by some chance from his own company, came ready to lend his aid in another part of the line, he was not always asked to 'fall in,' but more often to help toward the business of quick firing in a less formal, yet workman-like fashion.¹ He would so take his turn with another man near as that the one who was ready to fire should be for the moment in front, and the one who was loading in rear. Elsewhere, men resorted to 'division of labor,' and so ordered the work as that some should always be loading, and others constantly firing. Here and there along the whole line there were little knots toiling thus in friendly, irregular concert. When the assailing force had drawn near, a man choosing to listen, they say, could hear through the din of the fight that rewarding sound of the 'thud' which showed him where the ball from his strong-shooting rifle had ended its flight. Our soldiery, conscious of their power, and understanding the purpose of their toil, worked on with a great alacrity, and amongst them it would have been hard to find discontent or impatience, except here and there in some man who might be raging for want of cartridges.

What the real causes are which moderate the devastation inflicted by such steady shooting as this it may be hard to say; but certainly fire-arms in battle are not so largely destructive as the processes of antecedent reasoning might compute them to be. The Russians, it is true, at this time were falling in numbers; but their column, after all, was retaining its massive dimensions, and still valiantly ascending in the face of the Scots Fusileers, without returning their fire.

Our rank and file liked a work in which each man, for once, could feel himself to be separately and distinctly effective; but care pressed on the minds of their chiefs; and indeed for any officer so high in command as to have to think of the issue, it was hard to judge how, if at all, when the last trying moment should come, this knotted string of men on the crest might withstand, or attempt to withstand, the weight of the advancing thousands. When H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge, after his expedition in search of

² Soldiers had been suffered to attend to the wounded, and this was one of the ways in which a man might become 'displaced.'

reinforcements, had returned to the neighborhood of the Sand-bag Battery, he remained, it seems, chiefly with the Grenadiers. General Bentinck, the next in authority, had been disabled by a wound in the arm; and upon the north front, where our Scots Fusileers awaited the heaviest onslaught, their colonel was receiving no orders. He himself having met with two wounds, was for some time disabled by one of them, but before the moment now reached he had recovered his powers of action. If refusing to harbor despair, he at least confessed to himself that he would willingly know of some basis on which hope might rest; and seeking to learn how the few in their strife with the many could best derive

The Colonel of the Scots Fusileers.
His first two wounds.

an advantage from their hold of the Sand-bag Battery, he now, for the first time, entered the work. Once within it, he saw that any troops

planted there behind a tall parapet without the resource of a banquette must of necessity be wasting their power, and then he understood why it was that the Grenadiers when they held the work had chosen to abandon its shelter. The Russians, however, in general did not know that the work had this fatal defect; and still believing (as our people had done before them) that it was an essential part of the English defenses well worthy of their most valiant efforts, they came on in their strength, and this time with firm resolve.

His visit to the Sand-bag Battery.

Whilst the Okhotsk battalions still continued to move up in gross numbers against the left shoulder of the work, the Selinghinsk troops made a rush at its face, and numbers of them having climbed up to the top of the parapet, began to fire down almost vertically upon those of our soldiery who stood gathered along its base.

The commander of the Scots Fusileers was now suddenly stripped of the power which we saw him exerting victoriously in one combat after another. Struck in the jaw by a musket-ball, he all at once learned the warmth of his fast-streaming blood, and, being now hardly able to speak, was forced at last to confess that this, his third wound, was disabling. He found means, though not without effort, to signify a message, handing over the command of the regiment.

Selinghinsk troops on the top of the parapet.

It was upon Colonel Francis Seymour—though he did not yet know of his elevation—that the command of the regiment devolved. Notwithstanding the onsets made again and again from the east by

Colonel Walker's third wound.

Devolution of the command to Colonel F. Seymour.

The measure he took. the troops of the Selinghinsk regiment, Seymour judged that the heaviest of the Russian attacks was the one aimed against our north front, and perceiving (as his chief had just done before him) that the parapet of the dismantled battery must neutralize both the fire and the steel of the infantry sheltered behind it, he labored to get the men out of the work, and bring them more to their left, in order to strengthen the line which confronted the Okhotsk battalions. When this object had at last been attained, the instincts of the men on either flank of the work made them seek to refasten their line; whilst, on the other hand, the advancing thousands exerted their natural pressure upon a thin string all of soldiery, undertaking to change their array whilst the enemy was coming upon them. From the composition of these diverse forces there resulted some movements—not of them voluntary—but yet on the whole opportune; for within a brief compass of time the remains of the two battalions of Guards had relinquished the paralyzing shelter of the Sand-bag Battery, had fallen back upon higher ground, had refastened their line at some distance in rear of the work, had covered the change throughout by a ceaseless fire, and were now reunited in a convex array, which still offered a front to the east as well as a front to the north. About this time Neville fell, and Napier Sturt, who carried the Queen's color of the Grenadiers, was severely wounded. Staggering under the blow, and hardly able to crawl, he still held fast to the color till he had placed it in the strong, faithful hands whence it passed at a later moment to the care of Lieutenant Turner.

After all, there was only a portion of the English thus newly arrayed who knew any thing of the evil which had attended the occupation of the Sand-bag Battery. Far from priding themselves on the wholesome change they had concurred in effecting, the great bulk of them saw with indignation that the ground on which they had just before stood was passing into the hands of the enemy, and the Russians, on the other hand, gave unrestrained voice to the joy with which they sprang forward to seize the abandoned work.

From the great column of the Okhotsk battalions advancing against the north front, and also, although in less measure, from the Selinghinsk columns on the east, the Russian soldiery in great numbers rushed up toward the Sand-bag Battery; and as many as could thronged together under the parapet of the empty

Relinquishment of the Sand-bag Battery by the English.

Their change of position.

The Sand-bag Battery entered by the Russians.

work with exulting cheers, whilst others drew as near as the crowding of their comrades would allow to the coveted goal; and it resulted that the great Okhotsk column, which in spite of a ceaseless and murderous fire had long held on its steadfast way from the bed of the gorge to the crest, was now a less shapely, if not a disordered mass. But ^{This the sixth capture.} the enemy was flushed with a sense of his supposed achievement; and this was but natural; for, excepting only the men who had themselves stood behind the parapet, scarce any of the contending soldiery, whether Russian or English, had yet come to know that the Battery was a worse than valueless prize.

After farther advancing some way, the enemy came to a halt; and our people, on their part, not yielding ^{The opposing forces standing at bay.} up any more ground, the two hostile forces—the thousands in a misshapen mass on the one side, and the hundreds on the other in a knotted, strongly curved line—stood at bay confronting each other, and divided by a space which, though greater elsewhere, was at one point toward the right no more than about eight yards.¹ The firing continued, and along the chief part of our line the rifle was still working havoc in the enemy's masses; but with some of the Grenadiers on the right ammunition began to fail, and a few of their immediate adversaries were feeling, it seems, a like want; for the combatants on each side at this spot began to hurl against one another some of those loose pieces of rock which there strewed the ground.

By some of our officers this Homeric resource was regarded as 'unsoldierly,' and it seems that their disgust at the sight of such child's play served to hasten the resolve which was presently formed. The general result of the movements just effected did not make itself instantly plain to the bulk of our troops; but as soon as they came to know that they had abandoned the subject of a long-sustained contest, they chafed at the thought of having thus yielded, and their anger rose high when they saw the 'muffin-cap' soldiery flooding into the work and heard their triumphant hurras. The Grenadiers were more especially raging, because they imagined, though wrongly, that theirs was the battalion which had last held the Battery. All at once, men who chanced to look southward saw a new line of Bearskins fast cropping up over the brush-wood. In a moment many knew that the Coldstream was near. Far from resting content (as less

¹ 'Six or eight yards.'—*C. Lindsay.*

fiery troops might have done) to await the support thus approaching, the Grenadiers were seized with desire to recapture the work before the Coldstream could come up. Colonel Henry Percy, observing that the enemy's masses were writhing under the fire they had met, ran forward in front of his men, as also did Colonel Charles Lindsay; and, the right flank company under Captain Burnaby breaking out to the front with a cry of 'Charge again, Grenadiers!' the battalion uttered its will in a burst of hurras, sprang forward with bayonets down, and drove straight at the hapless crowd of soldiery, who, instead of attacking, had submitted to be attacked where they stood, with the parapet of the Battery in their rear. They broke and fled; but this was not all that resulted, for the enemy's forces on the north front, bending under the force put upon them by the Scots Fusiliers, were involved in the common overthrow. Of the men falling back into the gorge of the Battery very many were obstructed in their flight by its parapet; and, some of these standing at bay, it was not without hand-to-hand fighting and slaughter that the Grenadiers put down all resistance and resumed their hold of the work.

Our men were not in so orderly a state that at the will of a commander they could be brought back from the false position of the reconquered Battery to better ground in its rear; but, for the present, at least, their officers were able once more to withhold them from a ruinous pursuit down the steeps; and the enemy, understanding the impunity thus conceded to him, soon stayed his flight. His retreating masses dropped no farther down the hill-side than was needed for the attainment of shelter, and the ground close outside the Battery, if ever abandoned at all, was quickly repeopled by troops crowding under its parapet. Soon again, as had happened before, there were Russians firing into the work through its two embrasures or over the parts of the parapet which sloped away low at each flank. Before long, there came venturesome men, who not only climbed up the parapet, but stood for a while on its top overlooking our people below, and beginning to fire down upon them. Colonel Percy, not brooking the sight of this trespass, clambered up from his side of the parapet in order to drive off the intruders, but was himself thrown down backward by the weight of a stone heaved against him whilst turning to give an order; and when in spite of his hurt he again climb-

Seventh capture of the Sand-bag Battery.

Speedy cessation of the enemy's retreat.

His return to the conflict.

Charge of the Grenadiers.

The Russians overthrown on each front by the Guards.

ed the parapet, he was so heavily struck on the brow by a fragment of rock from the hand of some Russian Ajax, that again, as before, he fell down backward, and this time the blow laid him senseless.

Those of the Grenadiers within the Battery who had found False position of the Grenadiers within the work. berths for themselves near one of its shoulders, or by one of its two embrasures, could engage more or less in combats; but the great proportion of the troops, though exposed every instant to the chances of an overwhelming attack on either flank, had to stand almost passive at the foot of a parapet some ten feet high, and to listen meanwhile with what patience they might to the raging yells of a multitude fended off by no physical obstacle except on one front, and there only by a pile of earth revetted with sand-bags and gabions, which any one who chose might climb.

X.

The succors dispatched to this part of the field now began to come up; and it seems that if the Duke of Cambridge had been obeyed, the approach by the Gap would not have been left unguarded, for, with a just apprehension of what the occasion required, he ordered both Crofton's and Champion's troops to 'take post' on the left of his Guards, and between them and the 2nd Division;¹ but the attraction of the strife going on by the Sand-bag Battery continued to exert its old force; and, excepting Horsford's few riflemen, whose chief kept them somewhat more clear, all the succors now reaching the Kitspur were quickly drawn into the fight. Upon the whole, it resulted that the The Gap still open. perilous Gap still lay open, and the ground there was not only left unguarded, but even, it seems, unwatched.

The Coldstream battalion formed line on the right of the Grenadiers. One part of Crofton's wing of the The actual disposition of the fresh troops. 20th Regiment aligned on the right of the Coldstream, thus prolonging yet farther the front which our people showed toward the east; and the other part went to strengthen the defense of the Sand-bag Bat-

¹ 'I confess I never saw the 20th Regiment again after the earlier part of the day, when I had myself directed them to take post to the left of the Guards, and between them and the 2nd Division, as I did the 95th Regiment, which followed in the same direction.'—*Private letter of the Duke of Cambridge to Lord Raglan*, written from Constantinople, 20th December, 1854. The Duke speaks of the 20th and 95th Regiments, but must have meant a *wing* only of each.

tery. Colonel Horsford, with one wing of his Rifles, moved forward to operate near the head of St. Clement's Gorge. The wing of the 95th, under Champion, was happily placed at the first, for, whilst standing in support to the Guards, it could and did fend back the column then attempting to turn their left flank;¹ but afterward the wing was subdivided, one part being sent into the Sand-bag Battery, whilst the rest, cut up into fractions, moved hither and thither, as occasion required, to prop the defense at weak points. Altogether, the fresh troops brought up were more than 800 strong;² but although the remains of our soldiery, who had fought all this while on the Kitspur, were mere hundreds engaged against thousands, it is nevertheless true that a bare increase of their numbers was not what they wanted the most. Sup-

The real exigency not met by this accession of reinforcements.

posing that, for their pride's sake, they were to go on with a struggle begun by mistake on wrong ground, the kind of relief they most needed was, first, support on their left to secure them from being cut off; and next, such a change in the general plan of the battle as might give a set purpose to their hitherto aimless fight by terminating its isolated character, and combining it with other operations conducive in some way to good. The dispatch of a body of troops to attack the Iä-koutsk battalions at the head of the Quarry Ravine might perhaps have supplied both these wants, but neither the one nor the other could be anyhow met by simply reinforcing the combatants on the ground where they stood. The succors spared for this purpose—and remember they were troops called away at great hazard from tasks of far more vital moment—might prolong the defense of the Kitspur; but our people there planted were struggling under such conditions that no real advantage could be gained by merely bringing up other soldiery to fight alongside them and stand in the same predicament. Aid in that shape was less fitted to retrieve the mischief than to swell its proportions. The task of repulsing attacks was one which, many times over, the Grenadiers and the Scots Fusileers, with some intermixed troops of the line, had superbly performed for themselves; and if,

¹ So far Champion seems to have been acting in exact conformity with His Royal Highness's direction.

² Coldstream.....	314
20th, one wing.....	160
95th, do.	222
Rifles, do.	139
	<hr/> 835

in spite of the adage, this often repeated success had hitherto proved unsuccessful, the accession of reinforcements to the actual scene of the conflict was not a help of such kind as to make the anomaly cease. Whether with or without such aid, our people engaged on the Kitspur were still, as before, an isolated, unsupported force, still liable every instant to be turned in flank and cut off, and meanwhile so circumstanced that, although defeating their enemy with all his masses again, and again, and again, they yet could not finally quell him without almost annulling themselves, because it was plain that to pursue beaten troops far down the acclivities, and into the thicket below, would be in effect to disband.

So, although the fresh troops of the English extended their
The general
tenor of the
fight on the
Kitspur after
the accession
of the rein-
forcements. line on each flank, and perhaps nearly trebled its fire, they did not in other ways change the main tenor or course of the fight. Russian troops in vast herds might be falling back after defeat, or rallying under the shelter of the steeps, or formed once more for attack, and heaving their painful way upward under the torment of fire, but always in one way or other they thronged the hill-sides, and always on the crest above them there somehow remained adhering the long, knotted string of our English infantry with still that same bend in their line which from almost the first had enabled them to show a front to the north as well as a front to the east.

Like the force they had come to support, our fresh troops were soon rudely disordered by the peculiar exigencies of a close, ceaseless fight on rough ground; and it must not be supposed that the entire English line now engaged on the crest was susceptible of being wielded as an aggregate body by any man's word of command; but in the components of the force, and especially in its several companies, the principle of military coherence survived, and again if the 'company,' or any less organism broke up at last into units, there was still a magnificent reserve of bravery and presence of mind in the individual men. From what I have called the 'knotted' part of the string, men would come to 'bear a hand,' as they phrased it, at any weak threatened point, and there was a great intermixture of troops. If a man chanced to find himself planted amongst the soldiery of another regiment, would not only work heart and soul alongside them, but he even perhaps grew to think that he had won for himself a specially good fighting berth; and in such case, being true Anglo-Saxon, he would become tenacious of his supposed

advantage, much as though, after pushing his way in some sight-seeing crowd at home, he had found at last 'a good place.'

The Coldstream at first could not get their wet rifles to speak, but they dried them after a while by snapping off numbers of caps, and soon the fire of our people extended along their whole line. The strife raged. Sometimes heavy masses thronged howling against the face of the dismantled Battery, sometimes against the part of our line which looked down on St. Clement's Gorge, sometimes against that which faced eastward toward the valley of the Tchernaya, and sometimes again they would troop away laterally in order to get round by a flank.

The heaviest of the attacks at this time was one undertaken with great resolution by the Okhotsk battalions. Collecting on ground near the head of St. Clement's Gorge, they so made their onset that whilst hotly engaging the Scots Fusileers with the right of their column, they forced their left into the Sand-bag Battery by its northern shoulder. Thence thronging heavily forward, they began to roll up the line of our people ranged under the parapet, and already had fought their way on as far as the first embrasure, when some men of the Grenadiers, and some of the 20th Regiment, and some, too, of the 95th (with whom Captain Carmichael was seen), collected themselves for a blow, and then fell upon the intruding mass with such impetuosity as to thrust it back out of the Battery; and the rest of the column then bending under the power of the Scots Fusileers, the whole force was overthrown, and driven fast down the hill-side.

For a while after this discomfiture, the Okhotsk battalions kept aloof in great measure from the fight, and two of them even quitted the Kitspur; but these sturdy troops, we shall find, soon proved able to re-form, and gather up their strength for fresh efforts. Still, it resulted that on the northern front of the English there now was for some time a lull.

From first to last, a distinct character adhered to the combats maintained on the eastern flank of the Kitspur. There, the masses—the Selinghinsk battalions—which fought on the steep overhanging the Tchernaya, found shelter in general after every discomfiture by retreating only a little way down; and apparently they soon understood that they were exempt from the worst

consequences of defeat because the policy of their English adversary obliged him to abstain from pursuit. They rallied so promptly, and delivered their assaults so quickly one after the other, that the sum of their efforts might be almost regarded in aggregate as a single, unceasing onslaught; for although at one moment the ledge in front of the Battery, or elsewhere in front of our line, might seem left to the dead and the wounded over much of its space, and only darkened beyond by crowds of men turning their backs, yet presently again it would become overspread by that broad, deep, and heaving expanse of white upturned faces which distinguished the times of attack from the times of retreat.

Though in some places clear, the atmosphere overhanging the steeps on this Tchernaya front was still in such a condition as to be strongly retentive of smoke, and from this cause, as well as from the abrupt fall of the ground beyond the ledge, it resulted that the enemy's columns when advancing to attack from the east were often unseen by our people until within some thirty or forty yards. At about this distance the mass would in general raise a loud cheer, but a cheer which our people detected as one delivered by order. After executing this shout, the hapless column would continue its advance, but under so terrible a fire that flesh and blood could barely, if at all, endure the ordeal. Whilst still at a distance of several paces the column in general would stop and waver. That moment of anguish and doubt on the part of the enemy is the one which, in general, an English commander would seize for delivering a bayonet-charge; but here our officers knew that to charge down the hill would be to break in pursuit, and being still able to hold back their men, they took care not to strike at the column in this crisis of its fate. Therefore, the heaving mass, though tormented by fire, was still not bereft of free-will by the crash of a charge tearing bodily into its ranks. Between the endurance of yet more slaughter and yet another retreat, it could choose. Then—their swords shining high in the air, and waving as in passionate signal—numbers of Russian officers, with a valor our people admired, would spring out to the front, striving eagerly by voice and example to lead on the mass. One young fellow, as though refusing to live in the endurance of successive defeats, held on his brave way to the face of the Sand-bag Battery, climbed up to the top of its parapet, and—followed by only one soldier—leaped down upon the death that was proffered him from a hedge-row of bayonet-points.

These efforts of example and leadership did not often so take effect as to draw on the suffering column; and, in general, the mass, after more or less of agony and wavering, would turn and fall back, dropping quickly down out of sight. But sometimes the enemy's masses would persist with a greater obstinacy, neither turning nor halting till they had forced a part of the English line to bend for the moment before them, and, if not to break asunder, at all events to yield ground a little and begin to bulge inward; but, in every such emergency, our people gave proof—and this was an almost new teaching—that if the column (having been spared for some special reason from the ordeal of a charge) has thus far prevailed against the line, its task even then may not be near its accomplishment; for when it chanced that the enemy thus pressed his attack almost home, men would come from some neighboring part of our line to strengthen the defense at its point of tension, or else a few of our people gathering hastily together would spring with their bayonets low at the front or the flank of the intruding mass. Whether fended back from the crest by tough, sober resistance, or brilliantly charged and routed, all the columns one after another were driven back down the hill-sides. In the course of these struggles, it here and there happened that opposing bayonets clashed, that the sword of the officer was put to proof of its quality in some close personal conflict for his life, and that men struck at men with the butt-ends of rifles or muskets;¹ but these collisions were the exceptional incidents of the fight; for in general, even here, though the fighting was unusually close, there remained interposed that dim, changeful, elastic belt of space which commonly divides the combatants in modern warfare.

Of course, under the conditions which have been stated, the English line was never for an instant that rigid wall of soldiery, with its edging of fire and steel, at which English discipline aims, but a knotted chain of men working all of them hard, with interchanges of strength going on here and there whenever occasion required; and, in general, at some part or other of the line, if not along its whole course, there was the writhing, the swaying to and fro of undetermined strife.

From the ease with which the Russians after every de-

¹ Swords furnished by tailors disclosed the frailty that might be almost considered appropriate to them if regarded as articles of costume; but, so far as I have happened to hear, the 'Wilkinson' always proved true.

feat found shelter under the steep, and the determination of the English to hold fast the crest, yet always abstain from pursuit, it resulted that this singular fight on the Kitspur had been hitherto raging entirely upon one narrow strip of ground, and was, besides, more strictly physical in its nature, or, in other words, less governed by imagination, than the struggles that are commonly witnessed in a modern battle-field. Therefore, also, it had lasted all this while without decisive result. Repulses not clinched by pursuit had proved hitherto barren of consequences, and Panic was not yet imparting to successive discomfitures the proportions of a headlong defeat.

The last of the onslaughts which the enemy here undertook was directed by one of the Selinghinsk battalions against a part of our line on the right of the Sand-bag Battery, and with such resolution that the column persisted in its advance until within a few paces of the crest; but Captain Wilson of the Coldstream, with part of his company and a few other men, then attacked and overthrew the whole mass, and sent it in hurried flight down the steep. A few of the victors, excited by combat, and no longer restraining their eagerness, rushed down the hill-side in full chase; and although the pursuers were themselves pursued by their captain, who did all he could to recall them, he was baffled in every effort to make himself heard through the din, and soon both he and his people were all the way down in the valley of the Tchernaya, and even incurring fire from the skirmishers of Prince Gortchakoff's corps.¹

This outbreak of a few Coldstream men in unbridled pursuit marks the beginning of an entire change in the tenor of the fight.

But another mind now intervenes.

XI.

When Sir George Cathcart reached Mount Inkerman, he had close beside him his favorite 'Rifles,' and presenting the battalion to Pennefather as a force that could be trusted to 'do any thing,' he asked where its service was needed. Pennefather, glowing with the excitement of a fight after his own heart, answered simply 'Everywhere!' and the corps, with its modest strength of only 278 men, was soon split into two.

¹ The corps which our people in general (notwithstanding Gortchakoff's accession to its command) continued to call 'Liprandi's.'

Sir George Cathcart's arrival. His conversation with Pennefather.

Coupled with the expedient of thus subdividing a body already so small, that one-worded answer of Pennefather's may be taken as showing the aspect under which he regarded the battle, and will also account for the way in which Cathcart scattered his troops. Owing partly to the mist, and the nature of the ground, but in part, perhaps, also to the peculiarity of our insular mind (which commonly abhors an integral and busies itself with the fractions), neither Pennefather nor his people had consciously felt, as an aggregate, the whole united weight of their 40,000 assailants; but they believed that here, there, and there—in many places at once—there was some special emergency, an emergency sufficiently grave, but still of such kind that it could be met at each spot by so few as 200, or even 150 men. Their labor, as understood by themselves, was that of men anxiously stopping a number of troublesome leaks. Yet, the problem really in hand was nothing less than to dam back a torrent.¹

In compliance with the appeals of officers sent back to ask for support from various parts of the field, Cathcart suffered his men to be taken from him with a generous readiness which shows that the idea of selfishly reserving to himself the means of personal distinction was altogether absent from his mind. He even intrusted to subordinate hands a power to meet reported emergencies by parting with some of his troops;² and it resulted that before Torrens joined him, the whole force of near 1700 men, brought up by Sir George, had been already distributed piecemeal. The destinations assigned to Lord West's wing of the 21st,³ to each wing of the Rifles,⁴ and to Crofton's wing of the 20th,⁵ we have already seen; but it now must be added that the other wing of the 21st,⁶ with the whole of the 63rd,⁷ moved off to the left, and that General Goldie, with a wing of the 20th⁸ and the main body of the 57th Regiment,⁹ was to operate on the line of the Post-road.

¹ I can not prove that there was any copy of the 'Novum Organon' in Pennefather's tent, but some minds will find an analogy between his way of fighting a battle, and the Baconian or 'Empirical' philosophy.

² To Windham, for instance, he delegated this kind of authority.—*Windham's Dispatch to Head-quarters*, 6th November, 1854. ³ Strength, 201.

⁴ Strength of the two wings together, 278. Colonel Horsford commanded the battalion.

⁵ Strength, 160.

⁶ Strength, 201, under Colonel Ainslie.

⁷ Strength, 466, under Colonel Swyne. This regiment marched early with the 21st. Colonel Windham, accurate in most other respects, was mistaken in the part of his official narrative which concerned this regiment.

⁸ Strength, 180, under Colonel Horn, the commander of the regiment.

⁹ Strength, 196, under Captain Edward Stanley.

The great bulk of Cathcart's troops distributed piecemeal.

When Sir George had thus parted with no less than ten wings, or, in other words, five battalions, he remained during some little time without any troops at his side; but Brigadier-General Torrens was approaching him with another body of rather less than 400 men.¹ The force, although small, was still destined to give Sir George Cathcart a great opportunity; and, if he should well use his power, nay, even if he should simply obey the timely commands of Lord Raglan, it might be given him to rule a crisis in this battle of Inkerman.

As we long ago saw, our troops engaged on the Kitspur were all this while holding wrong ground; and, unless they could be supported on their left, it was scarce possible for them—with all their prowess—to achieve any wholesome result. If they should pursue the enemy down the steepes of Mount Inkerman and into the jungle below, they would cease to exist as an effective force. If, abstaining from such pursuit, they should go on maintaining the struggle as an isolated fight, they would be every minute consuming their strength without either crushing their immediate adversaries or perturbing other portions of the enemy's forces; and besides, would be liable to find themselves at any moment cut off by a body turning their left. So, had this been only a 'war-game,' the flat slips of lead representing our troops on the Kitspur would have been long ago withdrawn by any competent player. But Lord Raglan, of all living men, would have been one of the last to forget that the rigid dictates of science must sometimes bend to considerations of the kind which people call 'human.' From a spot near the right shoulder of the Sand-bag Battery he had witnessed this singular struggle during some of its phases; and his judgment assured him that, however great the imprudence of originally accepting a combat in that part of the field, it was now too late to retract. It would be breaking the heart of good troops to tear them away from the fight; and to do this without the means of enabling them to effect a steady retreat would be to embrace actual disaster in preference to that which as yet was only an ugly pre-

The small force of 400 men remaining under Cathcart's personal control.

Its importance.

The vice of the position maintained at the Sand-bag Battery.

Lord Raglan's determination.

¹ Two companies of the 46th, under Captain Hardy, and the 68th Regiment—i.e., four of its companies, under Colonel Henry Smyth, making together 384. The forces above mentioned number altogether 2066, and comprise the whole force furnished to the battle of Inkerman by the 4th Division, except 151 men of the 57th Regiment who reached the Isthmus at a later time.

dicament. Still, if our people were to go on maintaining their hold, it was vitally necessary to support them by the co-operation of troops on their left. Pennefather, with whom Lord Raglan conferred, pressed strongly in this direction, and urged the great need that there was to close, as he expressed it, the 'Gap' which was left open between him and the guards. Again, it was to be remembered that, though hitherto isolated, and therefore in great measure wasting their power, our people engaged on the Kitspur had inflicted, and still were inflicting, great slaughter upon the enemy; and that even now, if they could be supported on their left by a well-pressed attack, they would be not only secured against a turning movement, but at once become clothed with such power over the battle that the sacrifices our people had made might not, after all, prove barren. Therefore, to give this support at the Gap was to avert a grave danger, but also perhaps to wring good out of evil, and retrieve a costly mistake by making it conduce to victory. On the other hand, the penalty that lay in wait for the English, if they should omit to take the required step, was obvious, and closely impending. General Dannenberg had been hitherto slow to apply the easy leverage of a turning movement; but without providing a safeguard against such manœuvre, our people had no right to believe that this forbearance would last.

After the obdurate refusal of the two French battalions to advance in support to our troops, it appeared that the only force which well could be used for this vital purpose was the body of 400 men remaining under Cathcart. Sir George, with this force in hand, was upon a salient bend of the crest overhanging the Tchernaya valley, yet commanding a view toward the north, when his interview with the Duke of Cambridge took place. The Duke, riding up to Sir George, strongly urged him to move his troops to the left and support the Guards. Cathcart seemed for a moment quite willing to act in the direction required; but presently, with a small double field-glass—he was a near-sighted man—he began to gaze earnestly upon the steep, hanging ground before him where some troops of the Selinghinsk regiment were making one of their efforts to turn the right flank of the Guards. Then all at once he became animated, and assured heart and soul by one of those mocking inspirations which resemble the false Oneiros—the 'pernicious' and yet

Imperative
need of troops
at the Gap.

Instances of
H. R. H. with
Cathcart to in-
duce him to
act in the re-
quired direc-
tion.

His own con-
ception, and
his conse-
quent resist-
ance to en-
treaties.

'divine' dream.' He declared he would go down and attack the troops he saw operating on the right front of the Sand-bag Battery. In other words, he would descend from the heights to attack the extreme left of the Russian army. This imported that being on strong heights with the enemy's left wing outstretched before him, he would go down and make war against the tip of its outermost feather instead of striking the pinion. The Duke of Cambridge strongly combated the idea, and at another moment Pennefather did the like, but Sir George clung fast to his plan. Still, Cathcart, as yet had been only resisting entreaties and arguments. He was now to receive an order.

When Lord Raglan had ascertained that the only remaining body of infantry he well could dispatch to the Gap was the one of 400 men under Brigadier Lord Raglan's order to Cathcart.

Torrens, he sent General Airey to Cathcart, the divisional general, with orders which will be presently stated. General Airey (who was accompanied by Colonel Hardinge) found Sir George on a part of the crest which was only a little farther south than the extreme right of our troops engaged on the Kitspur; but observing that Cathcart's troops had begun to fire shots into the copsewood below, and desiring that the message he brought should not be robbed of its weight by the semblance of a combat, he first requested Sir George to cease firing, and then delivered the order. Cathcart, strangely enamored of his own idea, still sought to urge its advantages, but General Airey in decisive language conveyed the will of his chief, saying that Lord Raglan wished Sir George 'to move to the left and support the brigade of Guards, and not to descend or leave the plateau;' and he added, 'Those are Lord Raglan's orders.'

That Cathcart at the moment of receiving these orders could have harbored an intention to set them at naught, few or none will believe; for if such a thought had then seized him, he at least would have given to his commander the important though painful advantage of knowing what was to come; but, supposing that at first he had meant to obey, his change of purpose soon followed.

Since Sir George Cathcart knew the high destiny which our Government under certain contingencies had at one time reserved for him, it was natural perhaps that, whilst deriving from this circumstance an augmented confidence in his own sagacity, he should have

The state of Cathcart's temper in the Crimea.

¹ Οὔλος—θειος. 'Pernicious,' because fraught with mischief—'divine,' because sent from on high.

become more or less disappointed when he found himself not called upon to share in Lord Raglan's deliberations; and the passionate complaint which he left one day at Headquarters, is a proof that anger sprung from this cause might for the moment overmaster his judgment.¹ He moreover had harbored a notion that both Sir George Brown and General Airey were accustomed to act in the name of Lord Raglan without Lord Raglan's authority; and now, as it happened, the order overruling Cathcart's opinion, forbidding him from following it, and directing him in cogent terms to march in another direction, was delivered to him by one of these supposed usurpers. Here are circumstances which may seem fitted to account in some measure for the course Cathcart presently took; but that they did actually furnish the motive power which drove him, there is not, I think, any proof. Whilst General Airey and Colonel Hardinge were present, Sir George Cathcart's temper did not strongly break out; for, though certainly he remarked to Hardinge that 'he had so good a pack he did not want to be cautioned,' his manner and tone at that moment were not merely

Question as to the cause which induced him to disobey orders.

good-humored, but joyous. Whether afterward there followed an access of rage which overpowered his self-command, or whether he imagined

some great and novel emergency, or some shining prospect of advantage which might warrant disobedience of orders—these are questions which seemingly he did not leave means of determining by any words uttered at the time to those who rode at his side. What we know is that his desire to go down the hill-side, and strike at the enemy's

His determination to go down and attack the enemy's extreme left.

extreme left, came back upon him with a force which unhappily he did not resist. He ordered General Torrens to attack. His small force, when thus misdirected, lost at once that exceptional

One of the effects of this resolve.

power of swaying events which occasion—well seized by Lord Raglan—had offered it the minute before, and became a mere link added on to

the chain of the soldiery which had fought all this while on the Kitspur.

The column which Sir George undertook to assail was a part of the Selinghinsk regiment, then working its way up the steeps against the right front of the Guards, but still on ground so low down that the attack, if immediate, could only be made by descending.

His fatal descent from the high ground.

¹ See this paper of the 4th October, and also some statements on the subject of the Dormant Commission, *ante*, p. 37.

So now—in an evil moment—Sir George Cathcart, with his 400 men under Torrens, began to move down the hill-side. He little knew that he was turning his back on a column of Russians then already engaged in their march across the slopes of Mount Head, and preparing to take his place on the crest he had fatally left.

XII.

By this determination of Cathcart's he aligned, so to speak, on Crofton's right, and thus merged both himself and his 400 men in that lengthened fight on the Kitspur to which we are once more returning. It is as one of the partakers in that struggle that we must now see him act.

Continuation
of the fight on
the Kitspur.
Cathcart now
a partaker in
it.

The four companies of the 68th, under Colonel Henry Smyth, with the two companies of the 46th, under Captain Hardy, formed up on their left, had already deployed on a front toward the body marked out for attack; and the brigadier, General Torrens, now placing himself at their head, these 400 men¹ in line, closely followed by Cathcart and his staff, began to move down the steep. Cathcart some time before had caused them to leave their great-coats, and they were the only considerable body of infantry who on this day disclosed their red uniforms. Traversing difficult, obstructed ground, and incurring after a while heavy fire from artillery,² as well as from the troops in their front, they still worked their way down with a keenness which—even in the eyes of an enemy looking up from some distance below—was expressive, it would seem, of a resolute purpose, for the troops which this attack threatened were presently seen to waver, if not indeed to give way, and our people then no longer firing, but setting their hearts on the bayonet, descended with impetuous haste to strike at the shaken mass. Colonel Henry Smyth, commanding the 68th men, had his horse shot under him, and Captain Wynne fell dead in the midst of this charge, being struck through the head by a musket-ball, whilst leading forward his company and striving to keep it united; but, if less than 400 in number, the English, extended in line and yet farther parted in moving by the roughness of the ground, had by this time spread out a great front, and already the huddled and clustered aggregate below was shrinking under this onset as from the cast of a net, and flying down the hill-side.

Charge of
Cathcart's 400
men under
Torrens.

¹ 384.

² Their red jackets drew fire from 16 guns on East Jut.—*Todleben*, p. 472.

General Torrens, whilst striving to hold back his too impetuous soldiery, fell grievously wounded, and was lying on the ground disabled when Cathcart rode down and spoke to him, saying, 'Torrens, well and gallantly done!' Our soldiers in their eagerness poured freely down the steeps, and were, some of them, presently mingled with those men of the Coldstream—the men vainly called back by Wilson—who had reached the meadows of the Tchernaya.

Passing now from our right toward our left, we come next to Colonel Crofton's wing of the 20th Regiment, or rather to that fraction of it which had aligned upon the right of the Coldstream, and was now divided by only a narrow space from the scene of the charge led by Torrens. Desiring, perhaps (as he naturally might), to act in conformity with the operations of Cathcart (who was his divisional chief), Crofton undertook to assail the battalion directly confronting him, but was wounded at an early moment. A staff-officer chanced to ride up who proved to be Colonel Cunynghame, 'an old 'Twentieth man.' Lieutenant Dowling³ accosting him, said: 'Colonel, all our mounted officers are killed or wounded. 'Where shall we go?' Cunynghame accepting the leadership thus cast upon him by the chances of battle, caused the troops to form a well-knit line, marched them down to within a hundred yards of the enemy's column, and then, halting them, opened a fire which forced the battalion to yield. The halt of these 'Twentieth' men was not long maintained. When Cunynghame left them, they not only advanced in pursuit, but 'drove the Russians like sheep,' and were soon far below the crest, some getting down close to the spot where Cathcart sat in his saddle, and in this fortuitous way rejoining the commander of their own division.

We before marked the kind of predicament in which stood those Grenadiers and other intermixed soldiery who were lining the Sand-bag Battery; and the physical conditions under which we last saw them acting, still remained for the most part unchanged; but, more angrily now than before, men were chafing at the obstacle interposed by a benchless parapet which condemned them almost to inaction without giving them the least security against overwhelming disasters. On the left of the

¹ Torrens died from the wound, but after an interval of several months.

² He was A. Q. G. attached to the 1st Division, but had at one time commanded a battalion of the 20th.

³ This young officer was soon afterward killed.

Colonel Crofton's charge with some men of the 20th.

Impatience of the troops in the Sand-bag Battery.

Sir Charles Russell out on the ledge with but one follower.

work, some men said, 'If an officer will lead, we will follow;' and Sir Charles Russell, of the Grenadiers, having chanced to be the only officer who heard this appeal, was moved to accept the challenge, crying, 'Follow me, my lads!' He sprang out through the left embrasure, and the next instant was busy with his revolver amongst numbers of Russians standing clustered about on that part of the ledge; but he had been followed by only one man—a private soldier named Anthony Palmer. Palmer quickly shot down an assailant who was in the act of bayoneting Sir Charles; and somehow the two—the Captain and his brave Grenadier—not only found means to defend themselves for the moment, but even made good their way fighting to a part of the ledge on their right where they saw a few more of the Bearskins. Russell was a man of slight build, not disclosing great bodily strength, yet in one of his struggles for the mastery—which also were struggles for life—he was able to tear a rifle from the hands of a Russian soldier, and he kept it to the end of the day.

But those Bearskins seen on the right? We must see whence they came.

Weakness of the defenders at the flanks of the Battery:

the enemy's advance against its right shoulder.

At each shoulder of the work men not only had to confront successive bodies of assailants, without either taking or yielding ground, but to do this with no better shelter than the flank of a parapet which became less and less in height as it approached its extremity. So disposed, they had neither the advantage of fortified ground, nor that of a fight in the open; and at the right shoulder of the work more particularly, the difficulty of making them stand fast had already been felt for some time, when an enemy's column was seen coming up, with a mind to attack this weak point. Our men there had few cartridges left.

Captain Burnaby was the officer in command of the right flank company of the Grenadiers¹—the company here lining the work. He did not believe that a strong, determined body of infantry could well be beaten off by the mere trivial fire of his few men with nearly empty pouches, then distrustfully manning the parapet at a part where it dwarfed down to nothing, and that the column, if suffered to keep its prerogative as the attacking force, must almost surely roll on over the feeble obstacles in its way

¹ The 3rd Company, the 1st and 2nd Companies being elsewhere on picket duty. For the authority on which I rely for the account of the fighting on the Ledgeway here about to be given, see note *post*, p. 202.

with resistless weight. He therefore judged that, to defend the flank of the work, he must charge his assailants. So, jumping to the top of the parapet, he called upon his people

His first attempt to make the men charge:

to follow, and ran forward a few paces, but then, finding himself alone on the outside of the work, he came back to his men.

Other masses were presently seen undertaking to turn the right flank of the Battery, but the more instant peril still lay in the direction of the body advancing against the right shoulder of the work. That body, indeed, was now striking home, for already one of its soldiery, a little in advance of the rest, had begun to get over the parapet. Captain Bur-

his resistance at the parapet:

naby, raising his sword, laid the brave Russian dead, and then hastening to repeat the appeal he had just before made in vain, he cried out to

his men,

‘We must charge!’ James Bancroft, a private soldier of the Grenadiers, was the first to come after him, when he now for the second time sprang up to the top of the parapet and bade his people

his charge with six or seven men.

come on. Five or six other men of his company sprang forward at the appeal of their captain, and Burnaby, saying to Bancroft, ‘How many will follow?’ but not waiting, it seems, for the answer, leaped down to the outside of the parapet. Bancroft, following his captain, was immediately attacked by several assailants, of whom he killed one by a bayonet-thrust in the chest; but the next instant he was so grievously wounded by a Russian bayonet tearing in through his jaw and the cage of his teeth as to be made to stagger back a few paces before he recommenced his exploits.

Captain Burnaby had but just cleared the parapet when he found himself met by a Russian officer of great stature, who was heading the attack at this spot, and vehemently calling forward his men. Upon seeing Burnaby, the Russian officer sprang at him sword in hand, but Burnaby parried; and before his assailant could again raise the arm, brought him down by a cut so delivered on the side of the head, that the tall leader fell, and died at once with a groan. Then, still followed by five or six men, and getting quit of his two next assailants with nothing worse than a shot through his bearskin, Captain Burnaby made a dart at the thick of the troops confronting him.

Surprised, and for a moment confounded, the mass of the Russians fell back several paces in avoidance of this sudden lunge; but they presently rallied, and a number of their people swarmed forward in be vies undertaking to clear the front. On the

The Russians thrown back some paces: their rally:

other hand, Burnaby's original following of six or seven was by this time a little increased. Before long, he had with him more men belonging to his own company; and, whilst also Sir Charles Russell, with his valiant man, Anthony Palmer, approached this part of the Ledge-way, there came besides from the left Captain Kinloch and Captain Robert Lindsay of the Scots Fusileers, with a few more men of the fighting Guards. All these springing forward opposed themselves singly or in knots to the thickening flakes of the Russian infantry thrown out in front of the columns; and hence it resulted that on the narrow belt of ground then dividing our English line from the enemy's aggregate masses many separate personal combats were sustained by private soldiers of the Guards.

Before hearing of these, one should guard one's self against unjust conclusions by acknowledging that the two opposed armies were not made up of such elements that they could afford means of fair comparison between the individual Russian and the individual Englishman: for the first had been one in a chain-gang of weeping peasantry torn out of their homes by some ukase; the other, a sturdy recruit, choosing freely the profession of arms, and now realizing, perhaps, on the Ledge-way, the favorite dreams of his boyhood.

Three Russians acting together attacked Edward Hill, but Hill's life was saved by Isaac Archer, who ran his bayonet through one of the assailants. Richard Wilkins, when shot through the bearskin by one of two Russians attacking him at the same time, sent a rifle-ball into the breast of the man who had thus barely missed him, drove off the other assailant with the point of the bayonet, and then reloaded so quickly as to be able to shoot the man running. Private Wilson, attacked by two Russians, and trying to run one of them through, chanced to stumble and fall; but Joseph Troy coming up bayoneted one of Wilson's foes, and Isaac Archer killed the other. William Overson, attacked by two Russians, killed one of them, and, it seems, drove the other away. Sergeant Minor, confronted by five or six Russians, ran one of these through the side; and another of them (who had that moment driven his steel through Minor's great-coat), being pierced in the neck and killed by a bayonet-thrust from George Bates, the two English made good their ascendant, and were not, it seems, farther molested by the rest of Minor's assailants.¹ Our

¹ Sergeant Minor, it is true, was wounded, and George Bates killed, but not, it is believed, in this encounter.

people had learned, or were learning, that the safest and best way of fighting was to deliver their thrust at the face or the neck, because it often proved difficult to drive a bayonet through the Russian great-coat; and if piercing this tough, woollen armor a man should so use his strength as to transfix the trunk of his adversary, and drive the blade home to its socket, this very success, it was likely, would make him, for the moment, defenseless; because he might find—as did Hilton Sayer when he thus killed his man—that it was a hard task to withdraw the imbedded steel. Men speak to an instance of two foes slaying each other, for a grenadier named Sellars was run through, they declare, by a bayonet at the moment when he with his bayonet ran through that very assailant; so that one and the other alike fell back with a groan; and the body of each proving tenacious of his antagonist's steel, whilst the hands of both loosed their grasp, it resulted that the two men in dying made a ghastly exchange of their firelocks. Private Pullen so fought as to win the admiration of his captain for exceeding bravery; and indeed the man's coolness in danger left him time and inclination to indulge his cynical humor; for whilst still in the turmoil of the fight, though at a moment when the pressure of close bodily struggles was a little relaxed, he affected to become fastidiously disdainful of the Russians herded close in his front, declaring he would shoot nothing less than a general, and sarcastically adjusting the sight of his firelock to a range of 300 yards.

As for Bancroft, he had not been quelled; for although, as we saw, he staggered back a few paces when grievously wounded by a second assailant, he still kept his eye on the man, and presently shot him dead. His third assailant he killed by running him through. A fourth and a fifth assailant then set upon Bancroft at the same moment; and, one of them bayoneting him in the right side, he fell; but the next moment he was again on his feet and driving his bayonet through one of the two last assailants. The Russian, thus pierced, fell to the ground, but without being killed or subdued; and by clutching, it seems, at Bancroft's legs, he strove to hamper him in his hand-to-hand struggle with the other assailant. Bancroft—fighting for his life with one upstanding antagonist, and clutched at the same time round his legs by the one who had fallen—could only repress the fierce energy of the man on the ground by stunning him with kicks in the head. Curiously—and one welcomes the sentiment, even if it be wrongly applied—the sight of

kicks given to a man on the ground brought out, in the midst of the combat, an Englishman's love of 'fair play;' for, though Bancroft was but one defending his life against two, Sergeant Alger called out to him, from a spot some way off, and forbade him to 'kick the man that was down.' It is believed certain that by fire, by steel, and by the sole of his boot Bancroft killed altogether five men.*

Fighting thus—one or two of them singly, the rest in very small knots—a few men of the Guards proved able at length to break up the opposing clusters of Russian soldiery and drive them down from the Ledgeway upon the heads of the columns below. Captain Burnaby himself passed through this fight on the Ledgeway without any hurt; and of the thirteen men of the right flank company of the Grenadiers who are shown to have followed him, two only were killed and five wounded; so that one exact half of the band remained still alive and unharmed.¹

It was scarce possible that fights such as these should fail to kindle the ardor of our troops within reach of contagion. Those men of the Coldstream and other intermixed soldiery on the right of the Sand-bag Battery who had been hitherto restrained, broke loose from their bounds on the crest and descended upon the Russians below; whilst on the left of the work, the line of the Scots Fusileers, no longer enduring to be kept back by the exertions of their officers, became so frenzied with zeal, and at the same time so disordered, as to be in effect an impassioned crowd. The gathered mass heaved itself over the brow, carrying all the dissuaders along with it, and tearing pell-mell down the steeps.

But now also, and almost simultaneously with the loosening of these torrents, there burst forth the passion that had been gathering in the Sand-bag Battery. There opposite impulsions were clashing. A supply of ammunition, then newly brought up, furnished means of continuing an attitude of simple defense on the crest. His Royal Highness of Cambridge, with an immense energy of voice and gesture, was commanding, entreating, adjuring all the men who could hear him to keep the high

Downward
rush of the
troops on each
flank of the
Battery.

State of the
troops within
the work.

¹ In speaking of the thirteen grenadiers of the right flank company, who are 'shown' to have followed their captain, I purposely leave room for the supposition that there may have been more men of the same company who did the like, though their names have remained unrecorded. There were also, as we have seen, on the Ledgeway men of other companies, but I do not know either their exact number or the amount of the losses they there sustained.

ground; and the colors of the Grenadiers remaining steadfast in the hands of Verschoyle and Turner offered proof to those who could see them that the battalion as a body was not under orders to move. But then, on the other hand, to men long enraged and still chafing at the obstacle of a parapet without a banquette, there was ineffable charm and temptation in the sound of the tumult, the fray going on close outside on the ledge—in the voices of comrades engaged life to life with their foes, and the moan of the columns beyond. Major Champion of the 95th, ever vehement in fight as in prayer, proposed to some of the Guards an onset to be carried straight forward by climbing over the parapet; whilst Carmichael, of the same regiment, was already undertaking to lead out a mixed body of men from the left shoulder of the work; and it may be that these forces, in making ready to spring, were the first to utter the cry, but what we know is, that from numbers and numbers of voices,

Outburst of
troops from
the Battery.

and almost at once, there abruptly burst out the word, 'Charge!' Percy, lying in his blood, half-blinded and hitherto disabled, caught new life all at once from the sound, was able to rise, was able to stand, was able to throw himself into the torrent of the soldiery now bursting its bounds. Except some ninety or a hundred men, restrained by the commands and entreaties of the Duke of Cambridge, and standing fast by the colors, scarce any resisted the impulse. The soldiery standing near Champion made haste to follow his counsel. Carmichael led out his mixed band from the left flank of the Battery. Lieutenant Alexander Macdonald, the Adjutant of the 95th, rode out through the left embrasure.¹ Whether climbing over the parapet, or pouring through its two embrasures, or swirling round by its flanks, the bulk of the Grenadier Guards and other intermixed soldiery within the work stormed out upon the ledge; and then—not resulting directly from fire, nor from steel, but rather from a moment's despair on the one side, and on the other a passionate will—all seemed to be flight and pursuit; Russian masses descending the steeps in headlong confusion—English soldiery tearing down in full chase with a vehemence hard to control.

Flight and
pursuit of the
Russians in
front of the
Battery.

Of the enemy's visible masses in this part of the field the only one not yet in flight was a column moving up from the bed of

¹ An account of the strange ordeal through which this indomitable officer passed when he afterward fell wounded into the hands of the enemy will be found in the Appendix, No. VIII.

Column in St. Clement's Gorge confronted by troops of the 95th Regiment.

St. Clement's Gorge. Confronting this mass from the western crest of the Kitspur, there stood the wing of the 95th, or rather that major part of it which, though numbering little more than about a hundred men, still constituted its main body.

From the edge of the steep, this fraction of the Derbies was looking straight down on the front of the column below. All at once, by some voice still unknown, the word 'Charge!' was uttered in a tone of command; but the men instinctively felt that a charge down the steep must be wrong, and without yet obeying the order, they looked to their officers for guidance. Those officers, however, believed that the word of command, if unwise, was spoken, nevertheless, with authority; and not enduring that an order to charge should be met by mere criticism instead of obedience, they repeated and began to enforce it. Led by Captain Sargent—a man of powerful will—the Grenadier company moved, and the whole line of these


Charge of the 95th.
Its effect.

95th men charged straight down the steep. Not awaiting their headlong assault, the column below broke asunder, and turned and fled. Our men followed in downward pursuit, and even, indeed, pressed the enemy's heels part way up the opposite bank; whilst some of them, turning to their right, went in chase of a body which had separated itself from the rest, and was descending along the bed of the gorge. It was whilst restraining the too eager pursuit of some of the soldiery that the brave, pious Champion fell. To make his way down through the copsewood at a part where no horse could well penetrate, he had just quitted his saddle, when a musket-ball gave him his mortal wound.

So now, along the whole of that line which had extended from Cathcart's front on our right to where Champion's wing of the 95th thus charged on our left, the enemy was in hasty retreat. It is true that our combatants in this part of the field

True extent of the overthrow sustained by the Russians.

had behind them and on their left flank a curtain of dim atmosphere which might be concealing unvanquished bodies of Russians; but toward the east and north-east they commanded a view less obscure, and nowhere within this range could they now set their eyes on an enemy's column which was otherwise than in a state of flight. At some points, the Russians, when neared by their pursuers, made haste to throw down their arms and fall prostrate in the attitudes of Oriental worship, calling piteously for mercy in the name of 'Christos!' The rout seemed complete.



FIGHT ON MOUNT INKERMAN.

Second Period.

The "False Victory" won by the Guards and some companies of the 20th, 46th, 68th, and 95th regiments.

It must be remembered, however, that this overthrow, though extending over the whole scene of the fight on the Kitspur, still did not involve those two Okhotsk battalions which had temporarily withdrawn from the fight, nor yet those four Iäkoutsik battalions which had, as we saw, their chief lair at the head of the Quarry Ravine. And in truth what our people had gained was a false, unwholesome victory. By the very act of thus routing the left wing of the Russian army they had lost the high ground.

There were some of our people, as, for instance, the men with Bellairs, and, besides these, a few of the Guards, who in striving against assailants on their left flank had been gradually drawn from the Kitspur to ground farther west. These will be seen by-and-by re-appearing on the line of the Post-road; but the bulk of the English forces successively brought to the Kitspur were now tearing down in pursuit toward the valley of the Tchernaya, and it is plain that our troops could not thus rush down from the heights and disperse in the jungle below without forfeiting—at least for a time—their power of farther swaying the action. Except the hundred men whom the Duke of Cambridge had held back with the colors of the Grenadier Guards, there was hardly now left on the higher slopes of the Kitspur so much as even a remnant of the 2600 English who at one time or other had combated in this part of the field.

In chasing the enemy down from the higher slopes of the Kitspur, Colonel Percy had been so drawn toward his left that he found himself soon on the crest overhanging St. Clement's Gorge; and on looking to its opposite bank, he there saw Russian columns descending, with an evident intention to cross the chasm, advance up the side of the Kitspur, and attack our people in flank. The troops he descried were those two Okhotsk battalions which had been temporarily withdrawn from the front before the general overthrow sustained by their comrades on the Kitspur, and were now coming back in a reorganized state, to take part once more in the fight. By firing across the gorge to its opposite bank Percy's men caused the force there appearing to bend away to its right, and vanish for a time in the dimness; but the columns, thus deflected in their course, marched round the head of the gorge, and when next they emerged into sight they were not only found to be advancing toward the left flank of the

A false victory.

Westward direction taken by a few.

Course taken by the bulk.

The high ground almost denuded.

The newly approaching battalions seen by Percy. His measures.

Sand-bag Battery, but already drawing near to their goal. Percy, seeing that he was cut off from the crest above him by the columns which had thus got round his left flank, formed up his men in line, with their front toward the interposed mass; but his people saying they had no ammunition, he was obliged to abandon the idea he had entertained of attempting to cut through, and resort to the more feasible plan of moving past under the ledge where the enemy had appeared, and afterward regaining the top-land at a point farther south. He had the good fortune to strike a bridle-path which led him in the direction required.

Besides the troops seen by Percy, a Läkoutsch battalion was moved, as we shall afterward see more particularly, to a part of the heights farther south, and when —in the midst of their chase—our people looked up to the crest behind them, they saw that the enemy had come into their vacated places on the high ground. In this strait there were some—chiefly men of the 95th, under Vialls and Sargent—who remained near the ground they had reached when making the unwelcome discovery; whilst others—a few Coldstream men under Wilson, and Carmichael of the 95th, with his following—were afterward able to find opportunities for re-ascending to the heights they had abandoned; but, except Captain Burnaby, with about thirty of his company, no collected body of men climbed back to the heights in time to anticipate the enemy; and the great bulk of the troops which had gone down the hill in pursuit chose the same course of action as the one we saw Percy adopt. Without means of intercommunication, they took plain counsel from circumstances, and comprehending that a soldiery dispersed far and wide in thick copsewood could not even do so much as collect themselves for an effort to reconquer the heights, they resolved to turn the flank of the position which the enemy had newly gained on the crest, by keeping at a sufficient distance below him, and so making their way through the brake to the right rear of Pennefather's position. This they accordingly did. The fractions of the 46th and 68th were drawn off together by a staff-officer of their division, and in other parts of the hill-side the remains of companies, and many small chance-gathered bodies, moved southward under the guidance of officers; but elsewhere, soldiers worked their way individually or in knots. To say nothing of shot and shell from the ships, our soldiers moved thus, one may say, between two Russian army-corps; for, whilst some of them

Movement effected by the bulk of the soldiery who had fought on the Kitspur.

were a mark for Prince Gortchakoff's batteries, and even drew fire from his infantry collected on the bank of the river, there were others within a few paces of General Dannenberg's columns. Sir Charles Russell, for instance, and the soldiery with him scraped past the interposed Iäkoutsik battalion by moving so close under it as to get shelter from the abruptness of the ground.

For those who had not the fortune to strike into Percy's bridle-path, a route which lay through dense copsewood across the abrupt steep of the hill-side was necessarily hard for the soldiery to traverse, and some of them dropped from exhaustion; but nearly all, sooner or later, made good their way back to the Isthmus; and, upon the whole, it may be said that the mischief these troops inflicted upon themselves by winning their false victory was not, after all, greatly aggravated by the interposition of the enemy on their vacated heights.

Colonel Percy with his Grenadiers—he and they yearning fiercely after cartridges—was amongst the first to come in. Seeing at length a staff-officer, and eagerly asking where his people could obtain fresh supplies of ammunition, he was answered, he says, with 'Pou honor, 'don't know,' unaccompanied by any offer to meet the exigency by riding off to make inquiry; but the man thus disclosing his uselessness was besides so provokingly sleek, that Henry Percy—inflamed with the fight, bruised, wounded, begrimed with wet earth, and reeking with sweat and blood—grew as savage as his ancestor did under like conditions with the knight, 'trimly dressed,' who drawled out his dislike to saltpetre; and it seems he indulged his temper. But if a Hotspur, after five centuries, was 'pestered' again 'by a 'popinjay,' he soon drew the solace he needed from a tumbril of fresh ammunition.¹ In this one respect, it proved easy to

restore the personal efficiency of the soldiery as they came in from the brush-wood below; but to reorganize them was of course a hard task, its difficulty being greatly aggravated by the losses the regiments had sustained in officers. At one spot, where no officer of the Guards was present, Dr. Wilson of the 7th Hussars did excellent service by rallying some of their soldiery.² At another, Sir Charles Russell of the

¹ I do not understand that Lord Henry Percy knows who the staff-officer was, and certainly I can make no guess; for I fail to remember any staff-officer in the Crimea who was either affected or listless.

² So stated (with a grateful acknowledgment of the service) by H. R. H.

Grenadiers, with the aid of Captain Greville Finch of the 68th, devoted himself to the task, and was able at last to form a little battalion composed of men from different regiments.

Still, for these and other like efforts applied to the work of reorganization, time of course was more or less needed; and, so far as concerns their efficiency at the particular hour now reached, the remains of the Guards, and other soldiery coming in from the Kitspur by the Tchernaya flank, must be numbered in the category of what we have called the 'spent forces.' Their false victory over the left wing of the Russian army was indeed dearly bought.¹

XIII.

Altogether, the few score of soldiers restrained by the Duke of Cambridge, and those whom we shall see climbing back in time for fresh strife on the crest, numbered only about 200;² but the conflicts these men sustained were of singular interest, and must now in their turn be recounted.

It is only by the interposed task of pursuing the false victory to its conclusion that we have been parted all this while from Sir George Cathcart. When Sir George, indulging his dream, rode joyously down, as we saw, to praise and congratulate Torrens, he already was near to the moment of finding himself rudely awakened.

He had followed his troops in pursuit some way down the side of the hill, when he all at once heard from behind the outburst of a volley of musketry, which tore through the air above him, and swept down over his head in the direction of the red-coats below.

For a moment, Cathcart thought that this volley had been the Duke of Cambridge in his private dispatch to Head-quarters, 6th November, 1854. His Royal Highness there says that Dr. Wilson for some time opposed these men of the Guards to a body of the Russians which sought to get through, but I do not know enough of the service thus reported by His Royal Highness to be in a condition for narrating it. Dr. Wilson was attached to the 1st Division.

¹ The extent of the sacrifices resulting from the fights on the Kitspur will be found indicated *post*, p. 219.

² The estimate is of necessity a very rough one, but is thus based:

Men held back by the Duke of Cambridge.....	100
Men brought up the hill-side by Cathcart.....	50
Men brought up the hill-side by Burnaby.....	30
Stragglers	20
	<hr/> 200

fired by mistake, and must have come from the Guards; but when the smoke lifted, a glance dispelled his idea, for above him on the crest from which he had so lately descended was the head of a strong Russian column. The enemy had turned the position of the Kitspur by simply marching in through the still open 'gap' which Lord Raglan ordered Cathcart to close. Without firing or receiving a shot, nay even, so far as I learn, without having been seen by the English, a battalion of the Iäkoutsik regiment had moved up from the Quarry Ravine across the unguarded slopes which descend toward the north from Mount Head, and now was so placed as to be not only in the direct rear of Cathcart, but also in the rear of the Duke of Cambridge, then remaining, as we saw, with the colors of the Grenadier Guards and 100 men round them, by the gorge of the Sand-bag Battery. The Russians thus interposed could not doubt the opportunity they had gained, for Cathcart's troops, as we saw, had abandoned their great-coats, and were fighting in red. Heavy fire poured down upon our troops from what had been their own heights.

If Sir George Cathcart had obeyed Lord Raglan, his organized body of near 400 men would have been standing at this time well posted on the northern slopes of Mount Head, and confining to its lair in the Quarry Ravine that very same Russian column which had now stolen into his ground. As it was, he had to sit in his saddle with only his staff and a few straggling soldiers about him, looking up at the hostile battalion thus planted in rear of his troops.

When the men on the hill-side near Cathcart looked up and saw a gray column on the crest he had just now abandoned, they could hardly have failed to conjecture that their heights had been lost through some commander's mistake; but our soldiers can be superbly indulgent of faults committed by a general, and—if only a rescue be possible—they often, as the great Captain said, will 'get him out of his scrapes.'

Trusting largely—if not indeed wildly—to this generous resource, Cathcart yielded himself to the impulse of his valiant and chivalrous nature. So far as I know, he did not, for even a moment, harbor any other idea than that the Russians, however many, must be attacked by the English, however few. There were near him, dispersed in the brush-wood, some men who, though busied like the rest of the troops in pursuit, could still be reached by his orders. They were only some fifty

The inter-
posed Iä-
koutsk bat-
talion.

Cathcart.

His resolve.

His scant
means.

in number, but they belonged to the 'Twentieth,' a regiment of historic renown, which is famous for imparting its aggregate quality to the individual soldier;¹ and the chief, besides, had around him the devoted officers of his staff, Colonel Windham, Colonel Charles Seymour, Major Maitland, Captain Hugh Smith, and Captain Greville, and his nephew, young Augustus Cathcart.

After ordering Windham to ride down and try to 'get
The attack made by fifty men of the '20th.' 'back' the troops on the hill-side below, Cathcart gathered together the fifty men of the 20th, and with these—formed rudely in line—undertook to move up against the overhanging body of some seven or eight hundred men which stood on the crest above him.²

In ascending to make their attack, these few 'Twentieth' men were obstructed, and, besides, more or less thrown asunder by the varying abruptness of the acclivity; but, if aggregate strength was thus neutralized, the individual soldier toiled forward with a determination all his own, and the twenty or thirty men who formed the right of the line—Maitland forced his horse up alongside them—had not long been climbing the steep, when on the shoulder of the hill they emerged all at once from below into the close presence of the enemy. Then, panting after their effort, they sprang at the left of the column, the part directly confronting them; and the Russians there exposed to the onset began to break and give way without awaiting the thrust of the bayonet. But in the right-hand part of the column its troops stood their ground with more firmness, and did not fall back. Even there, however, the Russians, though not turning round, still so far gave way to the English ascendant that they 'accepted the files.'³ Here, there, and in several places, they allowed some strong, willful assailant to tear his way in through their ranks, and every intruder thus received into the hostile mass fought hard, as may well be supposed, for life no less than for victory, using sometimes the point of the bayonet, sometimes the butt-end of the musket, sometimes a ready fragment of rock.⁴

¹ The circumstances under which these men of the 20th chanced to be near Cathcart are shown *ante*, p. 177.

² The Iäkoutsik battalion had no doubt sustained some casualties; but the regiment went into action with a strength of 3223, which gives an average of rather more than 805 to each of its four battalions.

³ With respect to the use of this phrase in our army, see 'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. iv., 3rd ed., p. 117.

⁴ From the vantage-height of his saddle, Maitland was able to see the combats thus maintained on his left.

A column which endures this kind of invasion is commonly doomed; but here the disproportion of numbers was overwhelming; and, however formidable the intruding assailant might prove to any hapless Russians so planted or packed as to be within reach of his bayonet, the paths of blood he thus opened were after all so narrow, so few, and so far apart, that the body, in spite of such stabs, was able to hold together; and one must infer, though no witnesses speak, that of the brave 'Twentieth' men who thus engulfed themselves bodily in the depths of the column, a large proportion fell slain. Still, if Russian narrators speak truly, there were some, at least, of our soldiery who cut their way out through the column.¹

Upon the whole, it resulted that the column, although for some moments forced back at one part, and at others pierced, riven, and torn by individual assailants, was able to maintain its ground on the crest. There were some of the English who had not either cut their way through, or fallen in the struggle. These desisting at length from their singular onslaught, dropped back one by one, or in small knots, under the shelter of the steep, some remaining, it seems, within a few paces of the enemy, some choosing their berths lower down. They had exhausted their cartridges, and could not vex the column with fire.

The Russian commander apparently was content with the immunity his troops now enjoyed, for he not only held back the column, but abstained from throwing out soldiery to clear its front; and, the steepness of the ground being such that men not many paces asunder might be out of each other's sight, Sir George Cathcart remained with his staff on the broken hill-side at a distance of only a few yards from the column planted above him.

On each side for once there was a sense of discomfiture. The Russians considered that they had failed to prevent Cathcart's troops from cutting through their column. On the other hand, our people had been the assailants, undertaking to drive off the force in their rear by means of an up-hill

¹ The Russians, indeed, seem to have thought that the main body of their desperate assailants succeeded in cutting through. 'At this moment,' says General de Todleben, 'confusion began in the ranks' [the ranks of Cathcart's soldiery], 'but being quickly rallied, these brave troops made a supreme effort, and throwing themselves with desperation [en désespérées] upon the Jäkoutsk regiment, they succeeded in forcing its ranks, and cutting for themselves a way through the midst of our soldiers,' p. 473. My own sources of information do not, at present, enable me to confirm this on English authority.

attack, made with numbers as one to fourteen; and not to perform the prodigy, but, on the contrary, allow an enemy's column to remain on the English Heights, was to fail. So, at all events, Cathcart thought. With Maitland at his side, he rode up and down for some moments in front of the crest, and presently said, 'I fear we are in a mess.' Maitland said he yet hoped that our people would drive the enemy back; and then seeing some men coming up from the foot of the hill, he rode down to get them together, and hasten their ascent. These soldiers, however, when addressed by Maitland, complained that they had been fired upon by their own fellow-countrymen; and, until they had come back to within some thirty yards of the Russians, they persistently maintained their belief. Maitland entreated them to form a blended line without regard to diversity of regiment; but they declared that any such effort would be vain, because they had no cartridges left.

Maitland having thus failed in his purpose turned back toward Sir George Cathcart, and found him sitting on his horse in a small, sheltered nook within some fifteen or twenty yards of the Russians. Seeing his favorite staff-officer approach, Cathcart moved a step or two toward him, and—being already in anguish—he now, as it seemed, upon hearing Major Maitland's report, would have to endure a new pang. But in an instant the conditions of his welfare so changed that the bulk of God's reasoning creatures might well enough envy him; for the great Deliverer came, withdrawing him from the agony of discomfiture, from censure, from controversy, from all the torments of life, and surrounding him at the last with a halo which the every-day world can not give. Whilst moving toward Maitland, and thus partly quitting his shelter, Cathcart all at once dropped from his saddle, and was blessed with a soldier's death. A musket-ball had passed through his heart. Colonel Seymour—Charles Seymour—fell slain by the side of his chief, and Maitland was grievously wounded.

Our soldiers left standing on this part of the acclivity became stragglers again as before, moving whither they chose in the brush-wood, till at last—with the troops farther down—they came under the guidance of Windham.

The position thus maintained by a Russian battalion on that Fore Ridge which formed part of the English Heights

Cathcart's
words to
Maitland.
Maitland's
farther ef-
forts.

Death of
Cathcart.
Seymour killed
and Mait-
land wound-
ed.

The remains
of the fifty as-
sailants.

Position of the Iäkoutsk battalion on the Fore Ridge. was plainly one of great value as a means of swaying the battle; but it is difficult to infer that General Dannenberg perceived the advantage which fortune had placed in his hands, for he made no visible effort to follow and drive in the wedge. Still, a trophy at all events, if not indeed a prize of great brilliancy, was lying almost within reach. Adhering to the crest they had been suffered to occupy, the troops of this Iäkoutsk battalion kept watch on what still could be seen of their late assailants, and the other small bebies of redcoats dispersed lower down in the brush-wood; but some of their men fronted northward, and these spreading out on the north-eastern slopes of Mount Head, looked down into the rear and right flank of the Sand-bag Battery. There, surrounding the colors of a regiment, they saw, besides some led horses, a few score of tall foot-soldiers, distinguished by their black, lofty head-gear. This Iäkoutsk battalion had not before met the Guards.

XIV.

Without as yet knowing their peril, the Duke of Cambridge and the hundred men near him were thus cut off by a force interposed in their rear; but Troops on the Duke of Cambridge's left front as well as in his rear. also two other battalions—the two battalions of Okhotsk which Percy had seen—were now coming up to attack them from the direction of their left front.

Captain Burnaby's measures. Burnaby also had witnessed the approach of these Okhotsk battalions; but it happened that at the moment of making his discovery he was not so far down on the Kitspur as Percy had been, and he judged that, by dint of hard climbing, it might be possible for him, with the twenty or thirty men of his company still gathered about him, to regain the high ground behind him before the Russians could seize it. He did not misreckon; for, after a short though severe exertion of bodily strength, both he and his people were up on the Ledge-way, and much nearer to the front of the Sand-bag Battery than the Russians yet were to its flank. No other collected body of men came back from the chase in time to co-operate with the remnant still holding together under the Duke of Cambridge.

Critical position of the Duke of Cambridge and the colors of the Grenadier Guards. Upon the whole, then, the predicament of the Duke of Cambridge was this: Still remaining near the gorge of the Sand-bag Battery, with about one hundred men and the colors of the Grenadier Guards, he had an Iäkoutsk battalion established on the high ground behind him, that is, on the

slopes of Mount Head, whilst the two Okhotsk battalions were advancing upon him from his left front; and (except from the accession of perhaps ten or fifteen stragglers attracted toward the colors) the only help within reach was that which Burnaby might be able to give him with some twenty or thirty more men.

The three Russian battalions had together a strength which may be computed at about 2000;¹ whilst the English, including the stragglers and the remains of the company with which Burnaby was seeking to interpose, numbered only, it is believed, at most about 150 men.²

With a few of the surviving staff-officers—Colonel Brownrigg, Lord Balgonie, Captain Hamley, Macdonald, and others—H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge was still near the colors, and as yet unaware of the perils now closely surrounding him, when he all at once heard a voice saying, ‘Sir, you will

The inter-
posed force
discovered.

‘be taken!’ Then came fire pouring down from

Mount Head. ‘Halloo! halloo! our own people

‘firing upon us!’ These, or words of like import,

were uttered at the same instant by many, and amongst others by Captain Higginson of the Grenadier Guards; but at this moment—with a midshipman on a pony beside him—there came up on foot a ship’s captain, no other than Peel, of the *Diamond*. With the aid of a field-glass he carried, the seaman’s calm gaze had enabled him to speak as one certain, and he instinctively saw how advantageous it would be if the ugly truth could become known to so able an officer as Captain Higginson a few moments before its discovery by the men. Therefore, speaking so as to be heard by the captain and none other, he pointed by a slight gesture to Mount Head, and said that the body thence firing was Russian. It was owing in part to this thoughtfulness of Captain Peel’s that the general discovery of the truth, which presently followed, caused no confusion. The men had scarce learned that they were cut off, when already the voice of authority was telling them what they must do.

Several officers gave out or repeated a word of command, which imported that the men were to keep the high ground

¹ The three battalions had come into action with a strength of 2416, and, if the casualties they had sustained up to this time were not very much greater or less than 416, the above estimate of 2000 would be a tolerably close approach to accuracy.

² Captain Higginson’s estimate puts the number at only 130. I attain the rough estimate of 150 by allowing (in addition to the 100 gathered round the Duke) the full numbers of 30 for Burnaby’s strength, and 20 for stragglers. The 50 who made up ‘the 200’ were, as we have seen, with Cathcart.

Orders given in consequence. and force their way up the hill in the teeth of the interposed force. All seemed to understand in a moment that this was their task.

As though eager to seize their prey, the troops of the Iäkoutsik battalion began to move down the hill-side; but they remembered, perhaps, that their line of retreat was toward the head of the Quarry

Ravine, for, by spreading out men toward their then left, they disclosed a slight westerly leaning; whilst, on the other hand, those of our people who were with the colors of the Grenadier Guards.

and of the men with the colors of the Grenadier Guards. way, keeping always as close as they could to its eastern margin. There was, therefore, with a part of each force a tendency to incline toward its then left; thus observing, at some points, that very same 'rule of the road' which obtains on an English highway. The Iäkoutsik battalion, however, though disclosing this tendency, still did not for a moment abandon the obvious duty of endeavoring to overwhelm the little band of English soldiery, and, upon the whole, it resulted that the task of our people was, at some points, to scrape their way past; at others, to cut their way through.

The Duke of Cambridge, not being personally obstructed by any hostile mass directly barring his path, was able to ride past the enemy with his ever blithe aid-de-camp, Major Macdonald;¹ and although, as may well be supposed, he drew abundance of fire, he finally made good his way with only the loss of a charger shot under him and the graze of a ball in his arm.

As with the chief, so also it fared with a part of the soldiery under him; for they scraped past the Russians without being flatly obstructed. But another part of the remnant which had come up from the gorge of the Battery took a route which lay more toward the west, and became thus a separate band, consisting in great measure of Coldstream men,

The band of English directly confronted and attacked by the Russians. with other troops intermixed. They had not yet moved far up the hill, when they found themselves directly confronted and fired upon by a part of the interposed battalion, which—because of the smoke and the mist—our people had not before seen.

¹ The indefatigable 'cheeriness' of Macdonald on the Inkerman day was much remarked, and in particular, I believe, by Lord Raglan, who liked to see his officers in that mood during an action. In his dispatch of the 11th November, he adduced his *personal testimony*—a rather unusual step—in support of the praise accorded to Macdonald.

These Russians were disposed in no order that well could be traced by the eye, but they formed a thick belt of infantry at a distance of only about twenty or thirty paces from our people. It chanced that with the English soldiery thus challenged no combatant officer was present;¹ yet amongst them they had that kind of leader which the stress of the moment required. Assistant-surgeon Dr. Wolseley's charge. Wolseley, of the 20th Regiment, had marched with Crofton's wing of the regiment. He was one who lived, heart and soul, under the dominion of the Christian faith; but the heraldic motto of his house was expressive, perhaps, of the tendencies handed down to him by his warlike ancestors, and the theory which it bade him remember was this one: 'Man to man is, and must be, a wolf.'² Unconsciously biased, perhaps, by his inborn fighting propensity, he had contrived to persuade himself that the spot where his medical services would prove the most useful was—of all places on earth! the Sand-bag Battery; and there, strange as it may seem, he had established his field hospital. When afterward 'the hundred' fell back, he had moved along with them, and was now one of those whose retreat appeared to be blocked by a part of the Iäkoutsch battalion. He had come into action without his sword, but he uttered a self-inspiring prayer for the welfare of his soul, without deigning to ask from God any mere prolongation of life; and when he had got his hold of a firelock—choosing one, by the blessing of Heaven, which had the bayonet fixed—he was a formidable antagonist for even the most pious soldier of Russia's orthodox Church. Here and there, some moments before, he had heard orders given or repeated; and, as they were all to the same effect, and all consistent with the dictates of his own soldierly instinct, he had one at least of the requisites for conducting a difficult enterprise—that is, a clear, steadfast idea.

Wolseley spoke a few words to the men within range of his voice, and told them what they now had to fight for was—not victory only, but—Life. Then, the minds of his hearers being ripe, he gave them the word of command: 'Fix bayonets, charge, and keep up the hill!'³ The soldiery answer-

¹ Men mainly belonging to the Coldstream might well be thus circumstanced, for they had lost a huge proportion of their officers either killed or wounded; and I am not aware that *any* Coldstream officer was with 'the hundred' who had adhered to the Duke of Cambridge, and abstained from pursuit.

² *Homo homini lupus.*

³ It may seem strange that amongst soldiers long engaged in close fighting, and still in the close presence of the enemy, there should have been men with their bayonets unfixed, but so it was.

ed him with a burst of hurras, sprang forward to the charge, and in the next instant were tearing their way through the thickest of Russians. They suffered, it is believed, heavy loss in proportion to their scanty number;¹ but they achieved their purpose, and came out at length on the southern or English side of the force which had undertaken to block their path.

The soldiery who moved along the margin of the Ledge-way with the colors of the Grenadier Guards, had already, by this time, made some little way toward the rear; but they were only a part of 'the hundred' which had abstained from pursuit. With a strength of perhaps some three-score, they were moving against a battalion which both faced and swirled past them, and they had no troops thrown out to cover them in rear or in flank. They still went on forcing their way, but only, as it seemed, to thrust themselves more and more absolutely into the enemy's power. The two colors had become separated, the regimental color in the hands of Verschoyle having made some twenty paces more way toward the rear than the Queen's color, carried by Turner. The group immediately surrounding this last standard was in general very small, and though having at one time a strength of about fifteen, numbered during some perilous moments only five or six men. It occurred to some one that the sight of the colors in danger would be likely to draw stragglers toward them, and this, it seems, was the real purpose of the shout now all at once heard; but the words, as it happened—the words, 'Carry high the colors!'—had a brave, welcome sound, giving strength to the resolve of the men, and inflaming their soldierly pride.

Whilst our people thus strove to open a path for the colors in the teeth of an interposed force, their other and even more formidable adversary was approaching them from the opposite quarter. The two Okhotsk battalions by this time had neared the left shoulder of the Sand-bag Battery, and were now moving forward with a great alacrity, for their soldiery saw the colors retreating with only a small band around them.

Captain Burnaby, however, as we know, with his twenty or thirty men, had succeeded in climbing up to the now deserted Sand-bag Battery before the two Okhotsk battalions could reach it, and thus found himself able to interpose between the retreating colors and the enemy advancing force.

¹ The loss was estimated by Doctor Wolseley at not less than one half.

to overtake them. The bodily effort he made to effect this rapid ascent had been so violent that, when at last on the crest, he allowed himself to sink to the ground and rest his lungs for some moments.

He had not yet overtaken his comrades, when already he saw that the small clumps of men round the colors were without any rear-guard in the folds of a hostile battalion, and that the prospect of their saving the standards by means of their own was almost null. So, to cover their retreat, and, if possible, ward off the impending disaster, he called out to the twenty or thirty men near him, and drew them more closely together. Then he told them the purpose for which they must fight. By firmly retarding their own retreat they must win time for the retreat of the colors. They were to be in effect a diminutive rear-guard, fending off, if they could, the weight of two Russian battalions.

Of some such measure as this there was soon crying need; for whilst the small clumps of our people round the colors still wrestled with the Iäkoutsch battalion in front, and fended it off their right flank, the two Okhotsk battalions came on past the Sand-bag Battery—one moving along in front of its parapet, the other along its gorge. They were both pressing eagerly forward, the officers vehement with their swords in the air, the men shouting and rabidly yelling. For once there was an absence of that air of doubt and hesitation, and that looking about for guidance, which elsewhere had characterized the Russian masses when brought into the close presence of our people; and indeed the mere sight of English standards in retreat with only a small band around them, might well give assurance and purpose to troops pressing on in pursuit. The foremost of the Okhotsk battalions was at length within pistol-shot of our people; and, if it should close, all hope of saving the colors must seemingly come to an end.

In this strait, Burnaby remembered what he had been able to achieve on the Ledgeway by striking there at a column with only a small knot of men, and perceiving that now mere defensive resistance was hopeless, he judged that by comparison with so blank a resource as that, an attack which would be wild under other conditions, might be in reality prudent. His men at this moment were falling back very fast, but still he did not despair of being able to rally them and get them to charge.

He had no brother officer near him; but Bancroft—the

hero of the fight on the Ledgeway—stood yet at his side, as did also a sergeant of the Line who had mingled with the Guards, and was doing splendid service. Isaac Archer, Joseph Troy, John Pullen, Edward Hill, and William Turner were near. With these, besides ten or twelve more—some Guardsmen, some men of the Line—there gathered and fronted under Burnaby's appeal some eighteen or twenty men.¹ Burnaby told them to close together, and then said, 'Are you ready?' The men answered by their act. They sprang forward. In front of them all at that moment, giving splendid example to others, were Isaac Archer and the sergeant of the Line. There were some Russians in loose order advancing in front of the column, but our people, as Archer expresses it, 'knocked them out of the way,' and then there was nothing except air and smoke between the solid column and the little knot of its English assailants.

Men in the foremost of the enemy's ranks brought their firelocks down to the charge, but did not spring forward 'at the double' in advance of their comrades. The whole column, however—and of course the front ranks along with it—continued to advance against the English. Yet down to this moment the little bevy of English was still advancing against the column. Of the two, which would halt or hold back? Not the Russians; for, this time, at least, with English colors retreating before them, they came on with set purpose; and, whilst their people in front gave a voice to the eagerness of the force by their shouts and fierce yells, the whole mass was kept in glad consciousness of its overwhelming numbers by the multitudinous strains of a hymn roaring up from its depths. Must it, then, be the eighteen or twenty English who, as was natural, would have to yield? Not they, if their Captain could choose, for his shout was now again heard: 'Get close together and charge them once more, my men!' Desperate as his appeal might sound, he was obeyed. 'I thought it perfectly useless,' says Bancroft, with his soldier-like simplicity; 'I thought it perfectly useless so few of us trying to resist such a tremendous lot; but, for all that, I did so.'

In modern war the clash of two hostile forces does not often occur at a moment when each is advancing against each; but here, certainly, the still persisting column was met in its onward course by the still continuing onset of the small English band, and for once, troops whilst charging

¹ One man says about eighteen, another about twenty, and no one gives any other numbers as his estimate.

were charged. Could a score of men survive hostile contact like this with a strong, well-ordered, and resolute battalion? To one looking back as did Richard Minor from ground close beside the Queen's color, the small English band seemed to drop and become altogether extinguished, the actual truth being, however, that whilst several of the twenty were indeed at this moment laid low, some others, including the Captain himself, yet remained unstricken, though being now fewer than ever and disparted, and mingled in close strife with their adversaries, they had ceased to be discernible at even a few paces distant. These survivors fought hard. Burnaby, receiving the bayonet-thrust of an eager assailant in the folds of his cloak, gave the point of his sword to two others; and, his men closing fast and wrestling, as it were, with their nearest antagonists, the column, without being for an instant disheartened or turned from its purpose, was still so hampered and baffled by the hindrances resulting from these bodily combats, as to be either stopped dead, or at all events grievously retarded in its onward course, and this at a time when moments were precious, for our troops in charge of the colors had been all this while forcing their way through or past the intercepting battalion, and, having now shaken it off,¹ they were gaining upon the other—the Okhotsk—body of infantry, thus obstructed in its eager pursuit. Bancroft, Archer, and Turner by this time had been all three of them wounded; whilst Troy and Pullen and Hill were not only living, but each of them fighting aggressively in the midst of the Russians, and even, it is said, gaining ground. Ingulfing those foremost assailants, and now laying its weight on the tormentors who still obstructed its front, the column at length recovered its powers of movement, and began to draw forward once more. Then, however, its troops all at once undertook to deploy; and the evolution had begun, when Burnaby, happening to slip upon the wet barrel of a musket, fell to the ground; and the Russians passing on over him, it presently resulted that he and the remains of his men, namely, Bancroft, Archer, William Turner, John Pullen, Edward Hill, and Joseph Troy, with besides a few more then living but afterward slain, were in the wake of the enemy's advancing battalions, or, in other words, upon the Russian side of the column with which they

¹ The intercepting—the Iäkoutsch—battalion had been maimed, as we saw, by the defeat which a part of it suffered when charged and cut through by Wolseley. The line of retreat for the Iäkoutsch troops was toward the head of the Quarry Ravine.

had fought; but besides that Bancroft, Archer, and Turner were all three of them wounded, and the Captain himself lying prostrate, John Pullen, though afterward rescued, stood surrounded at this moment by Russians, and was for some time held prisoner. On the other hand, three, if not more, of the English survivors, namely, Hill, and Troy, and James Archer—in spite of his wound—were yet upstanding in arms, and still ready, as they presently showed, to engage in fresh personal conflicts.

Cast thus by the chances of war into the wake of the enemy's advancing battalions, our people perforce became witnesses of the things he there did. Russian soldiers detached from the ranks went about from spot to spot dispatching the wounded English they saw on the ground, and even in their superlative carefulness transfixing men seemingly dead.¹ A Russian lying wounded at Burnaby's side malignantly invited the attention of these fell destroyers to the English Captain, but Burnaby had a loaded revolver and could speak the Muscovite tongue. He silenced his neighbor by pointing the pistol at him and telling him that if he spoke again he would shoot him. Then, pistol in hand, he awaited his destiny with a determination to sell his life dear. Despite the still combative energies of Archer and Hill and Troy, both they and their Captain and the rest of the seven survivors must have been soon dispatched or made prisoners if no succor had come from without.

Succor came. We saw how on the right of Hill Bend a French battalion of infantry—a battalion of the Sixth of the Line—stood resisting the entreaties of all who would then drive it into the fight, and we learned that our people, in the rage and impatience provoked by this lengthened recusancy, had suffered themselves to use bitter words. Well, now this very battalion—this much be-damned 'Sixth of the Line'—did good, loyal service, which will long be remembered in England. Its fixed attitude of expectancy had been owing to no other cause than the want of due sanction for a forward movement, and was converted at once into opportune action by the authority of General Bourbaki, now apparently giving impulsion to

¹ There is no proof that the Russians in general refused quarter to men who remained upstanding. It was against prostrate soldiery that their homicidal mania raged. They probably had an idea—and it was one not always ill founded—that a recumbent soldier, whether wounded or not, might retain, and would be likely to exercise, his power to harm them. In Burnaby no doubt, though prostrated, they still had a dangerous foe.

Retreat of the
Okhotsk bat-
talions.

this part of his brigade.¹ The Russians in their eager pursuit of the colors had been so led to shape their course that at this moment they were laying open their right to the French battalion, and De Camas began to advance against their exposed flank. Thus all at once threatened, whilst moving, with an attack on their flank from a fresh, strong, and organized force, the Russians, it seems, first endeavored to form up a new front with which to oppose their new enemy, and next—as though discontented with the result of their efforts—began to turn and retreat.²

Extrication of
Burnaby and
the other sur-
vivors of his
little rear-
guard.

Captain Burnaby, with the rest of the seven survivors, was still where we saw him in the wake of the enemy's columns, when he found that the ebb had set in, and that those of the Russians around him who had not yet moved off were going, nevertheless, to retreat. Hill, Troy, and James Archer, acting all three together at a well-chosen moment, rescued Pullen and Turner from the Russians surrounding them. The enemy's retreating movement proceeded; and Captain Burnaby himself with, besides, the six other survivors of his little rear-guard—that is, with Bancroft, Archer, Turner, Pullen, Hill, and Troy—became parted at length from the hostile multitude in which until now they had been mingled. No longer molested, and exulting in the now completed salvation of the colors, they met the advancing battalion to which they had owed their deliverance and gratefully passed through its ranks.³

Complete suc-
cess of Burna-
by's rear-
guard opera-
tions in cover-
ing the retreat
of the colors.

Without venturing to adopt any estimate of its actual duration in minutes, one may say that this struggle against encompassing numbers was maintained during all the time needed for the achievement of the purpose in hand.⁴ A rear-guard spontaneously formed by some twenty of the Grenadier

¹ So I gather; but the language on which I have to rely is not so distinct as I could wish.

² Apparently the deploying movement before mentioned was a part of that effort to show a new front which was made when the French appeared.

³ As regards the achievements of this little rear-guard, and also—in chief measure—the fight on the Ledgeway, I owe my knowledge to a most valuable little record called 'The Right Flank Company at Inkerman,' which contains the separate statements of Captain Burnaby himself, and nine of those who took part with him—viz., Color-sergeant Minor, Wilkins, Gilbert, Morris, Sayer, Overson, Bancroft, Archer, Troy; the last three, it will be observed, being three of the seven survivors of the rear-guard. Each of the statements is an entirely independent one, not copied or borrowed from the others, and all, as I think, bear the evident stamp of truth.

⁴ One of the partakers in this singular fight estimates at no less than ten

Guards proved able to fend off great masses. It shielded the men with the colors from all the vehement onsets directed against their then rear, and by setting their energies free for combats in the opposite quarter, enabled them to fight on, and fight through in the teeth of the intercepting battalion.

The survivors of the men who cut through under Wolseley had already come in; and the final success of their movement being added to that of the small band with the colors, as well as to that of 'the twenty' who assumed the task of a rear-guard, it results that the enterprise of the 150 soldiers who broke out of the circle drawn round them by 2000 men, was now at all points complete. They, or those who survived unstricken, had victoriously fought their way home.

When the Duke of Cambridge, after brushing his way past the Iäkoutsik battalion, got to find that he had become separated from his troops, he began to endure bitter anguish, and was driven almost to distraction when minute after minute elapsed without his being able to learn what had happened. He became possessed with an idea that the Guards were perhaps lost; and his grief—roused to frenzy by this cruel thought—was hardly allayed when Percy Herbert said, cheerily, though in language almost harshly prosaic, 'The Guards, sir, will be sure to "turn up."'

As respects the great bulk of not only the Guards, but also all the rest of our soldiery who seized and pursued their false victory, we before had the means of observing that Percy Herbert's rough prophecy was destined to receive its fulfillment; and, so far as concerned that small remnant of troops which fought round the colors, the Duke of Cambridge had been already prepared by Captain Burnaby himself for the joyful sight now awaiting him.¹ Still His Royal Highness was not a man so constituted as to be able to gaze with restrained emotion when he saw, coming out of the dimness, and slowly approaching him, a little body of unformed soldiery—

minutes the duration of what was only a part of it—namely, that close wrestling between the few and the many which followed upon Burnaby's charge; but it is difficult for any man engaged in such strife to measure the flight of time by a mere effort of mind.

¹ After the retreat of the Okhotsk battalions, Burnaby ceased to move in the exact wake of the troops with the colors, and came in by a route farther west, which brought him into contact with the Duke of Cambridge. He apprised His Royal Highness of the safety of the colors, and showed him the part of the field in which they might be met.

mainly Bearskins—but a few of the Line—and with them two standards, the colors of the Grenadier Guards. The apostrophe that broke from his lips was marked with religious fervor, and indeed he half borrowed church language for the utterance of his soldierly joy. But the Duke, if more vehement than others, was not alone in his rapture. From all—and many stood near—there was an outburst of admiration and praise and thankfulness, to greet the small band of Guardsmen and other intermixed soldiery coming quietly in with the colors, and driving before them the prisoners they had been able to take whilst fighting their way home from the Battery.

XV.

The Okhotsk battalions continued to retreat before the French '6th of the Line,' and descended into St. Clement's Gorge; but a number of the enemy's troops—not, however, in a state of formation—still remained showing front from the gorge of the Sand-bag Battery. Between these and the French battalion there had become interposed a weak thread of English skirmishers—men belonging to different regiments—and near them a single horseman.

General Bourbaki, it would seem, had ridden forward in the direction of his left front, and was not at this moment present with the battalion of Colonel de Camas. The battalion—extended in line—had been hitherto maintaining its advance, but now, from some cause, it faltered. The men did

not fall back, but they would no longer come on. Captain Armstrong—the horseman we saw with our skirmishers—was an able young officer, accustomed to wield authority, and not wanting in that soldierly sternness which the need of the moment required.¹

He rode up to the front of the French battalion, and spoke to its officers in language which perhaps might be harsh, but was nevertheless opportune. Our few men extended in front

saw his purpose, and gave him a cheer. Seizing the moment, he adjured the French battalion to advance. By gesture, by words, by example, the officers strove to draw their men forward; and the drums of the battalion, brought together in rear of its centre, broke out into a fury of sound with their hurricane '*pas de charge*.'

¹ Captain James Armstrong (now Major-General and Deputy Adjutant-General at the Horse Guards) was General Adams's Brigade-Major at the time of the battle.

Recapture of
the Sand-bag
Battery.

The battalion resumed its advance, and, the enemy's soldiery then withdrawing from the gorge of the Sand-bag Battery, it presently resulted that the dismantled work changed masters once more, and was now in the power of the French, though not actually kept in their hands. Colonel de Camas avoided the error of clinging, as our people had done, to the site of the dismantled battery, and moved on in a westerly direction toward the head of St. Clement's Gorge, where General Bourbaki, as it seems, was already present in person.

Continued advance of the
French 6th of
the Line.

There the General found Colonel Horsford, who had so manœuvred his small band of Rifles as to be able to remain in this advanced part of the field, whilst Russian battalions moved past him in either direction. Some conversation took place between the two gifted officers thus meeting in the front of battle. General Bourbaki's object apparently was to continue his advance, and at the same time take care not to quit the high ground. Addressing the '6th of the Line,' he said: 'Come, my lads, the English are in your front.'¹ Forward! He then led the battalion some way, in an almost northerly direction, across that rib of high ground which ends in the Inkerman Tusk.

Meeting between General
Bourbaki and Colonel
Horsford.

XVI.

Retrospect of
the fights on
the Kitspur.

In their struggles thus maintained on the Kitspur against hugely overweighting numbers, our soldiery passed through a fierce ordeal; but from almost every one of their fights they came out victorious.² When the enemy appeared on the north, they attacked and defeated him; when he appeared on the east, they attacked, defeated, and chased him; and when at last he appeared on the south (where lay their line of retreat), they at some points turned his flank, at others attacked and cut through him. Though beset by hostile forces in their rear as well as their front, they so well delivered themselves from the usual consequences of being cut off, that—far enough from any dream

¹ There were no English troops at the time in front of Bourbaki and Horsford, and I do not know how the General derived the impression disclosed by his words.

² General Adams, with a strength of 700, was pressed back, after hard fighting, by 4000; and Cathcart's attempt to drive off a whole Russian battalion with 50 men was not crowned with success. But except as regards these two instances, I know of no combat on the Kitspur in which our people failed to achieve their purpose.

of a surrender in mass—they hardly, it seems, lost a prisoner.¹

Brought about, as we saw, by mistake, the fights which
Their results. raged on the Kitspur were a mere waste of strength in so far as concerned the old battery, or the ground where it stood; and their sway in the battle was owing to no other circumstance than the havoc they wrought in the numbers and organization of the contending forces.

That havoc, however, was great. Out of some 2600² English engaged on the Kitspur, near a thousand, it is believed, were killed or wounded;³ and besides, though victorious, the remains of the forces thus mangled had not come out of the fight in an orderly or collected state. From the nature of their strife on the Kitspur, but more especially from their unbridled pursuit down the steep and through copsewood, our battalions and demi-battalions had become broken up; and although we shall find them re-forming, and returning to the front with an excellent promptitude, it is still very plain that for the purpose of immediate and organized resistance to the next impending attack, we hardly can now count on any of those magnificent troops—2600 in their original number—which fought so hard on the Kitspur. By means of comparison with other numbers, we shall by-and-by see the full import of this ugly deduction from the present strength of the English. The Russians, it is true, and especially the Okhotsk battalions, sustained heavy losses in both officers and men; but it is evident that the enemy, with his great numerical preponderance over the English, could bear deductions from strength much better than they, and that, even though losing very many more men, he might still be a gainer in relative power.

¹ The Coldstream, the 41st, the 46th, the 49th, and the 95th had not, any of them, *one single man* 'missing.' In other regiments contributing to the English force on the Kitspur, the 'missing' were: Grenadiers, 2; Fusileer Guards, 4; 20th, 6; 68th, 8; Rifle battalion, 6. No man could have been taken prisoner without coming into the list of the 'missing;' but men might well be, and undoubtedly were, in the list of the 'missing' without having been taken prisoners.

² 2646.

³ The casualties which occurred in the several regiments contributing to the force on the Kitspur were 1275, but that return includes the casualties in the three wings which fought elsewhere, with also those losses which were sustained by the combatants of the Kitspur in other parts of the field; and, upon the whole, I conceive that the estimate of 1000 can not be far from the truth. It must not be supposed, however, that all the wounded were disabled.

XVII.

But meanwhile, our centre—and there the ground was of vital worth—had been undergoing incessant attacks. At the very moment when this Second Period began, and thenceforth, again and again, the enemy moved up in strength to assault our lines on Home Ridge, and was every time met before gaining the crest by some little band of our infantry thrown forward to dispute his advance.

The centre.

To encounter the enemy thus in advance of Home Ridge was, indeed, to forego all advantage afforded by the natural strength of the ground, and to neutralize the power of our artillery by combating in front of the guns; but Pennefather still clung to his plan of making the Russians fight hard for every foot of ground they might gain; and accordingly he almost always opposed to them when emerging from the Quarry Ravine a body of English infantry. The force so thrown forward, however, was in every instance so small, that its task, as defined by Circumstance, if not by actual directions, was scarce other than that of a strong picket. The mere hundred or two of combatants so employed for the moment on ground far beyond the Home Ridge could not plainly stand bound to do more than trouble the enemy in his advance, and take care that the process of driving them in should cost him something in men, and something also in time. If we see their resistance protracted beyond those natural limits, we must ascribe its excess to the valiant stubbornness of our soldiery, and not to a preconceived notion of defending any ground near the Barrier as a part of the English position.

Pennefather's method of defending it.

The first body of troops thus employed against Dannenberg's fresh battalions was that wing of the 30th which we saw under Colonel Mauleverer, defeating and driving before them the two Borodino columns. Indeed the men were still panting with the efforts attending their victory and the consequent pursuit, when they had to form up anew and meet the fresh Iäkoutsch battalions already descending Shell Hill. These Thirtieths had come into action with a strength of only 200, and now, as may well be supposed, their numbers were grievously lessened, but there remained to them valor and zeal. In the strife which ensued the officers gave themselves to their work with absolute devotion, whilst the men on their part stood carefully shoulder to shoulder, always eager to obey every word they could

Mauleverer's wing of the 30th Regiment.

Its protracted resistance to the enemy's advancing columns.

catch from the lips of their chiefs; and even when the communication of orders was baffled by the mist and smoke, by the roar and tumult of the fight, there did not then follow any collapse of the fighting power, for what happened in such case was that 'every man worked for himself, and did 'the best he could.' The fire of these few resolute English in line was more deadly than any that the enemy could deliver from the heads of his bleeding columns; but the Russians burned abundance of cartridges, and our people could not help wondering how it was that they were more or less able to live and to thrive under a pattering hail of lead ever thudding into the earth, and cutting the oak twigs all round them.

The fight was characterized by a recurrence of effects curiously uniform. In every one of the many charges they made, these men of the Thirtieth were for the moment victorious, always driving before them the front ranks of their antagonists, and, of course, more or less gaining ground; but the moment they ceased to be the assailants they lost their ascendancy, finding always that when they stopped, and lapsed into an attitude of sheer defense, they could no longer bear up against the weight of the hostile throng; and substantially, it came to this, that they must be always either gaining or losing ground, either charging or falling back. Now, the same men of course can not always be charging; so our people, having no supports with which to hold fast an advantage once gained, and the Russians, on their part, not proving irresolute, there resulted, for some time, that swaying to and fro which is the characteristic of hard and close infantry fighting in modern battles. In such a conflict, if long continued, weight of numbers could not but tell, and after a while the alternations of the swaying movement began to disclose on the whole a slow progress southward; for in general, after charging and defeating the foremost of its antagonists, the little band of the Thirtieth was sooner or later forced back by the other encompassing soldiery amongst whom it had penetrated, and these recoils, taken together, extended over more ground than all the intervening attacks.

In this way, at length, after a foot to foot resistance long maintained against heavy columns by only a few score of soldiery, the men of Mauleverer's force were pressed back and back till they found themselves at last behind the crestwork on the top of Home Ridge, and aligning with other fractions of their regiment under Major Patullo. By that time their bodily fatigue had become so great that the belt

The 30th men
at length
pressed back
to the crest-
work.

The moments
of rest they
there found.

of ground where they lay was to them a very haven of rest, and they thought with gratitude of Colonel Percy Herbert, to whose zeal and forethought the crestwork mainly owed its creation. These brave men, if absolved for a moment from the toil of close fighting, were still in a hot part of the battle-field, under constant artillery-fire, and liable, as the event soon proved, to be attacked by infantry; but Nature can be divinely imperious when she ordains perfect rest for the weary. There were many who slept.

The mass which had been thus obstinately resisted by Mauleverer's people was pursuing its dearly earned advantage, and making its way up the slopes of Home Ridge, when Pennefather launched against it the left wing of Horsford's Rifle battalion—a fresh and united body with a strength of some 140 men.¹ The wing formed already in line advanced through our guns, and was presently confronted by the enemy at short distance. During a minute or two, both column and line stood face to face firing their hottest; but then the column began to fall back, and was closely pursued by the Rifles. The Russians, if not dispersed, were still so far broken up that the spectacle they presented was that of a force retreating in numbers of large, heavy clumps. Whether most of their people then falling were men really stricken, or whether there were some who 'downcharged' in avoidance of the balls that pursued them, they at all events dropped in large numbers under the fire of the Rifles; and the column, now driven back into the Quarry Ravine, left the ground in its wake thickly strewn with the prostrated soldiery of Russia. Numbers of them were in a state of great terror, imagining that they would be put to death by the victors. To officers of the Rifles (as, for instance, to Bramston, whose description is the one now before me), they addressed themselves on bended knees, with hands clasped in prayer; and 'extraordinary,' says Bramston, was the sudden change of every suppliant's countenance when he all at once learned from kind gestures that there was no danger of his being dispatched.

The troops composing this wing of the Rifles became parted in the course of the pursuit, the right flank company (or a part of it) bending off toward its right front, whilst the rest of the wing inclined away to its left; but when the Russian columns once more emerged from the Quarry Ravine,

¹ *I. e.*, half the battalion, which had a strength of 278. Colonel Horsford himself, as we saw, acted with the right wing of his battalion.

Continued advance of the Iakoutsk column:

till attacked and defeated by a wing of Horsford's Rifle battalion.

they were met by another small body of English soldiery, that is, by Hume's wing of the 95th, a force numbering 200 men, which (pursuant to orders delivered by Pennefather in person) was marching in line toward the Barrier.¹ The two hostile forces were yet advancing each against each, when Hume, a splendid officer—we saw how he fought on the Alma—was wounded and disabled; and it seems that thenceforth the wing acted rather through the separate energies of its component parts than in its capacity as an aggregate unit.² But whatever their method of action, these men of the 95th proved able, it seems, to withstand all the forces directly confronting them; and if some of the enemy's troops made good their way up to the topmost slope of Home Ridge, they did not do this by overcoming Hume's wing of the 'Derbies,' but rather by turning its flank.

There came one Russian column moving up on the enemy's right which approached the crest of Home Ridge without being there met by infantry, but then all at once it was torn by the merciless case-shot delivered from the left part of Turner's battery, and driven back down the hill-side.

We left the weary men of the 30th reposing after their fights, and blessing the name of Percy Herbert for the welcome moments of rest which they owed to his little field-work. They had lain for some time undisturbed, and now, when a body of soldiery was seen ascending the slope in their front, they still did not rise; for in the absence of all firing and shouting, their officers took it for granted that the approaching troops must be English, and accordingly suffered them to come unmolested even up to within a few yards; but then suddenly—
 'Up, 30th, up!'—the new-comers proved to be Russians. The men of the 30th sprang to their feet, bounded over the crestwork, and were presently driving the enemy in a dispersed state down the slopes of the ridge.³

¹ Hume's wing comprised the half of a battalion which had come into action with a strength of 443.

² When Hume had been wounded and taken from the field, there was no longer, I believe, any mounted officer with the wing; and it is obvious that under dense mist and in brush-wood it would be difficult for any officer on foot to exert a perfectly effective command over troops extended in line.

³ It is evident that this Russian column had made good its way to the crest by turning the flank of any interposed forces, for otherwise, of course, it could not have come up so quickly.

Few indeed were our people thus combating in front of their centre at any one time; but the scantiness of their numbers was more or less compensated by two circumstances—the density of the mist charged with smoke; and the often recurring presence of General Pennefather in this troubled part of the field.

The favorite ride of the General, when he left his place on Home Ridge, was into the thick of the tumult inviting him on the line of the Post-road. During these expeditions of his, he never had near him in advance of Home Ridge so much as a single battalion with which to encounter great masses; but, always undaunted, always kindling with warlike animation, he was a very power in himself. To the eye, any horseman approaching the Barrier in the then state of the atmosphere was a blank, unrecognized phantom, and not even that radiant, exulting countenance—an ideal almost for the lineaments of a soldier truly loving the fight—could now shine out through the dimness; but for men who had ears to hear there was comfort and even a smile when the shadowy form of the rider brought with it the sound of a familiar voice, and the ‘grand ‘old boy’s’ favorite oaths roaring cheerily down through the smoke. Irrespectively of the value attaching to any orders he gave, the mere energy he exerted in battle was of such a kind as to mask his numerical weakness, and trouble the heart of a column groping up through the dimness in ignorance of what lay before it. He had partly apprehended that truth which the enterprises of Burnaby brought still more clearly to light, and had got to perceive that the column, if met at close quarters by even a very small band of resolute men, may prove, after all, to be only a fragile and sensitive piece of mechanism which—especially under dense mist—can be trifled with and tormented, and grievously checked, if not indeed finally baffled. In the tumult he was all joy or all anger; but whether in joy, or whether in anger, his bearing disclosed sense of power. Nay, despite all the tens of the thousands that were challenging his reign on Mount Inkerman, he had even an air of ownership. With the command of the 2nd Division, he had received, as it were, a dominion co-extensive with the range of its pickets. The camp was his; the ground was his—he knew it every foot—and, because of the hordes of trespassers, he was not the less in his seigniory. When his horse was shot under him, and he had to struggle some moments

before he could extricate himself from its overthrown trunk, the emotion he disclosed was sheer rage, as though the enemy's gunners who had dared to go and kill his first charger were guilty of some lawless outrage for which they must speedily suffer, and in the mean time be damned. As from the first he had accepted, so now he still held, the theory which indeed had been conceded to him by Lord Raglan as well as by Canrobert, and understood that, the ground being his, he therefore had charge of the battle. With magnanimous imprudence he had allowed the troops to fly off on an enterprise which was of no moment at all as compared with the vital object of defending Home Ridge, and now it was for him—for him with what men he had left, but still for him, before all—to clear his domain of invaders. The hot, merry, riotous blood that flowed in his veins may have been the true motive power, and perhaps he was really obeying the impulses of a temperament which the 'Sacred Isle' gave him, whilst he fancied himself guided by policy; but it is strictly true that at any particular moment when, from the poverty of his resources in men or cartridges, he was almost unable to strike, he liked to have the interval filled if only by the shouts of a few men. The English soldiery—more austere than the General—did not always indulge him in what some called his 'Donnybrook' tactics; but—considering always the mist, and, besides, the brilliant result—it would be rash to say that he erred. On the ground between Home Ridge and the Barrier, our people now and then for the moment might be almost entirely wanting in the means of immediate physical resistance; but still no enemy's column could drive its way far up the road without encountering that reserve of Spiritual force—the Soul, as it were, of the storm—which hovered round every spot where 'old Pennefather' chanced to be riding.

It was thus that against mighty numbers a resolute man held the ground taken specially under his charge; and, whatever may be said of the tactical method he followed, his purpose was so well fulfilled that, as in the earlier hour of the battle, so also now during this its Second Period, the Russians attacking our centre were repulsed in every effort they made; and the Barrier, though oftentimes turned, still remained in the hands of our people.

It must be understood, however, that the small bands of English soldiery which thus fended off the successive attacks on our centre had no pretensions to do or attempt more. They could neither dislodge the enemy

The 'Gap' left open:

from his lair in the Quarry Ravine, nor molest nor even detect him if he should choose to move up thence by his left to the northern slopes of Mount Head. In other words, though they were able, with their hundred or two of men at a time, to fend him off from Home Ridge, they still did not and could not perform a second miracle by closing the Gap.

It was apparently with the judicious purpose of closing or watching this chasm that H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge dispatched Colonel Upton with two detached companies of the Guards.¹ Upton, moving in the direction which he understood to be the one indicated by his Royal Highness's gesture, soon found himself confronted by what was appar-
and not closed
by Colonel Up-
ton's manœu-
vre. ently the whole Iäkoutsik regiment, for he saw two huge columns moving up from the Quarry

Ravine with a strength which he estimated at about 1500 each. Upton, extending his men, sought to combine the object of checking the enemy with that of taking ground to his left (where a body of English troops could be seen); and although, after losing some men and having his horse shot under him, he was so far coerced by troops outflanking and working round him as to be obliged to fall back to Hill Bend and take shelter under the field-work, there is reason for believing that the presence of his little force deflected the course of the advancing masses by making them incline toward their right, and prevented them from then seizing the advantage presented by the open Gap.

This manœuvre of Upton's, however, was only a brief one, not preceded or followed by any other like efforts; and (having before seen the failure of every attempt to get troops for the Gap from either the French or Sir George Cathcart) we now know completely the circumstances under which it became possible for an Iäkoutsik battalion to move up unimpeded from the Quarry Ravine and plant itself in the rear of both Cathcart and the Duke of Cambridge. The handful

of English maintaining their unequal conflict in front of Home Ridge could do nothing to check such a movement; but, on the other hand, the very stubbornness with which they fought be-
Illusion cre-
ated by the
stubbornness
of the fight at
the Barrier.

¹ When met by the Duke of Cambridge, Colonel Upton (now Lord Templeton) was riding forward to take the command of his battalion, the Coldstream. He had commanded the Guards pickets (posted on the 4th of November) which watched toward the plain of Balaclava, and on the morning of the 5th he was of course detained on that front till it became evident that Prince Gortchakoff's menaces were not serious. The two detached companies of the Guards had been just relieved from picket duty, and were advancing to join their comrades when the Duke gave the above order to Upton,

came a source of misapprehension, and therefore of danger, for their lengthened resistance made it seem that they must be in strength near the Barrier, and could answer against any flank movement proceeding across their right front. Men imagined a line of battle where in truth there was only an outpost.

XVIII.

In the next of his efforts, the enemy varied somewhat his line of attack, driving rather, this time, at the right than at the centre of Home Ridge. From his lair in the Quarry Ravine he heaved forward again two or more of his unwearied Iäkoutsik battalions; but, avoiding the line of the Post-road, and inclining a little to his left, he this time kept clear of those obstinate, out-fighting soldiery who had hitherto baffled his enterprises. When he neared the part of Home Ridge which he chose as his goal, he was found to be moving upon a concave front, the central mass of his force being covered at each flank by a protruded claw.¹

But the strain that had been pressing so long upon Pennefather's slender resources was now in some measure lightened by the accession of Brigadier-General Goldie, with a wing of the 20th Regiment counting 180 men, under Colonel Horn, and the approach of the 57th, nearly 200 strong, under Captain Edward Stanley.²

Lord Raglan ordered an aid-de-camp, Captain Somerset Calthorpe, to bring forward the wing of the 20th, and take it at once up to Pennefather. This was speedily done. After moving up the Home Ridge by ground on the right of the Post-road, Colonel Horn,³ with his men of the 20th, there came under fire, and he at once deployed into line, then began to advance

¹ It would be rash to speak confidently of the numbers which the enemy engaged in this attack; but considering that he acted, as usual, in heavy columns, and that he could afford to throw out a massive claw on each flank, there seems to be almost a necessity for believing that the whole force must have numbered fully 2000. The Iäkoutsik battalions had no doubt suffered by this time heavy losses, but it will be remembered that they went into action with a strength of 3223. Toward the close of this Second Period, however, one of the four Iäkoutsik battalions was engaged, as we have seen, in another part of the field.

² Colonel Powell, who commanded the regiment, being on duty with a part of it in the trenches. The exact strength under Stanley was 196.

³ Now General Sir Frederic Horn.

down the slope. The state of the atmosphere had by this time in some measure changed, and was clear enough to disclose a massive body of Russians pressing up through the brush-wood at a distance of about a hundred yards. The men of the 20th delivered their fire, and thus manifesting their presence to the enemy's gunners on Shell Hill, drew upon themselves a storm of artillery missiles. Whilst still a good way off from the column, they understood that they were ordered to charge. They briskly worked their way forward under a powerful fire of both artillery and small-arms, which was continually lessening their scanty numbers; but the obstacles interposed by rugged ground and thick brush-wood soon distorted their line, and, by making rapid movement impossible, precluded them from executing as yet what an Englishman means by a 'charge.' Thus circumstanced, they advanced firing. Before long, the exigencies of their hastened progress over obstructed ground had brought them into what one may call close skirmishing order. Their colors drew toward them some stragglers from other regiments, whom they welcomed into their fellowship. Presently they found that the enemy, whilst directly confronting them with his masses, was also overlapping their line on each of its flanks; and there was obvious room for question as to what in such case they should do; but in the absence of any directions proceeding from higher authority, it was judged that their right course must still be to 'force the enemy back down the hill,' and therefore fight on to the utmost against the troops straight in their front. There ensued a combat, maintained for some time by an industrious use of the firelock, and Colonel Horn's people at length had so nearly exhausted their cartridges as to be driven to the expedient of taking ammunition from the pouches of the dead.

But a change of temper came on; and at the thought of the bayonet these men of the 20th seemed all to have but one will. Despite the hostile masses on their flanks, they were glowing with that sense of power which is scarce other than power itself. To men of their corps and none other had been committed the charge of a sacred historic tradition; and, if they were to use the enchantment, they must not, they knew, endure that, in their time, its spell should be broken. The air was rent by a sound which—unless they be men of the initiated regiment—people speak of as strange and 'unearthly.' After nearly a century from the day when their cry became famous, and forty years after the time when last it resounded in battle, these men of the 20th once more

had delivered their old 'Minden yell.'¹ Disregarding alike the force on their right and the force on their left, they sprang at the mass in their front and drove it down the hill-side. In pursuit, they inclined to their left, and were presently on the Post-road. Following its course, they passed over the Barrier, and descended some hundreds of yards into the Quarry Ravine, but by that time they were in a dispersed state.

Lieutenant Vaughan chanced to be with the foremost of the pursuing soldiery, and he found himself in command of about a score of men belonging partly to his own regiment—the 20th—but partly also to the Guards and regiments of the 2nd Division. With the aid of a volunteer officer (Lieutenant Johnson of the Indian Irregular Cavalry) he formed up his men across the road, and moved steadily forward, pushing always before him the enemy's disordered troops. He was approaching the part of the Quarry Ravine where it makes a sudden bend in its course, when, on looking toward the crest straight before him, he saw a Russian light battery brought rapidly on to its edge; and presently he and his men were under its plunging fire. In a moment he saw what to do. Choosing out a few of the Guards and other men armed with the rifle,² he bade them disregard altogether the enemy's infantry, sight their pieces for 300 yards, and steadily shoot at the battery. He was so well obeyed by his marksmen—they knelt down and took aim with studious, deliberate care—that the battery, after firing another round, limbered up and made off in great haste.

It was only on the approach of fresh columns that the now scattered fragments of Horn's victorious soldiery, and, with them, Vaughan's little band, began to fall back from the far advanced ground they had reached in the eagerness and heat of pursuit. Colonel Horn's wing of the 20th was never forced back to the crestwork. Sometimes losing, sometimes gaining ground, it remained fighting out in the front.

The Russians thus overthrown drew with them into re-

¹ It was of course by steady practice in the regiment that the art and mystery of the 'Minden yell' had been faithfully preserved. The elder officers of the regiment had generally an idea that the practice might be regarded as 'irregular' at Head-quarters, and they did not openly sanction it, but the young officers did. In England—so opposite in that respect to the Continent—youth is strongly tenacious of custom.

² It should be remembered that not only the 20th, but all the infantry of the 4th Division (except Horsford's battalion of Rifles) was armed almost entirely with the 'smooth-bore,' there being only about 35 rifles in each of the 'red regiments.'

treat the force which had constituted their left claw; but the column which had formed their right continued to hold the ground gained, and was still on the slopes of Home Ridge.

Against this the 57th was destined to act. The regiment coming up under young Captain Stanley, was placed on the left of the ground from which Horn's attack had proceeded, and some way in front of the crestwork, but lying down on the ground to let our gunners fire over it. General Goldie approaching, spoke proudly of Colonel Horn's charge to the men of the 57th, and then launched them against that protruded column which stood in their front. It is supposed that when these 200 men of the 57th were nearing the massive column, Stanley saw, or imagined he saw, in his people some tendency to waver. At all events, he thought fit to utter an inciting apostrophe. Forty-three years had passed since the day when—encompassed on all sides but one by the enemy's hosts—this regiment had heard from its colonel the words—'Fifty-seventh! die hard!' but the remembrance of that dismal, that valiant command had been cherished in the corps with tenacious affection, and young Stanley knew well what chord it was that he touched when he said—'Men, remember Albuera!' then ordered the regiment to charge. He fell mortally wounded, but was obeyed to the letter, for his little regiment charged home. The enemy's column, if breaking under the onset of bayonets, still did not at first turn in flight, and the meeting of the Line and the Column was followed by a good deal of obstinate hand-to-hand fighting; but at length the 57th, now commanded by Captain Inglis, had absolute mastery, and not only defeated the opposing mass, but pursued it down the Quarry Ravine to that same bend in its course which not many minutes before young Vaughan and his people had reached.

Upon the appearance of a fresh and heavy column of Russians the remnant of the 57th was drawn back. Keeping up all the way, whilst retreating, a well-sustained fire, it gained the top of Home Ridge, and lay down behind the crestwork. From time to time Russian troops came up approaching the spot, but not at this period with any thing like a strong

¹ The men of the regiment prided themselves on being called the 'Die-hards.' The cherished remembrance had probably been rendered more vivid than ever, if it is true, as I think I have heard, that one of its captains at Inkerman—Captain Inglis, who succeeded to the command of the regiment, and brought it out of action—was the son of the Colonel Inglis who at Albuera, in 1811, had bade it 'die hard.'

purpose; and without being gravely molested, the 57th here continued to hold its defensive position.

Result of this Russian attack against the right of Home Ridge.

Thus, against the whole weight of the forces attacking the right of Home Ridge, our people made good the defense with less than 400 men.¹

XIX.

Two hours of hard fighting had passed, and the Russians were now at the close of this Second Period without having yet gained any ground in advance of Shell Hill. Far from crushing Pennefather by their huge numerical preponderance, they had failed to drive in his main picket.² After the efforts they had made, and the blood they had spent, this grievously disappointing result might at first sight appear to involve the sure failure of their enterprise.

The result of the conflicts which took place during the Second Period.

But, on the other hand, there was ample room for considerations of an opposite tendency. Except a truant body of Zouaves allured by the roar of the fight, no fresh infantry reinforcements, whether English or French, were so nearly approaching Mount Inkerman as to be in time for the next great conflict. General Dannenberg's artillery, with nearly 100 guns by this time in battery, was rampant from east to west along a whole mile of front; and, though mangled and cruelly lessened in numbers, the battalions with which he had fought during this Second Period were still in an organized state; whilst his infantry supports and reserves, to the number of more than 9000, were altogether untouched. And another whole corps, he well knew, was awaiting the preordained signal. If only he could force his way on over the opposite hillock, and show the head of a column on ground as far south as the Windmill, he would instantly unleash Prince Gortchakoff, and soon find himself joined on the top-lands by more than 20,000 fresh troops.

But above all, General Dannenberg could draw comfort from the weak state to which our people had been reduced at the close of this Second Period. Though not gaining ground, and constantly worsted in combat, he had nevertheless provoked fights which not only wrought bloody havoc

¹ With regard to the Russian strength engaged in this attack, see the grounds (stated *ante*, note, p. 214) for putting it at fully 2000. The English troops engaged were fresh, and therefore their numbers can be given, as we saw, with exactness—viz., wing of 20th, 180; 57th, 196; total, 376.

² 'The Barrier,' it should be constantly remembered, was simply a picket station.

in the too scanty force of the English, but disorganized—at least for the moment—a large proportion of their troops still remaining alive and unwounded.

The decomposition resulting from victory and unbridled pursuit may of course be more easily remediable than that brought about by defeat; but after the dispersion of inter-mixed soldiery over a great breadth of copsewood, their spontaneous re-assembly and their subsequent restoration to order were processes that would necessarily occupy the greater part of an hour; and accordingly, for some time to come, the remains of our troops engaged on the Kitspur were, almost all, destined to rank with what we called the 'spent forces.'

A moment's comparison of numbers will show the full import of this change. Before the Sand-bag Battery had yet lured on the Guards to victory, pursuit, and dispersion, the Allies, after duly providing for the defense of their left, had in hand, or else closely approaching, several organized bodies of English infantry with a strength of 4700,¹ and, besides, two battalions of French infantry comprising 1600 men.² Well; those French battalions, it is true, were still nearly intact; but of 4700 English one half³ had been either destroyed, or otherwise, for the moment, annulled, from the effects of their fight on the Kitspur: and when, also, allowance is made for the losses which Pennefather had sustained whilst defending Home Ridge, it becomes apparent that at the close of this Second Period a very small number indeed would suffice to represent the whole strength of the organized English infantry when ready to meet the next blow.

Under every aspect this enormous diminution of the immediately effective strength was a change of grave import; but more especially so in its bearing upon the fate of the next hour's conflict; and upon the whole it must be judged that, in spite of the incessant defeats he had been sustaining, the enemy might at last fairly hope to conquer fortune by a resolute use of his power.

It was now half-past eight o'clock.

¹ See *ante*, p. 138.

² 1665.

³ Except the small remnant of the companies of the 49th still acting under Bellairs, none of the 2600 men who fought on the Kitspur were so circumstanced that they could take part, as organized troops, in resistance to the coming attack on Home Ridge. There were about 200 of them who still retained military cohesion—viz., a few of the Rifles under Horsford; the 95th—rather more than 100—under Vials and afterward Sargent; and some—Coldstream men—under Wilson: but all these still remained far away on our right front.

THIRD PERIOD.

8.30 A.M. TO 9.15 A.M.

I.

The battalions thrown forward by Dannenberg when he made all the recent attacks had suffered losses in battle which largely reduced their original number of 10,000;¹ but they continued to be in a well-organized state, nay, were even so little disheartened as to be already judged fit for the effort of another great onslaught; and, the 9000² men in reserve being yet quite untouched, it may be taken for granted that at the opening of this Third Period, the enemy still had on Mount Inkerman coherent bodies of infantry with a strength of about 17,000. He retained all his guns intact, and, as before, had nearly 100 of them in battery.

Besides what we called our 'spent forces,' but including the men set apart to guard their left flank, the English had of troops held together in an organized state some 3300 foot with 36 guns, and to these there had been added rather more than 1600 French infantry. So, besides a little truant body of Zouaves, which was already approaching, the Allies may be regarded as having organized bodies of foot arrayed at this time on Mount Inkerman with a strength of altogether 5000,³ and, including Boussinière's 12 pieces—for these were now close at hand—as many as 48 guns.

General Dannenberg was not destined to receive any further accession of troops; and it proved nearly the same with the Allies. Lord Raglan, one may say, had no more infantry left that he could fitly bring up to swell his strength on Mount Inkerman; whilst General Canrobert, with abundance of troops and a real determination to use them, had still somehow failed to provide for the speedy support of his two battalions already taking part in the action; and upon the whole it resulted that (excepting the truant body of Zouaves) no fresh reinforcements of foot were as yet so nearly approaching that they could be in time for the next conflict.

¹ 10,712.² 9036 without the Sappers.³ See in the Appendix, No. IX. Of the 3300 English infantry, 1000 at the least were still guarding the unassailed left, leaving only 2300 for the impending fight.

II.

Plan of the
Russians.

The Russians now gathered their strength for a concentrated attack on Home Ridge.

Whatever their earlier movements, the great bulk of the troops undertaking this onslaught came emerging at last from the Quarry Ravine. Percy Herbert, indeed, saw great columns which started at first from Shell Hill, and began to pour down its side in a state of excitement and hurry ill suited to the then long distance between them and their foes;¹ but it is believed that these masses soon bent away toward their left in avoidance of the Saddle-top Reach, and afterward made their way up by ground where their march could be but little observed till it brought them within a few yards of the Barrier.² Movements resting thus largely upon the advantages of the Quarry Ravine were much favored, of course, by the circumstance of its offering two parallel roads for the advance of the columns.³

The central or great trunk column of the assailing force consisted of two heavy masses, one moving in support to the other, and containing each two battalions.⁴ Our people from some cause had hitherto seen very little of Russian colors in action;⁵ but with the four battalions constituting this trunk of infantry, the enemy was now visibly carrying a standard, and one of great size.⁶ It was in charge of the second mass. The

¹ On account of the smoke these movements on Shell Hill were not visible to Pennefather, but the accident of being at the moment on the Fore Ridge enabled Percy Herbert to discern them. The cynical speech he was heard to utter when he saw the Russians beginning their 'double quick' so prematurely was characteristic of the cool sportsman as well as of the cool soldier: 'Nicely blown those poor devils will be!'

² A question as to the routes by which the enemy in this great attack made good his advance to the foot of Home Ridge was long the subject of discussion in the camp of the 2nd Division; but I believe the statement in the text to be accurate, and at all events it is the one supported by the authority of General Pennefather. He 'always thought,' as he once assured me, that the Russians effected their advance almost entirely 'by the line of the Post-road.'

³ The old road in the bed of the ravine, and the new one scientifically carried on terraces along its left bank.

⁴ These, it is believed, were the four battalions of the Iäkoutsik regiment.

⁵ Though forming only the fourth part of a regiment, each Russian battalion had its 'flag,' but our people, I believe, rarely if ever saw these minor standards in action. They were probably small, and 'cased.'

⁶ The standard, I suppose, of the whole *regiment*—i. e., of all the four battalions. The evidently abnormal appearance of the standard made one question whether it might not have been an 'Icon,' that is, a flat 'image'—a picture, or a basso-relievo—of some protecting saint.

other forces advancing against the Home Ridge consisted of single battalion or single company columns with skirmishers covering their advance; and these detached bodies were so placed and so moved that they shielded the great trunk column on both flanks, and ultimately spread out far in front of it a moving thicket of bayonets, which thus practically, if not by design, was destined to act as the 'van-guard' of Dannenberg's present enterprise. When nearing its goal, this van-guard, if so one may call it, will be found several hundreds of paces in advance of the great trunk column, and then showing a front uneven and not without breaks—but co-extensive with the whole length of Home Ridge.

The forces thus advancing against the Allies on Home Ridge, comprised, it is believed, about 6000 men.¹

Strength and disposition of allied forces available for resistance to this attack.

Of coherent infantry forces so disposed on the ground, or so closely approaching it as to be able to take part in resistance to this coming attack, the Allies had some 2000 English, and (besides the truant body of Zouaves) a battalion of 900 French.²

Of the two thousand English, some 600—broken up into several small bodies—were ranging out far and wide to harass the enemy's advance, in conformity with Pennefather's favorite system; whilst another portion of the two thousand, having also a strength of about 600, and commanded by Colonel Ainslie and Colonel Swyney, stood drawn up in line between the Home Ridge and the Wellway; but the 800 English troops which remained after deducting those two bodies of 600 each were either on the Home Ridge itself or else closely approaching it.

¹ The combats undertaken by the Russians during this Third Period were perhaps, on the whole, more creditable to them than any of their other endeavors on this Inkerman day; but, whether from losses of officers or from whatever other cause, they have entirely failed to record what they did in this stage of the battle; and the number above indicated is attained by accepting—with, however, some reduction—the estimate of skilled English observers. Officers on Hill Bend or on the Fore Ridge had a commanding view of the enemy's advance when it neared the Home Ridge, and they describe it as a force which must have comprised some twelve battalions. I may add, however, that the interest of the strife during this Third Period does not turn so much upon comparison of numbers as was the case in those earlier struggles where the greatness of the odds was in reality a main characteristic.

² 2027 English and 908 French, the rest being either at a distance on the right or right front, or left in charge on the opposite flank to guard the Carreenage Ravine and the Mikriakoff Glen. See Appendix, No. IX., where the components of the forces thus divided are given in detail.

In the judgment of Pennefather, as we saw, the loss of this little hillock would involve the sheer ruin of the Allies; but apparently he still trusted much to his plan of fighting out in the front, or else put his faith in the steadfastness of the '7th Léger,' now closely approaching; for certainly the English troops that he had at this time on the Home Ridge itself were not only few, but all placed so exclusively on the flanks as to be leaving the crest at its centre altogether unguarded by infantry.

Some way to the left of the Post-road there lay the remnant of the 55th, computed to be 100 strong; and yet farther left—after leaving, however, a wide interval—the right wing of the 47th Regiment, with now about 200 men; whilst on the extreme right, at Hill Bend, Colonel Upton, with some 120 of the Guards, and on his left some 170 men under the colors of the 57th, were still lining the parts of the crest-work to which they had been forced back by stress of battle.¹ But the weight of the coming attack, if pushed home, must fall plainly on the centre of the crest, and yet there, for the moment, no infantry at all could be seen.

However, the 7th Léger, with its strength of 900, was already approaching the Post-road from the right of Pennefather's camp, whilst the truant body of Zouaves was coming up from the opposite quarter, as were also the four companies of the 77th under Egerton;² and it may be said that the Allies, on the whole, were awaiting their 6000 assailants with a strength of about 3000.

Pennefather—still recognized as the General more especially in charge of the battle—was at the centre of the Ridge, and near its crest; but lower down, on the reverse slope of the Ridge, Lord Raglan sat in his saddle. General Canrobert during the battle was often at the side of Lord Raglan, but not at this exact time.

III.

The enemy did not neglect to smoothen the path for his columns by a raging fire of artillery; and indeed we shall find him persisting in the use of this arm with an indiscriminate zeal, at the risk of mowing down his own soldiery.

¹ Under the colors of the 57th there was the 57th itself, and on its left some men of the Rifles, including Lieutenant Tryon, the officer of that name whose achievement on a later day won him great distinction.

² He was coming, as we saw, from the duty of guarding the Mikriakoff Glen, having been there relieved by Lord West's wing of the 21st Fusileers. His force was now about 200 strong.

The clearer state of the atmosphere, the unity, simplicity, and wisdom of the enemy's now settled design, and the skill with which he was covering the trunk of his assailant force under a thick outer sheath of close-gathered soldiery—all these new conditions distinguished his present attack from every former enterprise. We shall not see him baffled, this time, by any small obstinate bodies of men resisting his advance from the first and disputing the ground step by step.

Owing rather to chance, or the ideas of the moment, than to any general or foregone design, the small slender threads of English soldiery thrown out in advance of Home Ridge were in such positions at the outset of this attack that the enemy in great strength could move steadily forward between the bramble of combatants which hung on his right, and the one which hung on his left, thus, no doubt, exposing the thick sheath of soldiery with which he covered his flanks to incessant though petty attacks, but encountering only slight obstacles in his direct front. Acting under such conditions, the enemy at some points bore the fire on his flanks with such excellent fortitude as even to seem unconscious of the infliction. At others, the ensheathing columns were roughly handled and closed in upon by our out-fighting troops; and it is curious to observe that these English—even whilst the great onset proceeded—were tearing batches of prisoners from the enemy's flanks, and quietly marching them in; so that Russian assailants and Russian captives were now and then seen to be moving, not only at the same time and in the same direction, but so close to one another as to be actually at some moments intermixed. Except on his flanks, however, the enemy encountered no grave resistance. He was not entangled, this time, in any long, obstinate fight, arresting or even retarding his onward march; and if he did not at once deliver his van-guard from the few score of English soldiery who had stood direct in its path, he at least forced them ceaselessly back without once being brought to a halt.

Thus Pennefather's beloved plan of fending off the strife from Home Ridge by seeking it out in the front was, this time, destined to fail, or rather, to speak with more strictness, it did not fairly come into play; and not having been able to kindle any more of those long and obstinate fights near the Barrier, which had so gloriously signalized his former struggles, he now all at once found himself assaulted on his own denuded heights by great

Circumstances distinguishing this attack.

The enemy's advance not effectually obstructed this time by out-fighting troops.

Pennefather assailed on his own Ridge.

masses brought up with dispatch, and in solid unbroken strength, from the Quarry Ravine to Home Ridge.

IV.

The troops of the enemy's van-guard were not moving upon a front so closely connected and straight as the enemy's van-guard: to be in the order for making an absolutely single attack along their whole line, but at nearly, if not quite the same time, they might burst upon the threatened hill-side in several waves; and the onset now first to be witnessed is the one which broke over the western extremity of the Home Ridge.

It was there, as we saw, that a demi-battery under Lieutenant Boothby, which formed part of Captain Turner's command, had been placed by Colonel Fitzmayer. For want of room on the crest, the leftmost of the three pieces—the one under Sergeant-major Henry—had been placed upon the westward slope of the Ridge, where it not only stood lower down than the rest of the demi-battery, but upon ground encompassed by tall brush-wood, which indeed at the first reached so close to the mouth of the gun that, until the oak-boughs had been, some of them, lopped, it could not be brought into action.

The assailants were advancing in strength against both the front and the right front of Boothby's guns, but it was from another direction that the enemy delivered his home-thrust; for one of his columns, which had made a bend round by its right in order to approach unobserved, now all at once flooded in from the west upon the left flank of this half-battery, and in an instant Henry's gun was surrounded by Russians. From the other part of the half-battery men found time to fire a round of 'case,' but not, it would seem, with any great result, for the weight of the attack was in the flank. I can not undertake so broad a negative as to assert that no English infantry were witnesses of this attack, but it is certain that none came up in time to avert the capture. An order was given to limber up, but the drivers, it then appeared, had already retreated with all the limbers and teams; and Russian troops then breaking in upon the two upper guns, the officers and artillery-men present with that part of the demi-battery fell back several paces, or rather moved up by their right to a higher part of the Ridge.

When the foremost of the enemy's troops had so closely surrounded Henry's gun as to be already but a few paces

off, they charged in with loud shouts, undertaking to bayonet the gunners; but by Henry himself, and one at least of his people, they were encountered with desperate valor. Henry called upon his men to defend the gun. He and a valiant gunner named James Taylor drew their swords and stood firm. The throng of the Russians came closing in, very many of them for some reason bare-headed, and numbers of them, in the words of a victim, 'howling like mad dogs.' Henry with his left hand wrested a bayonet from one of the Russians and found means to throw the man down, fighting hard all the time with his sword-arm against some of his other assailants. Soon both Henry and Taylor were closed in upon from all sides and bayoneted again and again, Taylor then receiving his death-wounds. Henry received in his chest the up-thrust of a bayonet, delivered with such power as to lift him almost from the ground, and at the same time he was stabbed in the back and stabbed in the arms. Then, from loss of blood, he became unconscious, but the raging soldiery, inflamed by Religion, did not cease from stabbing his heretic body.¹ He received twelve wounds, yet survived. For the most part the gunners drew off in time to save their lives, but those who lingered were bayoneted. The Russians, now undisturbed masters of the demi-battery, were presently doing their best—though only with pieces of wood—to spike the three captured guns; but they disclosed no larger ambition, and did not undertake the real conquest that might seem to await them, if they should move on by their left along the crest, to attack in the flank an inviting line of artillery scarce supported by 300 foot.

Capture of the
demi-battery.
Limited effect
of the capture.

Recapture of
the three Eng-
lish guns by
a truant body
of Zouaves:

The enemy had been in possession of the demi-battery about three minutes when there all at once appeared on the left rear of the Home Ridge a truant little body of Zouaves.² These brave, lawless men had stolen away from their camp—or even perhaps from their duty in the trenches—that they might take part in the fight they heard raging on Mount Inkerman; and there is reason to believe or surmise that in the earlier stage of their onset they were led by Sir George Brown in person.³ They had come into a part of the field

¹ See *post*, Prince Mentschikoff's dispatch, p. 313.

² I can not give the strength of these Zouaves, but they were probably the same whom we shall presently see at the side of Pennefather, and the number of *that* body was computed by him at about 60.

³ Sir George Brown was a rigid disciplinarian, and would have been horri-

where they saw the captured demi-battery directly in their front, whilst on their right lay the 600 men of the 4th Division, drawn up under Colonel Swyney and Colonel Ainslie.¹ This last force, advancing in line, drove back all the enemy's troops in its direct front, whilst the brave Zouaves sprang at the Russians they saw in possession of the demi-battery, thrust them out at the point of the bayonet, passed on between the guns in pursuit, again defeated the enemy when they found him striving to rally, and thus finally made good their recapture of the three English guns.²

After giving that collateral aid toward the recapture of the guns, which resulted from the overthrow of the troops in their direct front, these 600 men of the 4th Division continued to advance in pursuit till they incurred fire from the batteries on Shell Hill. Then the men halted and lay down, but the colors remained erect, drawing fire upon those who were near them. In the course of its advance, this body of 600 men had considerably brought round the left shoulder, and whilst now lying halted in line it fronted toward the north-east.

We now move along the crest toward our right till we come to the spot where Colonel Warren of the 55th stands posted with 100 men of his regiment.

The bank of smoke lying between Shell Hill and Home Ridge owed its source almost all at this time to the fire of the contending batteries, and of foot-soldiers waging their war along the flanks of the

fied to learn that, whilst making himself the leader—the *ringleader*, may one not say?—of this brilliant attack, he was abetting a body of soldiery who were 'absent from their post without leave.' In his private dispatch to Head-quarters, 12th November, 1854, after speaking of the English position as 'greatly 'denuded of troops,' he says: 'It was that circumstance which enabled a few 'of the enemy to break through to take temporary possession of three or four 'of our guns, which rendered the arrival of the French infantry so opportune. 'It was in leading them on that I received a musket-ball in the left arm, 'which compelled me to quit the field.' Supposing Sir George's language to have been strictly appropriate, *this* must have been the French advance which he led; but he does not say that the troops were *Zouaves*. I have never seen any one who observed him at the time when he received his wound.

¹ 667 men—viz., 466 of the 63rd, and the right wing of the 21st with strength of 201.

² Since this brilliant exploit involved an outrageous breach of discipline, it was to be expected that French authorities might observe a rigid silence on the subject; and I can not state the numbers of the valiant culprits, nor even mention with certainty the battalion to which they belonged. Time, however, effaces the reasons for silence; and I am not without hope that these pages may elicit a tardy avowal.

assailant force; for in his direct front the enemy was so weakly opposed as to be able to make good his advance without any difficult fighting; and the score or two of English receding before him had long since expended their cartridges. So circumstanced, those few English soldiers were hardly distinguishable in the battle-field at even a few yards' distance; and on the other hand, being sullen and weary and brave, they did not come hastening in with the speed that is commonly used by men who no longer resist. So, upon the whole, this great Russian attack was not only proceeding through its present stage with a quiet and unostentatious dispatch, but even under such conditions that observers looking down from Home Ridge might mistake what were really some portions of the enemy's loosely formed van-guard for English troops in retreat.

Colonel Warren was with his hundred men of the 55th in the western bulge of the crestwork when, from the ground where he stood dismounted by the side of his charger, some gray-coated soldiery were observed coming quietly up from the front. He believed, as did every one with him, that the people he saw were English troops slowly retiring, and went on undistracted with the task of the moment—namely, that of providing for the removal of a gun and a howitzer which had become clogged, and could not be made to work by any of the contrivances tried. For some time, the refractory pieces had been drawing fire upon this part of the crest without being in a state to return it; but Colonel Warren at length had caused them to be limbered up, and they had even been moved a few paces, when there fell on the ear an undefined foreign sound as of multitudinous life, and then all at once on the top of the Ridge there rose up before the eyes of our men a strong Russian column which instantly came closing in upon the front of the 55th line, and at the same time flooding on past its right flank. At some spots, the enemy when first recognized was within five yards; at others even nearer, and indeed quite close. Taken thus by surprise, the hundred men of the 55th were some of them enveloped and made prisoners, and the rest driven back several paces, leaving all that part of the crestwork which had been in their charge to be held or overswept by the enemy. The Russians then found all at once that they were under fire from their own batteries, and this discovery so embarrassed some of the troops, that they hastily marched off their prisoners without taking from them their arms.¹

¹ Those prisoners afterward attacked their guards, and such of them as were not struck down in the fray recovered their liberty.

Colonel Warren, they say, would not stir one foot in retreat till he saw his people re-forming, and remained standing angry on the crest whilst the Russians flowed past him without staying to take his life.

On the crest some way more toward our right, but still not so far east as the Post-road, Captain Turner was present with that half part of his battery which had been left under his personal control. Before him, and on his right front, a part of the enemy's van-guard was already ascending the slope. Turner, seeing that he was altogether unsupported by infantry, well knew he must presently move; but meanwhile he plied the assailants with 'case,' and it was only at a very late moment that the gun commanded by Hesketh delivered its last shot. All three of the guns were limbered up and withdrawn in time to save them from capture.

Before many moments, loose bodies of troops forming part of the enemy's van-guard began to appear on the crest, and soon indeed they broke over it, not only at the part just then vacated by the right half of Turner's battery, but also by the line of the Post-road, and over ground yet farther east. The assailants having come on thus far could look all the way down the hill-side and beyond over Pennefather's camp without seeing so much as one body of English infantry formed up to oppose their advance;¹ but a French battalion was approaching—the battalion of the 7th Léger. This force halted in front of the camp, and formed line with its left on the Post-road. Met thus by a body confronting them with a strength of 900 men, the Russians at some moments stopped, at others moved doubtfully forward. They had the bearing of soldiery who knew that they were strongly supported, and were not in such a state of hot zeal as to disregard the advantage.

The battalion of the 7th Léger began to advance up the slope, but all at once came to a halt. Plainly something was wrong. An English staff-officer rode galloping down to the battalion and stopped when he reached its left flank. From this part of the battalion there presently arose a low murmur, which swelled and ran on along its ranks. The murmur, perhaps, meant no more than a protest against fighting in line; but in another

¹ Nor, indeed, could they see the approach of Egerton then coming up from the west with some 200 men.

moment the battalion was visibly faltering. Then the English staff-officer was heard undertaking an actual harangue in plain French, and vehemently asking all Frenchmen within reach of his voice whether they were indeed of that nation which had so nobly contended with ours in the Peninsula. The men listened, nay, listened with favor. The battalion took heart, and once more began to move forward. Soon, however, the English staff-officer was struck by a shot which not only put an end to his efforts, but forced him to quit its retreat. the field, and again the battalion stopped. Then it broke, began to fall back, and retreated down the hill-side.

At this moment there came up by fours, under Egerton, that victorious wing of the 77th which had been withdrawn, as we saw, from the left. The wing marched in such a direction as to be almost running its head against the flank of the retreating French, and one of Egerton's captains, in the heat of the indignation he felt, did not scruple to lay his hand on the collar of a French officer whom he caught in the act of retiring. The arrested officer explained his retrograde movement by pointing up toward the crest, and saying, 'But, sir, there are the Russians!' The indignation of our people did not all at once stay the retreat of the French battalion, and for the moment it fell back into Penefather's camp.

Thus the enemy almost unresisted, and with only the help of his van-guard, was grasping that very Home Ridge which the Allies, as some thought, could scarce lose without forfeiting their hold on the Chersonese, nay, even on the Crimea itself. Great issues had been seemingly trusted to the steadfastness of a young French battalion, and when the prop broke there was little at hand to replace it.

Excepting Egerton's little column of some 200 men just brought round, as we saw, from the left, no succor was near. The air at this time had so cleared that a man looking south from the crest of Home Ridge could see on as far as the Windmill—a distance of nearly a mile—and yet he might search to the utmost the whole of the interposed space without being able to see even one fresh battalion approaching.

When Lord Raglan saw the French falling back, he for once, they say, suffered his countenance to disclose the vexation he felt, and even uttered an

Peril resulting from the defeat of the French battalion.

Anger of Lord Raglan.

¹ 'Mais, monsieur, voilà les Russes!'

exclamation of 'astonishment and annoyance.'¹ Then he sent off an aid-de-camp—not in the direction of the retreating French battalion but—to the spot where the remnant of the 55th was re-forming its line.²

The enemy, not seeing apparently that his soldiery had crowned the Home Ridge, still kept up, all this while, against the English position his accustomed artillery-fire, so that Russian assailants at one spot, and our Head-quarter Staff at another, were 'molested,' as Lord Raglan would say, by the round-shot and shell which came flying low over the crest.³ The officer conversing with Lord Raglan—the one on his right with the long, silver hair—was the Commander of the English Artillery, a veteran whose ennobling experience—he fought at Leipsic and Waterloo—had linked him with England's great days. While still conversing with Lord Raglan, General Strangways was mortally wounded by a round-shot or shell, which tore off his leg; and the brave old man tranquilly asked that some one would help him to dismount, but did not fall from his saddle.⁴ A live shell at nearly this moment passed into the trunk of Colonel Somerset's charger, and there at once burst, doing no grave harm to the rider, yet scattering abroad the torn vitals of the horse, and splashing the by-standers with blood. Colonel Gordon's horse, too, was killed under him. Other horses were overthrown by the fall of those killed, and for a moment it seemed that the enemy

¹ 'Letters from Head-quarters by a Staff-Officer.' Colonel Calthorpe, the author of the work, was present, it seems, at the moment, and witnessed both the retreat of the French battalion, and the effect which the sight produced upon Lord Raglan.

² At least so I infer. The 'staff-officer' who saw Lord Raglan dispatch the aid-de-camp conceived certainly that the message was sent to Pennefather; but Pennefather, I believe, had no recollection of either receiving a message from Lord Raglan at *this* particular time—the message mentioned by the 'staff-officer' was later—or of sending an order to Colonel Warren; and, on the other hand, when we look to the men of the 55th we find them remembering and recording the arrival of an aid-de-camp, though they do not undertake to say whence he came. Upon the whole, therefore, the inference I have drawn seems fairly warranted.

³ Our people, I believe, consider that for the purpose of the fire he maintained against the Home Ridge, the enemy's charges of powder were well adjusted. Missiles which had cleared the crest were often so obedient to the design of the gunner that they skimmed down over the reverse slope at only a little distance above the ground.

⁴ The task of helping him to dismount was rendered to him with affectionate care by Colonel, now General Sir John Adye, R. A., K. C. B. General Strangways died before the close of the battle. He desired—and was, of course, obeyed—that his last resting-place might be amongst the gunners.

must have wrought a great havoc in the Head-quarter Staff; but none of them in reality, except General Strangways, were either killed or much hurt; and after the few moments spent in extricating fallen riders from their overthrown chargers, this little cluster of horsemen remained undisturbed.

If any man, appalled by the void which now yawned in the very centre of the Allied defenses, were inclining to harbor despair, he might turn to the Head-quarter Staff and there come under the spell that is wrought in moments of trial by a commander who seems free from care. After seeing the Russians break over the crest, Lord Raglan had to witness their gathering on the reverse slope of the Ridge, and this at a time when he had not in hand one battalion with which to beat back the assault. Was his calm a sheer quality or mood of the soul scarce dependent on outward circumstance? Or was it perhaps a mask concealing—for the good of his people—all outward signs of care? From the spot where he sat in his saddle on the reverse slope of the Ridge he could see the small remnant of the 55th, but this body was scarce 100 strong, and moreover had just been surprised and driven back from the crest. In so scant a number of discomfited men, did he still see a power of resilience that might work the needed miracle?

When the Russians surprised and drove back that small remnant of the 55th, they lingered as though well content with the ground they already had won, and the hundred discomfited English, not being pursued, were able to begin their rally at a distance of only a few yards from the crestwork. Without counting their angry colonel, whom we saw standing fast, though alone, at the moment when his people retired, they had with them four or five officers, including Lieutenant-Colonel Daubeney, Lieutenant Warren (the son of their chief), Lieutenant George Morgan, and Ensign Henry Burke, the Adjutant. The value of the exertions made by these officers, and the quality of the men they commanded, will be inferred from what follows. Whilst still at only pistol-shot distance from the Russian swarm, the rally was so promptly, so completely effected, that within a period of some three or four minutes from the time of its discomfiture, this small band of men stood formed up anew in good order. An aid-de-camp galloped up at that moment with an order to attack.¹ The line first

What the source of Lord Raglan's apparent confidence at this crisis?

The 100 men of the 55th rallied and re-formed.

¹ This order, as I infer (see the last note but two), was from Lord Raglan.

SCALE

12 Inches to a Mile



FIGHT ON MOUNT INKERMANN

Third Period

The Enemy's advanced Forces breaking over the crest of Home Ridge, capturing the half of an English Battery, driving off the rest of its guns, surprising and forcing back a remnant of the 55th Regiment and causing the 9th Lieger to retreat into Pennefather's Camp. The Enemy's great trunk column simultaneously advancing and crossing the Barrier

Their victorious charge: poured its fire into the body of Russians which hung on the crest, then charged, and charged home with the bayonet. There ensued an intermixture of the English with the enemy's soldiery. Our officers, no less than their men, became engaged in personal conflicts, which put them to the use of their pistols, and during some moments the fighting was close; but at length the Russian mass, after loosening out into clusters, began to fall back, and the remnant of the 55th quickly took back possession of its old ground beside the crestwork. The enemy's soldiery covered their retreat by a continuous fire, and moved slowly with the air of troops feeling and knowing that, although repressed for the moment, they were strongly and closely supported.

At the centre of the Ridge there yet stood those troops of the van-guard which had there broken over the crest, for they had not been tempted to descend the hill-side in pursuit of the retreating French battalion, and still clung to the ground they had won. But Egerton, we saw, marching eastward by fours, had come round from our left to the part of the Post-road close in front of Pennefather's camp, and now changing his column of march into a line fronting north toward the enemy, he at once advanced up the ridge-side. Before long, he was supported on his right rear, for the discomfited battalion of the 7th Léger had been rallying in Pennefather's camp with admirable dispatch. The experiment of advancing in line after the manner of the English had been abandoned, and the battalion, when formed up anew, was in double column of companies. In that last state of formation it once more marched up on the right of the Post-road, and, Egerton being on the left front of the French, the two movements together constituted an advance in echelon of nearly 1100 Allies. Under this pressure, and especially, perhaps, at the sight of the French column, the enemy's troops on the crest began to fall back, and soon the whole crest of the Home Ridge was free from its Russian assailants. Whilst still on the reverse slope of the Ridge, the battalion of the 7th Léger, and the little force under Egerton, were both of them brought to a halt.

The readiness with which the enemy's van-guard thus surrendered the crest was owing in part to the overthrow which their comrades on their right had been just before suffering when attacked by the 55th Regiment; but it is evident that

they must have been also discouraged by the sense of having come under fire from their own artillery.

V.

A change, which brought back to the Allies their half-lost advantage of ground, was plainly one of great moment; but it did not result, after all, from any hard trial of strength, and the main fight was yet to come. The Russians who had yielded so easily were only at most the advanced guard of a powerful force, and had scarce, perhaps, seen the vast good they might have done to their cause by holding the crest a while longer, if only during three or four minutes. The trunk of the assailant force, inclosed in its sheathing of lesser columns and skirmishers, had not ceased for an instant to heave its way forward, and it came fraught with power. A central mass, 2000 strong, which came guarded in the way we have seen by ensheathing columns, was even at the first a formidable assemblage of infantry, but much more so now, because Fortune, lending her aid to the tactician's skill, had shielded this huge, compact trunk from all the earlier perils of the advance, and brought it in unimpaired strength home up to the foot of the Ridge. How would this great trunk column be met by troops so disposed near the centre of the Ridge as to be able to take part in the struggle? France and England were there; but in what proportion and strength?

France had on the Ridge her battalion of the 7th Léger, and some 60 fresh soldiers approaching would bring up her numbers here gathered to little short of 1000. The English were less flush of numbers that could take part in the coming encounter. On the right, by Hill Bend, Colonel Upton, with his two companies of the Guards, was confining himself to the task of holding the ground where he lay; and the same may be said of Colonel Farren on the left, with his 200 men of the 47th. In effect, General Pennefather had none of his people so circumstanced that they could be brought to take part in the approaching encounter on the central part of the crest, except the 170 men with the colors of the 57th Regiment, the remnant of the 55th, now counting about 80 or 90, and the wing of the 77th, with its strength of about 200, making altogether a number of only about 450 English. Those, added to the French, would make up the strength of the Allies on this central part of the Ridge to about 1400. The remnant of the 55th lay in its newly recovered berth

behind the left bulge of the crestwork, whilst the 7th *Léger* on the right of the Post-road, and Egerton's wing of the 77th on its left, were still on the reverse slope of the Ridge; but the 170 men under the colors of the 57th had been moved forward diagonally in the direction of their left front to ground in advance of the crest.

With these somewhat disjointed resources at hand, and surrounded by the officers of his Staff, General Pennefather was scrutinizing the advance of the enemy's heavy trunk column from ground near the right of the 57th, when there all at once rushed to his side a young officer of Zouaves, a man of so fiery a spirit, and so kindling with the joy of battle, that he seemed to be invested—so Pennefather said—with a singular radiance. The officer had brought with him some 60 Zouaves, and it is believed that both he and his men were a part, if not the entirety, of that same truant force which we saw in their glory recapturing Boothby's three guns. With an air of enthusiastic devotion, the young officer placed both himself and his men at Pennefather's disposal; and it presently appeared that he brought with him something more than the aid of sixty brave, fight-loving soldiers; for, as though he were armed with authority by virtue of some Zouave prerogative, he audaciously undertook to provide that not merely his own men, but also other French troops, should conform to the English General's pleasure. He accordingly asked Pennefather how he would like to have the forces disposed.

Pennefather gladly caught at the opportunity which thus seemed to offer for fighting once more (as we always saw him yearning to do) in advance of the crest. Looking back in the direction of his right rear, he saw the 7th *Léger* on the reverse slope, and he said he would like that this battalion should move forward to ground on the right of the 57th; that it should there take its stand; that the 60 Zouaves should link it to the English regiment by taking post between the two; and that by these united bodies of French and English the trunk of the enemy's forces should be met before reaching the crest. The heaven-sent captain of Zouaves proved able to fulfill his bold promise. At his impetuous bidding the French battalion advanced, and the array desired by Pennefather was soon completed. On ground some way down in advance of the crest the 900 men of the 7th *Léger* formed the right and the centre of this little order of battle; whilst the 60 Zouaves, and

Accession of a
truant captain
of Zouaves
with 60 men:

His opportune
assistance.

Pennefather's
disposition of
the Anglo-
French force.

the 170 men under the colors of the 57th, constituted its left wing. The array showed a bend at one part, because the 170 English (who were drawn up in line) had brought their left shoulders forward. The 7th *Léger* was still in column, but placed at deploying distance from the 60 *Zouaves* drawn up on its left, and ready to extend into line.

In anticipation of a later moment, it may here be said that upon the near approach of the great trunk column a staff-officer¹ galloped up to the part of the crestwork where lay the remnant of the 55th, then from 80 to 90 strong, and asked why the force did not charge; and that thereupon Colonel Daubeney, springing over the parapet with some 30 of the men, moved rapidly off to his right front in a direction for making the attack, of which we shall by-and-by hear. Still later, but in time to take part in their movement, the last remnant of the 55th, with a strength of from 50 to 60 men, moved forward and aligned on the left of Tryon's few riflemen, thus swelling a little the numbers of what we call the 'left wing.' Colonel Egerton, with his 200 men of the 77th, was not brought to the front at this moment; and, omitting his force, the number of the Allies now immediately about to engage comprised in all rather more than 1200, of whom nearly 1000 were French.

So at this central part of the Ridge, where 2000 Russians were about to be met first or last by nearly 1200 opponents, with 200 more in support, there was not that huge disparity of numbers which had characterized the earlier fights of the morning; but of those 1200 Allies no less than 900 were troops which we saw showing signs of weakness, whilst these, as it chanced, stood so placed as to be directly confronting the advance of the great trunk column, and were therefore apparently destined to bear the brunt of the encounter. It seemed that the fate of the combat, carrying with it the fate of the battle, if not of the Invasion itself, might after all come to depend upon the hitherto uncertain quality of a young French battalion.²

Before witnessing the advance of the great trunk column, we must see what troops stood confronting it at the head of the Quarry Ravine; and in reference to that last subject some few words of elucidation seem necessary.

Those portions of the enemy's van-guard which gained and

¹ Captain Harding, unless I mistake, aid-de-camp to Pennefather.

² That Pennefather himself so thought is shown by the extract from his dispatch given in the Appendix, No. X.

English soldiery interposed between the great trunk column and the enemy's advanced troops.

held for some minutes the crest of Home Ridge were, all of them, troops which had avoided the Barrier by turning one or other of its flanks;¹ and when they pushed on their advance beyond that part of the Post-road, they there left behind them a ribbon of ground which neither they nor any other of their people had as yet overswept. With-

out knowing this, it might be hard to account for the presence of English soldiery, interposed (as we shall presently see them) between the head of the great trunk column and the enemy's more advanced troops.

After the close of his fighting on the Kitspur, Bellairs had worked his way across to the Barrier, and was now lying posted behind it with only, indeed, a small remnant of his three companies; but having near him some officers of other regiments and several little knots of soldiery who brought up the whole number of men to about 150.

Preceded by a thick line of skirmishers, the head of the great trunk column was now seen approaching the Barrier. Bellairs and the other officers were preparing to make a stand at this spot, when a field-officer, whose name is unknown, called out suddenly, 'Retire!' He repeated this order several times, and then rode back at a gallop. Thereupon, as was natural, the men connected the words

Advance of the great trunk column to the Barrier.

Retreat of the few English troops in this part of the field.

of the officer with the example he seemed to be giving them, and at once began to run; but Bellairs said, 'Don't run, men!' and, other officers repeating his words, the greater part of the soldiers were promptly restrained, and thenceforth ceased to move otherwise than at a walk. When ordered, however, by Bellairs to keep up their firing, they could only answer, 'We have no ammunition, sir.' Without means of firing themselves, they yet had to move under ceaseless blasts of musketry which struck down some of their number, and almost made it seem strange their destruction should so long remain incomplete; for, wherever they looked, they saw the twigs and the shivering leaves of the brush-wood cut and tossed by the pelting lead; but on the other hand, they now found themselves sheltered from artillery-fire by the close presence of the pursuing column, and, upon the whole, this change was felt as a relief. Other knots of our soldiery became linked in retreat with the troops near Bellairs, bringing up their full number to nearly, perhaps, 200; and amongst

¹ As explained *ante*, pp. 221, 222, where it is shown that the 'van-guard' was furnished exclusively by what had been the flanking columns.

the accessions on the right—proper right—of our line was that score of men under Vaughan—chiefly men of the ‘20th’ and Guardsmen whom we saw doing venturesome service in an earlier stage of the battle. From time to time, after retreating a little way, Vaughan caused the men with him to turn and show front; and, there being amongst them a few who had some cartridges left, he was able to vex the assailants with occasional shots; but of course no such efforts as these could retard for even an instant the march of the heavy trunk column; and, indeed, at this time our interposed soldiery must have been doing the enemy more good than harm, because they screened him from artillery-fire.

The 200 English retiring from before the great column might well cast their eyes up the slopes of Home Ridge in wistful search after some force brought forward to meet the attack. At first they looked southward in vain; and indeed it does not appear that they at any time saw the ‘left wing’ of the Anglo-French force collected by Pennefather in advance of the crest; but somewhat suddenly, and with great joy, they found that they were retreating upon a strong column of red-capped soldiery drawn up in good order at a distance of no more than about a hundred yards. This force, as we know, was the battalion of the 7th *Léger*.

The interposed distance was lessening every instant; and it soon became fit that without another moment’s delay our people should cease to linger between the French and the Russians; for whilst being themselves almost harmless for want of cartridges, they were screening the enemy from the fire of a strong battalion. Accordingly, the knot of men under Vaughan, with the rest of those forming the right—proper right—of the interposed English troops, fell back into the rear of the French column, and then briskly re-fronting, formed line; but toward the centre and left, our men, though preparing to do the like, had become so weary, so sullen, so callous by this time to danger, that they were provokingly slow in their movements, and they remained interposed between the French and the Russians even down to the time when the head of the enemy’s column was within pistol-shot of the 7th *Léger*. With natural impatience the commander of the French battalion stepped forward, crying out to Bellairs and the English soldiery near him: ‘Come! do retire: we are going to open;’ and his appeal

1 ‘*Mais retirez vous. Nous allons ouvrir.*’ The word ‘*mais*,’ I think, discloses the impatience which I have sought to express by ‘Come!’

Preparation
for the combat
between the
great trunk
column and
the Anglo-
French force
on Home
Ridge.

somewhat quickened the movement of the English to whom he was speaking.

They at length fell back into the rear of the French battalion, and there formed up in support, as Vaughan's men on the right had already done; but their tardiness had already wrought mischief, for by the time that the front had been thus at last cleared, the head of the Russian column was so near that its soldiery, if so they should choose, might charge home, and offer cold steel without first having to suffer under more than one round of fire.

Therefore the task now engaging the troops of this young French battalion was one more than commonly difficult. From out of their column formation they undertook nothing less than to effect a deployment in the face of a powerful enemy now only a few paces distant. The battalion passed bravely through that trying part of the ordeal, and mean-

The combat. while was able to exert a formidable power of destruction, unhampered as yet, apparently, by any approaching mistrust. The file-firing executed by the ranks already in front was excellent, and yet hardly more sure than that of the soldiery in the deploying companies, who steadily delivered their shots one after another as each man ranged into line. The calm prowess of the French during those moments of file-firing is proved by the havoc they wrought. Under the fire which poured down from their extended and still extending front the Russians fell in numbers so great—some dropping together in knots, and even in clumps—that before many moments the shattered face of the column had sunk down into an almost continuous bank of prostrate soldiery. With the bodies of their slaughtered and wounded comrades thus lopped down before it in heaps, the unstricken part of the column disclosed a rare fortitude, and, though staggering, did not yet break; but it is evident that a body thus appallingly maimed and stopped dead in its path of attack could hardly be in a state for resisting an instant charge with the bayonet.

A respite, however, was given. Strange as the interruption may seem, where the two opposed forces were only a few paces asunder, there followed a moment—nay, moments—of suspended action. From some cause or other it happened that, with victory almost in its grasp, the young French battalion was seized with misgiving. One solution represents that its soldiery had trusted to the prospect of being able to reload for another round of fire, and then all at once came to see that, whilst they were still handling

their ramrods, the enemy might be on them with the bayonet. Be that as it may, the battalion lost its moment for charging, then visibly loosened in structure, then ceased to stand fast. From several parts of the line, and more especially from its flank companies, men began here and there to drop out, with a tendency to gather in toward the rear of the centre. It is true that toward the centre and the left of the battalion the soldiery who had begun falling back stopped short in their retrograde course when they found themselves confronted by the English line under Bellairs, which now stood formed up in stiff order across their line of retreat; but the evil, if not beyond remedy, was beginning, remember, in the direct front and in the close presence of a powerful enemy, was involving a body of no less than 900 men—full three-fourths of the whole allied strength here placed in array—and thus threatening to end every hope of defending the Ridge against its present assailants. Once again, therefore, much seemed depending upon the way in which this young French battalion might pass through its next moments of trial.

To understand what now happened, it must be borne in mind that not only Pennefather himself, but even the more cool-blooded staff-officers acting under his orders, had been wrought up by this time to a high pitch of zeal. Elate with the keen, ceaseless work of fight after fight, too incessant to leave room for care, and glowing with the sense of a victorious ascendant long maintained over hosts of assailants, they all more or less had upon them that flush of the soul—that Faith, as the Prophet would call it—which gives power over herds of men. They were entering, however, upon a singular task. Within a few paces of a powerful enemy, they undertook nothing less than to rally a young French battalion which was withstanding the commands and entreaties of its own officers, and to do this by mere force of words shouted out in a foreign tongue.

It was upon the left of Vaissier's battalion that General Pennefather had placed himself at this time with a number of other horsemen near him—with Colonel Wilbraham, with Captain Thackwell, Captain Glazebrook, Captain Harding, Captain McDonald, and several more who belonged for the most part to the staff of the 2nd Division.¹ Facing east for the moment, and from the vantage-height of their saddles, the General and his attendant staff-officers looked flankwise

¹ I shall be glad to have the names of all the other officers present at this time with Pennefather.

along the French ranks; and, when the line faltered, they all at once burst down upon it in a torrent of vehement speech. 'Brothers,' 'Comrades,' 'My brave fellows,' 'Forward!'—these turned into French, and repeated again, and again, and again—were some of the more predominant words which they hurled at the shaken battalion. The phrases they chose might be simple, and spoken, perhaps, more or less in the accents of the barbarous north; but the great trunk column was close, and the hearers of this eager appeal were, after all, men of a race deeply prizing its honor in war. The French soldiery listened, nay, seemed to acknowledge, and acknowledge with favor, the value of a fresh motive power. They took heart. They ceased to fall back, and perhaps, if the whole battalion had been under the same wholesome sway, it might have not only rallied completely, but even passed into the mood for undertaking a bayonet-charge.

But with the right of the battalion, meanwhile, all seemed to be going on ill. There the soldiery were not within hearing-reach of Pennefather or the officers near him; and despite all the vehement efforts of the French officers (who were striking their men right and left with the flat of the sword), numbers not only turned and broke in disorder, but fell back so heavily upon the friendly line of the English as to burst their way through it. This occurred at the part of the line where Vaughan had drawn up the small thread of soldiery under him.

Yet even in this the most disordered part of Vaissier's battalion, there were some who refused to yield. A young French officer hoisted his cap upon the point of his uplifted sword, and ran out several paces to the front. An English officer sprang forward and stood at his side. Another and another darted out to the same advanced spot, and there the four remained steadfast, provoking a great flight of musket-balls without being even once struck.

But all this devotion did not yet turn the hearts of the broken and retreating French troops, and those of the enemy's soldiery who directly confronted this scene of disorder and flight now joyfully saw their occasion. With exultant 'hurras' they sprang forward to clinch the victory which Fortune seemed to be proffering.

But then all at once those same Russians stopped dead.

Why the enemy thus retracted his purpose we shall presently see, but the effect of the change must be first for a moment observed. It gave respite to the discomfited French, and enabled the officers to make, at the least, an endeavor

toward staying the retreat of their men, and bringing them once more to the front. With excellent zeal they seized the opportunity thus happily offered them. The four French and English officers we saw springing out to the front were still on their ground; and now, from the rear of the spot where Vaughan stood, a voice was all at once heard crying out in French: 'Drums to the front!' At this bidding, not only the drummers, but with them also the buglers, ran boldly out to the front, and in another moment they were storming and storming at the conscience of the troubled battalion with their passionate 'Double quick, charge.' Nor altogether in vain. Men could not indeed at the instant recover formation, but they could and they did stay their flight one after another, and front once more to the enemy. The few English soldiery whose line we saw broken by fugitives remained intermixed with their friendly disturbers. Some here, and some there, wherever they most fitly could, they all now aligned with the French, and stood with them shoulder to shoulder.

But what was the sudden constraint which held back the exulting enemy in the midst of his charge, and gave the French time for this rally?

Without firing a shot, Colonel Daubeney, at the head of his thirty men of the 55th, had been all this while approaching the right flank of the great trunk column; and perceiving, when near, that the head of the column was engaged with troops in its front, he resolved to attack its second battalion, the battalion which, at quarter distance, was next in rear to the one standing foremost. That second battalion, as it happened, had been ordered the moment before to deploy to its right, and the evolution was beginning accordingly, when Daubeney sprang at its flank with the thirty men he was leading; and along with his people he not only wedged himself in between the 2nd and 3rd companies of the riven battalion, but tore his way on and on into the centre of the mass. There, at one time, the assailants and the assailed stood so closely locked together that their power to hurt one another was, during some instants, suspended. With one Russian officer thus pinioned, as he was himself, by the weight of the crowd, Colonel Daubeney exchanged a smiling acknowledgment of the duress suffered by each. But at length the men worked their way on. Some were wounded, some slain, and

Colonel Daubeney's singular charge.

¹ 'Avancez, les tambours!'


² The 'pas de charge.'

SCALE
12 Inches to a Mile

Head of the
Quarry Ravine

The Barrier

THE FORE RIDGE



FIGHT ON MOUNT INKERMAN

The Crisis of the Third Period.

- P Pennesfather & his Staff
- Z The 60 Zouaves
- B Bellairs
- V Vaughan
- Y Yelverton
- L 7th Léger

some—one or two—taken prisoners; but the rest of them still held their course, still went on forcing their way betwixt the howling ranks of the enemy; and this singular charge did not end until Daubeney, with the remains of his 'thirty,' had cleft a path through the battalion from flank to flank, and come out at last into open air on the east of the great trunk column. Besides Colonel Daubeney himself (who was not even wounded in the course of this exploit), there came out alive a number of men who had charged with him through the battalion, and amongst them Thomas Layland, Donald M'Intosh, William Smith, Jeremiah Ready, John Stokes, James Ryan, John Prindiville, and William King. Sergeant Ashe became separated in the throng, and did not emerge with the rest on the farther, or eastern, flank of the column, but he too was one of the thirty who took part in Daubeney's charge. If I knew the names of the rest, I would place them in the same honored roll.

Although suffering, perhaps, but small loss in killed and wounded from the steel of its thirty assailants, a body some 600 strong could hardly be thus torn and riven from flank to flank without falling into confusion; and confusion in this second battalion at such a moment imported a yet wider mischief. Its effect upon the Russian battalion engaged all this while in the front may be imagined by all, and by soldiers will be even inferred. No soldiery whilst closely engaged along their whole front could well help being palsied upon hearing the roar of fresh tumult burst out in their rear, and presently coming to learn that the battalion which had there been supporting them at quarter distance was itself now engaged with some new enemy tearing in through its ranks; and accordingly, when Colonel Daubeney emerged on the east of the column, he had not only worsted the body which directly received his attack, but had frozen the rush of the torrent let loose on the broken French soldiery, and was now so coercing the foremost Russian battalion that some, if not all, of its troops already began to fall back.

What was happening thus in the rear of the foremost Russian battalion could neither be seen by the men of the 7th *Léger*, nor by the English staff-officers near them; but perhaps General Pennefather, although not knowing the cause, still was able to discern signs of weakness in the ranks directly confronting him. What we know is that he now seized his moment. To the cries, the commands, the entreaties of the French officers, to the swelling

Its effect upon
the issue of
the combat.

Conclusion of
the combat.

appeal of the clarions, to the trebled roll of the drums, there acceded a joyous 'hurra!' begun by General Pennefather himself, and the horsemen around him, taken up by our troops on his left, taken up by the men near Bellairs, and carried along the thread of the English soldiery to where, on the right under Vaughan, our men stood intermixed with the French. Thackwell's charger was at this moment shot under him, but Pennefather and the rest of the horsemen around him were still in their saddles, and now achieving their purpose. Aided on their left by the simultaneous advance of the troops that we there saw disposed—the 900 men of the 7th *Léger*, and the few English soldiers supporting or combating with them, passed over the interposed bank of prostrate Russians, and victoriously made good their advance in the wake of the great trunk column now slowly retreating before them.

The pursuit was not orderly, and with every step in advance the French and the English became more and more intermingled. Great indeed, during these happy moments, was the exultation of the French soldiery, and they liked, whilst they moved on and on, to be both giving and inviting congratulations. The sixty Zouaves, now broken into several clusters, were more especially eager for these interchanges of sentiment; and over and over again, whilst bounding merrily forward, one or other amongst them would find time and breath to accost some Englishman near him. 'Ah well, come,' they would say, 'we French, you see now, we are good for something after all. 'Are we not?—are we not?' They felt that now at last, if never before, they could honestly speak to our people in this tone of soldierly fellowship.

VI.

When the great trunk column advanced, its flanks, as we saw, were well covered by ample bodies of infantry; but these, although moving abreast of it, were so far sundered from the central line of march by distance, by the obstructions of the copsewood, and finally by the dimness of the atmosphere there heavily laden with smoke, that they did not become involved in the fight we have just been observing. Now, however, they, some of them, approached the right flank of that force under Swyne and Ainslie which still lay extended in line on the ground where last we observed it, and still fronted toward the north-east.

Engagement between the right wing of the enemy's assailing forces and the 600 men of our 4th Division.

This body united comprised, as we know, a wing of the 21st Fusileers, and the main body of the 63rd Regiment, troops numbering altogether more than 600 men. The Fusileers were magnificent troops, men of the finest natural quality and highly trained, whilst the 63rd was a body which owed its main strength to lads newly and hastily recruited in the city of Dublin; and, until it moved down to the port for embarkation, the battalion thus rawly constituted had never executed so much as even one march. But the love of a fight was a passion which might move the young Irish recruit no less than the proud Fusileer, and give singleness of purpose to two dissimilar bodies engaged side by side in the same conflict. Their united array was about to face round to the east in resistance to the body advancing against their right flank; but, a fresh mass of Russians appearing, they presently found themselves challenged along their whole line, and therefore did not change front.

During the earlier moments of the combat now beginning our soldiery were bitterly vexed, for the wetted chambers of their firelocks refused every spark that was offered, but at length, by help of the flame-jets from many and many a cap the muskets were warmed into life and power, and the fire of these 600 men extended in line soon became so destructive that before long the Russian masses showed signs of being in torment. Then, whether by word of command, or under the force of some impulse growing suddenly common to all, the whole of this united body began to move forward in line. The exulting soldiery were obstructed and disjoined from one another by the interposed brush-wood, but they tore their way on in full cry, as though madly chasing the fire which shot out in numberless jets through a dim bank of smoke. The wild joy of the Irish recruits infected the rest of the line, and the superb Fusileers, hardly less than the young 63rd, were seized and carried away by the frenzy of battle. Against this tornado of warlike passion the Russian throngs could not stand, and their joyful assailants—now extended even more than at first—swept on, driving all before them. Still fronting toward the north-east (as they had done when beginning their charge), they held on diagonally across no small part of the battle-field, till their line was at length astride the Post-road, the 63rd on the right of the road, and the wing of the 21st on the left. Even then they did not long halt, but the direction of their continued advance so far changed as to lose all its eastward

Diagonal advance of the 600, bringing them into the central part of the field:

tendency, and they now moved due north along both the sides of the Post-road.

These 600 men in effect had so ordered their course of their engagement with troops there assembled. action that, having first overthrown the whole force which encountered them in their appointed part of the battle-field, they crossed afterward into the 'fighting ground' of other troops, and were now the foremost of the Allied infantry in that central part of the field by which the great trunk column had advanced and retreated. They here found themselves closely confronted by heavy bodies of Russians which had ceased to retreat, and were undertaking, as it seemed, to make an obstinate stand.

The fire of the troops thus striving to hold their ground proved extremely effective at this particular time, and told heavily upon the line of the 600, but more especially upon the officers of the 63rd Regiment. Colonel Swyney, who rode near the colors of his regiment, was struck dead by a musket-ball, and Colonel Dalzell, who succeeded to the command, soon had his horse shot under him. Clutterbuck and Twysden—the two ensigns who carried respectively the Queen's and the regimental color—were both of them struck down, the one being killed on the spot, the other mortally wounded. Three of the captains of the 63rd—Captain Harris, Captain Fairclough, Captain Bamford—and the Adjutant of the regiment, Bennett, were wounded too at this time.

The whole line, however, pressed forward, and the enemy's masses gave way; but this time with evident reluctance, and, even when the columns had yielded, there remained many clusters of indignant soldiery standing out against the shame of retreating, and trying to hold their ground. The enemy attempted to make a stand at the Barrier by defending it from the reverse or north side; but all his efforts proved vain, and the defeated masses, still pursued by the men of the 21st and 63rd, poured down by both of the roads into the jaws of the Quarry Ravine.

The victors broke in pursuit, and their foremost body of troops was one led by Colonel Haines of the 21st, who had acting under him some forty men of his own regiment, with besides a few men of the 63rd.

Colonel Haines pushed on his advance till he reached the part of the Post-road which our people had cut by digging a trench across it. There he came to a halt. Sheltered from the Russian artillery by the steep hill-side on his left, he not only plied with his

Their advance into the opening of the Quarry Ravine.

Limit reached by Colonel Haines.

musketry the bodies of troops standing gathered on the line of the Post-road below, but also (from over the parapet of the causeway) dropped a plunging fire down on battalions in the bed of the Quarry Ravine.

VII.

The separated masses of Russians which constituted the left wing of the assailing force had been marching up nearly abreast of the great trunk column, during the later moments of its advance, without finding themselves resisted by infantry; but from this alluring immunity they drew, on the whole, no advantage, for the absence of any interposed soldiery laid them open to the fire of our ordnance.

For a while, it is true, they were spared. The gun which their foremost column directly confronted was one worked at the moment by a young artillery-man who had failed to depress it sufficiently for striking at troops which, though fast coming up, were still some way below the crest. His firing was so high that the head of the column ascended to within some thirty or forty yards of the gun without as yet suffering harm. But Captain Yelverton chanced to be present with this part of Pennecuik's battery, and the vantage-height of his saddle enabled him to see the exact position of the approaching column. Dismounting from his horse he ran forward to the gun, depressed it with his own hand, permitted himself to deliver one murderous blast of mitrail into the thick of the advancing mass, and then, with such simple command as was given in the words, 'Stick to that!' handed over the writhing column to the mercies of canister-shot, no longer wasted in air, but tearing through flesh and blood. By the time he had regained his saddle, the soldiery of the stricken mass were retreating down the hill-side. As before, when advancing, so now also, whilst falling back, they moved parallel with the great trunk column, which had been receiving its final overthrow at nearly the same moment.

VIII.

Thus the enemy was not only worsted at every point he assailed, but driven back signally and with slaughter, and followed down into the lair from which he had made his spring. Boussinière, we saw, had come up with a splendid and powerful force of horse-artillery, and, to sustain the Allies in their victorious advance, he now, with great spirit and alacrity, pushed forward some of his guns.

However momentous in their effects, the operations we have seen taking place in the course of this Third Period filled no great compass of time; and when they came to a close it was only about a quarter-past nine.

FOURTH PERIOD.

9.15 A.M. TO 10 A.M.

I.

Although signal, complete, and extending along the whole front of attack, the repulse thus sustained by the Russians was not in itself such a blow as must needs rule the fate of the battle. No panic ensued; and indeed the retreating masses were in a more collected, more orderly state than the troops which pursued them. From the failure of this his last onset, it resulted, of course, that the enemy's prospect of a victory was again for the time overcast, and that his grounds for going on with the struggle were more or less weakened; but he quickly began to display his faculty of courageous resistance; and the footing he had gained on Mount Inkerman was unshaken. Still firm on Shell Hill and the Juts, still plying the powerful batteries which had given him his overwhelming ascendant in the artillery arm, and always keeping in hand no less than 9000 foot-soldiery, who had not as yet fired a shot, he was scarce to be swept from a stronghold thus guarded and armed by the few and disordered soldiery now following the retreat of his columns. And the pursuing troops were without support. Lord Raglan had not in hand so much as even one fresh battalion with which he could press the advantage, and the remains of his 2nd Division and of the Guards were now busied in reorganizing their strength.¹ Large French reinforcements, indeed, were approaching under Bosquet in person; but for the purpose of seizing the particular occasion now offered, they had marched forty minutes too late. Nor did the Allies find it practicable to carry forward the weight of the battle by moving their ordnance arm. The French guns that we saw gallop down in advance of Home Ridge were very soon stopped in their course, for the long

¹ More especially in supplying themselves with fresh cartridges. Amongst the 2nd Division men 'word was passed' that they were to go to an indicated spot in rear of the camp where the ammunition awaited them. From this cause it was—at least from this in great part—that men were so frequently seen walking quietly back from the front.

teams which drew them began to lose horse after horse when they came under fire from Shell Hill; and Boussinière's bold, eager attempt to support the pursuit with artillery was thus speedily brought to a close. Before long, the enemy had ceased to retreat, and was turning upon his pursuers. Far from seeing their latest achievement expand at once into a victory, the Allies began to lose ground; and the French battalion then operating on the right front of our centre underwent a disturbing reverse.

II.

We left the French '6th of the Line' on the right bank of the Quarry Ravine. There, during some time, the battalion maintained an extremely advanced position without being involved in combat; but it now was assailed by a strong Russian column, and began to fall back. The brave Colonel de Camas himself, however, was still personally fronting toward the enemy, when a musket-ball entered his chest, and by thus inflicting a wound which was soon to prove fatal, fulfilled that mystic prognosis of Pennefather's which had been able to read 'death in his face.' Presently, the standard-bearer of the battalion was killed, and the eagle, falling with him to the ground, lay in danger of being captured by the enemy; but Lieutenant-Colonel Goze, who had succeeded to the command of the regiment, sprang forward, plucked up the fallen banner, raised it high over head, and appealed to the men of the battalion, exhorting them to stand by their flag. Many gathered around him. Whilst still holding the flag-staff he was wounded in the arm; but, without suffering the color to fall a second time to the ground, he committed it to the charge of Lieutenant Bigotte, and the standard was saved from capture. Colonel de Camas was carried some way with his retreating battalion upon the back of a soldier, but after a while, and, as is said, at his own request, he was laid upon the ground, and suffered to fall alive into the hands of the enemy.¹ The battalion, still falling back, descended to lower ground on the right bank of the Quarry Ravine, and the enemy's victorious column continued to advance, but not in the very wake of the French. It moved southward along the high ground, thus turning instead of pursuing the defeated battalion.

¹ In this instance happily there occurred, it is believed, no ill treatment of the wounded man. He was found dead after the battle with no other wound than the one he had received in the chest whilst bravely confronting the enemy.

By this flanking movement the Russians at once put great stress upon their adversaries. General Bourbaki withdrew the 900 men of the 7th Léger from the fellowship of the English on the west of the Post-road, and placed them near the 6th of the Line, thus providing that the two battalions which he had in the field should now act together, and be ready to afford to each other a mutual support. A French battery brought up at this time to the top of Mount Head gave welcome support to the infantry, and also drove back a column which was undertaking to re-occupy the Sand-bag Battery;¹ but General Bourbaki, it seems, now considered that all hope of avoiding another retreat must depend upon the speedy accession of reinforcements.² An officer of the French staff—bare-headed and extending his naked sword in the air—came galloping back to the Isthmus, came vehemently asking for Bosquet, said his people were turned by the movement made on their flank, and declared that unless they could be supported—nay, supported by two or three regiments—they must be again falling back.³ To give such a message to Bosquet was to declare an instant need for some thousands of fresh troops.⁴ There were no reinforcements so near as to be able to meet this exigency at once, and apparently it now lay in the power of the enemy to thrust back both the 6th of the Line and the 7th Léger, thus ridding the field of all Frenchmen, except the truant body of Zouaves. But happily the Russians did not see the occasion presented to them, or at all events did not seize it.

III.

The state of the atmosphere was such that the victorious advance of the enemy's column on the right of the Quarry Ravine could be seen by troops acting in the more central part of the field; and our people there, when they observed that their flank was thus turned, could hardly help seeing that the positions they held were somewhat too far in advance. Though slowly and sparingly, they nevertheless yielded ground.

¹ The 1st battery of 17th artillery brigade.

² I infer this from what follows, and assume that the staff-officer spoke with due authority from the Brigadier.

³ This was stated by the staff to one of our artillery captains as the purport of the communication he was wanting to make to Bosquet.

⁴ The strength of the French regiments was such that to ask for 'two or 'three' of them would be to ask for from 3000 to 5000 men.

And now too on the opposite flank the enemy threw out a column which turned the left of our troops engaged on the line of the Post-road. Except against that one expedient, the position laid hold of by Haines in the jaws of the Quarry Ravine was one of singular strength; for whilst affording his men perfect shelter from the enemy's batteries it enabled him to fend back the masses confronting him on the line of the Post-road, and at the same time to harass the troops on his right which stood crowding beneath him in the bed of the chasm; but he had perceived from the first that he must withdraw his small band from this advanced spot if the enemy should push forward infantry to turn his left; and, that movement now taking place, he fell back to the main picket wall. There, finding himself the senior officer present—for General Goldie was busied at some little distance—Haines prepared to renew that tenacious defense of the Barrier which others had maintained without ceasing in the First and the Second Periods of the fight.

After examining the features of the adjacent ground, he consolidated the defense of the Barrier itself, and also formed a small outwatch on its left front, by placing an officer and some men of the 68th under the shelter of a broken wall found standing in that part of the field, with orders to observe the enemy's movements on Shell Hill, and harass his artillery-men there by a careful, well-sustained fire.¹

General Goldie, however, though not present for the moment in person at the Barrier, was the supreme commander engaged in this fore-central part of the field. A brigadier from the first without any collected brigade, he had succeeded to the command of the 4th Division without for the moment acquiring any actual increase of power;² but he was not the less a general officer; and irrespectively of his normal command over Haines, and the wing of the 21st Fusileers, he here made himself a chief of larger authority, by giving fixed purpose to the small bands of soldiery of different regiments who were drawn within the sphere of his power, by wielding them, as occasion required, with unfailing good fortune, and, above all, by maintaining the heroic assumption that a picket wall of loose stones,

¹ The presence of 68th men in an organized state near the Barrier so soon after the false victory of the Second Period is obviously highly creditable to the regiment.

² He had become aware of Cathcart's death, and imparted the tidings of it to Major Ramsay Stuart.

which chanced to be standing in very contact with a hostile army, might be indefinitely defended against it with the help of a few hundred men.

In obedience to the orders we have already observed, the '7th Léger' now moved gayly across the front of the Barrier to join the French 6th of the Line, which was acting on the opposite flank; and, as before the last fight, so also now and henceforth to the end of the day, our people fought unaided by others at this their favorite post.

Under cover of artillery-fire, a column moved up by the Post-road to attack the defenders in front, whilst another column ascending from the bed of the Quarry Ravine sought to turn and work round their right flank; but Haines standing fast at the Barrier, General Goldie proved able to arrest, to defeat, to drive back the assailant masses. Still, even in the moment of his discomfiture, the enemy made himself formidable by not only shelling the victors, but throwing out a large number of riflemen, whose fire proved destructive; and although for the moment victorious, General Goldie could not help seeing that the small force he wielded must soon become almost null unless he could have some little succor.

The order he thereupon gave conveys of itself some idea of the way in which our people were maintaining this struggle. Saying, 'If we don't get support we shall be cut to pieces,' he directed Major Ramsay Stuart—the only mounted officer remaining who was not in command—to gallop back to the 2nd Division camp and 'send up the "camp-guard," or any other 'available men he could find.' Those words breathed the very spirit of Inkerman. There it was, only there, that an officer with a handful of troops would hang fastened upon the throat of a hostile army, would confess his dire need of reinforcements, and yet somehow think to make shift with perhaps about one hundred more men. Stuart found in the camp when he reached it a little body of infantry, of about 150 strong, already drawn up under two or three officers, to whom he gave Goldie's orders, and they at once began moving their force toward the scene of the fight at the Barrier.¹ Riding back into the heat of the fight with this reinforcement, Ramsay Stuart met a

¹ It is believed that this body of 150 men was a reorganized portion of what had been the 'spent forces.'

body of some thirty English soldiers walking tranquilly back from the front. He asked them why they were retreating, and they answered (through the sergeant, who was one of their number), that they had no one to lead them. Stuart ordering them to align with the reinforcement he brought, they did this at once with great willingness, and afterward fought very well.

Colonel Haines, too, at nearly this time, made a separate effort in person to obtain some small reinforcement, as also a supply of ammunition, and not without a result; for Pennefather (with Egerton's assent) gave him an augmented company of the 77th Regiment under Lieutenant Acton, and at once sent forward some cartridges.² Pennefather (who had told Colonel Egerton that the men he required were to skirmish in front), rode across from the left with Acton's company till it reached the Post-road. Then—as though it were really his policy to mask the scantiness of the reinforcement by tumult—he sent the men into the fight by bidding them to go fast down the Post-road and shout as loud as they could. English soldiery engaged in determined, yet orderly fighting, are famed for their 'terrible silence,' interrupted only at cardinal moments by the roar of an opportune cheer; and these superb 77th men—we saw how they fought against Soimonoff's masses—were disconcerted, it seems, by an order which struck them as wild, but also by a feeling that they did not know what they were to do. Except Lieutenant Acton himself, who moved at their head whilst they marched down the Post-road by fours, they had no officer with them; and there were not only many who grumbled, but some who even tailed off. Acton not being cautioned by any one, or otherwise guided, continued to move down the Post-road till he had entered the Quarry Ravine; but when there, he soon found his right turned by a column moving up in the bed of the ravine along the old carriage-track. The rush and the whir of round-shot and shell flying over his head at

² Haines requested Major Rooper of the Rifles to execute this mission, but Rooper, not knowing the ground, doubted whether he should be able to find Pennefather; and there being no other mounted officer within reach, Haines himself galloped back to see Pennefather, leaving Rooper for the moment in charge at the Barrier. The force which I have called 'an augmented company of the 77th,' comprised the company which Acton had been commanding all day, with the half of another company added to it. The first supply of ammunition sent down to the Barrier comprised only Minié cartridges, and proved useless to the greater number of the men there engaged, because they were armed with the musket; but the mistake was afterward remedied.

this time had become so loud, that he could not audibly convey any order except by bawling into the ear of some one soldier at a time; and it was not without some difficulty and loss that he found means to draw his men back into the rear of the Barrier. There, however, the accession of this little force, with besides an importation of cartridges, proved exceedingly welcome to our people, for it showed them that, despite their isolation, they had been neither cut off nor forgotten. They were aided too before long by a company of the 49th which Lieutenant Astley had made bold to withdraw from its post on the right of the camp.¹ Haines obtained yet one more reinforcement, comprising a few score of men; for it chanced that, by the course of the fight, Colonel Horsford, with the remaining fraction of his Rifle battalion, had been gradually drawn from our right to this fore-central part of the field, where he found himself alongside of Colonel Haines, who was his senior officer. Haines at once claimed the right to command him, and Horsford lost his independence, but gained the advantage of acting in a sphere where every man's help was precious.

General Goldie came to visit his people at the Barrier, and there, before many minutes—having first had his charger shot under him—he was struck down mortally wounded. Nowhere else on that day could a general fall with more lustre; for to be holding this singular post under the fire of Shell Hill, and in very contact with the jaws of the Quarry Ravine, doubly garnished with infantry columns, was to stand grappling with Dannenberg's army, and that, too, on the central ground where its main strength always stood gathered.

In the absence of Haines, Major Rooper, of the 1st Rifle battalion, was for the moment in charge at the Barrier, but he also presently fell, and his wound proved mortal.

From the moment when Goldie fell, Haines exercised an undivided command in this fore-central part of the field. Again and again assailed, he so surely beat back all the masses surging up to attack him in front, or striving to turn his right flank, that at the close of this Fourth Period he was still holding fast at the Barrier.

The Barrier, however, was now the very foremost spot near the centre of the field to which the Allies remained

¹ The company until thus withdrawn was furnishing what men called 'the 'hay picket' on ground overlooking the Tchernaya valley.

The enemy once more in the ascendant. clinging, and on their right front they were not even trying to maintain the conflict. The enemy still oppressed them with his overwhelming artillery; and, upon the whole, it, before long, resulted that despite his last signal discomfiture he once more had the ascendant.

But now—and with what to the Russians seemed absolute suddenness—a new power came into action.

IV.

In the earliest hour of the fight, Lord Raglan, we saw, ordered up a couple of 18-pounder guns; and if he refused to be thwarted by the use of such a word as 'impossible,' his firmness now met its reward. It was only, in fact, from an error affecting the transmission of the order that his purpose encountered a moment's obstruction.¹ Far from interposing any hindrance, Colonel Gambier and all our officers and men standing gathered on the ground where the siege-guns were parked had been eagerly expecting the summons long before it arrived. Ever since the 26th of October, they had been keeping prepared for field-service a pair of their 18-pounder guns; and when the outpost-firing at last deepened into the roar of a battle, they at once understood that the foreseen occasion had come. There was even amongst them a theory that, without waiting for an order, they might take the sound of the cannon for guidance as well as for warrant; and they did indeed so far anticipate Lord Raglan's wish that from an early hour they kept themselves in readiness to move forward their two 18-pounder guns at a moment's notice, with

¹ The order, instead of being carried to Colonel Gambier—the officer in command at the Siege Park—was brought by mistake to Fitzmayer, who commanded the two field-batteries then defending the vital position of the Home Ridge. It was of course quite 'impossible' that Lord Raglan could have meant Fitzmayer to abandon his command in the heat of the battle, to go out of action at a specially critical time, and repair to the distant Siege Park for the purpose of superseding the able officer there in command, and arranging means for dragging up the two heavy guns. Accordingly, it was to *that* notion that Fitzmayer rightly enough applied the word 'impossible.' He did not add, 'Ride to the Siege Park. The guns Lord Raglan wants 'are there. You must give the order to Gambier;' and the original mistake still remaining for the time uncorrected, there resulted an actual, though momentary, hindrance to the execution of Lord Raglan's design. This actual hindrance Lord Raglan naturally connected with the unwelcome answer, 'impossible,' and he hastened to overcome by his firmness what seemed like obstruction; but it must be understood that neither Fitzmayer nor any other officer attempted to interpose difficulties in the way of bringing up the two guns.

the ammunition-wagons and all the equipments required for effective fighting. They had not draught-horses at their command, but they brought out their man-harness, and prepared to drag their great guns by the power of human muscle. Every rope was in its place before Gordon rode up with the order, and he had scarce delivered his message when already the eager artillery-men were harnessing themselves to the guns.

These men were in number about 150. The body of officers with them included Colonel Gambier, their commander, Colonel Collingwood Dickson, Captain d'Aguilar, Captain Mowbray, Captain Chermside, Lieutenant Sinclair, Lieutenant Harward, and George Symons. Excited by the roar of battle, and chafing at the physical conditions which set bounds to the rate of their progress, all—officers and men alike—had their heart in the work. After finding that the labor of their task had been aggravated by a provoking mistake which led them for some time in a wrong direction, our artillery-men by continued exertions succeeded in dragging forward their guns to the verge of the battle-field, and presently came under fire. Colonel Gambier, struck down by a round-shot, was forced to give up the command, and he ceded it to Colonel Collingwood Dickson.

By laying an embargo upon some teams of draught-horses which he saw coming out of the fight with a part of our disabled artillery, Colonel Dickson found means to accelerate the advance of his two 18-pounders; and he then galloped forward with Chermside in order to determine the spot where these two guns could be best placed in battery. These planted in battery by Colonel Collingwood Dickson. Accepting, after careful examination, the opinion offered by Chermside, he judged that the right spot to choose was that crest at the bend of the heights which, uniting the Home and Fore Ridges, looks down in a north-west direction along the Saddle-top Reach, and faces against Shell Hill. The natural form of the ground must alone have sufficed to govern Colonel Dickson's decision; but at this very spot, as we saw, the foresight of some of our officers had begun the construction of a thick gabionade, with a front wide enough for three pieces of field-artillery; and, although the work at this time was only about two feet high, it still offered cover which was far from being valueless.¹ Here, in place of three field-guns which had just been withdrawn to make room for them, the two 18-pounders were planted.

¹ Especially for the wheels of the guns.

The Guards
brought up in
support.

The remains of the Guards had been collected by this time, and they now were moved up the ridge-side in support to the two 18-pounders.

Was it possible that Lord Raglan might exert a great sway over the course of events by merely bringing into the field a couple of additional guns?

The great relative power of these guns.

The enemy, we know, had in battery a hundred pieces of cannon, including a large proportion of 12-pounders, with also some 32-pound howitzers; and it may well appear strange at first sight that the accession of only two heavy guns should suddenly enable his adversary to work a cardinal change. The truth is that, as compared with the heaviest of the enemy's ordnance on Mount Inkerman, these two English guns had a mastery which was not of such kind as to be measured by the difference between eighteen and twelve. They were long iron guns, weighing each 42 hundred-weight, bearing very strong charges of powder, and—at any such range as those now about to be tried—they threw their 18-pound ball with precision and terrific power.

Of these two 18-pounders the first was under Sinclair, the second under D'Aguilar and Harward; and at half-past nine o'clock, the one first in readiness opened. That first shot was fired to try the distance, and fell short, but the next one found out the enemy, and tore into one of his batteries.

Engagement
between these
two guns and
the batteries
on Shell Hill.

The aggression of course did not fail to provoke counter-fire, and from battery after battery a storm of round-shot and shell came pelting at the crest of Hill Bend. From some unexplained causes it happened that a large proportion of all this iron and lead flew at just such a height as to come striking against the embryo parapet in front of the two 18-pounders, and a great deal of slaughter was thus warded off by an obstacle no more than about two feet high. Still there were quantities of the enemy's artillery missiles which shot clear of this dwarf gabionade, and some besides which broke through it. From moment to moment the round-shot came upturning the ground on all sides of our gunners—came crashing through the under-wood and tossing branches and roots into the air—came striking down men, and striking down horses, and smashing artillery tumbrils; whilst—sometimes overhead, sometimes on the ground—the 32-pounder shell would tear itself into fragments and send them crying for blood with their harsh, grating, truculent 'serisht'—the most hated of all battle-sounds. By the fire thus raging against it from a numerous and powerful

artillery, Colonel Collingwood Dickson's small band of 150 men was at first somewhat heavily stricken, and in one quarter of an hour there fell seventeen of their number—a proportion of more than one-tenth; but as often as any man dropped whilst working one of the guns, his place was eagerly taken by another. All were glowing with zeal, and exulting as only gunners can do in a sense of artillery power. Each of the guns was laid every time by an officer—one by Sinclair, the other by Harward—and visibly, every shot carried havoc into the enemy's batteries. Lord Raglan (who had come to this spot and descended from his saddle) stood watching the development of the new artillery force he had been able to bring into play, and admiring the ardor and the skill with which our men fought their two guns against all the ordnance strength on Shell Hill. To the eye of any English artillery-man engaged in this struggle the batteries he specially challenged were more or less on the sky-line; and from time to time, when the smoke lifted, or the blaze of an enemy's gun shot out its column of light, he could see the dark, busy figures of the opposing gunners, and catch fitful glimpses of havoc in the wake of his 18-pound shot.

No extraneous force interposing to turn the scale either way, this conflict between a numerous field-artillery on the one side and two heavy guns on the other, was left to work out its own conclusions; and at first there seemed ground for believing that the fire of several batteries converging upon one narrow spot must sooner or later overcome the little band of artillery-men who were working their two 18-pounders from behind a mere embryo parapet some twenty-four inches in height; but at the end of a quarter of an hour it could be seen that our gunners were conquering for themselves a comparative immunity. The slaughter, the wreck, the confusion they spread in the enemy's batteries had by that time weakened his fire, and henceforth every instant it began to seem more and more plain that this was an unequal conflict. The harm our artillery-men suffered was only, after all, 'severe loss,' whilst the harm they inflicted might rather be called 'devastation.' Every minute, the ascendant they already had won was gaining them an ascendant yet greater. During the second quarter of an hour they only lost two or three men; yet, whilst thus lightly stricken themselves, they were able, no less than at first, to go on destroying and still destroying. Whether tearing direct through a clump of the enemy's gunners or lighting

Ascendant obtained by the two 18-pounders.

upon some piece of rock, and flinging abroad, right and left, its murderous splinters; whether bounding into a team of artillery-horses, or smashing and blowing up tumbrils, the terrible 18-pounder shot never flew to its task without plowing a furrow of ruin.¹

The havoc was fast becoming so dire as to be more than the enemy's gunners could steadfastly endure. It may be that their officers did not yet harbor even a thought of altogether abandoning the struggle, but they soon began longing to shift their positions, and battery after battery was moved from one spot to another in the hope that the fell 18-pounder might not come to search out its prey on the new and less exposed ground.

From the moment when the enemy resorted to this flinching method, his artillery power on Shell Hill began to wane fast; for the gunners of any battery which had shifted its place proved always unable to recover their former efficiency. Within half an hour from the time when he brought into action the two 18-pounders, Colonel Collingwood Dickson had made his ascendant complete, and it was with almost perfect impunity that his gunners thenceforward continued to ravage the enemy's batteries.

From this ruin of the enemy's artillery power on Shell Hill many hastened to infer his approaching defeat; and in truth the change wrought was one of great moment. This will seem plain to all who remember the nature of the enemy's footing on Mount Inkerman. He there, indeed, had a lodgment and magnificent vantage-ground from which to deliver his successive assaults, but this was not all; for his hundred guns established in battery along a range of commanding heights upon a front scarcely short of a mile, and his ample masses of infantry drawn up in support, were forces so placed as to be in reality constituting that instrument of tenacious power which soldiers call an 'army in position;' and it was in the centre—the culminating centre—of a line of battle thus puissant for either attack or defense that the two 18-pounders were now fast breaking its strength. What the enemy had suffered before was a succession of calamitous discomfitures, which nevertheless, after all, were only so many 'repulses;'

¹ The traces of the ravages left by these shot were observed by our people after the battle with much interest, and even—so great was the devastation—with surprise. It was probably by the violence of the friction that the 18-pound shot had power to blow up a tumbril of ammunition. Of the fact that it did this there is no room for doubt.

but the force now exerted against him was tearing at the very foundations of the power he had seized on Mount Inkerman.

Boussinière, too, planted first six, then the rest of his twelve heavy guns on the crest of the Fore Ridge, and thence opened a fire which promised to act with great power against batteries hitherto spared.

V.

It is true that, to grasp the victory which might thus seem to shine within reach, the Allies had need of fresh troops; but General Bosquet in person had now reached the verge of the battle-field, close followed by 450 infantry,¹ and—at a little distance—by nearly 1500 more.² These again were followed by several squadrons of French and English cavalry. Moreover, the last vestige of any anxiety occasioned by Prince Gortchakoff's attitude had at length passed away, and General d'Autemarre, now fully released from the duty of watching him, was advancing in person to the scene of the real conflict with 2300 foot,³ accompanied by an additional battery.

Thus, in time for prompt action, Bosquet would have at his disposal (with artillery and some horse to support it) a body of more than 3000 foot;⁴ whilst, if choosing to play at fence with the enemy and give time for D'Autemarre to come up, he would be able to deliver his attack with a united force of all arms, comprising between five and six thousand infantry with a powerful field-artillery and several squadrons of cavalry.⁵

Since the Russians, after numberless discomfitures, and whilst suffering the destruction of their artillery power on Shell Hill, were now to have Bosquet upon them with all these French troops at his back, it might seem that, unless General Dannenberg could at once undertake another assault, he might fitly

Conditions
under which
Dannenberg
would now
have to act.

¹ Four companies of the Chasseurs à pied belonging to Bourbaki's brigade.

² Algerines, 2nd battalion.....	757	} D'Autemarre's brigade.
2nd battalion of the 3rd Zouaves.....	703	
	<u>1460</u>	

³ 1st battalion of the 3rd Zouaves.....	703	} D'Autemarre's brigade.
50 ^{me} Regiment.....	1601	
	<u>2304</u>	

⁴ Subject to deduction for the losses which had been incurred by the two battalions—those of the 7th Léger and the 6th of the Line—which had been for some time in action, the number would be 3575.

⁵ Subject to the deduction indicated in the last foot-note, the strength of the bodies of infantry here referred to would be 5879.

abandon the ambitious part of his enterprise, and content himself with the measure of intrenching his baffled forces on the ground they had long ago won.

Yet for Dannenberg (as for any other commander in battle who has not already succumbed) it was possible to entertain one last hope. His adversary might commit some huge fault.

It was now about 10 o'clock.

FIFTH PERIOD.

10 A.M. TO 11 A.M.

I.

When Bosquet heard of the fighting by which a too scanty soldiery had long been defending Home Ridge, his first impulse apparently was to reinforce them without the loss of a moment, and to act in whole-some concert with our people; for he sent an aide-camp to Lord Raglan entreating him 'not to let the Ridge be abandoned by his troops, however exhausted they might be, until his' (Bosquet's) 'troops could come into line and replace them.' Lord Raglan answered quietly, 'You are right;' adding afterward, as a motive for dispatch on the part of the French, that his men had not broken their fast, and were without cartridges.¹

Thus the understanding between Lord Raglan and Bosquet was for the moment complete; but there soon came a fatal disturber of plans and promises in the person of that flurried staff-officer whom we saw riding back bare-headed with his sword in the air. By him, or by the message he brought, General Bosquet was so eagerly petitioned to provide instant help for the two French battalions already engaged under Bourbaki that, whilst hastening forward in person, he sent back an order requiring the 450 chasseurs to come on at a run;² and it was owing perhaps to this supposed need for actual bodily hurry that—notwithstanding the promise so lately made through his aide-camp—he suffered himself to adopt another distinct plan of action, and even to pursue it at once without first seeing Lord Raglan or communicating with General Pennefather.³

¹ Fay, aid-de-camp to Bosquet, p. 137.

² At the 'pas de course,' Fay, p. 136.

³ Pennefather himself assured me that this was so. If one did not allow for the perturbing effect of the message above mentioned, Bosquet's omission would seem beyond measure strange.

There were not at this time any circumstances to warrant precipitate haste; for not long after the moment when Bourbaki's flurried staff-officer galloped off to ask for support, a great change, as we know, had been wrought in the state of the battle by the ascendancy of Lord Raglan's two guns; and the enemy, though still wrestling with our soldiery at the Barrier, was exerting little force in other parts of the field. But the cry for help had been loud, and and hurried him into an isolated course of action. General Bosquet apparently still felt the impulsion it gave him. Dispensing with all English counsels, he surrendered himself unreservedly to the supposed exigencies which drew him toward his right front, and it was in the false direction of the Sand-bag Battery that he determined to throw his weight. In that part of the field, as we know, our people—taught at last by a costly experience—had ceased to waste any fraction of their small remaining strength, and therefore General Bosquet's resolve was one that engaged him—though certainly without his knowing it—in an isolated course of action.

General Bosquet has not veiled the surprise with which he first looked upon the field of battle. In comparison with what his imagination had pictured, there was but little to see. Informed by words so elastic as 'division,' 'brigade,' and 'the Guards,' he plainly had failed to conceive the exceeding scantiness of the numbers with which our people were maintaining their hold; but, if he at first looked out wistfully for the gathered thousands of an English army, the scenes which now opened before him as he rode on and on, were scarce such as to sustain his illusions.

Of the very existence of that English infantry which had long been defending Mount Inkerman the indications he was able to see proved slight and obscure. He says he observed sentries pacing amongst the ruins of Pennefather's camp, and from time to time came upon soldiers walking back one by one from the front.¹ High above on the right, where there sauntered a red-coated officer with the 'bonnet de poil' and a singularly

¹ This spectacle was one that prevailed more or less during a great part of the day. The bulk of the soldiers thus walking back were men who had exhausted their cartridges. At first there were numbers of men who, finding themselves without ammunition, and without the guidance of their officers, fell back of their own accord, but afterward, as we saw, 'word was passed' directing those who had emptied their pouches to go back and replenish them. A keen observer has assured me that amongst the whole number of men he saw thus walking back from the front there was not one officer.

unconcerned air, some men of the Guards could be seen lying down in the brush-wood;¹ and, if only from the presence of many staff-officers on horseback, and artillery-men busy with their guns along a great part of the crest, General Bosquet was able to learn that the English still reigned on the Home Ridge, and were there for the time undisturbed; but for 'divisions' or 'brigades,' for 'regiments' or even 'battalions,' he looked in vain. He indeed might infer, though without being able to see them, that Lord Raglan had troops on the border of the Careenage Ravine, and that their hold was at the moment unchallenged, for all in that quarter lay quiet; but by the evidence of his own eyesight he convinced himself that in front of the ground forming the right of the English position our people had no troops at all.²

It was only at one chosen spot half a mile in advance of Home Ridge that the battle never had rest. From out of the smoke always gathered in that central part of the field there sounded (as there had sounded all day) the tumult of a fight; for Haines and his men were still combating at their favorite Barrier. But although they defended their post from turning movements no less than against front attacks, they had neither the pretension nor the power to control distant ground on their flanks, still less to guard the acclivity which divides the Inkerman Tusk from the bed of the Quarry Ravine. On their left front there were generally some of our riflemen in the brush-wood who, having crept up very near to the enemy's batteries, were persistently vexing his gunners; and no doubt on both the flanks of the Barrier small bands of English infantry were often moving this way and that in the course of their desultory combats. Thus, for instance, during the Second Period, Colonel Horsford with a few of his Rifles was frequently skirmishing on the right bank of the Quarry Ravine; and, at a later hour, Colonel Horn with a remnant of his 'Twentieth' men, and Vaughan, too, with his knot of soldiery, were from time to time fighting on the

¹ The officer was Colonel Upton, now Lord Templeton, whose wound did not disable him; but his horse, as we saw, had been shot under him, and he was therefore on foot. So few on that day had omitted to wear an overcoat, that his red uniform was singularly conspicuous.

² The result of General Bosquet's survey in this respect is given very distinctly and very broadly in his official account: 'A son arrivée sur le champ de bataille le Général Bosquet vit tout le terrain en avant de la droite des 'Anglais évacué par nos Alliés; il n'y avait plus d'occupée que la crête qui précède de vingt pas le premier rang des tentes.'—*Journal d'Operations de la 2^{me} Division.*

right of the Post-road; but—sometimes advancing, sometimes falling back—these few score of soldiers did not even endeavor to fasten upon any particular ground, and their efforts, though ceaseless and brilliant, can scarce have led any one to mistake them for powerful bodies of infantry maintaining a set line of battle.

Upon the whole, it may be said that the English thrown forward in advance of Home Ridge were exerting the same kind of power and performing the same kind of duty as if they had been the men of the pickets not yet driven in. They combated upon a front which, by help of the Barrier, was riveted fast at its centre, but shifting at all other points.

Our people had ceased to be under that stress which was felt by Pennefather when, in the earlier hours of the morning, he used to speak of the ‘gap.’ It is true that the ground on the right front of the Barrier was still (as it always had been) without troops undertaking to guard it; but this circumstance was no longer a source of danger; for when our people abandoned their error of maintaining a force at the Sand-bag Battery, they freed themselves of course from the burden of having to cover its left flank. Yet if Bosquet, as he was now minded to do, should bend off to his right front, there was likely to be an ugly interval between his left and any other Allied troops. In such case, the void would again be a ‘gap,’ and again there might follow some such troubles as those that resulted from the same cause in the Second Period of the fight.

From the recurrence of the same error at different times it may be fairly surmised that there was something in the aspect of the battle-field or in the sound of its tumults which tended to deceive. Just as numbers of our people, when fighting at the Sand-bag Battery, made sure that Pennefather must be holding the ground in strength on the right front of the Barrier, so also now General Bosquet gave a welcome to the same fond belief. He made to himself a false picture of the state of the battle-field, and imagined that in the direction of his right front he might bend off to the Sand-bag Battery, or even to the Inkerman Tusk, without ceasing to have his left covered by the close presence of an English force.¹

¹ This error of Bosquet’s seems the more curious when one remembers that the evidence of his own eyesight must have tended to guard him against it. See the last foot-note.

II.

Owing mainly to the stress put upon him by Lord Raglan's 18-pounder guns, the enemy had retracted the movement by which half an hour before he came on to press his advantage against the French 6th of the Line; but General Bosquet, still under the sway of the message which had hurried him forward, was especially drawn on by that part of it which craved protection for Bourbaki against the column then turning, or threatening to turn, his right flank. So the moment his Chasseurs came up, Bosquet ordered them to advance upon the Sand-bag Battery, and at the same time he directed Bourbaki to resume the offensive.

By the movements resulting from these orders the enemy's skirmishers were pressed back; but the 450 Chasseurs (who had inclined toward the left of the Kitspur, instead of marching straight on the Battery) were met before long by two strong Russian columns. The columns, whilst they advanced, were slowly forcing back what remained of that little band of the 'Twentieth' which (under their chief, Colonel Horn) we long ago saw fighting hard in the central parts of the field. Colonel Horn having fronted, the Chasseurs formed up on his right, and these 450 Frenchmen, with the few score of English beside them, maintained their ground for some time against both of the enemy's columns. The officers, French and English alike, devoted themselves to the task of personal leadership with a zeal unsparing of self; but the favorite hero of the moment—at least in the eyes of our people—was a particular French captain—a man distinguishing himself by his bravery, but conspicuous also from his excessive corpulence—who, by moving far out to the front with his cap on the point of his sword, gave the troops both a valiant example and the cheering advantage of a laugh.

But though fighting for some time with excellent steadiness, the men of this Anglo-French force did not so hotly follow their officers as to be undertaking any of those resolute bayonet-charges by which a few companies, and even in some instances small knots of soldiery, had wrought their wonders in the earlier hours of the morning; and, this time, weight of numbers proved able to get the ascendant, or, at the least, to avoid discomfiture. Failing any determination of the united Anglo-French force to try the bayonet, it was

only by fire that the conflict could be sustained; and our few soldiery had nearly exhausted their pouches, some not having one cartridge left. Colonel Horn, too, at this time was wounded, and for several minutes disabled. Presently, the French Chasseurs separated themselves from our people—not, however, by falling back to the rear, but rather by drawing off to their right flank as though summoned to other duties.¹ Thenceforth, it is plain, the two columns were virtually masters; but they ceased to press their ascendant against either the French or the English, and the combat came to an end.

III.

Arrival of
more French
reinforce-
ments. All this while the foremost columns of D'Autemarre's brigade had been lessening the distance which parted them from Mount Inkerman; and at length there came up the 2nd battalion of the 3rd Zouaves and the 2nd Algerine battalion, the Zouaves under Commandant Dubos, the Algerines under Colonel Wimpfen. These troops were followed by cavalry—that is, by the 4th regiment of the Chasseurs d'Afrique; and these again—at supporting distance—by another and much smaller body of horse upon which people looked with an admiring, though mournful interest, for—comprising five regiments, yet numbering only 200 men—it represented what now, after the battle of Balaclava, was the whole mounted strength of the famous 'Light Brigade.' In the absence of Lord Cardigan (who had slept and tarried too long on board his yacht), the brigade was commanded by Lord George Paget. In obedience to the order he had received through Nigel Kingscote, and complying too with a peculiarly urgent entreaty addressed to him by General Canrobert, Lord George Paget felt bound to take care that the brigade should be always within supporting distance of the Chasseurs d'Afrique; but, to do this, he was forced to keep his troops for some time under fire, and endure to see yet further losses sustained by that remnant of horsemen which the battle of Balaclava had spared.²

¹ They had inclined too much toward the Post-road, and were now apparently told that, to obey the orders directing them to march on the Kitspur, they must bend sharply off to their right.

² Out of his 200 men he lost five killed, including one officer (Cornet Cleveland), and five wounded. Nigel Kingscote was one of Lord Raglan's aids-de-camp, and those who conveyed the request of Canrobert were Colonel Claremont and a French staff-officer. It may seem strange that Canrobert should have made such a point of having his own cavalry supported by this small

Bosquet now had assembled on the right of the Post-road, and ready for united action, full 3000 foot with 24 guns, supported by several squadrons of cavalry; and, considering not only the losses and repeated discomfitures already sustained by the Russians, but the now actual state of the battle as altered by the two 18-pounders, there was reason to trust that his forces, if wielded with vigor and skill, might prove able to end the conflict.

Indeed many who witnessed the coming of the two fresh battalions under Dubos and Wimpfen made sure that by those troops alone—irrespective of Bosquet's other resources—the repression already suffered by the enemy must soon be turned into defeat. And it was not in quiet obscurity, with their light hidden under a bushel, that the two fresh battalions came up. Borne along in that swift storm of sound that bursts at such moments from unnumbered French bugles and drums, they came on in two columns, the black Algerines on the right, the Zouaves on the left: the Algerines bounding like panthers—so Wimpfen, their commander, described them—and crying already for blood; the Zouaves now springing, now crouching, but always making swift way, for they were led by their *vivandière* gayly moving in her pretty costume, fit alike for a dance or a battle, and she did not seem minded to loiter whilst taking her lads into action.

IV.

But—apparently not knowing the ground, and ‘hankering after flank movements’—General Bosquet persisted in the resolve which first made him incline to his right; and, as already he had dispatched his Chasseurs in the direction of the Kitspur, so also he now moved thither with his two fresh battalions. Leaving there in reserve some companies taken from Dubos as well as from Wimpfen, he threw forward the rest of their two battalions, as also the four companies of Chasseurs (which had now joined his left), and halted them on the Inkerman Tusk. There he ranged them in an order of battle extending some way down the Tusk, with a sheer precipice on his right. His extreme left was at a distance of no more than about 300 yards from the Barrier; and, if Bourbaki's two battalions had come up abreast of the Chas-

remnant of the Light Brigade; but certainly to this measure (if his messengers accurately represented him) he attached unbounded importance. At a later hour Lord Cardigan presented himself.

seurs, they would have so filled the interval as to make General Bosquet's whole force one continuous array, prolonged toward the west by our people still combating at their favorite post. As it was, the two battalions of Bourbaki had not so come up to the front as to be ready to align with their comrades; but Bosquet apparently did not suffer himself to be disquieted, because, as we know, he imagined that the right bank of the Quarry Ravine at this upper part of its course was guarded by English troops. That one hallucination, however, will hardly suffice to account for the extraordinary measure of forming a line of battle upon the Inkerman Tusk. The troops there arrayed had no Russian infantry before them. With a deep ravine in their front, and the batteries of the East Jut beyond, with deadly precipices on their right, and their uncovered left standing helpless on the very edge of the lair from which the enemy had been accustomed to spring, they were so circumstanced as to be themselves in grave peril without means of doing to the enemy any manner of harm.

Bosquet, separating himself from his infantry thus strangely arrayed on the Tusk, and having with him Colonel Fourgeot, Captain Minet, an aid-de-camp, and a small escort of horse, rode some way aside toward the bank of the Quarry Ravine, as though wishing to have a look at the English force which he thought must be there, and perhaps to exchange words of counsel with its imagined chief.¹ For the English his eyes searched in vain, but upon coming to the edge of the Ravine and looking down into its bed, he saw a Russian column ascending toward the part of the ground where he stood. He instantly sent for artillery, and before many minutes Boussinière came up in person with Tous-saint's six guns. Two of the guns were unlimbered and planted in battery, but then suddenly Fourgeot cried out, saying, 'General, here are the Russians!'

The exclamation was no false alarm; for a number of skirmishers thrown out in advance of the column had been quietly working up for some time under cover of the steep, wooded ground, and were now within fifteen yards of the two guns that had been just placed in battery. An order to limber up was instantly given, and Boussinière's artillerymen obeyed it with excellent coolness and valor, but the foremost driver of one of the guns being inopportunately shot

¹ I believe that the aid-de-camp with Bosquet was Captain Fay, the author of '*Souvenirs de la Guerre de Crimée*,' an able work from which—more especially as regards this part of the narrative—I have derived material aid.

down, it was suffered to fall into the hands of the Russians. They took their prize down the ravine, and left it by the edge of the quarry.¹

At the moment when this gun was lost, General Bosquet, with his staff, with his escort, and even with his pennon-bearer, was within fifty yards of the Russians who had effected the capture, but, from some unexplained cause, those simple-minded soldiery rejected the opportunity of killing or taking a French general, and suffered him to ride off unmolested.² The whole of Toussaint's battery also, except the one gun we saw captured, found means to make good its escape.

The column, however, meanwhile (it was one of the Iäkouts battalions) moved up unopposed to the crest, and was presently on the left flank of the French still extended along the Inkerman Tusk. And now, too, that same French array was threatened in another direction.

From the time when they came into action the Selinghinsk battalions had tenaciously clung to the Kitspur, ascending sometimes to the Sand-bag Battery, then undergoing discomfiture and lapsing back under the steeps, but always after a while proving able to stay their retreat and make ready for another attempt. It so happened that at this very time they were in one of their ascending moods; and when their skirmishers, once more toiling up toward the Sand-bag Battery, looked over their right shoulders across St. Clement's Gorge, they found themselves gazing upon the rear of a little force drawn up in order of battle. They were looking, in fact, on the rear of that singular array which Bosquet's infantry formed along the Inkerman Tusk. Perceiving the opportunity offered them, they bent to their right, and began to operate against the rear of the troops on the other side of the gorge.

Still the gravest of the perils encompassing Bosquet's troops on the Tusk was the one which now closely beset them on their left flank; for the Iäkouts battalion by this time had made good its way up

Advance of a Russian column on Bosquet's left.

¹ It was found there after the battle, and brought back, of course, into the French camp.

² One explanation of the circumstance is that the Russians were so busied and excited by their capture of the French gun that they could think of nothing else.—*Fay*, p. 140. General Bosquet says, I think, that the Russian soldiery all but saluted him. The poor fellows apparently had been strongly schooled into the duty of never forgetting the respect due to a general officer, and did not at the moment comprehend that the circumstance of Bosquet's being a *hostile* general might constitute an exception to the rule.

across the right bank of the Quarry Ravine, and was already on the topland above. The movement, however, it seems, was not one originating in any special design against Bosquet's troops on the Tusk; and from the sloth of the column when this gift of Fortune was offered, one may infer that its commander was as thoroughly taken by surprise as the French general. He apparently could scarce understand that it had suddenly become possible for him to make Bosquet's people his prisoners, or to roll them up fighting with their backs to a frightful precipice; and whilst happily he stood losing time, the more lively intelligence of the French made them swift to acknowledge their peril, and seize the best means for eluding it. Opportunely, and with brilliant dispatch, the Zouave troops made a spring which checked their Selinghinsk assailants, nay, caused them indeed to stop dead, and then by a timely rush to their left flank and rear, the nimble and quick-witted soldiery who had been brought into this ugly predicament found means to get clear of the Tusk without having to fight for their lives.


Peril and escape of Bosquet.

Though the two battalions with Bourbaki had not become linked to the force which Bosquet led on to the Tusk, they still, it seems, reeled under the shock which their comrades received. They fell back, and continued to retreat till they found themselves behind the Home Ridge, and on the left of the Post-road. There they halted and took up a position in rear of the English field-batteries. By this movement to their left rear they separated themselves very decisively from the Chasseurs, the Zouaves, and the Algerine troops which Bosquet had been leading in person; for all these, after the peril that had threatened them on the Inkerman Tusk, fell back to the reverse slope of the Fore Ridge, and the bulk of them ultimately halted behind Boussinière's guns. To the Zouaves, along with discomfiture, another misfortune had come. The *vivandière* who led them was killed at the head of her battalion.

Divergent retreat of the French.

With unsparing zeal the French artillery on the Fore Ridge devoted itself to the purpose of checking pursuit; but it was not in rear of Boussinière's guns that troops compelled to retreat could now find a scene of repose. Russian batteries so placed on the heights as to be free from the dominion of the two 18-pounders were assailing Boussinière with a fire of great power; and his twelve heavy guns, his artillery-men, his long teams of horses, his limbers, his tumbrils, and, in short, all his ord-

The havoc wrought in Boussinière's batteries.



THE FIGHT ON MOUNT INKERMANN

EXPLANATIONS.

Fifth Period.

The French in retreat along their whole line

A A Algerine battalions

B. Bosquet in person.

Z. Battalion of the 3rd Zouaves

F. C. Foot Chasseurs, one wing of 3rd battalion

H. Colonel Haines in command at the barrier

R. Lord Raglan in person.


The Russian troops on the Kistspur are the 4 battalions of the Selenghinsk regiment with also a battalion of Sappers and some companies of Riflemen.

The eight battalions in the Quarry Ravine are those of Okhotsk and Iakoutsk regiments. The indications on Shell Hill are meant to suggest the dislocation of the enemy's artillery front under the fire of the two eighteen pounders. Those guns are represented as being in battery at the part of the Crestwork which fronts towards the N.W.

The first and second positions of the retreating French are taken from the Official Atlas de la Guerre d'Orient.

Scale.





nance resources, had been gathered within so narrow a space that they presented a rich offering to the enemy's cannon, and underwent frightful havoc. Speaking to Collingwood Dickson, who, as we know, was his 'next gun neighbor,' he said, 'We are getting massacred;' but he cheerily added, 'Well, after all, this is war,' and continued to hold on with a courage much praised by our people. Still, it soon became evident that if he would save his batteries from becoming disabled, Boussinière must shift their ground. This at last he accordingly did. Keeping one of his batteries for opportunities of service on the right, he sent off the other one to operate beside the English field-artillery on the left of the Home Ridge.

Their removal
from the Fore
Ridge.

The discomfiture suffered by Bosquet was not one that the Russians had planned; and having stumbled, as it were, upon Fortune, they scarce knew what they had done, still less what they ought to do next. Whether owing to the restraint put upon them by Boussinière's guns, or from ignorance of the advantage they had gained, or from a sense of the danger they might incur if they were to push far their advance without first having captured the Barrier, they did not attempt to urge the retreat of the French infantry by a vigorous pursuit.

The Russians
blind to their
opportunity,
and attempt
no pursuit.

But notwithstanding the absence of any such physical pressure, the French were swift to understand, and even indeed to overestimate, the reverse that had befallen them. General Canrobert, their anxious, devoted commander-in-chief, was already at the true seat of danger—that is, the Fore Ridge—the ground on which the enemy's columns might come sweeping on in pursuit. As we saw, he had taken the precaution of bringing cavalry into the field; and now, to cover the retreat of Bosquet's infantry, and avert the threatened disaster, the Chasseurs d'Afrique were brought up. Half despairing, perhaps, but still ready for an act of brave self-devotion, General Canrobert seems to have felt that the moment was one for extreme resolves, and even used words which were thought to import a determination to lead his horsemen in person. But there now came a shell which burst close to one of the squadrons of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, and they immediately retreated—nay, withdrew altogether from Mount Inkerman.¹

Canrobert at
the seat of
danger:

his cavalry
brought up:

its retreat.

¹ This was the French regiment which did excellent service at the battle of Balaclava.

Thus, without any strenuous effort on the part of the enemy, and, indeed, without his quite knowing it, the French troops—horse, foot, and artillery—had all encountered discomfiture. There followed, as may well be imagined, a temporary prostration of spirit. Despairing of their own power

Despair of the French.

Lord Raglan, after all the heavy loss he had suffered, could for a moment dispense with their aid, the French hastened to conclude that the battle was irretrievably lost.

One of their officers considerably rode up to surprise Colonel Dickson of what was, as they understood, the real condition of things, and advise him to withdraw his guns. ‘My officer,’ said the horseman, ‘save your guns! all is lost!’

Their considerable intimation to Dickson.

Dickson having received no corresponding intimations from his own chief, and being in the full enjoyment of the great artillery power which his guns were exerting, felt loath, as may well be supposed, to accept the proffered counsel. Seeing this, the French officer again pressed his warning, and again gave assurance of the hopeless condition to which the Allies were reduced. At last, upon finding Dickson still immovable, he resorted to that singular figure of speech which has so fastened itself into the language of the French camp, that for the purpose of expressing the complete ascendant of one power over another it seems to have become really essential.¹ When even against that utmost phrase Colonel Dickson stood proof, the French officer found no more to say, but at least he could ride off with the consciousness of having told the worst.

In bringing about this reverse, the enemy had taken small part, and General Bosquet sustained no huge losses in killed or wounded; but, if the blow he had received was in a sense self-inflicted, and but little destructive of his numerical strength, it fell, nevertheless, with great weight; for, as we saw, it caused his troops to despair; and to despair was to be, for the time, without power. Nor was it certain that the mischief could be speedily cured by appealing to the bare, simple truth; for to tell a quick-witted, suspicious, and highly critical soldiery that they had

Present effect of the reverse sustained by the French.

¹ I could cite an instance of a French general officer who, after an interview with the English commander, came out into the aid-de-camp's room and there disburdened his soul of the indispensable phrase, doing this—not lightly at all, for he was in a distressing state of anxiety, but—on the expressed ground that his omission to venture upon a coarse word in Lord Raglan's presence had prevented him, he feared, from fully conveying his meaning.

not been really much hurt—that they had hardly, indeed, been attacked—and that their discomfiture was nothing more than the consequence of their leader's mistake, would be to aggravate distrust; whilst any allusion by Bosquet to that facile theory which would cast all blame on the English might deepen the ominous curses of disheartened French troops, and cause them, perhaps, to be followed by that cry of 'treason' which often precedes headlong flight.

If the Russians, disdaining the thorn that had vexed them all day at the Barrier, had come on in their strength against Bosquet's retreating troops, would the French have proved able to recover their confidence in the moment of trial, and to make, after all, a good stand? If not, could Lord Raglan have broken the torrent of Russian battalions by pressing upon it in flank with the few English troops within reach? These are questions inviting surmise, without foreshadowing answers; but at least it may be taken for granted that Bosquet's discomfiture now placed the Allies in jeopardy. A great change in the state of the battle had been almost suddenly wrought. Little time had yet passed since that moment when the Algerine and the Zouave battalions came bounding into the field with what seemed an evident mission to enter upon the triumph already prepared for them; and now, the French were disclosing—nay, even inculcating—a belief that the battle was utterly lost. From what seemed all but contact with victory, the Allies, though since hardly attacked, had come to be on the brink of disaster.

V.

What reason there was for despondency stood based, after all, upon a fear that the enemy must be perceiving his opportunity and preparing to seize it. With every minute of his continued inaction the peril grew less, and it might cease altogether if the French should but wait for plain signs of the apprehended pursuit before lapsing into farther retreat.

And, for any among Canrobert's people who could read the dim features of this Inkerman battle, some comfort might be found, after all, in the actual state of the fight; for on the part of the English there was a continuance, nay, a farther development of the power we saw them exerting at the close of the Fourth Period.

The two 18-pounders were exercising an almost uncontested dominion over the opposite batteries, and it was only on

ground yet unsearched by these powerful guns that the enemy with any advantage still used his artillery arm. At the Barrier too all remained well.

And the aspect of things on Home Ridge was such, on the whole, as might tend to put down despondency. It is true that the English commander could point to no organized and collected battalions in proof of his yet remaining strength, could show of fresh troops little more than 200 men,¹ and could speak of no succor approaching him, except indeed one small body, 150 strong;² but, after a now long experience of combats upon combats, sustained during several hours, the English had become so well accustomed to the scantiness of their numbers, so strong in the sense of their past triumphs, and, besides, were so blissfully ignorant of what had befallen their Allies on the Inkerman Tusk, that—unconsciously and without any notion of acting a part—they so spoke and acted and looked as to convey the idea of stability.

VI.

Our people thus seeming to prosper, and General Dannenberg still making no effort to pursue his advantage, the despondency of the French passed away; and when D'Autemarre came up in person with three fresh battalions, General Bosquet resolved that he would make one great effort to retrieve his recent discomfiture.³ Trusting apparently to the elastic spirit of his men, he ventured to throw forward once more the same battalions that had lately been worsted, leaving all his fresh troops to act in reserve and occupy the vacated ground. By his orders, accordingly, the Zouaves under Dubos, and the Algerines under Wimpfen, were again thrown forward on the Kitspur to assail those Selinghinsk troops which now occupied the gorge of the Sand-bag Battery and the ground on its flanks.

¹ General Codrington, considering that he might venture to weaken his force on the Victoria Ridge, had sent off from it the wing of the 50th, under Colonel Wilton, with a strength of 225, and this force was now at hand. See *ante*, p. 76, note.

² This was a remnant of the 57th, numbering 151 men, which having been in the trenches during the previous night had been prevented, by the terms of Cathcart's orders, from marching off to Mount Inkerman with the Head-quarters of the regiment under Captain Stanley.

³ The three fresh battalions numbered altogether 2304—viz., 1st battalion of 3rd Zouaves, 703; 50th Regiment, 1601. The French had been so deeply impressed by their late discomfiture that they candidly speak of this endeavor of Bosquet's as 'un suprême effort.'—*Fay*, p. 141.

The wing of the 95th which we long ago saw charging down into the bed of St. Clement's Gorge was still near the ground it then reached; and this body was for the moment cut off, because some of the enemy's forces were barring its retreat by the low ground, whilst another mass now interposed was blocking its return to the heights. These hundred men of the 95th, under Vialls and Sargent and one or two other officers, were preparing for an act of desperation, and resolving to sell their lives dear, when there all at once reached them a new, foreign outburst of sound. What they heard was the cry of the Zouaves, and the howling of the African soldiery. The men of the interposed column could already be seen looking round as though distracted and troubled by some peril threatening them in rear.

The Zouave battalion was advancing against the Sand-bag Battery, when—as though come to haunt the old ground where men of the Guards had been dying—the Bearskin all at once re-appeared. It was from the wooded steeps of the hill-sides that the spectre uprose. Since the time when last we observed it during the Second Period of the action, the small band of Coldstream men collected by Wilson had remained in the brush-wood below, watching always for some such occasion as the one that now offered. Amidst a roar of joy and welcome—for the Zouaves and the Guards were close friends—these Coldstream men joined the advance, aligning on the right of the French.

Having first fronted round to the east, the two assailing battalions—each gathered in column—moved forward abreast of one another, the Algerines on the right, and the Zouaves, with their little adjunct of Guardsmen, on the left.

With this fragment of the Guards alongside it, the Zouave battalion marched straight at the Sand-bag Battery, or rather at the body of Russian troops which stood thronging the gorge of the work with their backs to its parapet.

It was scarce to be imagined that Russian infantry so unhappily posted would prove able to make a good stand against the coming assault; but, having the constitutional bravery of their nation, they were slow to acknowledge the necessity of retreat, and stood facing the onset so long, that although at the last they sought to take flight, the Zouave battalion was on them before they could get away by the flanks of the work. The raging pack had so closed that all lateral outlet

Advance of
the Zouave
battalion.

Re-appearance
of some Cold-
stream men.

Defeat of the
Selinghinsk
battalions by
Zouave and
Algerine
troops.

was blocked, and when the hapless Muscoffs at last had turned their backs to the foe, they faced against the parapet—a parapet nine or ten feet in height, unprovided with any banquettes. To a great and compressed throng of men encumbered with coats long as gowns, and cut off in flank and rear, this parapet in most places was as a prison wall, and the best hope of escape that a man could well have was by one of the two embrasures. These two outlets were presently crowded—were choked. It was upon a pen of helpless Russians that the furious Zouaves sprang in with their bayonets. What followed was slaughter. The standard of the victorious battalion was planted upon the top of the parapet.

Colonel Wimpfen had before him a somewhat less easy task, because his adversaries, however embarrassed by disadvantage of ground, were not at all events fighting with their backs to a high parapet, and accordingly the Algerines he commanded were for a while fended back; but the flight of the Russians defeated at the Sand-bag Battery carried with it before very long the discomfiture of their comrades, so that those who had combated the Africans no less than those worsted by the Zouaves were forced down the steeps in retreat. The Zouaves pursuing descended at length to the ground where the 95th had stood fast, and completed the deliverance of the hundred men who, ever since the period of the ‘false victory,’ had found means to keep their place in this advanced part of the battle-field.¹

In the earlier morning, we know, these Selinghinsk battalions had been more than once overthrown; but this time they were chased down with fury, and by a soldiery trained in African warfare, who, with firelocks held up overhead, knew how best to strive through tall brush-wood.

The remains of the hapless Selinghinsk battalions were not only hunted down over the Aqueduct, but finally driven out of the battle-field; and for this reason the triumph of the Zouaves and the Algerines proved less barren than the ‘false victory’ obtained by our people in the Second Period of the action over much greater numbers of men. Still, the conditions were such that no advantages obtained by the Allies on this outlying spur could well react with much power upon

¹ One of the Zouaves came up to a soldier of the 95th, and, patting the man on the back, addressed him in good English, saying: ‘There! it’s our turn now: you go to the rear: you have had your share.’ Captain Sargent, who heard the words, says that the accent and address of the Zouave were such as to show that he must have been an educated Englishman. The wing of the 95th moved back along the low ground to take its place on Home Ridge.

the course of the fighting elsewhere; and indeed we shall learn that the achievement of Dubos and Wimpfen wrought no such effect upon the mind of Canrobert as to draw him into vigorous action.

When Bosquet gave the order for the advance of the Zouaves and Algerines, he also apparently meant that Bourbaki's brigade, and in particular the 6th of the Line and the 7th *Léger*, should execute an attack on the enemy's centre;¹ but the actual result was that these two battalions advanced by the line of the Post-road, and there they had our people in front of them.²

For Haines at the Barrier still maintained his ascendant. As during the First, and the Second, and a part of the Third, and the whole of the Fourth, so also throughout this Fifth Period, the enemy's successive attacks were defeated one after another, and the favorite ridge of loose stones, now yet farther endeared to our people as the object of numberless fights, remained in their hands to the last.

11 A. M.
Close of the
combats un-
dertaken by
French in-
fantry.

It was now only eleven o'clock, but the conflicts we have been witnessing were the last that the French infantry undertook in the battle of Inker-man.³

SIXTH PERIOD.

11 A.M. TO 1 P.M.

I.

Bosquet's troops, when drawn in, were re-formed; and Monet now coming up with three fresh battalions, General Canrobert at length had in hand between 7000 and 8000 infantry.⁴ Of these, two battalions were posted behind the Home Ridge

Strength and
disposition of
the French
and English
infantry.

¹ Their advance was to be a part of the 'suprême effort.'

² The French official accounts represent both these battalions to have advanced down the Post-road, and nevertheless use language importing that they had come into contact with the enemy and 'forced back his troops,' thus ignoring the fact that the English all this time were holding the Barrier. As though to reconcile geography with this statement, the official framer of the 'Atlas de la Guerre d'Orient' has boldly moved away the Barrier to ground some way west of the Post-road; thus applying, as it were, to geography the principle of 'tant pis pour les faits.'

³ See *post*, pp. 280, 281, and the foot-note appended thereto.

⁴ These troops had come into action with a strength of more than 8000 (see Appendix, No. IV.), but allowing for losses, the numbers given in the text would be approximately right.

in support to the English there ranged, the rest of them occupying the right of the position, that is, the Fore Ridge and the now quiet slopes of the Kitspur.

Of the English infantry, a large proportion was still kept apart to guard the ravines on our left;¹ and the remainder of them, with a strength somewhat short of 3000, were in the centre, some occupying the Home Ridge, and all the rest fighting in front of it. A large proportion of them had belonged to the number of what we called the 'spent forces,' but the efficiency of these scattered soldiery had been in a great measure restored by collecting them into bodies commanded each by some officer; and having been now supplied with cartridges, the men were for the most part in good humor, and willing enough to fight under any officers, whether strangers or not.² Altogether, the Allied infantry now on Mount Inkerman comprised between 12,000 and 13,000 men.

Besides his 8000 French infantry (which retained an unbroken organization, and comprised 5000 fresh troops), General Canrobert had under his orders a powerful artillery, with also 700 horse.

Supposing that his troops could be trusted, all men will agree that to command such a force as this in the sixth hour of a bloody and exhausting fight, was to wield a mighty engine of power. It is for the possession of just such a force at just such a time that the commanders of great armies yearn.

General Canrobert had been struck in the arm by a shrapnel, but happily without being disabled, and before long he was conversing once more with Lord Raglan. No two men could be easily found more unlike one another in temperament than the French and the English commanders, now again side by side on Home Ridge—the one consumed by anxiety, the other enshrouded by some mysterious quality of his nature which seemed to keep troubles aloof from him. Not unwilling, perhaps, to do something which might divert General Canrobert from his anxious thoughts, Lord Raglan chose this time for directing an aid-de-camp to learn how it fared with General Pennefather on the part of the ridge where he was, and to find out, besides, whether all was still well on the

¹ The force thus disposed comprised troops which came into action with a strength of 1208, and we have spoken of them as afterward numbering about 1000.

² I believe that the merit of causing these stragglers—these victorious stragglers—to be reorganized, belonged in a very large measure to the indefatigable Colonel, now General, Sir Percy Herbert.

The apparently great power and opportunity of Canrobert at this time.

Lord Raglan and Canrobert.

left.¹ Captain Somerset Calthorpe—the aid-de-camp dispatched on this mission—has never ceased to remember the joyous glow of Pennefather's countenance whilst giving and enforcing his answer. The answer imported that all

Pennefather's message to Lord Raglan: was going on well, but Pennefather added that at that very time he saw an opportunity opening, and that, if reinforced, he felt sure he could bring the fight to an end.² He has declared that he did not adorn his actual message to Lord Raglan with any rough expletives,³ but to the aid-de-camp he spoke, as was natural, in a free, conversational way. So, when Calthorpe came back into the presence of Lord Raglan and Canrobert, he conveyed the full import of the answer meant for Lord Raglan, and added, besides, the assurance which Pennefather had addressed to himself—an assurance that, if he, General Pennefather, were now reinforced, he could end this fight with the Russians, and 'lick them,' as he said, 'to the devil.'⁴

Lord Raglan archly rendered all this into literal French, and Canrobert, enchanted, cried out, 'What a brave fellow! 'what a brave man! what a good General!' Lord Raglan, perhaps, may have thought that if Pennefather's rough, eager words could produce this happy effect, his presence might be even more powerful; but, be that as it may, he sent at once to request that the General would come.⁵ When Pen-

His interview with Lord Raglan and Canrobert. nefather, obeying the summons, came beaming and radiant into the presence of the two commanders, he found Lord Raglan in his saddle, and Canrobert on foot close beside him re-adjusting the bandage of his wounded arm. Lord Raglan asked Pennefather what he would propose to do. Pennefather answered to the effect that he was for pressing upon the Russians, who already, he thought, showed signs of yielding. Then Lord Raglan said, 'What have you left?'

¹ As regards the *order* of events witnessed in battle, the memory of the most accurate observers will often deceive them; and being now guided by a chain of circumstances, which seems to leave no room for doubt (see footnote, *post*, p. 280), I place this incident at a period later than the one assigned to it by Captain, now Colonel, Somerset Calthorpe.

² This, he assured me, was the answer he sent.

³ He assured me that he never sent the expletives as part of his message, but I have found no difficulty in reconciling his statement with that of Colonel Somerset Calthorpe.

⁴ My first knowledge of this incident was derived from the Staff-officer's interesting 'Letters from Head-quarters,' p. 375; but I have also had the advantage of receiving communications on the subject from Colonel Somerset Calthorpe, the author of the work.

⁵ This the General informed me, and added that he attended forthwith.

There was nothing, perhaps, that Lord Raglan less expected or wished than an arithmetical answer to his question, but it happened that Pennefather only a few minutes before had been furnished with a report which proved that one portion, at least, of the infantry remaining to him was stronger in numbers than he had ventured to believe, and, armed with the knowledge thus gained, he stated that his 1st brigade alone still numbered 750 men present under arms.¹

However joyously uttered, this announcement of hundreds to set against the enemy's thousands was not so encouraging to Canrobert as the confident, dare-devil sentence translated to him a few minutes before, and the French commander resisted all efforts to engage him in aggressive action. With that large force of all arms which we found present under his orders, he subsided into an attitude of passive expectancy. After dividing the whole strength of his infantry between the English Heights and the now peaceful slopes of the Kitspur, he thenceforth kept it unmoved, allowing our wearied soldiery in his front to go on as they might with their struggle. His batteries, though oftentimes moving, and seeking in vain for good berths, were worked valiantly under a fire which inflicted upon them grave losses; but his infantry not attacking, nor being attacked, remained altogether inactive, and took no farther part in the conflict.²

Of course it was good for the English to have their right covered by powerful forces, and to be well supported by

¹ This report had been made to him by Colonel Daubeney of the 55th. When Colonel Warren's wound forced him to quit the field, Daubeney, as next senior officer, succeeded to the command of the 1st brigade of the 2nd Division, and he thereupon took measures for ascertaining the then actual strength of the three battalions which had thus come under his command. Going up for this purpose to the 95th, he found it on the Home Ridge under the command of Captain Sargent (for Vials as well as Champion and Hume had by that time been wounded), and from Sargent as its commander obtained the numbers he sought. If any one connects these facts with those mentioned *ante*, pp. 275, 276, he will see that the Zouave battalion under Dubos must have gained its victory over the Selinghinsk troops, and that Sargent and the 95th must have had time to come all the way back from St. Clement's Gorge before Pennefather's interview with Lord Raglan and Canrobert took place.

² I need hardly say that the statement in the text is not meant to negative the fact that soldiers, whether Russian or French, continued here and there to amuse themselves by trying long shots with their rifles. The fact that the French infantry desisted from farther fighting at eleven o'clock, is acknowledged by the French authorities. See extracts from some of them in the Appendix, No. XI. What the French say is—not that their infantry fought after eleven o'clock, but that at that hour the battle came virtually to an end.

troops in their rear; but, so far as concerned any active exertion of infantry power, our people were now left to fight on without any aid from the French.

General Canrobert's determination can not be justified by saying that the task attaching upon the Allies The import of this resolve. was essentially one of defense; for the enemy still held his dominion along the whole range of Shell Hill, including the Juts, East and West, and already, it seems, was intrenching himself on the ground he had won, with the purpose of including a great part of Mount Inkerman in the system of his Sebastopol defenses.¹ To suffer him to do this was to yield him a victory from which the magic hand of Todleben might quickly evolve great results. In short, it is plain that the task of dislodging him was one from which the Allies could scarce shrink if still they clung to the enterprise which had brought them over the seas. And, whatever General Canrobert may say for his plan of abandoning the offensive, there is at the least one circumstance which affords a presumption against it. The inaction of the Allies was what Dannenberg most had to desire, and this we shall presently see.

II.

The enemy's pretension to attack the Allies on the Cher-
The enemy's condition and prospects. sonese had been one resting mainly on his command of gross numbers; but, strange to say, he considered that even that source of strength had now failed him. He had prepared himself, as we saw, to throw upon Mount Inkerman full 40,000 men, and upon the adjoining ridge occupied by the Duke of Cambridge's camp,

¹ 'The siege-artillery of the latter [the English] was placed in position on the field of battle, and it was not possible for our field-artillery to contend against them with advantage. The superiority of the enemy's long-range rifles occasioned heavy losses amongst the horses and men of the artillery. This circumstance did not admit of our completing, without a great sacrifice of life, the redoubts which we had commenced during the fight upon the points which command the enemy's position, with the intention of connecting them with the works of the town of Sebastopol.'—*Prince Mentschikoff's Dispatch*, 6th November, 1854. The Russians, however, did not do so much toward intrenching as the Prince seems to have imagined they did. The battalions which brought gabions with them encountered defeat, and Todleben, who was charged with the duty, did not consider the attempt at intrenchment as being even worth mentioning. The ground after the battle showed few or no traces of the work indicated by Prince Mentschikoff. Still, if the English had consented (as the French were doing) to leave the enemy in possession of Shell Hill for the day, the hand of Todleben might have made the ground formidably strong within a very brief compass of time.

as many as 20,000 more, thus invading the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese with troops 60,000 strong, whilst the infantry the Allies brought against him on Mount Inkerman rose slowly from only 3000 at the first to less than 13,000 at last. Under such conditions, a complaint of want of numbers on the part of the Russians may at first sound almost absurd; but, if we assume, to begin with, that the Russian method of fighting required heavy, massive formations, we shall find that General Dannenberg at this time was really straitened. After the conclusion of the First Period, when more than 15,000 of his troops were extirpated, he had been driven to the necessity of executing his successive attacks for the most part with the same twelve battalions, and it is believed that, besides the wrecks of the 10th Division (regarded as almost valueless), the infantry which now remained to him on Mount Inkerman may be computed at no more than about 14,000, a number not largely exceeding the infantry strength of his adversaries.¹ Of these 14,000, 5000 were the survivors of the battalions which he had been keeping in the front of battle from the time he came into the field, whilst the remaining 9000 were troops hitherto held in reserve, as though consecrated to the one object of covering any retreat which the fortune of war might necessitate; and it would seem that, whether fettered by orders or by his own caution, the General did not venture to use them for any other purpose. Upon the whole, it is clear that, so long as he might consider himself bound by that restriction, he could not undertake any farther attack without having aid from elsewhere. Thus circumstanced, he might be pardoned if he felt, and felt bitterly, the want of reinforcements, or of help in some other shape.

Had no reinforcements been provided? Yes, lavishly. Reinforcements stood ready to the number of more than 20,000, and were, some of them, so near at hand as to be within shouting distance; but the hitherto inflexible Plan had, up to this time, interposed, and in strictness no doubt it was true that, having failed to lay open a path of ascent for Prince Gortchakoff by driving back our men to the Windmill, General Dannenberg had not entitled himself to the succor of even one fresh battalion. Still he evidently did

¹ Urosoff (who was an aid-de-camp of Mentschikoff's, and may be supposed to speak his chief's views) ascribes to Dannenberg at this time as many as 18,000 men; but the statement is one made under an apparent bias, and with a view to blame Dannenberg for retreating on insufficient grounds.

not imagine that the predicament in which he was placed had remained unobserved or unheeded. Prince Mentschikoff was present in person at a distance of only a few hundred yards; communication with the Tchernaya valley was practicable; and, upon the whole, General Dannenberg could not, and did not, believe that Gortchakoff would really forego the opportunity of placing the Allies between two fires.

Dannenberg's
object at this
time.

What he hoped, accordingly, was, that he might be able to hold his ground on Mount Inkerman, until the happy moment when the Allied troops now ranged in his front should be compelled to move off by the pressure of Gortchakoff's troops on their flank and right rear. Then, he might well believe, victory would be assured. On the other hand, Dannenberg was fighting with declivities at his back; and what above all else in the world he had to dread, was the contingency of being attacked, and defeated, and fiercely pursued on Shell Hill; for then the result to him and his people could hardly be other than an appalling disaster. Thus, by all the strongest motives that could actuate a commander, General Dannenberg was impelled to desire that he might not only be able to keep for some hours the footing he had gained on Shell Hill, but that also by some happy chance he might be suffered to hold his ground without having to fight in defense of it.

Canrobert's
course of ac-
tion in accord-
ance with
Dannenberg's
wishes.

General Canrobert commanded two-thirds of the troops opposing General Dannenberg; and, so far as concerned that large portion of the whole Allied force, he fulfilled the heart's desire of his adversary, by abandoning the offensive against him.

III.

For our people to agree with General Canrobert in abandoning the offensive against Dannenberg whilst he held seven-eighths of Mount Inkerman, would have been to make a final resolve conceding to him the victory; but in this truce, if so one may call it, between the French and the Russians, Lord Raglan did not concur, and within those contracted proportions to which the conflict had now been reduced it was destined to last two hours more.

Non-concur-
rence of the
English in
Canrobert's
plan of aban-
doning the of-
fensive.

The French thus standing apart, we shall have to follow the conflict betwixt the Russians and the English alone; but before going on, it seems right to mention an occurrence which, however trifling in itself, is still a subject of interest to the Czar's loyal people.

When Colonel Collingwood Dickson had so far overmastered the opposite batteries that he could well come the sight of some new object to strike at, an officer, using his field-glass, and looking toward the north-west, discovered a clump in the distance, which on further examination proved to be a small gathering of horsemen a mile and three quarters off. A shot aimed at this dark little target from one of the 18-pounder guns brought down at least one of the distant horsemen, and caused the rest to withdraw from the sight of our artillery-men by dropping back under the fold of the hill. The group thus disturbed (as our people afterward learned) was the one we saw formed on St. George's Brow by Prince Mentschikoff with the Head-quarter Staff and the two young Grand-Dukes. To those Princes the shot brought salvation. Prince Mentschikoff had formed so poor a conception of the duty devolving upon him as to imagine that, whilst making believe to take the brave lads into action, he ought to keep them quite out of fire. He has even imputed to himself a belief that it was his duty to watch over their safety in person, and indeed has caused men to understand that, for that absurd purpose, he deliberately abstained from taking his natural place in the battle. I myself disbelieve that last part of his confession;¹ but whatever his motive, the course he actually took is known beyond question. He kept the Grand-Dukes at his side on ground where they could not be harmed by horse, foot, or field-artillery, and was still in this way doing all that seemed needed for exposing them to the ridicule of Europe, when, happily for them, a ball discharged at long range from a siege-gun enabled him to report—and this too with literal truth—that the two lads had been under fire. The demeanor of the two youthful princes, when the missile swept past them, was all that a proud father could wish.

IV.

Excepting the small tract of ground at its southern extremity, the enemy still held all Mount Inkerman; and, from the moment—11 o'clock—when his French adversaries abandoned the offensive against him, the only forces

¹ My conclusion is that, although retaining the ostensible command, Prince Mentschikoff, in consequence of his failure at the Alma, was peremptorily forbidden to meddle in the Inkerman enterprise, and that that was the one sufficing cause which kept him from his place in the battle; but apparently he was unwilling to let men know or infer that his authority had been abridged, and liked better to have it supposed that he acted as a mere guardian or attendant of the imperial lads.

The enemy's hold now only to be challenged by 3000 English and the 18-pounders. remaining to challenge his dominion were the 3000 English soldiery we saw on Home Ridge or in front of it, supported by the two 18-pounders. And even that last power was now for a time in abeyance, for Dickson's ammunition had begun to fall short;¹ and, pending the arrival of a fresh supply, he suffered his artillery-men to share the repose which inwrapped the eastern part of the battle-field.² Of course, this suspension of a hitherto overmastering fire contributed to deepen the lull.

The troops under Haines at the Barrier, and the riflemen thrown out on his left, were too busily engaged with the enemy to be capable of finding repose; but elsewhere, speaking generally, the Allies at this hour had rest—rest not often broken by work, and little disturbed by anxiety.

People naturally though wrongly imagined that the enemy must have been yielding from the time when he abandoned the offensive, for they did not either know that he sought to intrench himself on the ground he already had won, or that—dreaming of aid from Prince Gortchakoff—he desired to stand firm and gain time. Our soldiery in most parts of the field had leisure to be conscious of their weariness, and to remember with sensations of faintness that they had not yet broken their fast.

It would be a mistake to imagine that under these strange conditions there arose on the part of the 3000 English a deliberate resolve to attack the position of Shell Hill without any aid from the French; for our people, in truth, did not know that the abstention of the French infantry was really destined to be permanent; and, besides—English like—they toiled in a great measure separately, each man at his own special combat—without much bending their minds to other parts of the field. We shall see how, without having vowed themselves beforehand to any heroic enterprise, they were gradually drawn on and on.

¹ The two guns had come into action with a supply of 100 shot for each.

² Captain Chermside was the very able officer chosen for the task of bringing up fresh ammunition. The physical difficulties of the task were so great (as compared with the scanty means available) that much energy and resource were needed in order to overcome them. Captain Chermside succeeded in bringing up another hundred shot for each gun. In the second period of his activity Dickson seems to have consumed even more ammunition than during the first one, for when he ceased firing there only remained, out of all the 400 brought up, about 25 shot.

It was in full consistency with his determination to stand henceforth on the defensive that we shall find the enemy still trying to possess himself of the Barrier; for the post was a clear encroachment upon his Shell Hill dominion. In the hours of his strength as an assailant the post at the Barrier had been practically an 'obstinate picket,' which he sought to drive in; and now, when his aim was defense, this same post at the Barrier was a 'lodgment' which he ought, if he could, to disperse.

Thus it happened that the combat at the Barrier, though animated by different motives, went on very much as before.

Haines, however, as we saw, had been constantly augmenting his strength in this part of the field by welcoming or commanding the accession of other troops; and, whether the Russians came on by the line of the Post-road to attack him in front, or whether swarming up from the bed of the Quarry Ravine they strove to turn his right flank, he always found means to repress them, and drive them back into their lair.¹

From an early period of the fight there had always been a chain of English soldiery on the left front of the Barrier, who, lying ensconced in the brush-wood, carried on a studious war of their own against the opposite batteries; and our riflemen in this part of the field, now increasing in numbers and boldness, made it more and more perilous for the artillery-men thus assailed to go on working their guns.

Our soldiery, whether combating at the Barrier or on its left front, passed gradually and almost unconsciously from the task of defense to the task of attack, for in truth the same kind of acts which before would have been acts of defense had now an aggressive force. To fight for the Barrier in the hours when Dannenberg was an assailant had been to defend the Home Ridge by fighting half a mile in its front. To fight for the Barrier now was, as it were, to hold open by force the gate of the enemy's castle, and grievously embarrass his defense. It was rather as a consequence of the enemy's having abandoned the offensive than from any abrupt change yet made in their own measures that the efforts of our people acquired an aggressive character.

But a power somewhere in abeyance now again came into activity. The strength of Shell Hill, after all, had been

¹ They were so sensible of their advantage in making all attacks from the Quarry Ravine that they never once tried to turn his *left* flank.

mainly owing to the magnificent vantage-ground it afforded to Dannenberg's batteries; and in proportion as it might become more and more difficult for the artillery there planted to hold its ground, the position of course would not only become less and less tenable, but less and less worth defending. It was therefore, as we said long ago, that Lord Raglan was substantially taking the offensive when he began to subdue the enemy's batteries by means of his heavier metal. After the interval of comparative repose occasioned by want of ammunition, this distinctly aggressive power was called into action once more, and again the 18-pounder shot flew, tearing into the enemy's batteries, and compelling them—not indeed to retreat altogether, but to writhe and to shrink and to shift their ground.

The Russians held on with a fortitude which was akin to martyrdom, for they could offer no effective resistance to the tyranny of the two 18-pounders, nor even to the fire of our riflemen, and yet were suffering cruelly. Of their batteries some were gallantly though hopelessly remaining in action, whilst others moved, flinching from the unequal encounter, without lapsing into retreat; but all of them, more or less, were loading the ground with horses and men killed and wounded, and the wrecks of a disabled artillery. Whether owing to the desperate energy of the gunners, toiling hard to the last, it might be difficult to say; but more here than elsewhere in the field men bit at the ground as they died, seizing mouthfuls of earth and herbage with their teeth.¹ The battalions still kept in the front were all of them troops which had been defeated again and again, and had suffered frightful losses. The orders to intrench the position had produced no results of such kind as to be a help in the existing emergency. General Dannenberg had had two horses shot under him, and almost the whole of his staff and other attendants had been killed or wounded.² Yet sustained, it would seem, by the faith that Prince Gortchakoff sooner or later must surely come to the rescue, he maintained his ground with a firmness which was the more deserving of praise since he had to go on enduring without being able to attack, and without even doing any thing effectively in the way of aggressive defense.

Such was still the condition of things, when the energies of Haines and Lord West brought about an attack on Shell Hill.

¹ See note in the Appendix, offering some explanation of this.

² Prince Mentschikoff in his dispatch says literally *all*.

V.

Whilst Haines stood defending the Barrier against every successive attack, he was never without some ambition in the direction of his left front. There, from almost the beginning of the action, and with but little intermission, our riflemen ensconced in the brush-wood had been harassing the enemy's artillery-men engaged on the nape of Shell Hill; but the fire thus directed became more destructive than ever when Haines extended his power to the part of the field whence it came, and gave our men there engaged the support of his troops at the Barrier.

At length the time came when, perceiving, as he thought, signs of weakness in the forces opposed to him, Colonel Haines conceived the idea of operating in the direction of his left front with means somewhat more powerful than before, and a purpose more distinctly aggressive. He threw forward a few score of soldiery—all armed with the rifle—and assigned them a task which was other and greater than that of merely harassing the enemy's batteries, for they were to work their way forward until they could deliver such a fire as must make it hard for the Russian artillery-men to go on serving their guns. This measure was far from representing the utmost of what Haines sought to accomplish; but his desire to undertake a more weighty attack with the soldiery assembled at the Barrier had been baffled by opposing counsels.

Now, however, it happened that—apparently without any concert—the wish of his heart was in some measure compassed for him by one of his personal friends, an officer of great vigor and ability, not shrinking from what some might think an undue assumption of power.¹

From his undisturbed post by the Mikriakoff Glen, Lord

¹ Lord West (the late Earl De la Warr) commanded, as we saw, a wing of the 21st Fusileers, the regiment to which Haines belonged. In anticipation of a probable conflict on Mount Inkerman, these two gifted officers had had the forethought to go over the field some days before, and it may be inferred that the important part they both of them took in the action was in some measure owing to a knowledge of the ground thus wisely acquired beforehand. Though communicating to me full information on other subjects, the late Earl abstained from volunteering any statement of the part he had taken in bringing the Inkerman battle to its final crisis; and I am assured that this abnegation of self, conjoined with the fearless assumption of power above recorded, was thoroughly characteristic of his exalted nature. 'A splendid soldier!' writes one brother officer of him. 'No truer gentleman, no more honest or braver man ever lived.' Lord West's military rank was that of a Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel.

Lord West. West came across to a spot in the more central part of the field where Lieutenant Acton was standing with the remnant of his little detachment of the 77th—troops some 50 or 60 in number—and said to him, ‘I see several of your men here; get them together,’ and then—pointing whilst he spoke to the westernmost of the Russian batteries disposed on Shell Hill—a battery which was firing on the position where Acton’s men stood—Lord West ordered Lieutenant Acton to go and join two companies which he said would be found at a spot that he indicated, a spot lying some distance off, and added: ‘Order them to join you and advance against the battery.’ Lord West went on to intimate that Acton’s object must be to take the battery or drive it off.

The combat undertaken by Acton. Lieutenant Acton having formed up his men marched off in the direction assigned; and found the two companies indicated by Lord West on a spot at the edge of some brush-wood, from which the ground sloped up toward the battery over a distance of about 800 yards. The battery was at this time throwing round-shot, which passed over the heads of our soldiery.

Acton drew up his men in a space which he found between the two indicated companies, so that these, with the one thus joining them, formed all three together one line, and were facing the battery which Lord West had marked out for attack.

Acton then called to his side an officer from each of the two companies which formed respectively the right and the left of the line, and told them what Lord West’s orders were, saying, ‘If you will attack the battery on either flank, I’ll do ‘so in front;’ and he recommended that the advance should be immediate. Both the officers thus called upon to act refused in plain terms to do so, saying that they [the three companies] were not strong enough. Then Acton said, ‘If you won’t join me, I’ll obey my orders and attack with the ‘77th;’ and so saying, he ordered his men to advance; but not a man of them moved, for they were checked, as was not unnatural, by finding that their captain was seeking to act in defiance of the opinion given by the two other officers, and with only one company instead of all three.

Acton said, ‘Then I’ll go by myself,’ and moved forward accordingly; but he soon found himself quite alone, at a distance of some thirty or forty yards in front of his men. Presently, however, James Tyrrell, a private of the 77th, ran out of the ranks and placed himself by the side of his cap-

tain, saying, 'Sir, I'll stand by you.' Then a soldier sprang out from the company which was on the right of the 77th men, and placed himself close abreast of the captain, whilst Tyrrell continued to stand on the other side of him. The officer and the two soldiers moved forward toward the battery, and they compassed a few yards without being followed; but then suddenly, to Acton's infinite joy, the whole of his 77th men rushed forward after their captain, and formed up behind him.

Acton divided his slender force into three parts, sending two of them—each under a sergeant—to turn the battery on both flanks, whilst he himself in the centre, with the rest of his force, undertook to assail it in front. He advanced with his men at a run. The opposing battery soon opened upon him with canister, but disabled only a few of his men, and the onset continued unchecked. The two dissentient companies did not long remain halted on the ground where Acton had left them, but, on the contrary, worked their way steadily up in the direction of the battery; and it is evident that, although not concerted with Acton, this advance of troops on both his right and left rear must have helped to mask his real weakness from the eyes of the enemy. Moreover, Horsford, under orders from Haines, was already advancing toward the ground which had been reached by the two dissentient companies: and this was not all; for a distant yet formidable power now began to partake of the combat.

First one, then another of the mighty 18-pounder shot flew whanging over the heads of our soldiery to strike at the same hapless battery which they were assailing; and, Acton's men still tearing onward to attack it in front and flank, the enemy's artillery officers could no longer keep down their fear that the guns, unless instantly moved, might fall into the hands of our people. One of their guns had been already dismounted. In an instant teams of horses appeared, and besides the artillery-men—now limbering up in all haste—a concourse of soldiers brought up for the purpose was thronging the rear of the battery and helping to save it. Toiling thus under fire, the Russians every moment lost horses and men, but went valiantly on with their task, and proved able to carry off every gun of the battery, including even the one that had been dismounted. When Acton and his people ran up into the site of the battery, their prizes were only one gun-carriage and a couple of artillery tumbrils.

Retreat of
the assailed
battery.

Opportunately, as though he were seeing into the enemy's heart at the moment of his bitterest trouble, an English staff-officer—Armstrong—came galloping up toward the ground which Acton had reached, and by gesture and voice, as he rode, drawing forward all the bodies or clusters of troops he was able to find in his path. Amongst these was a whole company of his own—the 49th—regiment, well led by Lieutenant Astley. Colonel Horsford, with his forty or fifty men, was already high up the hill-side. Altogether, perhaps, before long, though in small and separate bodies, there were some three hundred of our wearied soldiery toiling on with what strength they had left to reach the site of the battery, and afterward advancing beyond it in eager, though feeble pursuit.

That a battery when left unsupported should be driven from its position by the kind of attack we have witnessed—this might not have been in itself an incident of any great moment; but the guns we have thus seen withdrawn had been so disposed on Shell Hill that to strike them back out of the line was to break a set front of battle; and the insult was one scarce to be borne by a general still pretending to victory. But then, if the Russians should undertake to re-assert their power, they might well enough fear that they would be engendering a fight on Shell Hill, and thus fetching that very contingency which they could not but hold in sore dread; for they stood, as we know, on an upland, with a numerous and much crippled artillery in their charge, and difficult steepes behind them. Occurring at the place where it did, and occurring, too, at such a conjuncture, the dislodgment of the battery was an incident which might force on decisive counsels. It might either provoke an attack, or compel an instant retreat.

When the gunners, as we saw, limbered up and began to retreat, there was no one, so far as I learn, who ascertained the very time of the movement by casting a look at his watch; but, succeeding as it did to a long train of ills already suffered by Dannenberg, the spectacle of this hapless battery under the mercies of the 18-pounder shot may well have inflicted upon him the final, the conquering pang which at length subdued his will.¹ What he says himself is that

¹ Apparently Dannenberg's final resolve must have been brought about suddenly and by some new calamity; for otherwise it is hardly imaginable that he could have omitted to communicate on the subject with Prince Mentschikoff. See *post*, note, p. 296.

he was brought to his decisive resolve—not by any mere notion that the continuance of the struggle would be fruitless, but—by the actual stress of battle as felt at the moment—by the ‘murderous’—so he expresses it—the ‘murderous fire of ‘artillery.’¹

In some haste, as it would seem, and at all events without consulting his ostensible chief (who was sitting all this while in his saddle, within reach of a five minutes’ canter), General Dannenberg at about one o’clock determined to retreat, and gave his orders accordingly.² He directed that the batteries which had suffered the most should first be withdrawn; and, to cover the retreat, he ordered forward the Vladimir regiment, directing also that the light batteries should for the present retain their positions, supported by twelve of the battalions which he had hitherto kept in reserve.

When the advance of the Vladimir regiment should be sufficiently pronounced, the eight brave battalions of Okhotsk and Iäkoutsik were at length to begin their retreat.

So at last the battle was won.

The statement of the Russian narrator who fixed ‘about one o’clock’ as the time when Dannenberg yielded, is supported by English testimony. We saw how at break of day General Codrington—always watchful and vigorous—gave the first authentic alarm announcing this Inkerman battle, and now it so happened that he was the first to send tidings of the commencing retreat. Looking from his vantage-ground on the Victoria Ridge, and across the line of march which connected Shell Hill with the West Sapper’s Road, he saw a part of the enemy’s artillery beginning all at once to withdraw, fixed the time by a glance at his watch (which showed him ‘a quarter to one’), and—by Adye,³ who was then at his side—dispatched an instant message to Lord Raglan, acquainting him with the change thus observed.

¹ ‘Bientôt le feu meurtrier de l’artillerie ennemie nous contraignit à faire ‘retraite sur la ville.’—*Dannenberg’s Dispatch*. For proof that this expression referred to the fire of the 18-pounders, see extract from Prince Mentschikoff’s dispatch, quoted *ante* in note, p. 281.

² ‘Vers une heure.’—*Todleben*, p. 478. Lord Raglan says: ‘It was not ‘till the afternoon that the enemy were finally repulsed and forced to retreat.’—*To Duke of Newcastle*, November 6, 1854.

³ Now General Sir John Adye, R. A., K. C. B.






THE FIGHT ON MOUNT INKERMAN


EXPLANATIONS.

*Sixth Period.
The final crisis.*

- AA. Two Algerine battalions
 - ZZZ Two battalions of 3rd Zouaves & of the 2nd Zouaves.
 - E.G. Wing of 3rd Battalion Foot Chasseurs
 - M. Battalion of the 3rd Infanterie de Marine.
 - H. Colonel Haines in command at the Barrier.
- The eight Russian battalions in the Quarry Ravine are those of the Okhotsk and the Iikontsk regiments.*

Scale.





SEVENTH PERIOD.

FROM 1 P.M. TO 8 P.M.

I.

The battalions thrown forward by Dannenberg to shield his retreat were propelled, it may be, under some misconception of orders, or else, perhaps, by an outburst of warlike enthusiasm which repudiated the notion of yielding, and insisted upon another attack. A light breath of air springing up rolled the smoke on Shell Hill toward the west, and disclosed to one of our people a heavy column descending. The mass was coming on in seemingly eager haste, as though minded to attack the Allies at that very part of their heights where the two 18-pounders were in battery.

The troops thus descried were the four battalions of the Vladimir regiment which, having been directed, as we saw, to cover the retreat, were now transcending their orders by moving fast down the hill-side, as though to deliver an attack. No longer broken up, as at first, into company columns, these 2000 men had all gathered into one mass.¹ The officer who had descried the column was Captain Chermiside, then standing near one of the 18-pounders with Colonel Fitzmayer at his side. Another sure look with a field-glass, a word to Colonel Fitzmayer, a loud eager call from Fitzmayer to Collingwood Dickson, a few words from Dickson to D'Aguilar and Sinclair, and first one, then another, and another again of the tyrant 18-pounder shot were tearing through the ranks of the column. The stricken mass turned and fell back, undergoing, as it moved, cruel slaughter, but not lapsing into confusion.

II.

Thus discomfited in his effort to cover the movement by help of his Vladimir regiment, and retreating with vast trains of artillery upon difficult steepes, the enemy might seem to be now at the mercy of the Allies; for, unless he should owe his sal-

¹ The strength of the Vladimir regiment (which had suffered terribly at the Alma) was only 2132. The change of formation tends to confirm the surmise that the force moved with a mind to attack, for the Russians of those days imagined that a dense column was the most formidable instrument with which to strike a blow.

vation to their forbearance, it is hard to see by what prowess he could escape a crushing disaster.

But happily for him, the French still respected their foe, though defeated, and could not be persuaded to take any part in pursuing him. Why the task was declined by Canrobert it would be hard to say; for he had, as we saw, present with him some 8000 infantry—including 5000 fresh troops—with a powerful horse-artillery and 700 cavalry well accustomed to ground like Mount Inkerman;¹ whilst, being the master of 40,000 effective French troops assembled in the Crimea, he could afford to lose men for a purpose.² With the English commander, as we know, it was far otherwise; but still he did not fail to perceive that the vigorous pursuit of an army retreating upon difficult steepes, with cumbrous trains of artillery, might bring about signal results—perhaps even the fall of Sebastopol—and despite the exceeding scantiness of his numbers and the wearied state of his people, he desired that the Allies should press the retreat by advancing along their whole line. Speaking, as I can not doubt, under an impulse given him by Lord Raglan, General Pennefather proposed that the French troops on the right, aided by the English in front, should make a forward movement, and hurry the departure of the Russian troops; but to this, for some reason, General Canrobert would not consent.³

The existing conditions were such that a movement of the kind thus proposed must have put the Russians in peril of an almost overwhelming disaster; but it would have been ob-

¹ They were, as we saw, the 'Chasseurs d'Afrique,' Frenchmen with African horses. Lord George Paget, who moved in support to them with the Light Brigade, was forcibly struck with their power of moving rapidly over rough and obstructed ground.

² 41,786 was the official return of Canrobert's strength on the morning of the 5th of November.

³ In a private letter addressed to the Duke of Newcastle, December 31, 1854, Lord Raglan says: 'Toward the close of the battle [of Inkerman] Major-General Pennefather proposed that the French troops on the right, aided by the English in front, should make a forward movement, and hurry the departure of the Russians. General Canrobert was unwilling to act upon the suggestion, and has often since, as I understand, expressed his regret that he did not attend to it.'

Pennefather's recollection was rather to the effect that Lord Raglan himself had personally made the proposal; but, relying on Lord Raglan's accuracy, I feel sure that Pennefather must have been the spokesman, though I also regard it as certain that he received his impulse from Lord Raglan. Lord Raglan, from policy, and to avoid the mischief—nay, danger—of a refusal given direct from one chief to the other, was accustomed to adopt this method of imparting a proposal to the French.

No pursuit undertaken by the Allies. viously unwarrantable for Lord Raglan to launch his weary troops in pursuit, unless he were to be supported on his right by a corresponding advance of the French. So, in spite of all the reasons there were for endeavoring to make their victory signal, the Allies abstained from pursuit.

The gunners of the Allies on the Home and Fore Ridges did all that they usefully could to follow the retreating enemy with artillery missiles; and it may be added that from the Lancaster Battery on the other side the ravine our sailors threw shot and rockets, which were not without their effect; but, except by means of this kind, and by the little adventurous onset of which we shall presently hear, the enemy was left to go unmolested.

III.

The retreat had been some time in progress, when an effort to countermand it was made, and that, too, by one who—ostensibly—had a right to exact strict obedience. Down to a time considerably later than one o'clock, and on the lower ground not very distant from his original station on St. George's Ravine, Prince Mentschikoff still sat in his saddle attending the two young Grand-Dukes, and apparently left undisturbed by any requests for his sanction of the measure in hand, or any attempt to consult him;¹ but when he saw that the troops were retreating, he rode up at full gallop to General Dannenberg, and said, 'Is it you that have ordered the retreat? It is impossible for us to fall back.' General Dannenberg answered: that the soldiers had fought like very lions, that they had exhausted their whole power, that the artillery and the regiments of infantry were completely undone. Also, pointing, whilst he spoke, in the direction of Gortchakoff's forces, he said they had failed to perform the part assigned them. Prince Mentschikoff replied by peremptorily ordering Dannenberg to arrest the retreat, saying, 'Stop the troops here.'² 'Highness,' said Dannenberg, 'to stop the troops here would be to let them be destroyed to the last man. If your Highness thinks otherwise, have the goodness to give the orders yourself,

¹ This seems proved by what follows.

² Tchaplinsky, Dannenberg's aid-de-camp. According to Urosoff (Prince Mentschikoff's aid-de-camp), the part of Mount Inkerman on which the Prince wished to stop the retreat was ground selected by him on account of its 'being in a line with' [qy. covered by the fire of] the Malakoff.

Prince Mentschikoff deliberately set at naught by Dannenberg.

‘and take from me the command.’¹ To this the Prince did not answer one word, but at once turned his horse’s head, and rode off in the direction of Sebastopol.²

General Dannenberg’s language was either that of an officer deliberately taking upon himself the guilt of insubordination, or else of one knowing himself to be the real though not the ostensible commander; but the last supposition is apparently the true one.³ The process of retreating continued without disclosing any more deference to the will of Prince Mentschikoff than if he had been in reality what he virtually said that he was, that is, a sort of Lord Equerry intrusted with the care of Grand-Dukes. In one of the streets of Sebastopol, not long after this, the Prince was announcing to a naval officer that the retreat had been ordered, and adding that why the measure had been taken he could not at all understand.⁴

IV.

By continuing to keep a large proportion of his guns in battery upon the crest of Shell Hill and the Juts, General

¹ Tchaplinsky. The version of Urosoff (though he writes in a spirit antagonistic to Dannenberg) is closely similar. According to him, Dannenberg answered: ‘I do not take on myself the execution of your order. Will your Excellency please to execute it yourself? I surrender my command.’

² The occurrence of this scene between Mentschikoff and Dannenberg at an hour considerably past *one* o’clock, affords a decisive contradiction to the assertions of the French, who would have it believed that the battle virtually ended at *eleven* in the forenoon. The incident also strengthens the inference, see *ante*, p. 291, which would connect Dannenberg’s determination to retreat immediately with that ‘last ounce’ of adversity that was laid upon him when one of his batteries retreated under Acton’s assault. For if the determination to retreat had not resulted from the stress of some fresh occurrence, it is hard to believe that Dannenberg would have omitted to go through the form of conferring with his ostensible chief before coming to so momentous a resolve as that of abandoning Mount Inkerman. A five-minute’s canter would have brought the two generals together at any time, and yet Mentschikoff had plainly remained unapprised of the determination to retreat until he saw the operation going on.

³ In his dispatch, Mentschikoff, after enumerating the forces which were to operate on Mount Inkerman, says: ‘The command of the troops was intrusted’—he does not say by whom—‘to General Dannenberg.’ My impression is that, by virtue of orders from the Czar, Dannenberg was the real commander on Mount Inkerman, but that (as was natural) the language announcing this decision sought to avoid giving more pain than could be helped to Prince Mentschikoff, and left it possible for him to think he could *claim* a paramount authority, without making him feel strong enough to *insist upon* being obeyed.

⁴ This was recounted to me by the officer to whom Mentschikoff addressed his words.

Dannenberg's method of conducting the retreat.

Dannenberg still presented to his adversaries a specious front of battle; and under cover of this the remainder of his artillery began to draw off in two columns, one descending to make for Sebastopol by the West Sapper's Road, the other going down through St. George's Ravine, and retreating along the shore of the Roadstead in the direction of Inkerman Bridge. Of the bodies of infantry which had been ordered to commence their retreat there were some which attended the steps of the two artillery columns, but others made off by the Post-road and the bed of the Quarry Ravine.

Difficulty of withdrawing the Russian artillery from Mount Inkerman.

Having first sent away the crippled portions of his ordnance, the enemy proceeded to withdraw his batteries gradually from the front by removing four guns at a time; and, although taking place under strong artillery-fire, the operation was conducted throughout with unfailing steadiness. To our artillery-men, as indeed to all others well acquainted with such operations, it has always seemed that the task of withdrawing the enemy's cumbrous and now shattered artillery from the top of Mount Inkerman to its foot must have been one of extraordinary difficulty. The exploit was one which elicited the admirable perseverance and steadiness of the Russian soldiery in their hour of adversity; but what, after all, made it possible was the assent of the Allies. In the absence of any pursuit, the task, however immense, could scarce fail to be compassed at last by continued and strenuous efforts.

Circumstance favoring the task.

The two last Russian batteries on Shell Hill.

Lord Raglan's way of accelerating their withdrawal.

The last gun withdrawn from Shell Hill.

There at length came a time when along the whole crest of Shell Hill two batteries only remained; but these, favored perhaps by some advantage of ground, were maintaining an unequal conflict against the two 18-pounders with valiant obstinacy. Lord Raglan, understanding apparently that Canrobert would persist in hanging back until the last gun should disappear from Shell Hill, became anxious that the enemy's two remaining batteries should no longer delay their retreat; but his way of accelerating their withdrawal was one that would scarce have occurred to any other than a practiced soldier. He sent a message to Dickson, requesting him to cease firing; for then, he said, he imagined that the two opposing batteries would probably begin their retreat. His augury, or rather his insight, proved almost instantly true; for when Dickson ceased firing the two batteries began to limber up; and

before many minutes the last of the enemy's guns had been withdrawn from Shell Hill.¹

By about three o'clock,² the enemy had withdrawn all his forces from the topland of Mount Inkerman, leaving only behind him, amongst the lesser wrecks of battle, his ghastly thousands of dead and wounded men. He had still far to go, and had still immense toil to endure before his retreat would be accomplished; but it was on the steep descents of the Mount, or on the marsh-land by Inkerman Bridge, and no longer on the old field of battle, that he might have to encounter fresh troubles.

When the enemy had disappeared from the toplands of Mount Inkerman, his two steamships at the head of the Roadstead opened fire from their starboard broadsides, and swept the now vacant ground on the eastern part of Shell Hill with blasts of round-shot and shell.

V.

After the time when the last of the enemy's forces had descended from the Inkerman toplands half an hour was suffered to pass; and then General Canrobert threw forward a battery supported by two battalions of Zouaves to the crest of East Jut.³ He had entreated at one time that the Zouaves should be supported by the 'bonnet de poil;' but, if his request found assent at the moment, it did not result at this hour in a useless advance of the Guards.

The French guns, it would seem, wrought some mischief amongst the columns retreating over the marsh, but the steamships soon interposed, striking down some of Canrobert's people; and thenceforth the enemy was no longer molested in his eastern line of retreat.

¹ When he had been ordered to cease firing from Hill Bend, Dickson, at the instance of Lord Raglan, made strenuous efforts (which were continued even until dark) to bring forward one of his 18-pounders; but the physical difficulties of the task—as compared with the means of overcoming them—were too great to allow of its being brought to the opposite heights in time for farther usefulness.

² At half-past two, according to the French.

³ The Lainsecq battery. The French official accounts place this advance at 'about three o'clock,' but agree with the text in placing it half an hour later than the moment when the last of the Russians disappeared from the Inkerman toplands.

VI.

General Canrobert and Lord Raglan rode up side by side to the East Jut, and thence surveyed Pauloff's forces retreating across the Inkerman marsh; but it was in speaking to one of his own staff that the English commander imparted the singularly accurate surmise he then hazarded.¹ Conjoining what he saw on the marsh with his other impressions of the battle, he said, 'I have been attacked by 40,000 men.' He could hardly have been otherwise than conscious that the repression of these multitudinous assailants had been largely owing to the happy conception and the firm resolve by which he had found himself able to bring up the two 18-pounders; but he was always forgetful of self; and it happened that there rode up a man who had helped him—and helped him superbly—in giving effect to his orders. For once Lord Raglan gave utterance to a word which was scarce to be found in any of his great master's dispatches. He said to Collingwood Dickson, 'You have covered yourself with 'glory.'

The French and the English commanders dismounted. General Canrobert, with his arm in a sling, and resting the farther end of a field-glass on his horse's saddle, stood observing the march of the troops he had suffered to escape him, and already, perhaps, experiencing his first bitter pangs of regret for opportunities lost.

The ground here, as elsewhere on Mount Inkerman, was strewn with dead and wounded Russians. From some of these last there came cries and moans which were piteous to hear. Some found means to cry out for 'the hospital,' some for 'water,' some only for pity. Men appealed in their agonies to a common faith, and invoked the name of her who must be dear—so they fondly imagined—to all the Churches of Christ. There was one of these wounded Russians who crawled to the side of Lord Raglan, imploring for a draught of water. Lord Raglan—with his own hand—with his one kindly hand—made haste to raise the man's head, supporting him tenderly in a sitting posture, and asked, whilst he did so, for means to quench the sufferer's thirst; but he asked in vain. No officer near had a flask which had not been drained. Water, water, a drink of cold water, was more than the chief could grant in this, his hour of victory.

¹ To Wetherall, I think, or, at all events, in his hearing.

VII.

Retreat of the artillery brought up from Sebastopol. All this while the great train of artillery which Soimonoff had brought up from Sebastopol was falling back grievously shattered to make for the Karabel Faubourg;¹ and—although with less than sixty men—an effort to break in upon its line of retreat was boldly yet sagaciously made.

Colonel Waddy's enterprise. The enterprise did not originate with troops disposed on Mount Inkerman. Descending from his post on the Victoria Ridge, with one company of the 50th Regiment,² Colonel Waddy found means to cross over the depths of the Careenage Ravine, and thence make his way up to the north-western angle of Mount Inkerman. Once there, he began to advance through a covert of brush-wood against the huge artillery train then retreating across his front by the West Sapper's Road.

Chance at first seemed to favor his enterprise; for not only was he upon the flank of a retreating artillery, with its gunners, its guns, its gun-carriages, its drivers, its wagons, its great teams of draught-horses, all jammed into one crowded column of route several hundred yards deep, but he approached it besides at a time when—overtaken by missiles which threw down some of its tumbrils—the mass had been brought to a lock, and when, moreover, the infantry—not dreaming of any attack on ground so close to Sebastopol—was taking a route lower down, which passed along the shore of the gulf.

The enemy considered that his hampered train of artillery was simply helpless against infantry, and being prevented by the brush-wood from detecting the paucity of his assailants, he seems to have believed for a moment that the enormous prize they were coveting must be upon the very point of falling into their hands.³

Its frustration by Colonel de Todleben. But it happened that the Czar's greatest soldier was riding in this part of the field. Colonel de Todleben at once apprehended the full extent of the peril, and instantly judged that the assailants should be—not simply checked and fended off with a light hand,

¹ This portion of the enemy's artillery comprised 38 guns, of which 22 were heavy guns of position.

² The No. 7 company, with a strength of 56 men.

³ 'Profitant de cet obstacle [*i. e.*, the lock in the artillery train] les tirailleurs 'ennemis abrités derrière les buissons s'approchèrent si près de nos pièces 'qu'ils étaient sur le point de s'en emparer.'—*Défense de Sebastopol*, p. 480.

but—peremptorily stopped in their advance by interposing ample masses betwixt them and the obstructed artillery. As a first means of facing the onset he laid hold of a company of the Ouglitz regiment—the nearest foot-soldiers at hand—and sent it forward in skirmishing order to confront the assailants. He stopped the march of the whole Boutirsk régiment—a force more than 3000 strong—throwing forward two of its battalions in a double line of company columns, and holding the two other battalions in reserve. To give confidence to the infantry he even threw forward four guns—followed afterward by more—and caused them to open fire upon our slender thread of soldiery.

Stopped thus in the midst of their onset upon the flank of the troubled artillery, the venturesome company of the 'Fiftieth' could now do no more than ply the fire of their rifles; and Todleben meanwhile dispatched Skariatine to Admiral Istomine, requesting that a number of sailors might be sent up to aid the artillery-men.

Skariatine—a young naval officer of great zeal and ability—was not a man likely to fail in any practicable mission;¹ and he not only brought back a large body of sailors as demanded by Todleben, but, with them, two battalions of sappers. The superadded resources thus brought up to aid the artillery-men were applied with great zeal and great skill to the object of unlocking and moving this heavy agglomerate of ordnance-carriages, and gradually dragging them in; but the evening had reached eight o'clock before the last piece of cannon passed back within the lines of defense.

8 o'clock. The enemy's retreat accomplished, and the Inkerman fight at an end.

So ended the fight on Mount Inkerman.

I.

From this fight on Mount Inkerman there resulted, it seems, to the enemy a loss of 10,729² in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Amongst his killed or wounded there were six generals; and, if Russian grades were like ours, the number might be stated at twelve;

Losses sustained in the fight on Mount Inkerman.

¹ The then youthful lieutenant was destined to become highly distinguished for the bravery and zeal he afterward displayed in the defense of the 'ouvrages blanches.'

² Official return. This gives 2988 as the number of the killed; but I do not introduce that figure into the text, because it was evidently impossible for the Russians, when excluded from the field of battle, to know with any certainty how many of their 'missing' had been killed.

By the Russians.

for, besides Soimonoff, and Villebois, and Ochterlonè, and the rest of the six stricken chiefs having actual rank as generals, there were slain or wounded six other officers, who each of them held a command extending over thousands of men.¹ The enemy lost altogether 256 officers. Bringing fifty battalions to Mount Inkerman, he kept sixteen in reserve, and all those to the last remained sound; but in the thirty-four fighting battalions with which he delivered his successive attacks dire havoc was wrought. Twelve of them were all but annulled; and twelve more were so shattered and beaten as to become for the time nearly powerless, leaving not more than ten out of the whole thirty-four which continued to be at all fit for combat; and even in those—but more especially in the four Okhotsk battalions, where the ‘killed’ exceeded the ‘wounded’—the losses were ruinously great.

By the English.

In proportion to what they achieved, the losses of the English were moderate, but great, very great, in comparison with their scanty numbers. Out of a strength of only 7464 infantry collected on Mount Inkerman, with 200 cavalry and 38 guns, they lost in killed and wounded 2357, of whom 597 were killed.² Of their officers 130 were struck, 39 being killed and 91 wounded.

It is believed that of the Guards engaged in their false position by the Sand-bag Battery, nearly a half were either killed or wounded in the space of an hour;³ and in the right wing of the 21st Fusileers—a body which fought in the centre—the proportion of losses proved even more huge; whilst in the 20th and 57th Regiments it was not much less. Because fighting for the most part in scanty numbers, the combatants of the 2nd Division were able to carry on their lengthened struggle from the hour before day-break to one in the afternoon without losing more than about three-eighths of their strength; and in the companies of the 77th under Egerton, which exerted, as we saw, a great sway over the course of events, the proportion of killed and wounded was little more than one-fifth.

¹ Viz., the commandant of the artillery, and five chiefs of ‘regiments,’ comprising each on an average more than 2800 men.

² Official Return by our adjutant-general; the numbers being got at by deducting the losses which did not occur on Mount Inkerman.

³ The strength of the Guards at Inkerman was 1331; but the portion of them above mentioned as engaged by the Sand-bag Battery numbered only 1098. No doubt, some of the 594 casualties which befell the Guards generally occurred in other parts of the field, but not, I believe, so many as to vitiate the above statement.

LIST OF CASUALTIES ON MOUNT INKERMANN AFFECTING TEN ENGLISH GENERALS AND FIVE COLONELS OR LIEUT.-COLONELS, WHO BECAME EACH THE SENIOR OFFICER OF EITHER A DIVISION OR A BRIGADE.

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Commanding.</i>	<i>Casualty.</i>	<i>By whom succeeded.</i>
Br.-Gen. Strangways, Lieut.-Gen. H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge,	The Artillery, The 1st Division,	Killed by the side of Lord Raglan. Arm grazed by a ball, and horse shot under him.	Colonel Daecres.
Maj.-Gen. H. Bentinck, Colonel Upton,	The Brigade of Guards, "	Wounded, and disabled.	Colonel Upton.
Maj.-Gen. Pennefather, Colonel Warren,	The 2nd Division, 1st brigade of 2nd Division,	Horse shot under him. Wounded, and disabled.	Lieut.-Col. Danbenny.
Lieut.-Col. Danbenny, Br.-Gen. Adams,	" 2nd brigade of 2nd Division,	Wounded. Wounded mortally.	Major Farren.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. Cathcart,	4th Division,	Killed.	General Goldie, and, when he was killed, by Col. Horn.
Br.-Gen. Goldie,	1st brigade of do.; afterward 4th Division,	Killed.	Lord West.
The same, commanding Colonel Horn,	"	Killed.	Colonel Horn.
Br.-Gen. Torrens, Lieut.-Col. Horsford,	2nd brigade of do., "	Wounded. Wounded mortally.	Lieut.-Col. Horsford.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. Brown, Br.-Gen. Buller,	The Light Division, 2nd brigade of do.,	Wounded, and disabled. Two horses shot under him, and dis- abled.	Gen. Codrington. Colonel Egerton.

Although not disabled on the day of the battle, Colonel Upton was afterward invalidated by his wound, and Colonel Reynardson (Grenadiers) succeeded to the command of the Brigade of Guards, Col. F. W. Hamilton then succeeding to the command of the Grenadiers.

LIST OF OFFICERS COMMANDING BATTERIES, REGIMENTS, OR LESSER DETACHMENTS OF FOOT, WHO WERE KILLED OR WOUNDED ON MOUNT INKERMAN, OR HAD THEIR HORSES SHOT UNDER THEM.

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Commanding.</i>	<i>Casualty.</i>	<i>By whom succeeded.</i>
Lieut.-Col. Gambier, Major P. Townsend, Colonel Reynardson, Colonel Upton, Colonel Walker,	The two 18-pounders, The P Battery, Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, S. F. Guards,	Wounded, and disabled. Killed. Horse shot under him. Wounded. Thrice wounded, and disabled.	Lieut.-Col. Collingwood Dickson. Captain Hoste.
Lieut.-Col. Mauleverer, Colonel Warren,	30th Regiment, " "	Wounded, and disabled. Wounded, and disabled.	Col. Francis Seymour, who was himself also wounded, but not being disabled, he brought the regiment out of action. Major Patullo.
Major Champion,	95th " "	Wounded mortally.	Lieut.-Col. Daubeney, who was himself also wounded. First by Major Hume, and when he too was wounded, by Captain Vialls, and when he also was wounded, by Capt. Sargent, who marched the regiment off the field when the battle was over. Major Eman.
Lieut.-Col. Carpenter, Lieut.-Col. Haley, Major Dalton,	41st " " " "	Killed. Wounded, and disabled. Killed.	Major Farren. Major Thornton Grant.
Colonel Horn, Lieut.-Col. Ainslie, Captain Stanley,	20th " " " "	Wounded. Wounded mortally.	Captain Eveleigh. Major Ramsay Stuart.
Lieut.-Col. Swiney, Lieut.-Col. Henry Smyth, Captain Hardy,	57th " " " "	Killed. Killed.	Captain Inglis. Major Dalzell.
Lieut.-Col. Horsford,	63rd " "	Horse killed.	
	2 Companies of 46th, 1st Rifle battalion,	Wounded, and disabled. Wounded, though he did not so return himself. He was literally uplifted from the ground by an exploding shell, and marked for life, but (strange to say) not disabled.	Captain Dallas.
Lieut.-Col. Jeffreys,	5 Companies of 88th,	Wounded.	

Besides Lord Raglan and the principal officers of the Head-quarters Staff, there were ten English generals who came into action on Mount Inkerman, and these ten, with five other chiefs who succeeded to divisional or brigade commands (thus making altogether fifteen), were, all of them, either killed or wounded, or had their horses shot under them.¹ And, with only a single exception, the same may be said of the eighteen colonels or other officers, who brought regiments, or lesser detachments, of foot to Mount Inkerman, and took an active part in the struggle.²

The French stated that their loss on Mount Inkerman comprised 13 officers and 130 men killed, and 36 officers and 750 men wounded.³ We saw that General Canrobert himself received a wound in the arm, and that Colonel de Camas was killed.

The piece of French cannon which the enemy took was left on the battle-field, and recovered after the close of the action. No gun, Russian, English, or French, was definitively lost.

II.

Outline of the fight. The outlines of the fight—like those of Mount Inkerman itself—are indented and jagged, but well marked.

First Period.—Coming up from the west under Soimonoff, and from the east under Pauloff, 40,000 assailants moved forward under so thick a cover of darkness and mist, that by no greater effort than that of driving in an outlying picket, General Soimonoff was able to plant on Shell Hill a powerful artillery supported by heavy bodies of foot. From the commanding position thus rapidly seized, and now guarded by sixteen battalions, twenty other battalions with a strength of full 15,000 men were thrown forward to attack General Pennefather along his whole front, whilst a force called the ‘Under-road column’ moved up unobstructed by the bed of the Careenage Ravine, in order to turn his left flank. On his right for some time the enemy triumphed; he seized three of our guns; he drove from the field a bewildered body of nearly 400 foot; and meanwhile with the Under-road column he successfully turned the position, coming up by the Well-way at last to within a stone’s throw of Pennefather’s tents.

¹ See the table, page 303.

² See the second table, p. 304.

³ Return from Bosquet, imparted to our Head-quarters on the morrow of the battle.

Then, however, all changed; and the mist which had thus far protected the enemy, began to favor our people by taking from the many their power of rightly wielding big numbers, from the few their sense of weakness. It resulted that (with the aid of some batteries) 3300¹ of our infantry under Pennefather and Buller found means to defeat with great slaughter, and even to expunge from the battle-field, the whole of the 15,000 men who had assaulted their front, and, moreover, proved able to rout the Under-road column at a moment when it was driving into the very camp of the 2nd Division.

The number of Russian officers struck down was appallingly great, and General Soimonoff himself fell mortally wounded.

Second Period.—General Dannenberg now coming up assumed the command, and began to act with fresh troops. By attacking not only the front of the English position, but also the valueless ledge surmounted by the Sand-bag Battery, he challenged his adversaries to meet him in two separate combats; and our soldiery believing—though wrongly—that the dismantled work must be a part of the English defenses, fastened on it with so eager a hold, that Lord Raglan—in the midst of close fighting—could not even attempt to withdraw them. The mistake long continued to work its baneful effects; and the combatant part of the English force (now augmented by the accession of fresh troops) divided itself into two unconnected assemblages, with a dangerous gap between them. In one of the two simultaneous fights thus provoked—that is, the one in front of Home Ridge—General Pennefather, with very scant means, proved able to hurl back every onset; whilst in the fight for the Sand-bag Battery, after long and obstinate struggles, our people drove down the whole multitude which had swarmed on the ledge of the Kitspur; but then, haplessly, they went on to do more, achieving what I have called a ‘false victory’ over the left wing of the Russian army. Excepting only a few score of men with difficulty restrained from pursuit, they all of them poured down the steeps, attacking or chasing the enemy, became dispersed in the copse-wood, and in this way annulled for a time their power of rendering fresh services.

Russian troops, it was suddenly found, had moved up unopposed through the Gap, and the few score of English still

¹ 3692—390=3302.

remaining on the heights then seemed to be entirely cut off, yet proved able to fight their way home.

For some time, the two French battalions which had come up would take no part in the fight; but one of them—the 6th of the Line—moved forward at length with good-will against the flank of a Russian force then advancing along the Fore Ridge. The enemy thus threatened fell back, and the French battalion victoriously made good its advance to ground on the west of the Kitspur.

Thus the efforts the enemy made in the course of this Second Period resulted after all in discomfiture; but by the continued necessity for guarding our left, by Pennefather's still ardent propensity to fight out in front of his heights, and now finally by the losses and the dispersions sustained on the Kitspur, the number of English foot-soldiers that could be mustered for the immediate defense of Home Ridge was brought down to diminutive proportions.

Third Period.—That immediate defense of their position for which our people were thus ill provided became the very problem in hand. The enemy concentrating his efforts upon one settled purpose, delivered a weighty attack upon the Home Ridge, now almost denuded of English infantry, but guarded by the 7th Léger—a battalion 900 strong. His advanced troops broke over the crest, obtained some signal advantages over both the English and French, and then, upon being better confronted, began to fall back; but the bulk of the assailing masses had not ceased to advance all this while, and was soon ascending the Ridge. Then with the 7th Léger, with a truant little band of Zouaves, and with the few of our own people whom he could gather around him, General Pennefather, after a singular struggle which hung for some minutes in doubt, found means to defeat the great columns thus attacking his centre; and, the collateral forces brought up on the right and on the left being almost simultaneously overthrown by other portions of our infantry, and in part also too by our guns, the whole multitude of the troops which had undertaken this onslaught was triumphantly swept back into the Quarry Ravine.

Fourth Period.—The Allies having no troops in hand with which to press their advantage, the enemy very soon rallied, and with some vigor turned on his pursuers. The French 6th of the Line had been already driven back from our right front, and our people engaged at the centre were more or less losing ground, when the accession of the two 18-pounders ordered up by Lord Raglan put

an end all at once to the ascendancy of the Russians in the artillery arm, and began to tear open that stronghold on the crest of Shell Hill which had hitherto furnished the basis for all their successive attacks.

When in this condition of things General Bosquet approached with fresh troops, there seemed to be ground for believing that the end of the fight must be near.

Fifth Period. — When Bosquet's acceding reinforcements
 10 A.M. to 11 A.M. had brought up his infantry on Mount Inkerman to a strength of 3500, he was induced to advance with a great part of this force to the false position of the Inkerman Tusk. Upon the approach of a Russian column moving up to ground on his left where he fancied the English stood posted, he was forced to retreat in great haste with the loss of a gun; and, some Russian battalions appearing in another direction, it was only by a swift spring to the rear that his troops drawn up on the Tusk proved able to make good their escape. The 1500 French troops disposed on Bosquet's left rear fell back behind the Home Ridge; and, the cavalry which Canrobert brought up to cover the retreat being driven from the field by some shells, all this succession of adverse occurrences seemed threatening to end in disaster. The French troops became disconcerted, and the Allies were from this cause in jeopardy.

Their weakness, however, was masked by the vigor of the English defense maintained all this while at the Barrier, as well as by the might of the two 18-pounders; and, General Dannenberg not seizing his opportunity, the despondency of the French passed away.

Upon the accession of yet farther reinforcements, General Bosquet resumed the offensive, and with two of his battalions he not only defeated that agile Selinghinsk regiment which had once more climbed up the Kitspur, but drove it down over the aqueduct, and out of the Inkerman battlefield. He also withdrew both the 7th *Léger* and the 6th of the Line from their shelter behind the Home Ridge, and again sent them forward, but they moved by the course of the Post-road, and there had the English in front of them.

Then the share of the French infantry in this Inkerman conflict was unaccountably brought to a close.¹

11 A.M. to 1 P.M.

Sixth Period. — Whilst still minded to hold fast their respective positions on Mount Inker-

¹ They advanced, as we have seen, some four hours afterward; but by that time the Russians had abandoned the toplands of Mount Inkerman, and the 'conflict' had come to an end.

man, both the Russians and the French now abandoned the offensive; but our people, still disputing the victory which Canrobert would thus concede to his adversaries, maintained the fight two hours longer without the aid of French infantry, passed gradually from their old attitude of aggressive defense to one of decisive attack, and at length, by the united power of Lord Raglan's two 18-pounders and a small daring band of foot-soldiery, put so sharp a stress on Dannenberg, that—without consulting Prince Mentschikoff—he determined at once to retreat.

Seventh Period.—No pursuit worth recording took place, and General Dannenberg's retreat being accomplished at eight o'clock in the evening, the action came to an end.

1 P.M. to 8 P.M.

CHAPTER VII.

CLOSE OF THE GENERAL ENGAGEMENT.

I.

WE saw that the enemy's plan for the general engagement of the 5th of November had been constructed upon such a basis that the failure of his enterprise against Mount Inkerman must paralyze his action elsewhere. The forces left in Sebastopol formed that part of the Russian line of battle which extended along the course of the 'Southside' defenses upon a front of four miles, and they were instructed that their duty for the day (as distinguished from their accustomed task of resisting siege operations) was that of troops taking part in a battle; but, except as regards Timovieff's sortie, the orders for the conduct of the action in this Sebastopol part of the field were based, as we saw, on contingencies which did not occur, and therefore had the effect of keeping the garrison idle.¹

How the enemy's failure on Mount Inkerman paralyzed his action elsewhere.

Inaction of the garrison along the main part of their front.

But this neutralization of the Sebastopol garrison was not the most signal defect which disclosed itself in the practical working of a really ingenious plan. Prince Gortchakoff, as we know, with his 22,000 men, was to pass into unfeigned activity so soon as he should see the scant forces defending Mount Inkerman

Inaction of Prince Gortchakoff with his 22,000 fresh troops.

¹ Its losses in killed and wounded, irrespectively of Timovieff's sortie, were 111.

Its cause.

overborne and pressed back to the Windmill by their 40,000 assailants; but hour after hour that single, that small operation upon which so much was to hinge, remained unperformed, and Prince Gortchakoff having waited all day for the one pre-imagined event which was to warrant him in ascending the Chersonese, could at last, as he found, do no better than lead back his troops to Tchorgoun. His feints against Bosquet cost him only 15 men in killed and wounded, and indeed were so weakly pronounced that the whole of the effort he made was afterward described by Prince Mentschikoff as a demonstration against Balaclava.¹ It was natural enough that a general at the head of 22,000 fresh troops, who remained an almost passive spectator of the battle long raging on the wold close above him, should be blamed by those of his fellow-countrymen who did not know why he held back; but it is certain that he was tethered all day by the preciseness of his orders; for they required him to suspend his advance until the defenders of Mount Inkerman should be pressed back by sheer weight of numbers to an ascertained spot; and the unforeseen—nay, unimagined—tenacity of a scanty yet obstinate soldiery averted the fulfillment of the one condition which would serve to unleash him.

The Allies, no less than the Russians, had their instance of 'non-intervention.' The French trenches, as we saw, had been pushed forward to within a few yards of the Flag-staff Bastion; and some judge that a determined attack on that part of the defenses, if delivered when the garrison was learning of the defeat and the slaughter sustained on Mount Inkerman, may have led to the fall of the place; but General Canrobert was not in the mood—nay, he hardly, indeed, was the man—for undertaking any such enterprise.² The Allies engaged in the siege did nothing to convert the enemy's overthrow on Mount Inkerman into a crushing disaster.

Upon the whole, it may be said that the issue of this general engagement of the 5th of November was governed exclusively by the issue of the fight on Mount Inkerman; and, with only those limited

Inaction of the French forces confronting the Flag-staff Bastion.

The bearing of the main fight on the general en-

¹ 'The troops under the command of Prince Gortchakoff made a strong demonstration against Kadiköi, and thus kept in activity the enemy's detachment at Balaclava.'—*Prince Mentschikoff's Dispatch*.

² General Canrobert—a man no less candid than personally brave—would, I believe, say this himself. Always willing, and even prone to risk his own life, he could not bear taking upon himself to sacrifice his men.

agement: and of the combats elsewhere on the main fight. qualifications which have been already indicated, one might add, that the fight on Mount Inkerman was left to run out to its actual conclusion without being swayed by occurrences in any other parts of the field.

II.

From the general engagement of the 5th of November, including the fight on Mount Inkerman, there resulted, it seems, to the Russians a loss of 11,959 in killed, wounded, and prisoners;¹ to the English a loss of 2573, of whom 635 were killed.² The loss of the French in killed, including 25 officers, reached only 175; but their returns of the wounded show 95 officers and 1530 men, thus bringing up their entire loss, as officially stated, to exactly 1800.³

CHAPTER VIII.

SEQUEL TO THE INKERMAN NARRATIVE.

I.

THE Allies proposed to Prince Mentschikoff, under a flag of truce, that his people should come out to bury their dead; but the Prince was too wary to undertake a task which could hardly have been executed by Russian soldiers without deepening their sense of defeat, and might even have roused in their bosoms a perilous distrust of their chiefs, if not, indeed, of themselves. For, whilst the bodies of the Allies were many, and in some places heavily scattered, the Russian dead lay in heaps; and it must have been hard for a Russian observer to avoid the conclusion that, whether from any inferiority of weapons or of warlike prowess, or from the incapacity of some chief or chiefs, or from some grievous fault in the Czar's way of driving his flocks, their brethren had been as sheep against wolves.

Prince Mentschikoff answered rightly enough, that by the

¹ Official return. This gives 3286 as the number of the Russians killed. But see note *ante*, p. 301.

² Official return.

³ *Ibid.* The proportions in which these collected losses occurred at Mount Inkerman, and other parts of the general battle-field, will be found by recurring to statements made *ante*, in pp. 76, 301, 309, 310.

custom of nations the task of burying the dead lies on those who hold possession of the battle-field.

II.

Too often it happens that the soldier, whatever his nation, commits dire excesses in fighting. He slays men although they reverse or even throw down their arms, thus refusing in truth to give quarter; he slaughters the wounded; and sometimes in a frenzy more wild, though also less baneful, he goes and stabs at the dead; but in general, after some interchanges of complaint and recrimination, a veil has been suffered to fall over the crimes of the battle-field.

With Russia after the battle of Inkerman it fared otherwise, and she has had to stand out excepted from the easy forgiveness which is commonly accorded to nations at the close of a war. Few who know them will question that the Russians are, upon the whole, a gentle, humane, and kind-hearted people, and there were some, at least, of their soldiery who, in this very battle, gave quarter to adversaries laying down their arms. Nor should it be forgotten that of the acts committed at Inkerman against wounded men, there were some brought about by mistake, whilst others were done under circumstances which tended to palliate guilt. In fights which sway to and fro over ground thickly covered by brush-wood, men who have not been wounded at all will often lie down for a time to avoid some threatening danger, and again begin plying their firelocks when a good opportunity comes. Troops suffering under a fire from assailants thus hidden are apt to become indiscriminately savage against all prostrate foes, and it may be taken for granted that this impulse caused part, at least, of the slaughter inflicted upon disabled men.

Yet, after making all fair allowance for error and venial rage, it still remains certain that Russian soldiery in this battle of Inkerman did not only stab wounded men, but commit the crime with fell industry indicative of a strongly set purpose, and this, too, in the presence of numberless comrades apparently approving the outrages.

Full proof of all this was elicited by a military Court of Inquiry, and General Canrobert concurred with Lord Raglan in denouncing to Prince Mentschikoff the atrocious acts of his soldiery.¹

¹ It was upon the suggestion and advice of Mr. Romaine, the Judge Advocate, that Lord Raglan assembled the Court of Inquiry; the French

As regards the true source of an exceptional malignity driving good-natured men to go and butcher the wounded, there has been a general concurrence of judgment; and the tenor of Prince Mentschikoff's answer will be hardly surprising to those who remember that this war, after all, in its origin was a war of the Churches, and that the infuriate soldiery who could plunge and re-plunge their bayonets into the body of a prostrate, disabled adversary, had been 'consecrated' only a few hours before by blessings and prayers, and anthems grandly roaring for blood.¹

The motives which caused the atrocities.

In answering the denunciation, which reached him under a flag of truce, the Prince loftily repudiated it as a charge which could not be even listened to, if brought against the Imperial army generally; and he declared that a defenseless enemy was, and always would be, under the protection of the Russian flag. He, however, admitted it to be possible—though he did not, he said, know the fact—that 'individual-ly, and in the heat of combat,' some exasperated soldier may have suffered himself to do an act of violence which was to be deeply regretted; but then he went on to show that, supposing the imputed butcheries to have been really committed, they must have been provoked, after all, by a religious sentiment. His countrymen, he said, were an eminently religious people, who could not but be filled with horror when they learned that a church—very holy in their estimation—had been desecrated by the invaders of Russia; and thence he went on to conclude that, if any of the French or the English had indeed been dispatched on the battle-field whilst lying disabled by wounds, they must have owed their fate—not to the ruthlessness, but—plainly to the outraged piety of his troops.²

framed the remonstrance at first in language so grand, and—to the English taste—so bombastic, that Lord Raglan refused to sign it whilst in that state, and the document was duly sobered down before he put his name to it.

¹ As to the religious, or rather ecclesiastical, origin of the war (which had been almost forgotten by statesmen, but not by either the priests or the common soldiers of Russia), see 'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. i. As to the 'consecration' for Inkerman, see *ante*, p. 61.

² The Prince to the Allied Generals, November 9, 1854. The church in question was a small, antique structure, sacred to St. Vladimir, which stood near Quarantine Bay. The French, it seems, at first took only fire-wood from it, but afterward some of them pillaged it. This conduct was denounced as 'Vandalism' by General Forey, in an order of the day, and it is stated by Bazancourt (p. 105) that some of the delinquents were punished. Prince Mentschikoff says that the acts of spoliation were visible from the ramparts of Sebastopol.

Justice makes it imperative to follow up this explanation by acknowledging that the religion of the Russian is not, speaking generally, an aggressive sentiment. It is in defense, not attack, that his Church delights to be militant. His zeal glows at the thought of protecting his 'syn-orthodox' brethren from persecution; but he does not in general seek to enforce his faith by the sword, still less by burning dissentients.

III.

After springing on a misplaced picket, the column driven back by Hugh Clifford had moved up, as we saw, unobserved by the bed of the Careenage Ravine till it all but reached Pennefather's tents;¹ but laying aside that irruption as one that proved barren and failed, would it still be accurate to say that the English were 'surprised' at Inkerman?

For weeks they had well understood that an attack, if attempted at all, might there be most hopefully ventured; and only a few days before they had seen the enemy come to make himself at home on the ground, and even rehearse his enterprise.² They knew, too, that for such an undertaking early morn was the most fitting time, and some two or three hours after midnight they received a vague warning in the low, distant sound of wheels reported by Sargent and Morgan, followed up before long by the pealing of the Sebastopol bells. And again it is true that with a moderate addition to the force which performed and supported the outpost duty, or even without such addition—though in that case at a risk of incurring occasional vexatious losses—the pickets might have been so placed as to be capable of giving an earlier notice of any attack on Mount Inkerman than the adopted system could insure; and even, indeed, without all that hazard the object might have been partly attained by causing the outlying pickets to patrol to the front every morning a little before break of day.³ On the whole, it was certainly possible that by a keener attention to dubious signs, and an altered disposition of their outpost system, our people might have accelerated their discovery of the coming attack.

¹ The picket surprised and in part captured was one, as we saw, of the Light Division.

² See *ante*, p. 25, *et seq.* The attack of the 26th October was made at noon, and yet, as we saw, Colonel Federoff proved able to march across the north of Mount Inkerman from west to east without being perceived by the pickets of the 2nd Division. Still, no one thought, I believe, that Evans was then 'surprised.'

³ This Pennefather himself frankly said to me.

The machinery of Pennefather's outpost system was not 'set,' in such way as to make it detect the enemy in the act of ascending Mount Inkerman; but for the purposes of its more limited task the instrument worked with as much accuracy as the dimness of the air would allow. Before the first shot was fired, the troops here in charge had duly stood to their arms. At the time of the enemy's approach, the men of the new pickets were in their appointed places: they engaged the enemy as soon as he could be descried through darkness and mist: by their firing they amply announced the attack: they thwarted and vexed the advancing thousands so obstinately as to give time for our reinforcements to come up: and the commencement of the attack was reported to Head-quarters with a promptitude which at once brought Lord Raglan to the recognized seat of danger.

On our left, the first Russian attack was at once defeated by Grant. On our right, the Taroutine corps had scarce pressed back seven outlying sentries, when Adams came up with the 41st and drove it out of the battle-field. As regards the centre, Pennefather could say with truth that the Russians had been made to fight hard for more than two hours, and to suffer the defeat, nay, the ruin, of no less than twenty battalions, before they drove in his main picket.¹ In the teeth of such facts it would plainly be wrong to say that Pennefather was 'surprised' at Inkerman.

But, on the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the English—intent on the siege—had been able to bestow little care, with still less of their scanty resources, upon the business of defending the Chersonese against field operations;² and although long accustomed to expect an attack on Mount Inkerman, they had certainly failed to imagine that any force approaching in its numbers to a strength of 40,000 would ever be brought to assail them on that one corner of ground. So, when called upon to encounter what they did—and that, too, whilst baffled by a densely enshrouding mist—they acted by common consent as men who had been brought under the pressure of unforeseen emergencies.

¹ It was only at about a quarter to nine, and when more than 15,000 of the enemy's infantry had been shattered and ruined, that Dannenberg at length was able to seize the Barrier—the station of Pennefather's main picket, and even then he failed to retain his conquest for so much as half an hour. It was not, however, with the very same men that Pennefather so long held the post.

² The mind of Sir John Burgoyne had long been eagerly directed to the position at Inkerman; but it was for the sake of aggressive purposes against Sebastopol that he so longed to have it held in force.

Again, and again, and again, after the close of the First Period, some general or other officer might be seen overstepping, without any scruple, the usual bounds of authority, and governing the destination of troops, which—except on that ground of emergency—would not have been under his orders. No such license could well have obtained if the course of military business had not been rudely disturbed; and in the absence of all collected knowledge about the early part of the battle, it was natural that those who observed all this evident dislocation of formal authority should ascribe it at first to what soldiers call a ‘surprise,’ though, in truth, it was only after the close of the First Period that the laxity in question began. What our people really wanted was—not more time, but—more troops. Buller, the Duke of Cambridge, and Cathcart—the generals who brought up reinforcements—were all early enough in the field, and the real task was to make their scanty numbers suffice for that ‘everywhere,’ which summed up in a word the positions requiring succor.¹ The evident pressure of concurring emergencies which our people traced to ‘surprise,’ was brought about in reality by their adversary’s command of huge numbers, and his vigorous use of the prerogative which enabled him, because the assailant, to throw immense weight on one spot; but also, after half-past seven o’clock, by that destructive mistake which led them to imagine that the parapet of the Sand-bag Battery must be a part of the Inkerman defenses, and that, therefore, in that outlying part of the field no less than at home on their own ridge they ought to maintain a tough fight.

IV.

That the Czar—all nations observing him—should have succeeded in assembling some 120,000 troops upon the scene of his projected attack, that Fortune should so far have favored him as to give his people at once a magnificent vantage-ground from which to deal their main blow, and that the 40,000 men chosen out for this part of his enterprise should be defeated with ruinous slaughter by scanty bodies of soldiery coming up by degrees to resist them—here was certainly a chain of circumstances which might well rouse the interest of Europe, exciting not only a popular, but also a scientific curiosity to learn why the many were worsted; and any good or plausible explanation

¹ See *ante*, p. 170, Pennefather’s answer to Cathcart when asked where troops were wanted.

tion that might be tendered at an opportune moment, was sure to have that ready welcome which 'supply' receives from 'demand.' Prince Mentschikoff was inexplicit and brief. General Soimonoff, who would have been otherwise looked to as the natural defender of the course he took in the action, had fallen mortally wounded. On the other hand, General Dannenberg outlived his defeat, and—bespeaking assent through Berlin, where inquirers were keen and painstaking, and eager to find a solution—he gained the public ear. From the impulse thus given, and the absence of any counteracting power then ready to meet it, there resulted an opinion which fastened itself upon men's minds with a strong hold.

From that time to this, people rarely have made any comment upon the battle of Inkerman without asking what would have happened, if—according to Dannenberg's wishes—General Soimonoff had made his attack by the Victoria Ridge, leaving Pauloff's forces alone to deliver their assault on Mount Inkerman; and most commonly the inquirer answers his own question by saying that in such case the Allies must have succumbed.

Whatever the value of that conclusion as a guess or surmise, it was certainly based, when first hazarded, upon an imperfect knowledge of the facts essential to a trustworthy judgment. The Careenage Ravine is a chasm which forbids united action to forces advancing along the two ridges on either side of it. If Dannenberg's wish had been followed, the force under Soimonoff and the one under Pauloff must have been kept completely asunder by the interposed chasm, and in that state compelled to advance against a united foe who—commanding the head of the ravine—would be free to throw his weight against one of them whilst simply checking the other. The camps of the Allies were so placed on the Chersonese that, to meet perils threatening from the western side of the Careenage Ravine, they could effect a rapid concentration. With their forces assembled, and fast assembling, on the left of the Windmill, and the trenches of 'Gordon's Attack' on their left front, General Canrobert and Lord Raglan would have been well circumstanced for giving a hot reception to any Russian force which—after overcoming all the earlier difficulties of the enterprise—should attempt to debouch from the narrow Victoria Ridge in the face of an Anglo-French army.¹

¹ The succession of 'earlier difficulties' might have comprised—first, obstinate pickets; then, unless it were somehow eluded, the Lancaster Battery,

Of course, it is possible that if Soimonoff—deferring to Dannenberg—had delivered his attack on the west of the Careenage Ravine, the chances of war might have neutralized the mischief of his isolation, and given him the coveted victory; but in such case, apparently, he must have owed every thing to his own good fortune or to his own strength; for it is hard to believe that in the event of his finding himself checked on the Victoria Ridge, or baffled in his attempts to debouch from it, he would have had the least help—except in the way of a somewhat weak diversion—from any of Pauloff's troops.¹

The experience of the battle as actually fought lays a very safe ground for inferring that if Pauloff's troops only had attempted Mount Inkerman, they must have not only failed to carry the position, but even to make themselves formidable. It is true that the main body of Pauloff's troops traveled round by the East Sapper's Road, and finally ascended Mount Inkerman in a condition—though weary—to fight with determination and spirit; but they did all this under the shield which Soimonoff had spread out before them by coming up first to the topland with his 20,000 infantry as well as 38 guns, and from first to last they were supported by those 9000 foot, all belonging to Soimonoff's force, who, along with their artillery comrades, were the garrison, if so one may call it, of the stronghold formed on Shell Hill. Without those priceless advantages it seems idle to say that Pauloff's troops only could have overwhelmed General Pennefather, or even forced him to ask for large succors. The only troops under Pauloff which dispensed with the base provided for them by Soimonoff were the 6000 men of the Taroutine and Borodino regiments.² Those 6000 men, it is true, found a way of their own into action, but with a result which showed how ill Dannenberg could really afford to act upon his own crude idea; for the whole of them were not only defeated by some

and the forces issuing from it; then, possibly, the fire of siege-guns from Gordon's Attack; then the whole of the Light Division; and lastly, the men armed with rifles in the camp of the Naval Brigade.

¹ To apprehend the feebleness which must have apparently characterized any attack on Mount Inkerman attempted by Pauloff's troops only, one should know the circuitous route to which they were necessarily condemned (see *ante*, pp. 93, 133, 134), and cast a fresh glance at the map. That route was safe enough for a general advancing under Soimonoff's shield, but would have been perilous in the extreme for troops uncovered by other forces. The great proportion of Pauloff's artillery to his infantry—97 guns to 16,500 foot—would have been a circumstance adding immensely to the difficulty of the undertaking.

800 men of Pennefather's Division, but finally exterminated from the battle-field. If Dannenberg had had no troops of Soimonoff's on Mount Inkerman, he must have found himself reduced to sheer impotence before eight o'clock in the morning; for after the ruin and flight of his Taroutine and Borodino regiments, the necessity of providing a reserve and support to his guns would have absorbed so great a proportion of his remaining infantry as to leave him without the means of attempting any attack.¹

It may be added that the personal position of Dannenberg on Mount Inkerman with Pauloff's troops only would have been one of an anomalous kind; for he must have had to wait until other generals should win a battle before becoming entitled to assume his destined command.²

It is true that the slaughter incurred by the Russians was in great measure owing to the heaviness of the masses in which they attempted to fight; and at first there seemed ground for inferring that this excessive conglomeration of soldiery must have been caused by heaping 40,000 men on Mount Inkerman alone, and thus depriving them of the space they required for effective action; but the conclusion was one reached through study by the diligent men of Berlin comparing numbers with maps, and had no sound basis of fact. The heaviness of the masses into which the Russians packed themselves resulted from their attachment to a gross, huddled method of fighting; and this is well enough shown by adverting to the tactics they followed in another battle. On the Alma, their numbers, instead of being excessive, were much too scanty for the position, and yet even there they fought huddled, choosing rather to leave precious ground altogether unoccupied than to abstain from their gross formations. So again on the 26th of October, though the force they engaged was but small, they made their attempt to drive in our main picket by coming on in a throng. And, on the other hand, there is not, so far as I know, a single instance of any Russian column at Inkerman having become jammed or overlapped or otherwise embarrassed for want of space. Even when the Catherinburg battalions, having been ordered to act in support, became impatient, and pressed forward to the front, they found room to interpose themselves betwixt the foremost columns without jostling them

¹ Unless in the *supposed* state of things he could have made shift with smaller supports and reserves than those which he *actually* maintained, he would have had only 1676 men available for an attack. 16,556—5844—9036=1676. See *ante*, pp. 127, 128.

² See *ante*, p. 59.

or bringing about any sort of confusion. Far from wanting space on Mount Inkerman, the Russians, after a few hours' fighting, complained of want of numbers; and it was simply from want of numbers that General Dannenberg at an early period, and whilst still holding Shell Hill, was forced to abandon the idea of attempting any farther attack.

Upon the whole, then, it seems very plain that if the troops issuing from the Karabel Faubourg had delivered their attack on the western side of the Careenage Ravine, Pauloff's troops—left to act by themselves—must have failed on Mount Inkerman; and that, consequently, the fate of the whole enterprise would have got to depend after all upon what Soimonoff himself with his own unaided soldiery might prove able to achieve against an Anglo-French army.¹

The enemy's Inkerman plan was free from the glaring defects of the one imagined by Dannenberg, and indeed it had been cleverly—nay, in most respects, ably contrived; but, whether from pedantry, or from the want of a trusted commander, its framers committed the old Aulic fault of trying to make prescript words perform the task of a general. In providing that Prince Gortchakoff should be unleashed by an imagined contingency only, and not by a message from his chief, they sought to make their plan what mechanists would call 'self-acting,' and made it, as we have seen, self-hampering.

But although the plan had this fault, and in practice worked so perversely that it batted down Gortchakoff in the valley, and there kept him neutralized with forces 22,000 strong, there is nothing in its provisions that will serve to account for the discomfiture of the other 40,000 men undertaking to seize Mount Inkerman.

In the course of the efforts men made to show why the many succumbed, a good deal was said of their weapons; and it is true that the bulk of the Russian infantry still carried the smooth-bore musket, whilst the bulk of their foes had the rifle. The superior 'precision' of the rifle was a quality of but little worth in that early and most critical part of the fight, where the English marksman stood wrapped in thick mist and smoke with a howling throng of Russians before him;

¹ After leaving Pennefather and the Guards to deal with Pauloff's attempt on Mount Inkerman, the English would have had three Divisions with which to act against Soimonoff—viz., the Light, the 3rd, and the 4th—and the French, in abundant numbers could have been speedily drawn from the corps of both Forey and Bosquet.

but, irrespective of its accuracy, this weapon was besides an exceedingly strong-shooting fire-arm. In the hands of our soldiery, it sent the lead deeper than a musket well could through the flesh of a closely-packed column; but no corresponding advantage would have been assured to the Russians by giving them the same weapon as their English adversaries, because our people, being extended in line or drawn out into slender chains of skirmishers, did not ever afford to the enemy a target so thick that it could be more deeply penetrated by a shot from a rifle than one from a common musket. And again, it must not be understood that the enemy was altogether without the new arm. He had on Mount Inkerman no less than 1800 riflemen;¹ and considering the narrowness of the front upon which he in general fought, this was not an insignificant number.

Upon the whole, it would seem that the ascendancy of our people in this particular Inkerman fight was not so much owing to their weapon as many inclined to suppose. The men of the 4th Division who became engaged in the fighting left no room for saying that the power of other soldiery proved greater than theirs, yet scarce any of them, except Horsford's battalion, had any other arm than the musket.²

The results of the strife between huge Russian masses on one side, and our thin English lines on the other, have at first sight a look of the marvelous, yet were owing in the main, after all, to the union of four well-known conditions: 1. The nature of the ground; 2. The mist; 3. The enemy's gross way of fighting in masses; 4. The quality of our officers and men.

1. It is true that our people springing forward to the fight at their outposts did not make a full use of their heights, and that their efforts, indeed, bore little resemblance to the ordinary operation of defending a strong position; but they could not deprive themselves of the good they derived from having their flanks well covered, with their 'home front,' if so one may call it, shut in by the hand of Nature and narrowed to the modest proportions which befitted their want of numbers; whilst they also—being few against many—found advantage in that thick growth of brush-wood which both baffled the eye and obstructed the assaults of the enemy.

¹ Viz., belonging to his Rifle battalions.....	649
Distributed amongst his line regiments.....	1152
	<hr/> 1801

² Only, I believe, about 35 rifles to a regiment.

Causes most strongly tending to account for the defeat of the Russians in combat with our troops.

2. At first, it is true, the mist favored Soimonoff's enterprise, but afterward it wrought strongly against him; for unless they can pour round the flanks of their adversary, the power of mighty numbers advancing upon a confined front must depend in some measure, and for some time, upon the mere aspect of their strength; and if the dimness of the atmosphere be such as to make the many invisible, it may do much toward bringing them down to a level with the few. And again, from the effect of the mist every man's field of view was so narrowed as to forbid all notion of synthesis. In so far as the battle-field presented itself to the bare eye-sight of men, it had no entirety, no length, no breadth, no depth, no size, no shape, and was made up of nothing except small numberless circlelets commensurate with such ranges of vision as the mist might allow at each spot. A sentence that Brownrigg heard uttered by a soldier of the Grenadier Guards tells much of the Inkerman story. The man at the time was advancing against masses numbered by thousands, but the Russians that interested him were those whom he himself might perhaps shoot down or run through, and his delighted estimate was, 'I'm d—d if there aren't scores of 'em!' That man, multiplied by the number of English bayonets in action, was the difficult foe whom the enemy thought to overwhelm by the power and weight of his columns. The attention of a field-officer (until his horse should be shot under him) might take a somewhat wider range; but, if such a one could give unity to the weak battalion or wing he commanded, that was commonly the utmost he could attempt. In such conditions, each separate gathering of English soldiery went on fighting its own little battle in happy and advantageous ignorance of the general state of the action; nay, even very often in ignorance of the fact that any great conflict was raging; and the notion of the officer commanding in this narrow sphere was always that he must fight out his quarrel with what troops he had, or at most ask for small reinforcements scarce sufficient to furnish one company for a German or Russian battalion. It was by uncombined, though nearly simultaneous fights of this kind, that some 3600 of our infantry in the First Period of the action made good their resistance to 25,000, and even expunged from the battle-field no less than twenty battalions with a strength of 15,000 men.

3. The Russian soldiery being men endowed with great bravery, and a more than common share of physical strength, might possibly be brought to execute what the English call

The enemy's
gross way of
fighting.

a charge with the bayonet, and indeed they have a tradition that for such enterprises they have proved themselves peculiarly apt. This notion, however well founded in the days of Suwaroff, rests now on mere legend; for, since the time when the Russians in the early part of this century began to copy Napoleon, they have so massed their troops as to refuse themselves almost all opportunity of justifying their national boast; and certainly at Inkerman, where they collected their strength into throngs and close columns, and in front of these loaded the ground with swarms of skirmishers, they debarred themselves from even attempting what English soldiery mean when they speak of a bayonet-charge.¹ Unread in the story of the Peninsular war, they ventured to bring their gross formations into the presence of English infantry, and incurred crushing, ruinous slaughter, under conditions which left the bulk of them powerless, except to suffer and die. Most commonly, the Russian columns shrank from the charge of our people in time to avoid actual contact; and even when they stood their ground with comparative firmness, they invariably 'accepted the files,' allowing our soldiery to thrust themselves in betwixt theirs, and then there either followed a destruction of the intruders—this happened but once if at all—or else the disintegration and overthrow of the riven mass. Other wars had well proved the frailty of columns when called upon to suffer the fire, and then stand the bayonet-charge of infantry extended in line; but 'Inkerman' carried yet farther the experience of what can be dared against masses by small numbers of soldiery, showing plainly enough that a column which has not been defeated in the earlier moments of its agony may still prove helpless and weak when it has a few assailants within it. The examples of this that were afforded by several—as for instance, by Hugh Clifford, by Burnaby, by Daubeney—have an infinite value for England, because her people are commonly and perforce obliged to combat few against many.

Quality of the English officers and men. 4. As regards the quality disclosed by our officers and men, their achievements speak best. Mere narrative supersedes praise.

No one, no two, no three of the stated conditions could well have sufficed, but a fortuitous combination of the four brought about the results we have witnessed.

¹ If a column heaves its way slowly forward a few paces without firing (as did a column of the Vladimir regiment at the Alma), the Russians call the movement a charge with the bayonet.

V.

The dispatch of the forces hurried forward for his Inkerman enterprise formed no small part of the exhausting effort by which the Czar at this time was fast crippling his empire; but it must be owned that if the stake he ventured was heavy, the one that he played for was vast. A victory won by Russia on Mount Inkerman would have placed her at once in great strength upon the toplands of the Chersonese, and the Allies must then have been brought into so ugly a plight that, except by at once contemplating the very worst, it is hard to imagine the stage where their progress toward ruin would have stopped.

From the opposite event—the event which really occurred—it has been judged that the Allies might have obtained great results; for the blow fell with terrible weight, not only upon the discomfited troops, but also upon the garrison of a fortress closely touching the field of carnage, and receiving, with endless convoys of wounded men, the melancholy remnants of what only a few hours before had been ardent and strong battalions; but, the English having expended their strength, it rested exclusively with the French to push the victory to a great conclusion, and having already seen that General Canrobert stayed his hand on the day of the battle, we shall next have to learn by what counsels he determined his course on the morrow.

By the 4th of November the French had brought their trenches so close to the Flag-staff Bastion, that the moment for assaulting it was then all but ripe; and it was to avert that dread blow that the enemy hurried on his preparations for the onslaught of the following day.

This French enterprise against the Flag-staff Bastion was to have been the main feature of a general assault on Sebastopol; and, to make all the needed arrangements, a meeting of the Allied Generals had been summoned for the 5th of November. The exigencies of 'Inkerman' prevented the council from assembling to mature their contrivances, and it was with other thoughts that General Canrobert came to the English Head-quarters on the morrow of the battle. He remained with Lord Raglan 'some hours,' stating with much 'fairness and ability the great difficulties' the Allies had before them, and he urged it as their duty to heed both their yesterday's losses, and the magnitude of the numbers which

Magnitude of the results that might have followed a Russian victory at Inkerman.

How the Allies abstained from using their victory as a means to a greater end;

the enemy had displayed.¹ If accordingly no grand act of vigor could be attempted with a chance of success, Canrobert submitted that the alternative was to temporize, and wait for reinforcements.² To such representations—which Lord Raglan, it seems, did not combat—there succeeded in natural sequence a council of war, a unanimous determination that the assault of Sebastopol must not then be attempted, and, finally, a decisive resolve on the part of the French that for the present they would abandon all idea of seizing the Flag-staff Bastion.³ Thus, notwithstanding their overthrow, the Russians were allowed, after all, to attain one, at least, of the objects which had tempted them to their Inkerman venture.

For what of weakness there was in that last concession to a defeated enemy, General Canrobert was answerable: but the English, as well as the French, felt the teaching of the Inkerman Sunday; for it rudely dinned into their minds a sure knowledge of what before they had been learning more vaguely from dispatches, deserters, and spies, and forced them to confront the fact that whilst playing the part of besiegers, the Allies were in the presence of an enemy whose numbers almost doubled their own. General Evans, who had ridden up about midday from his sick-couch on board ship, became after a while so impressed by his perception of the enemy's great strength, and the evident losses sustained by our people, that, at the close of the battle, he did not shrink from recommending his chief to

and even allowed themselves to be checked by the battle.

One of the enemy's objects attained.

Impression produced on the Allies by the enemy's exhibition of numerical strength.

Counsel offered by General Evans.

¹ Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, November 8th, 1854.

² He described this course of action (or inaction) as an 'attermoiement'—a word which the Dictionary defines as—'composition, compounding with 'creditors, delay.' See in Appendix a copy of the note which Canrobert read. Considering, no doubt, the extreme importance of maintaining for the time as much secrecy as was possible in respect to such a resolution, Lord Raglan seems to have kept the note apart from other 'private' papers. I find it indorsed by his own hand in these words: 'Private note of General Canrobert read at a meeting on the 7th of November, 1854.'

³ The seizure of the Flag-staff Bastion was a measure which might have been adopted *without* undertaking a general assault on Sebastopol; and, unless General de Todleben errs, that is precisely the course which the Allies should have taken. He says: 'Once intrenched in the No. 4 [the Flag-staff] Bastion, the enemy would not have been under the slightest necessity of assaulting Sebastopol—an attempt in which he must certainly have been defeated with great loss—but our line of defense would have been forced, divided, maimed, and the ulterior defense of Sebastopol must have become 'all but impossible.'—*Todleben*, p. 433.

abandon the siege;¹ and, although Lord Raglan instantly, and with barely suppressed indignation, rejected this hasty counsel, he was not himself at all blind to the peril of another attack. Avoiding all spoken and written surmise as to what might be expected from the French in the event of a trying emergency, he yet seemed to take it for granted that the defense of the Chersonese must depend in large measure upon the strength of his own little force; and under that aspect, his now diminished numbers were extravagantly inadequate as compared with those Russia had assembled. Out of the 8000 or 9000 infantry that he had been previously able to muster for field operations on the Chersonese, near 2600 now lay, as we saw, killed or wounded, and the conditions were such that a deduction of that magnitude from his strength was a graver misfortune to him than the loss of 12,000 to Mentschikoff.

In a private letter to the Secretary of State he says, indeed, with just pride, 'It was a glorious day for the British 'arms;' but a little farther on, in his tranquil, business-like way, he discloses the slenderness of the numbers then left him for confronting another attack, and adds, 'To speak 'frankly, we want every man you can send us.'

¹ Since the Allies were not minded to strike a blow at once for the possession of Sebastopol, it was apparently a mistake to imagine (as many did at the time) that there was something ignominious in proposing to raise the siege; for the enemy had double the strength of those who were assailing his fortress; but there was another and a fatal objection to Evans's counsel. The Allies were not strong enough to be sure of covering their embarkation; and from the moment when they discarded all idea of using their victory as a means of winning Sebastopol, the best and safest expedient remaining to them was the maintenance of a bold front, with pretenses of pushing on the siege.

Lord Raglan's appreciation of the conditions under which he must act.

APPENDIX.

I.

BRITISH INFANTRY WHICH SOONER OR LATER WAS OCCUPYING THE
VICTORIA RIDGE ON THE 5TH NOVEMBER, 1854.

On the Inkerman side of the Victoria Ridge, under General Codrington.

1st Brigade of Light Division.

7th Royal Fusileers—Colonel Yea	334
23rd “ “	322
33rd, some companies	251
Rifles, part of 2nd battalion—Colonel Laurence.....	142
	1099
Companies of the Royal Marines—Captain Hopkins	120
	1219

In the course of the action, and under circumstances which resulted in their sustaining some loss, there were brought up besides—

3 companies of 19th Regiment (2nd Brigade), about 180

On the Western slopes of the Ridge, under Sir Richard England, commanding 3rd Division.

The Royals, a part.....	450
Companies of 50th Regiment under Colonel Waddy, which, <i>besides</i> the one after- ward counted amongst the Inkerman troops, numbered.....	169
	619 ¹

II.

STRENGTH OF 2ND DIVISION PRESENT AT BATTLE OF INKERMAN
UNDER GENERAL PENNEFATHER.

	Officers.	Men.	Total Officers and Men.
1st Brigade. { Staff.....	16		16
30th. Colonel Mauleverer, and upon his being struck down, Major Patullo	14	394	408
55th. Colonel Warren, and upon his being wound- ed, Colonel Daubeney.....	9	423	432
95th. Major Champion, and upon his being wound- ed, Major Hume; and upon his being wounded, Captain Vialls; and upon his being wounded, Captain Sargent.....	10	433	443
2nd Brigade. { 41st. Colonel Carpenter, and upon his being kill- ed, Major Eman	21	578	599
47th. Colonel Haly, and upon his being wounded, Major Farren	20	550	570
49th. Colonel Dalton, and upon his being struck down, Major Thornton Grant	15	473	488
Total.....	105	2851	2956

¹ These troops were not actively engaged in the Inkerman fight; but as a support to General Codrington (who *might* have been attacked by great forces) they were well placed.

III.

RUSSIAN FORCES ENGAGED IN FIELD OPERATIONS DURING THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN.

Under Prince Gortchakoff.¹

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Sotnia.	Guns.	Effectives.
Azoff Regiment.....	4	3,849
Dnieper Regiment	4	3,688
Ukraine Light Infantry	4	3,913
Odessa ".....	4	3,667
Dragoons of Crown Prince's Regiment	10	1,866
" of Grand-Duke Constantine.....	10	1,868
" of Grand-Duke Michael.....	10	1,893
Hussar regiment of Duke of Leuchtenberg	8	800
" of Grand-Duke of Saxe-Weimar.....	8	800
'Combined regiment' of Lancers.....	6	600
Regiment of Don Cossacks, No. 53	4	..	400
" of the Oural, No. 1.....	6	..	600
Battery of Position, No. 4, 12th Brigade.....	12
" of Light Artillery, No. 6.....	12
" " " No. 7.....	12
" " " No. 8.....	12
Heavy Battery of Horse Artillery, No. 21.....	8
" " " No. 22.....	8
" " " No. 23.....	8
Battery of Horse Artillery (Light), No. 12.....	8
" of Don Cossacks (Heavy), No. 3.....	8
Total.....	16	52	10	88	22,444

Under General Soimonoff.²

	Battalions.	Sotnia.	Guns.	Effectives.
Catherinburg Regiment.....	4	3,298
Tomsk ".....	4	3,124
Kolivansk ".....	4	2,875
Vladimir ".....	4	2,132
Soudal ".....	4	2,240
Ouglitch ".....	4	1,795
Boutirsk ".....	4	2,869
6th Rifle Battalion	289
" Sappers.....	207
Battery of Position, No. 2, 10th Brigade	12
" " " No. 1, 16th ".....	10
" (Light), No. 4, 17th ".....	8
" " " No. 5.....	8
Don Cossacks, No. 67.....	..	1	..	100
Total.....	29	1	38	18,929

¹ The above is taken strictly from General de Todleben. The General says that for the strength of this force under Gortchakoff he had to rely upon a 'State' made in the previous month before the battle of Balacava, and that the actual strength would be considerably less than here shown.

² Taken strictly from General de Todleben.

Under General Pauloff.

	Battalions.	Guns.	Effectives.
Selingkinsk Regiment.....	4	..	3,197
Iakoutsik ".....	4	..	3,223
Okhotsk ".....	4	..	3,182
Borodino ".....	4	..	2,509
Taroutine ".....	4	..	3,335
4th Rifle Battalion.....	$\frac{1}{2}$..	360
Battery of Position, No. 1, 10th Brigade.....	..	12
" " " No. 3, 11th ".....	..	12
" " " No. 3, 17th ".....	..	8
Battery of Light Artillery, No. 1, 10th Brigade.....	..	12
" " " No. 2, ".....	..	12
" " " No. 3, 11th Brigade.....	..	12
" " " No. 4, ".....	..	12
" " " No. 2, Don Cossacks.....	..	9
" of the Reserve.....	..	8
Total ¹	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	96	15,806

Forces left to guard the Road leading to Baktchi Serüi.

	Battalions.	Guns.	Effectives.
Grand-Duke Michael's Regiment.....	4	..	2026
Kamtschatka ".....	2	..	1836
Light Battery, No. 5, 11th Brigade.....
" " " No. 1, 16th ".....
" " " No. 2, " ".....
Total.....	6	36	3862

Forces acting under General Timovieff.

Timovieff effected his sortie with the four battalions of the Minsk regiment, having a strength of 3075 and 4 guns, and was afterward supported by three more battalions (the 5th reserve battalion of the Brest, the 6th of the Wilna, and the 6th of the Bialostock regiment) as well as by 8 more guns. If the three additional battalions be taken at the usual average of 750 each, it would result that Timovieff operated first and last with 5325 infantry and 12 guns.

Summary of Russian Forces operating on Mount Inkerman.

	Guns.	Effectives as shown in the other Tables.
Soimonoff.....	38	18,929
Pauloff.....	97	16,556
Add artillery-men, computing their number for 135 guns.....	135	35,485
Total.....	135	40,210 ²

¹ The above is taken strictly thus far from General de Todleben, but it will be seen that he leaves an error in the addition of the guns, and he also accidentally omits the battalion of Sappers which formed part of Pauloff's force. Taking it at 750, the corrected total will be as follows: Battalions, 21 $\frac{1}{2}$; guns, 97; effectives, 16,556.

² Excepting the 90 or 100 riflemen of the Catherinburg regiment, who appear to

Summary of Russian Forces which acted aggressively in the general Engagement of Inkerman.

	Guns.	Men.
On Mount Inkerman, as above.....	135	40,210
On Prince Gortchakoff's front.....	88	22,444
In Timovieff's sortie.....	12	5,325
Total.....	235	67,979

Summary of Russian Troops operating in the Open Field on the day of Inkerman.

	Guns.	Men.
Result of last summary, as above.....	235	67,979
Force guarding the road.....	36	3,862
Total.....	271	71,841

IV.

THE ALLIED FORCES WHICH SOONER OR LATER WERE PRESENT ON MOUNT INKERMAN THE DAY OF THE BATTLE.

English Infantry.

1st Division: Grenadiers, 501; Coldstream, 438; Scots Fusileer Guards, 392....	1331
2nd Division: as detailed <i>ante</i> , p. 326	2956
3rd Division: part of 50th, Wilton, 255, and one other company of it, 56, under Colonel Waddy in person.....	281
4th Division: 20th, 340; 21st, 402; 57th, 347; Rifles, 278; companies of 46th and 68th, 384; 63rd, 466	2217
Light Division: wing of 77th, 259; companies of 88th, 390.....	649
Goodlake's roving picket of the Guards.....	30
	7464

The English also had on Mount Inkerman 200 cavalry, the remnant of the Light Brigade, under Lord George Paget, and 24 pieces of field artillery, with besides two guns of position, being the two 18-pounders under Collingwood Dickson.

French Infantry.

Bourbaki's Brigade: Chasseurs, 4 companies, 450; 7th Léger 1st battalion, 903; 6th of the Line 2nd battalion, 757.....	2115
D'Autemarre's Brigade: Algerines, 2nd battalion, 757; 3rd Zouaves (first one battalion, then the other), 1406; 50th (after deduction of 94), 1507.....	3670
Brought up late under General Monet, 20th Léger 2nd battalion, 613; 22nd Léger 1st battalion, 1032; 2nd Zouaves 2nd battalion, 789.....	2434
	8219

The French also brought up 700 cavalry (the 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique), and 24 guns.

have headed, or a little preceded, the main body of the 'Under-road column,' no part of that force is included in the above computation; and accordingly the strength of that main body (which consisted, I believe, of drilled sailors or marines) must be regarded as *additional* to the 40,210. The Land-Service officials appear to have had the exclusive control of the reports made after a battle, and to have habitually omitted all commemoration of the part taken by seamen and marines. There was the same omission, and (as I think probable) from the same cause, after the action of the 26th of October.

V.

THE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH THE PICKETS OF THE SECOND DIVISION WERE SUPPLIED AT THE INKERMEN TIME.

Of the pickets on duty during the eve and until the early morning of the battle, one half were furnished by the 95th Regiment, and for the other half each of Adams's three regiments contributed. The new pickets which took up the ground on the morning of the battle were, half of them, given by the 55th Regiment, and the other half (as on the 4th of November) by Adams's three regiments.

The pickets of the First Brigade were on the right, and those of the Second Brigade (with the exception of the 'hay picket') on the left. The 'field-officer of the day,' commanding the pickets of each brigade, received his charge from the *divisional* authorities, and accordingly it was as likely as not that the officer commanding the pickets of, say, the First Brigade might be one belonging to a regiment of the Second Brigade. Thus on the *eve* of Inkerman the pickets of the First Brigade were commanded by Major Thornton Grant, of the 49th, and, on the *day* of Inkerman, by Colonel Carpenter, of the 41st.

VI.

ORDERS OF THE DAY AND OTHER PAPERS ISSUED BY RUSSIAN GENERALS ON THE EVE OF INKERMEN.

Prince Mentschikoff's Order of the Day, issued in the afternoon of the 4th November, 1854, and received at Dannenberg's Head-quarters at 5 P.M. :

'Il est décidé' [here follow the preliminary words, and the 1st and 2nd clauses, given *ante* in English, p. 91].

'3. Les troupes qui se trouvent sous le commandement du Prince Gortchakoff devront appuyer l'attaque générale, détourner les forces de l'ennemi en les attirant sur elles, et tâcher de s'emparer d'une des montées du Mont Sapounè. De plus, les dragons devront se tenir prêts à gravir la montagne à la première possibilité.

'4. La garnison de Sébastopol, sous le commandement du lieutenant-général de Möller, suivra la marche de l'attaque, en couvrant de ses batteries le flanc droit des troupes commandées pour l'attaque, et dans le cas où la confusion se mettrait dans les batteries ennemies, s'emparer de ces batteries.'

[Here follow the last two clauses—the 5th and 6th—which are given in the text *ante*, p. 91.]

Ordre du jour du Lieutenant-Général Soïmonow, pour la Disposition de ses Troupes.

Demain ^{24 Octobre}_{5 Novembre}, le détachement devra se mettre en marche à 6 heures du matin pour attaquer la position des Anglais, s'en emparer, et s'y affermir.

A cet effet :

1. Le mouvement préalable ayant pour objet le passage du ravin du Carénage devra s'exécuter dans l'ordre suivant : deux compagnies du 6-ème ba-

taillon de tirailleurs ; les 1-er et 2-ème bataillons du régiment de Kolivansk ; la batterie de position n° 2 de la 10-ème brigade d'artillerie ; les 3-ème et 4-ème bataillons du même régiment ; les 4-ème et 3-ème bataillons du régiment de Tomsk ; la batterie de position n° 1 de la 16-ème brigade d'artillerie ; les 2-ème et 1-er bataillons du même régiment de Tomsk. Le régiment d'infanterie d'Ekatérinebourg, son 4-ème bataillon en tête ; le régiment d'Ouglitch, son 1-er bataillon en tête ; le régiment de Boutirsk, ayant son 4-ème bataillon en tête ; le régiment de Sousdal, ayant son 1-er bataillon, et le régiment de Wladimir, son 4-ème bataillon en tête. Enfin, les batteries légères, nos 5 et 4 de la 17-ème brigade d'artillerie ; deux compagnies de sapeurs et une sotnia du régiment n° 57 des cosaques du Don.

2. Ces troupes devront se former, après le passage du ravin du Carénage, de la manière suivante, et sans s'arrêter dans leur marche : la brigade légère de la 10-ème division d'infanterie devra se former dans le 1-er ordre de combat (sans déployer les bataillons du centre) étant couverte de front et du flanc droit par deux compagnies du 6-ème bataillon de tirailleurs, déployées en tirailleurs ; le régiment d'Ekatérinebourg devra rester en réserve. Les régiments restants, conjointement avec les batteries légères, se formeront en ordre de réserve derrière les régiments de la 10-ème division, et les suivront à une certaine distance. La brigade légère de la 10-ème division d'infanterie aura ses carabiniers en tête de ses régiments ; dans les autres régiments les carabiniers devront rester à leur place ordinaire.

3. Les trois régiments de la 10-ème division d'infanterie seront commandés par le général-major de Villebois, et ceux de la division combinée¹ par le général-major Jabokritsky. Toute l'artillerie sera sous les ordres du commandant de la 10-ème brigade d'artillerie, colonel Zagoskine. Le capitaine d'état-major Yakovlew et le capitaine en second du même corps Andréianow devront se trouver près de la 10-ème division, et le lieutenant-colonel Zalesky près de la division combinée.

4. Toutes les troupes mentionnées ci-dessus devront se rassembler, demain à 4 heures du matin, près du bastion n° 2, et se masser d'après les indications du capitaine en second Yakovlew. A cet effet, toutes les troupes y enverront leurs jalonniers pour l'heure indiquée.

5. Pendant le ralliement et au commencement de la marche, il ne devra être fait aucun bruit, et il ne sera pas allumé de feux ; les chefs directs seront tenus responsables de l'exécution de cet ordre.

6. Les dispositions ultérieures seront faites par moi, sur place même.

7. Tous les médecins suivront leurs troupes respectives et seront sous les ordres du médecin en chef de la 10-ème division d'infanterie, conseiller du collègue Kopitowsky, qui aura soin d'établir une ambulance.

8. Les caissons d'infanterie, 4 par régiment, devront, ainsi que les 2-ème et 3-ème caissons d'artillerie, suivre les réserves générales du détachement.

9. Les musiciens resteront à leur place accoutumée, mais sans instruments.

10. Par ordre de Son Altesse le commandant en chef, l'ambulance du détachement sera à Sébastopol.

Ordre du jour du Lieutenant-Général Pavlow, pour la Disposition de ses Troupes.

Demain ^{24 Octobre}_{5 Novembre}, le détachement dont le commandement m'a été confié se mettra en marche à 2 heures $\frac{1}{2}$ de la nuit, et se dirigera vers le pont d'Inkermann, dans l'ordre suivant :

1. Deux compagnies du 4-ème bataillon de tirailleurs.
2. Le régiment d'Okhotsk.

¹ Les régiments de Boutirsk, d'Ouglitch, de Sousdal, et de la Wladimir.

3. Le régiment de Borodino.
4. " de Taroutino.
5. La batterie de position n° 3 de la 17-ème brigade d'artillerie.
6. Le régiment de Iakoutsk.
7. La batterie de position n° 3 de la 11-ème brigade d'artillerie.
8. Le régiment de Séleghinsk.

Réserve de combat :

1. La batterie de position n° 1 de la 10-ème brigade d'artillerie.
2. Les batteries légères n°s 1 et 2 de la 10-ème brigade d'artillerie.
3. Les batteries légères n°s 3 et 4 de la 11-ème brigade d'artillerie.

Les carabiniers de la 2-ème brigade marcheront derrière le régiment d'Okhotsk, et ceux de la 1-ère brigade, derrière le régiment de Iakoutsk.

Les caissons d'infanterie suivront le détachement, jusqu'à l'endroit indiqué pour l'établissement de l'ambulance ; là ils dévieront à gauche pour se disposer dans le ravin ; chaque régiment enverra un officier près de ses caissons. Le caisson contenant les cartouches de carabines, suivra derrière le régiment de Séleghinsk.

L'ambulance s'installera près de la fontaine, à deux verstes du pont d'Inkermann.

Le train des équipages restera où il se trouve actuellement.¹ Après avoir traversé le pont, les troupes confiées à mon commandement, *iront vivement opérer leur jonction avec celles du lieutenant-général Soïmonow*, qui attaquera du côté du ravin du Carénage. Le but est de s'emparer des hauteurs occupées par l'ennemi, et de s'y affermir.

Toute l'artillerie de mon détachement sera commandée par le commandant de la 11-ème brigade d'artillerie, général-major Vdovitchenko.

Disposition faite par le Général d'infanterie Prince Gortchakow.

Quand les forces principales attaqueront du côté de Sébastopol, les troupes rassemblées près de Tchorgoune effectueront un mouvement, dans le but de détourner une partie des forces ennemies et d'empêcher le détachement ennemi concentré à Kadikoï de porter secours à ses troupes, disposées devant Sébastopol.

A cet effet, le mouvement en avant sera exécuté dans l'ordre suivant :

1. Trois bataillons du régiment d'Odessa avec 8 bouches à feu de la batterie légère n° 7 et 4 pièces de la batterie de position n° 4, après être descendus de la position occupée par eux sur la montagne, se dirigeront, en allant droit devant eux, sur le mont Sapounè.

2. Deux bataillons du régiment de l'Ukraine et un bataillon de celui d'Odessa, avec 4 pièces de la batterie légère n° 8 sous le commandement du général-major Lévoûtzy, après être descendus dans la vallée, se dirigeront vers le mont Sapounè, ayant leur flanc gauche à peu près vis-à-vis l'église de Kadikoï.

3. Deux bataillons du régiment d'Azow et un bataillon de celui de Dnièpr avec 4 pièces de la batterie légère n° 7, commandés par le général-major Scmiakine, dirigeront leur centre vers cette même église de Kadikoï.

4. La cavalerie passera dans l'intervalle entre les colonnes du régiment de l'Ukraine et celles du régiment d'Odessa, ayant à son centre deux batteries de position à cheval et sur chacun de ses flancs un régiment de dragons.

Le régiment de dragons de S. A. I. le grand-duc Héritier et le régiment de hussards du duc de Leuchtenberg, qui se trouveront sur le flanc droit près du pont de pierre, avec 4 bouches à feu de la batterie n° 3, des cosaques du Don,

¹ C'est-à-dire sur les hauteurs d'Inkermann [*i. e.*, the 'Old City Heights'].

et la batterie n° 12, se transporteront sur les lieux indiqués près du gué, pour renforcer le flanc droit du régiment d'Odessa; ces régiments doivent aussi être préparés à marcher sur Inkermann, dans le cas où le général Dannenberg après s'être emparé des hauteurs situées en face, demanderait leur concours.

Les troupes se tiendront prêtes pour 6 heures du matin.¹

Ordre du jour relatif aux Troupes de la Garnison de Sébastopol,
pour le ^{24 Octobre}_{5 Novembre} 1854.

1. Par suite des dispositions générales concernant l'armée de Crimée, les troupes ci-après désignées, en garnison à Sébastopol, sont destinées à attaquer l'ennemi: les régiments de Wladimir, d'Ekatérinebourg, de Tomsk, et de Kolivansk avec les batteries légères n°s 4 et 5 de la 17-ème brigade d'artillerie, la batterie de position n° 1 de la 10-ème brigade, et la batterie de position n° 2 de la 16-ème brigade.

2. Ces troupes sont, dès ce moment, placées sous le commandement du général Soïmonow et ont leurs ordres à recevoir de lui.

3. Toutes les troupes qui restent à Sébastopol occuperont les emplacements qui leur ont été assignés par la disposition du ^{20 Octobre}_{1 Novembre}, sauf les modifications suivantes:

a Le bataillon du cosaques n° 8 quittera le bastion n° 1 et occupera l'emplacement d'un des bataillons du régiment de Boutirsk.

b Le régiment de Tobolsk occupera les emplacements abandonnés par les bataillons d'Ekatérinebourg sur la deuxième section de l'enceinte fortifiée.

4. Les batteries des 3-ème et 4-ème sections de la ligne de défense contribueront par leur feu à l'attaque de nos troupes et protégeront leur flanc droit en tirant sur l'ennemi aussitôt qu'il sera à portée de ces batteries, et sans se préoccuper du feu des batteries de siège.

5. Dans le cas où les troupes chargées de protéger les batteries françaises paraîtraient considérablement affaiblies, et où l'on y apercevrait du désordre, les régiments de Minsk et de Tobolsk, appuyés de douze pièces légères, se tiendront prêts à effectuer une sortie du bastion n° 6, sous le commandement du général Timoféïew, dans le but de s'emparer des batteries ennemies par le flanc gauche.

Un ordre spécial sera donné par moi pour ce mouvement; jusque là le régiment de Tobolsk ne quittera pas la ligne de défense.

DANNENBERG'S DIRECTIONS.

Dispositions relatives aux détachements des généraux Soïmonow et Pavlow réglées par le Général d'infanterie Dannenberg, dans son état-major.

D'après le plan qui en fut dressé, les régiments de Kolivansk, de Tomsk, et d'Ekatérinebourg reçurent l'ordre de quitter Sébastopol à deux heures de la nuit, et de se diriger vers le point où les troupes qui devaient traverser la

¹ This 'Disposition,' it will be observed, is inconsistent with the plan enjoined by Prince Mentschikoff's General Order, and also with what I state to be the real instructions ultimately given to Gortchakoff: for in Russian topography the words 'sur Inkermann' imported a march toward the site of the ancient city. It is very evident that on the eve of the action the ideas of most of these Russian commanders were in a confused and shifting state, General Soïmonoff's written plan of operations being the only one destined to receive its fulfillment; but considering what might be possibly discovered and reported by an efficient spy or deserter, it seems not improbable that the difference between the orders ostensibly given to Gortchakoff and the task which was really assigned to him may have been intentional.

Tchernaya trouveraient le plus de facilité pour effectuer ce passage. Ces régiments soutenus par la batterie de position n° 2 de la dixième brigade d'artillerie devaient se former en ordre de bataille, les Chasseurs rangés en ligne de combat, et le régiment d'Ekatérinebourg en réserve. Ces troupes seraient suivies par celles de la colonne du général Soïmonow qui se rangeraient en ordre de bataille à droite de la 10-ème division d'infanterie.

Quand la 10-ème division aurait déjà couvert le passage de la Tchernaya, c'est alors que les régiments de la colonne du général Pavlow devaient commencer à effectuer ce passage. Les régiments d'Okhotsk, de Iâkoutsk, et de Sélinghinsk avec deux batteries de position des 10-ème et 11-ème brigades d'artillerie devaient suivre la route des sapeurs et se disposer en ordre de réserve en arrière de l'intervalle laissée libre entre les 10-ème et 16-ème divisions de la colonne du général Soïmonow. Les chariots chargés de gabions devaient marcher à la suite de la 11-ème division, et après eux la 2-ème brigade de la 17-ème division d'infanterie et tout le reste de l'artillerie.

Le but de l'entreprise ainsi qu'il était dit dans le libellé du plan de la bataille, était de rejeter au delà de la ville l'aile droite de l'ennemi et de se retrancher sur le terrain qu'il occupait entre la ville et le rivage.¹

Prescriptions du Général d'infanterie Dannenberg, du ^{24 Octobre} ~~4 Novembre~~ *1854,*
n° 1521, au Lieutenant-général Soïmonow.

Comme durant la marche en avant des colonnes, le long de la berge gauche du ravin du Carénage, elles pourraient tomber sous le feu des batteries de siège anglaises, avant que vous ne fussiez à une hauteur égale à celle de ces batteries, il me semble utile de commencer votre mouvement en partant du mamelon Malakhow une heure plus tôt qu'il n'a été prescrit, c'est-à-dire à 5 heures, pour pouvoir franchir, encore avant l'aube, la partie du terrain qui offre des dangers pour la marche. Il me semble aussi utile que vous ayez les réserves générales des troupes qui vous ont été confiées, derrière votre droite; car votre *flanc gauche sera parfaitement couvert par le ravin du Carénage et la coopération des troupes qui se traverseront la Tchernaya.*

Rapport du Commandant du 4-ème corps d'infanterie, Général d'infanterie Dannenberg, adressé le ^{23 Octobre} ~~4 Novembre~~ *1854, sous le n° 1522, à l'aide-de-camp Général Prince Menchikow, Commandant en chef des forces de terre et de mer en Crimée.*

J'ai hâte de soumettre à Votre Altesse quelques changements, que j'ai trouvé urgent de faire, dans la disposition que m'a communiquée le lieutenant-général Pavlow, par les considérations suivantes :

Un ravin profond et très long, connu sous le nom de ravin du Carénage, nous sépare, le général Soïmonow et moi, au commencement de l'attaque. Ce ravin peut être franchi en traversant une route construite récemment, mais qui conduit seulement dans la direction où doit agir la colonne de droite; nous serions ainsi privés de la possibilité d'agir des deux côtés du ravin du Carénage, et cette double action me semble indispensable. En outre, le terrain sur la berge droite du ravin du Carénage est assez difficile, les forces de l'ennemi et leur disposition ne nous sont connues qu'incomplètement, et les chemins que prennent leur point de départ de l'endroit où sera traversée la rivière sont si étroits que chaque mouvement rétrograde, nécessité par quelque circonstance imprévue, ne pourrait s'effectuer qu'avec des difficultés extrêmes et une grande perte de temps.

Guidé par ces considérations, j'ai fait les dispositions suivantes : j'ai en-

¹ Todleben, pp. 450, 451.

joint au général Pavlow, d'amener les troupes de sa colonne à 5 heures du matin dans l'ordre suivant: le régiment d'Okhotsk; deux compagnies du 4-ème bataillon de tirailleurs; les régiments de Borodino et de Taroutino; 8 pièces de position de la 18-ème brigade d'artillerie, et le régiment de Sélinghinsk. Ces troupes doivent être suivies par les batteries restantes, qui composeront l'artillerie de réserve. A l'arrivée de ces troupes sur le lieu où doit s'effectuer le passage de la rivière, 100 carabiniers-volontaires s'embarquent dans une chaloupe pour protéger les travaux de réparation du pont. Ces travaux terminés, le pont est traversé par le régiment de chasseurs d'Okhotsk, qui se fraye un chemin à droite le long de la nouvelle route des sapeurs. Ce régiment est suivi par deux compagnies du 4-ème bataillon de tirailleurs, qui, après avoir été renforcées par le régiment de chasseurs de Borodino, traversent deux ravins; enfin le régiment de chasseurs de Taroutino, après avoir effectué le passage de la rivière, tourne à gauche et suit la vieille route postale. Les régiments de chasseurs, après avoir atteint le sommet de la montagne, et signalé les chemins les plus aisément praticables pour l'artillerie, s'arrêtent et protègent le mouvement des autres troupes. La marche ultérieure de l'affaire dépendra des circonstances mêmes. Dans le cas où les 12 bataillons de chasseurs auraient rencontré l'ennemi en forces supérieures ce qui n'est guères probable, ces bataillons ont l'ordre de descendre vers la baie, pendant que les hauteurs du rivage seront battues par les vapeurs *la Chersonèse* et le *Wladimir*, en supposant toutefois que ce dernier reçoive l'ordre de s'approcher pour donner son concours en cette occurrence. Il me semble aussi que la colonne du lieutenant-général Soïmonow pourrait être exposée au feu des batteries de siège anglaises au début de sa marche, et, pour cette raison j'ai ordonné au général Soïmonow de commencer l'action une heure plus tôt.

VII.

TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBERS OF THE 2ND DIVISION OUT ON PICKET OR SKIRMISHING AS PICKET-SUPPORTS, AND COMPUTING APPROXIMATELY THE NUMBER OF COLLECTED TROOPS REMAINING AVAILABLE FOR THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE FIGHT.

Pickets (each one company) furnished in ordinary course by the 2nd Division on the 5th of November.....	450
Two additional companies of the 55th understood to have been sent out skirmishing to the line of the pickets from the same regiment ¹	108
One wing of the 30th (<i>not</i> the one with which Colonel Mauleverer acted in person) sent out skirmishing in support of the pickets	204
Total of picket force and skirmishers supporting them.....	792
Total strength of 2nd Division.....	2956
Deduct pickets and skirmishers as above.....	792
Total strength of troops not on picket, or sent out as skirmishers..	2164
Deduct 2nd Division troops placed to guard the left rear—viz., wing of 47th, 235; and wing of 49th, 245.....	530
Total of collected troops which, <i>if no casualties had occurred</i> in the mean time, would have remained to encounter the attack on Penfather's centre and right	1634

¹ The main body of the 55th, after the reductions which it sustained, was generally spoken of as a mere 'remnant,' with a strength estimated at only 'about 100.' In these circumstances, I have ventured to infer that the extra draft made from the regiment comprised two companies.

This force was reduced by the effects of the fighting to perhaps about 1400; and one half of what thus remained went fighting out in the front, but the other half was for some time retained on Home Ridge. At length, however, the 95th, in two separate bodies, was pushed forward, and then the number of Pennefather's organized infantry still left on the Home Ridge became reduced to less than 400.

VIII.

LIEUTENANT, NOW COLONEL, M'DONALD, ADJUTANT OF THE 95TH
AT INKERMAN.

When Lieutenant M'Donald fell wounded, a soldier came up and disengaged him from his horse, and seated him with his face toward the body of Russian troops then approaching, and his back supported by a bush.¹ The man wished to remain with him, but M'Donald said No; and when the man still persisted, M'Donald *ordered* him to retreat, and was then left sitting alone. When the Russians approached, they fired at him a great number of shots, and several struck him, but many more struck only his outer coat. Presently the Russians, seeing that he was not dead, came up close and began prodding at him with their bayonets. He says he did not feel the pain of the thrusts, but he confirms the experience which gives rise to the expression 'cold steel.' He managed to raise himself on one leg, and make signs that he was a wounded man, but without effect, and he continued to receive bayonet-thrusts. He used his fists against some of the assailants, and for the moment not quite ineffectually, but soon he was again prostrate. When he was down, the Russians continued to poke at him with their bayonets, and now also they banged him with the butt-ends of their muskets. He at length became senseless, and the next thing he recognized was the sound of English voices. He heard the soldiers say that 'the poor fellow was done for,' and had not yet the strength to contradict them by either voice or sign. To find out whether he was really dead or not, they lifted up his body and then banged it down heavily on the ground. They then saw that he was alive, and before long he was able to speak. They carried him off the field; and when I saw him many years afterward (in 1869) he was, as I understood, in perfectly good health! Several of the bayonet-thrusts he received were in the sides and elsewhere in the trunk, and one was quite close to the stomach. He says that after recovering his consciousness he became impressed with an idea that, in spite of all he had undergone, he was destined to live through the danger. He speaks with no savageness of his assailants, and is quite ready to make full allowance for the excesses of a soldiery excited and fighting in brush-wood.

¹ The Russian force was apparently that Iäkouts'k battalion which, as shown in the text, had marched up unopposed through the 'Gap.'

IX.

APPROXIMATE COMPUTATION OF ALLIED INFANTRY ON MOUNT INKERMAN WHICH WAS STILL IN AN ORGANIZED STATE AT THE OPENING OF THE THIRD PERIOD.

On the right and right front.

The 'hay picket,' the remains of Champion's wing of 95th, of right wing of Horsford's Rifle battalion, and of Captain Wilson's Coldstream men; altogether, it is believed, about	250	
French 6th of the Line.....	750	
		1000

On the left, watching the Careenage Ravine and the Mikriakoff Glen.

Lord West's wing of 21st, Prince Edward's Company, the remains of the 88th companies, of Fordyce's wing of the 47th, and of Grant's wing of the 49th; altogether, about.....		1000
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Fighting out in front of the Home Ridge.

Remains of wing of 20th, under Horn, say	140	
" of the 30th, say	200	
" of Hume's wing of 95th, say.....	150	
" of left wing of Rifle battalion, say	110	
		600

On or near the Home Ridge.

Remains of Upton's two companies of the Guards, say	120	
" of 51th, say.....	170	
" of 55th, say.....	100	
" of right wing of 47th, say	200	
" of Egerton's 77th wing (now approaching Home Ridge), say...	200	
63rd Regiment (fresh).....	466	
Right wing of 21st (fresh)	201	
French 7th L��ger (fresh)	908	
		— say 2400

Total French and English infantry..... 5000

Of these 5000, 3000 only were on what was about to be the fighting ground during the Third Period; and of those 3000, 908 were French, and the rest English. There was, besides, a 'truant body of Zouaves,' of which I can not give the strength farther than by saying that Pennefather computed the number of those Zouaves who fought under his eye at 'about sixty.'

X.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL PENNEFATHER'S REPORT TO THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, DATED THE 6TH OCTOBER (MEANING NOVEMBER), 1854.

'And now heavy columns of Russian infantry pressed forward up the hill 'both to the left of our position and by the road leading to its crest; and 'here, I assure you, we should have hardly held our ground but for the timely arrival of two battalions of French infantry at the very crisis of the battle, who,¹ forming in two lines, and joined on their left by a portion of the '57th Regiment, after a momentary halt, cheered and charged the enemy, 'forcing them down the hill with fire and steel with considerable slaughter, 'aided by some of our guns in advance on our right, who plied the left flank 'of the Russians with good effect.'

¹ In the part of the sentence which follows this word the General refers to what was only one battalion, though certainly a very strong one—i. e., to the 7th L  ger, numbering 908 men.

XI.

AUTHORITIES SHOWING THE TIME WHEN THE FRENCH INFANTRY
CEASED TO TAKE PART IN THE BATTLE.

After describing the defeat of the Selinghinsk battalions, narrated *ante*, p. 275, the official Atlas de la Guerre d'Orient says, 'Il est environ 11 heures;' and thenceforth it mentions nothing done by any French infantry until 3 o'clock in the afternoon. It says, 'Depuis l'arrivée des français le lt.-gé-
'néral Dannenberg s'est décidé de battre en retraite.' [This was not the case.] 'A partir de onze heures, ses troupes n'ont fait aucun mouvement
'offensif. Le combat a continué de loin à coups de fusil et à coups de
'canon.'

Fay, A.D.C. to Bosquet, and a very good authority upon matters of fact coming under his observation, says, 'Dès 11 heures la bataille était évidem-
'ment gagnée, car l'ennemi sans paraître se retirer encore, avait cessé tout
'mouvement offensif.'

In the statement of fact, which I have distinguished by italics, Fay is perfectly accurate, being wrong only in going on to infer that *therefore* the battle was gained. Both the Russians and the French¹ abandoned the offensive at 11 o'clock; but the English continued the battle against an enemy who stood firm on the defensive for two hours more, *i. e.*, until about one o'clock.

Upon this point the Russian authorities are in perfect accord with our people.

XII.

'BITING THE DUST' IN DEATH.

It would seem that this muscular action is apt to occur when a man has been arrested by death in the act of strenuous bodily exertion; and no doubt an artillery-man, whilst hotly engaged and vehemently serving his gun, must in general be much harder at work than an infantry soldier busied with his firelock. In ancient times a large proportion of the slain were killed in the act of exerting their strength to the utmost, and then it was that 'biting the
'dust' became almost an equivalent for being killed in battle. However hotly engaged, a modern infantry soldier does not commonly exert, whilst halted, any great amount of physical strength, and the instances in which he literally 'bites the dust' are comparatively rare.

XIII.

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE ENEMY'S RETREAT.

'Bientôt le feu meurtrier de l'artillerie ennemie nous contraignit à faire re-
'traite sur la ville.'—*Dannenberg's Dispatch*. That the statement referred to the 18-pounders is apparently certain; for, apart from the power of those two guns, the Allies were grievously inferior to the enemy in the artillery arm. Indeed, Mentschikoff in his dispatch² gave the required point to Dan-

¹ The Russians continued their attacks on the Barrier long after 11 o'clock; but those attacks, as shown in the text, had a defensive purpose, and are not, therefore, inconsistent with the statement that the enemy abandoned the offensive at 11 o'clock.

² Quoted *ante*, note, p. 281.

nenberg's general expression, and distinctly ascribed the irresistibly coercive power of the allies to the 'siege artillery' brought up by the English—*i. e.*, to the two 18-pounders. Dannenberg does not mention any pressure from infantry at this juncture; but that omission is quite consistent with the above surmise, for it is not at all probable that he could have seen the few soldiery who worked their way up through brush-wood to assail the battery, and to him it would seem that the battery was succumbing to the fire of the 18-pounders alone. The discomfiture sustained by this particular battery was made specially signal, and to a Russian observer distressing, by the fact that, in order to carry off the dismounted gun, numbers of men were brought to the spot, and there kept under fire until the task had been accomplished. All these considerations tend to support the surmise that the discomfiture of the battery in question dealt the final blow which overcame Dannenberg's resistance.

XIV.

NOMINAL RETURN OF OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED AT INKERMAN.

*Nominal Return of Officers Killed at the Battle of Inkerman,
November 5, 1854.*

Cavalry Division.

17th Lancers.—Cornet Archd. Cleveland.

Royal Artillery.—Brigadier-General T. Fox Strangways; Major P. Townsend.

1st Division.

Staff.—Captain H. T. Butler, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards.—Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. Packenham; Captain Sir R. L. Newman, Bart.; Captain Honorable H. A. Neville.

1st Battalion Coldstream Guards.—Lieutenant-Colonel Honorable T. V. Dawson; Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Cowell; Captain Honorable G. C. C. Eliot; Captain F. H. Ramsden; Captain L. D. Mackinnon; Captain H. M. Bouverie; Lieutenant C. H. Greville; Lieutenant E. A. Disbrowe.

1st Battalion Scots Fusilier Guards.—Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Blair.

2nd Division.

Staff.—Captain W. K. Allix.

30th Regiment.—Captain A. Conolly; Lieutenant A. Gibson.

41st Regiment.—Lieutenant-Colonel G. Carpenter; Captain E. Richards; Lieutenant A. Taylor; Lieutenant J. W. Swaby; Lieutenant J. Stirling.

49th Regiment.—Major T. N. Dalton; Lieutenant A. S. Armstrong.

3rd Division.

50th Regiment.—Lieutenant W. G. Dashwood.

4th Division.

Staff.—Lieutenant-General Sir George Cathcart, K.C.B.; Brigadier-General T. L. Goldie; Lieutenant-Colonel C. T. Seymour, Assistant Adjutant-General.

20th Regiment.—Lieutenant W. H. Dowling.

21st Regiment.—Lieutenant H. F. E. Hurl.

57th Regiment.—Captain E. Stanley.

63rd Regiment.—Lieutenant-Colonel E. S. T. Swyny; Lieutenant G. C. W. Cartois; Ensign J. H. Clutterbuck.

65th Regiment.—Major H. G. Wynne; Lieutenant F. G. Barker.

1st Battalion Rifle Brigade.—Captain A. A. Cartwright.

Light Division.

33rd Regiment.—Lieutenant Henry Thorold.

19th Regiment.—Captain James Ker.

77th Regiment.—Captain J. Nicholson.

2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade.—Lieutenant L. W. Malcom.

J. B. BUCKNALL ESTCOURT, *Adjutant-General.*

*Nominal Return of Officers Wounded at the Battle of Inkerman,
November 5, 1854.*

Royal Artillery.—Lieutenant-Colonel G. Gambier, slightly; Captain and Adjutant J. F. L. Baddeley, severely; Captain G. Tupper, slightly; Captain C. H. Ingilby, severely.

1st Division.

Staff.—Major-General H. J. W. Bentinck, slightly; Captain T. H. Clifton, A.D.C., slightly.

3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards.—Colonel F. W. Hamilton, slightly; Lieutenant-Colonel R. Bradford, slightly; Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. H. Percy, slightly; Captain A. Tipping, severely; Lieutenant Sir J. Ferguson, Bart., slightly; Lieutenant C. N. Sturt, severely.

1st Battalion Coldstream Guards.—Lieutenant-Colonel J. Halkett, severely; Lieutenant-Colonel Lord A. C. L. Fitzroy, severely; Colonel Hon. G. Upton, slightly; Captain Hon. P. Fielding, severely; Lieutenant Hon. W. A. Amherst, severely.

3rd Battalion Scots Fusileer Guards.—Colonel E. W. F. Walker, severely; Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Seymour, slightly; Captain G. T. F. Shuckburgh, severely; Captain R. Gipps, severely; Captain F. Baring, slightly; Lieutenant S. J. Blane, slightly; Captain and Adjutant H. Drummond, severely; Assistant-Surgeon A. G. Elington, slightly.

2nd Division.

Staff.—Brigadier-General H. W. Adams, mortally; Captain J. Gubbins, A.D.C., severely; Captain C. Adams, A.D.C., slightly; Captain A. M'Donald, A.D.C., slightly; Captain F. P. Harding, A.D.C., severely.

30th Regiment.—Major J. T. Mauleverer, severely; Captain J. Rose, severely; Captain G. Dickson, slightly; Captain P. Bayley, severely; Lieutenant J. D. Ross Lewin, dangerously.

41st Regiment.—Captain H. W. Meredith, slightly; Captain Hugh Rowlands, slightly; Captain F. C. Bligh, slightly; Lieutenant H. S. Bush, severely; Lieutenant G. R. Fitzroy, severely; Lieutenant and Adjutant W. Johnston, slightly.

47th Regiment.—Lieutenant-Colonel W. O'G. Haly, severely; Ensign G. Waddilove, slightly.

55th Regiment.—Lieutenant-Colonel C. Warren, C.B., severely; Brevet-Colonel H. C. B. Daubeney, slightly; Lieutenant J. R. Hume, severely; Lieutenant W. Barnston, severely; Lieutenant G. A. Morgan, slightly.

95th Regiment.—Major J. G. Champion, mortally; Major H. Hume, slightly; Captain G. C. Vialls, slightly; Lieutenant A. J. J. M'Donald, dangerously.

3rd Division.

50th Regiment.—Captain H. J. Frampton, slightly.

4th Division.

Staff.—Brigadier-General H. W. Torrens, mortally; Brevet-Major C. L. B. Maitland, D.A.A.G., severely; Lieutenant H. D. Torrens, A.D.C., slightly.

20th Regiment.—Colonel F. Horn, slightly; Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel H. D. Crofton, severely; Brevet-Major J. B. Sharpe, severely; Captain W. T. Wood, slightly; Captain C. R. Butler, severely; Lieutenant G. Bennett, severely; Lieutenant and Adjutant F. Padfield, slightly; Ensign L. Kekewich, slightly.

21st Regiment.—Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Ainslie, mortally; Captain G. W. Boldero, severely; Lieutenant A. Templeman, slightly; Lieutenant H. King, severely; Lieutenant R. Killeen, slightly; Lieutenant R. Stephens, severely.

57th Regiment.—Captain J. F. Bland, mortally; Lieutenant G. W. Hague, dangerously; Lieutenant C. Venables, slightly.

63rd Regiment.—Captain Thomas Harries, slightly; Captain C. E. Fairtlough, slightly; Lieutenant T. Johns, slightly; Lieutenant W. H. Newhenham, slightly; Ensign H. T. Tysden, severely; Ensign T. K. Morgan, severely; Lieutenant and Adjutant R. Bennett, severely.

68th Regiment.—Major Harry Smith, dangerously; Lieutenant J. Cator, dangerously.

46th Regiment.—Captain W. Hardy, severely; Ensign E. H. Hellier, slightly.

1st Battalion Rifle Brigade.—Major E. Rooper, severely; Lieutenant Coote Buller, slightly; Lieutenant C. S. Flower, slightly.

Light Division.

Staff.—Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown, K.C.B., severely.

7th Regiment.—Major Sir T. Trounbridge, Bart., severely; Captain R. Y. Shipley, severely; Lieutenant H. W. P. Butler, severely; Captain E. H. Rose, slightly; Ensign L. J. F. Jones, slightly.

23rd Regiment.—Lieutenant T. F. Vane, slightly; Lieutenant J. Duff, missing.

33rd Regiment.—Lieutenant F. Corbett, slightly; Ensign J. Owens, dangerously.

88th Regiment.—Captain J. G. Crosse, slightly; Lieutenant H. J. Baynes, severely;

Lieutenant-Colonel E. R. Jeffreys, slightly.

2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade.—Captain E. Newdigate, slightly.

Royal Marines.—Captain W. H. March.

J. B. BUCKNALL ESTCOURT, *Adjutant-General*.

XV.

NOTE BY GENERAL CANROBERT READ AT THE MEETING OF THE ALLIED GENERALS ON THE 7TH OF NOVEMBER, 1854.

Lorsque les généraux en chef des armées alliées les ont amenés en Crimée ils avaient basé leur grande entreprise sur trois probabilités: 1°, sur la facilité du débarquement; 2°, sur le nombre peu considérable de troupes Russes en Crimée; 3°, sur la possibilité d'entrer rapidement dans une ville qui fortifiée d'une manière formidable du côté de la mer était loin de passer pour avoir des défenses redoutables du côté de la terre.

De ces trois probabilités qui ont été les raisons déterminantes de l'expédition deux, la première et la deuxième, sont heureusement et glorieusement devenues des faits accomplis: il n'en a pas été de même de la troisième qui a présenté jusqu'à ce jour, et présente encore les difficultés d'attaque et de défense qu'il n'était guère permis de prévoir: ces difficultés doivent être surmontées soit par un acte de vigueur éclatant s'il est humainement possible de le tenter avec des chances de succès, soit par un attermoisement qui tout en nous laissant l'ascendant moral que nous avons pris sur l'ennemi permettrait aux armées alliées d'attendre avec sécurité les renforts qui leur sont devenus nécessaires soit pour combler les vides laissés dans leur rangs par les combats et les maladies que, pour élever leur effectif au point qu'il est raisonnable d'attendre pour faire faces aux circonstances que vient compliquer l'arrivée inattendue d'une partie de l'armée du Danube. Il s'agit de prendre en conséquence une prompte décision.—Indorsement in Lord Raglan's handwriting: '*Private note of General Canrobert read at a meeting on the 7th of November, 1854.*'

XVI.

THE AUTHOR'S AUTHORITY FOR THE NUMBERS WHICH HE STATES TO HAVE BEEN PRESENT AT INKERMEN.

Amongst our officers present in the battle, there prevails, I believe, an impression that the numbers assigned to the Russians by the great official work published under the auspices of General de Todleben have been much understated; and I must acknowledge that I have felt a good deal of difficulty in reconciling the assertions there made with the great show of numerical strength which the enemy found means to make in the Third Period of the action; but, on the other hand, I repose confidence in the good faith of the illustrious soldier who has allowed this work to appear under the ægis of his name; and, upon the whole, I have come to the conclusion that, instead of asking the reader to contemplate the assaults of legions indefinitely vast, I shall do well to accept the basis afforded me by statements which are not only official, but supported in the face of Europe by the General's deliberate sanction. I of course permit myself to correct the little errors which I find made through mere inadvertence in one or two places; and I also call attention to

the fact that in a part of the field where General de Todleben places no troops at all there was that heavy body of men—drilled seamen, perhaps, or marines—which I have called the ‘Under-road Column;’ but subject to these slight qualifications, I adopt all those statements of the Russian numbers at Inkerman which are sanctioned by the General’s authority.

And, after all, the disparity that there was between the Russian and the English numbers remains sufficiently wonderful.

As regards the numbers of the English engaged in the battle, there was not that facility for coming to a conclusion which is afforded by a glance at the ‘Morning State;’ for, excepting only Pennefather’s force (which was attacked, so to speak, at its own home), every English division affording troops for the battle had also duties elsewhere which could not be neglected. The Guards had, perforce, to maintain an extensive system of pickets on an unattacked part of the ground; and at the Inkerman time, the 3rd, the 4th, and the Light Divisions were all of them providing men for the trenches.

Under such conditions it was not, of course, sufficient to know the strength of the ‘effectives’ on the morning of the 5th of November; for one had to learn also how many of them were actually marched off from their camps to the field of battle.

I am glad to be able to say that as regards this last matter I have been able to attain to what—though foreigners may question it—my fellow-countrymen will regard as certainty. Every statement that I make of the English numbers present at Inkerman rests, I may say, upon the personal assurance, and therefore upon the personal honor, of an English officer. To say this is, as I think, enough; but I will make myself guilty of a little supererogation, and add that every officer on whom I thus rely is, or was in his lifetime, a man of high distinction.

This will be presently made evident by a simple statement of the names; but as respects the strength of the Guards at Inkerman it becomes me to speak separately.

Upon that subject—and it was one involving some little complexity—his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge graciously permitted me to communicate with him; and not only aided me by the resources of his personal knowledge, but also by obtaining the aid of Colonel Stephenson and other officers of the Guards.

The sources on which I rely for the strength of the English forces engaged at Inkerman will now be given as under:

FORCE OF WHICH THE NUMBER IS STATED.		AUTHORITY FOR THE STATEMENT.
1st Division. The Guards.....		Colonel Stephenson, acting under the special directions of H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge, who commanded the Division at Inkerman, and afterward became Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards.
2nd Division.....		General Sir John Pennefather, who commanded the Division at Inkerman.
3rd Division.....		General Sir Richard England, who commanded the Division at Inkerman.
4th Division.	20th Regiment.....	General Sir Frederick Horn, who commanded the regiment at Inkerman.
	21st Fusileers.....	Colonel Ramsay Stuart, who succeeded to the command of the regiment at Inkerman.
	57th Regiment.....	Colonel Inglis, who succeeded to the command of the regiment at Inkerman.
	1st Rifle Battalion.....	Sir Alfred Horsford, who commanded the battalion at Inkerman.
	63rd Regiment.....	Colonel Dalzell, who succeeded to the command of the regiment at Inkerman.
	Companies of the 46th and 68th Regiments.....	The late General Sir Chas. Windham, A.Q.M.G., attached to the 4th Division at Inkerman.

FORCE OF WHICH THE NUMBER IS STATED.	AUTHORITY FOR THE STATEMENT.
1st Brigade of Light Division, including the Marines, temporarily attached to it.....	General Sir Wm. Codrington, who commanded the brigade at Inkerman.
Portion of the 2nd Brigade Light Division, which was brought into action at Inkerman by General Buller	
	Report made on the 6th of November, 1854, by General, now General Sir George Buller, to General Codrington, then commanding the Light Division.

With respect to the numbers of the French troops I have followed the 'Official Atlas de la Guerre d'Orient;' and in giving the strength of the battalions which Bosquet brought to Mount Inkerman, I have been careful to make proper deductions in respect of the men out on picket.

END OF VOL. III.

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